James Lovelock is a distinguished, if maverick, scientist (he describes himself as a scientist-inventor) whose many original research contributions have been massively out-cited by his Gaia hypothesis/theory that he introduced in his sixties and has done much to promote in the last thirty-five years, winning him a wide range of high honours. In A Rough Ride to the Future, published in his ninety-fifth year, he both reflects on a long and productive life in science and considers the future: Gaia is at the core of everything he says, but – as he makes clear from the outset – it is not a book about Gaia.
Bracketed by an introduction – ‘What this book is about’ – and conclusion – ‘So what was it all about?’ – the book comprises a series of loosely connected essays on: ‘The lone practice of science’, ‘How invention accelerated evolution’, ‘Gaia and its consequences’, ‘Climate science’, ‘Can we stop climate change?’, ‘The evolution of the city’, ‘Myths of environmentalism, and their consequences’ and ‘Human nature and tribalism’. Lovelock emerges as an optimist about humanity's future on earth, though, as the book's title suggests, sustaining it will not be straightforward ‒ some of his future scenarios may not be acceptable to many.
At the outset, he argues that a major change in humans’ relationship with their environment began some 300 years ago when the invention of the steam engine enabled us to release and harness stored energy in the earth and stimulated the industrial revolution. We have since become increasingly more inventive, outpacing evolution by natural selection a million-fold, but that exponential increase in inventiveness, driven he believes by necessity (is there no serendipity? is that why the Americans went to the moon?), has been haphazard. It needs to be both more closely regulated, if human survival is to be guaranteed, and stimulated to ensure no slowing down and development in the right direction (‘If there is a message in this book it is that we are not yet sufficiently intelligent to control or regulate ourselves or the Earth’, p.16) – otherwise Gaia will continue to regulate the earth without us. So how do we prevent that, in the face of the changes that we have already wrought and are increasingly wreaking on the earth – especially, but not only, on its climate?
Lovelocks's answer is to concentrate people even more than is already the case in cities that have been designed for comfortable living because of their very high densities within which climate can be controlled, leaving most of the earth's surface and oceans (about which we know much too little) to very low density occupance. His paradigm is Singapore which he considers ‘one of the most desirable cities to live in’, though his future cities – for which there is no detailed blueprint – would probably not look much like that contemporary city state;Footnote 1 one of its attractions for him is that, following the trend set by Lee Kuan-Yew, Singapore has ‘been dictatorial not democratic’, and he believes that ‘perhaps a similar suspension of democracy will be needed when climate and other changes become as deadly and serious as a major war’ (pp. 119‒20). We cannot, Lovelock believes, ‘save the planet’ that we have already ‘partially disabled’ just by halting (or at least slowing) climate change, as many now argue. Instead, we need a ‘sustainable retreat’ into climate-controlled cities, where we will presumably be governed by an elite dominated – indirectly if not directly – by scientists and engineers (his analogue for this is a termite mound – ‘go to the nest of almost any social insect in the world and discover one of the most enduring aristocracies of all’: p. 154). Lovelock believes in a class-structured society arising from an inbuilt tribalism that ‘is so strongly a part of our natures that there is little chance that a benign education, selective breeding of genetic manipulation can be used to alter it’ (p. 147).
How many will buy that future? How can we test the hypotheses underpinning it before we commit all our futures to such a blueprint? And what if some people, in some places (tribes in Lovelock's terminology) democratically decide on a different path? Can we readily accept a future in which we ‘entirely abandon the absurdly hubristic idea of saving the planet’ (p. 156) even if we could, through ‘intelligent software . . . live 1 million times faster than we [currently] do’, giving us through combining rational thinking with intuition (the former alone is not enough) ‘Time enough to evolve and diversify in the same way as carbon life has done’ (p. 161)?
In his final paragraph, Lovelock, claiming to be an optimist, argues that we may be able to create a future world that is a ‘better place, but getting to there from here will not be easy, and we will not all make the journey’, because for many of us he is a pessimist – ‘The system cannot sustain the present level of human population for very much longer’ (p.169). Perhaps that is not what we – democratically – want, but Lovelock's ideas may at least stimulate (some) to consider deeply what alternatives there are, before others take his ideas too seriously and begin the process of change he promotes.
This argument, very clearly set out – though with some tangents on the way, such as his promotion of the lone scientist/innovator (which he was and wasn’t: many of his scientific papers are co-authored) – and cogently argued on the basis of wide and deep scientific and technical knowledge, is clearly stimulating, as this review has conveyed. But what it should stimulate is debate about future worlds where all of us and our dependents will flourish, not one where a self-defined elite will take over and determine a future for some and none for others.
