In Possibilities of Perception, Jennifer Church offers an account of perception that aims to do three things, any one of which would be an ambitious undertaking on its own. The first is to explain the phenomenological character of perception and its epistemic role in a way that connects the two; as she contends, “other things being equal, accounts that can make sense of the connection are preferable to accounts that do not” (25). The second is to suggest a theory of imagination and argue for its fundamental role in perception. The third is to extend perception beyond sensory experience to the perception of reasons, moral perception (i.e., of the rightness or wrongness of states of affairs), and aesthetic perception (i.e., of artworks qua artworks). In addition to covering these aspects of philosophy of mind, epistemology, moral psychology and aesthetics, Church brings perspectives from phenomenology––mainly Husserl, and to a lesser extent Merleau-Ponty (the latter via secondary sources)––into a discussion primarily situated within contemporary analytic philosophy.
As she aims to connect perception’s apparent capacity to justify beliefs with its phenomenological character, Church bases her account on the felt immediacy of perceptual experience. Instead of taking perceptual beliefs to have justificatory immediacy (arguments against this view are found on pp. 22-24), she explains perception’s felt immediacy in terms of the “experience of objectivity” (11), a notion that becomes central to her account of perception, which is that one perceives something if and only if one experiences it as objective. Church is not saying that perceiving something entails its objectivity––an experience of something’s objectivity may be mistaken, e.g., seeing a mirage––but that perceiving something involves being aware of it as having objective reality, i.e., as existing outside of our perception or consciousness of it; whether it does or not marks the difference between veridical and non-veridical perception. Two things worth noting are the incompatibility of Church’s definition with causal accounts, since it allows one to perceive an X without there being an X, and that it makes no particular reference to sensory experience, which lets her talk of perceiving reasons, moral states of affairs, etc., in later chapters.
Church’s account immediately raises the question of how one can experience a thing’s objectivity in addition to experiencing that thing. Her answer is that we are aware of something as objective through having multiple perspectives on it, e.g., seeing an object from more than one side, leading us to experience it as existing in three-dimensional space, or going through multiple operations with different combinations of numbers to experience the objectivity of a mathematical truth. This seems plausible, since what makes us realize that something is not what we initially perceived it to be, e.g., that what we saw as a door is actually a trompe l’oeil painting, is that we do not get the additional perspectives we expect; we do not feel a door, but only the wall. However, this answer raises another, equally problematic question: how can one be aware of multiple perspectives from within a single perceptual experience?
To answer this, Church turns to a theory of imagination in Chapter 2, arguing that we ‘fill in’ the multiple perspectives required for the experience of objectivity by imagining them along with the perspective(s) we get in a given perceptual experience; e.g., in encountering objects as three-dimensional when at any given moment we only see a two-dimensional ‘presentation’ of them, we imagine them having sides not facing us, and in taking something we hear or touch with our eyes closed to be objective, we imagine that we could see it if we were to open our eyes. While this sort of account of imagination is not new, being found in Kant and Husserl (much of what Church says about imagination comes down to the latter’s idea of eidetic variation), and in Collingwood’s philosophies of art and history, Church nicely addresses a persistent problem for such accounts, that of ‘unconscious imagining’ (i.e., it does not seem that we consciously imagine the backs and sides of everything we see as part of our seeing them). While it is beyond the scope of this review to explicate her solution, it involves both empirical and ‘transcendental’ considerations which, while not proving we unconsciously imagine, makes the idea plausible.
Given Church’s reliance on the imagination to explain perception and to extend her account to perceiving reasons, moral and aesthetic properties, etc., in Chapters 3-6, and her comparative lack of concern with sensory perception, the real focus of her book would seem not to be perception per se so much as imagination and its role in conscious experience. While much conscious experience may involve things perceived sensorily, and while imagination may be necessary for sensory perception, if it is not also taken to be sufficient, the fact that “imagining can play precisely the same role in other domains” (84) does not entail that these domains involve perception proper rather than some other faculty, and so whether the third aspect of Church’s project (Chapters 3-6) actually deals with perception is questionable (though not unanswerable, just unanswered here).
Overall, Possibilities of Perception is a good read, especially for its several clear examples. While Church’s account of perception may only be of limited interest to philosophers of perception whose main concern is with sense perception, and while others who adhere to causal theories of perception are unlikely to be convinced by the account Church offers, her book will be of more interest to anyone concerned with either the imagination and its role in experience or with epistemic, ethical and aesthetic normativity and the connections between them. Also, while they are niche audiences, Church’s book should interest Collingwood scholars for its presentation and defense of a similar theory of imagination to his own, and philosophers of photography/film for its discussion of perceiving remote states of affairs (Chapter 4), which is relevant for the debate surrounding photographic transparency.
