Amitai Etzioni advances arguments about two forms of legitimacy, what I will call empirical legitimacy and substantive legitimacy. Empirical legitimacy is a matter of what people consider to be legitimate. It is assessed through the methods of social science—conducting surveys, for instance. Substantive legitimacy is a matter not of what people happen to think but of what is legitimate in the sense of being just or morally right. Etzioni's argument about empirical legitimacy, namely, that it is shaped through collective processes that involve emotions as well as reason, I find broadly plausible. Then he makes an argument about substantive legitimacy, one that explains how we are to know if an “act” (a term he uses broadly) is truly just or moral. This latter argument I wish to explore further and to raise questions about.
Etzioni asks whether there exists a core set of universal moral values that “can serve as a basis for cross-cultural judgment about which acts are legitimate” (115). The question is highly contested, he admits. But yes, he argues, such values can be identified and established as normative—the prohibition of lying and the duty of stewardship of the earth, for example. How does this identification and establishment take place? The moral rightness of certain values is self-evident, he holds. He explains what “self-evident” means through the metaphor of voice: certain values “speak directly to all human beings, which those who hear their voice find compelling” (116). No rational deliberation is needed to apprehend these values' normativity. But how to explain the world's seemingly great disagreement over morality? Do some people fail to hear the voice? Yes indeed, replies Etzioni, and what causes this failure is the distorting static of political repression, irrational tradition, poverty, and restrictions on information and debate. But this distortion can be eliminated through open, transnational moral dialogue, through which people from diverse cultures and circumstances can come to see and agree upon the self-evident normativity of core universal values.
Notice that Etzioni's argument for substantive legitimacy, that is, for determining what is just and moral, turns out to bear similarities to the determination of empirical legitimacy, that is, the assessment of what people consider to be just and moral. To be sure, he stresses that mere consensus does not establish normativity. The fact that “honor killings” of allegedly adulterous women are widely accepted among many Turks and Pakistanis does not make these killings right. Still, we can know what values are substantively legitimate by looking at what values people find to be self-evident once they have engaged in open moral dialogue. Political scientist Frances Harbour's cross-cultural findings about “primary values” and the fact that virtually every nation recognizes a commitment to reduce global warming both serve as examples of self-evident values that emerge from global conversation.
So Etzioni's argument about substantive legitimacy is something like the following: we can know what is truly legitimate, that is, what is just and morally valid, by observing what values people find to be self-evident, especially those people who live in circumstances characterized by open moral dialogue. By extension, one can infer that if a value has not yet attained the status of being widely accepted in such “zones of openness,” then either it is not substantively legitimate or else open moral dialogue has not yet demonstrated it to be substantively legitimate. By contrast, other theories of universal values—Kantianism, natural law in the Thomist tradition, or utilitarianism, for example—hold that establishing normativity requires something more than self-evidence via dialogue, namely, practical reasoning or moral deliberation. Contrasting still more deeply with Etzioni's view are postmodernism and deconstructionism, which deny universals altogether. What Etzioni advocates is something like intuitionism informed by collective dialogue.
What to make of Etzioni's argument? Do observations of what people who have experienced the moral dialogue of open societies find to be self-evident really tell us what is morally just? Surely they can contribute to judgments about universal moral validity. Philosophers of natural law hold that there are some moral truths that humans “cannot not know.”Footnote 1 If, once distorting social conditions are removed, convergent moral apprehensions shine through, such a view is strengthened.
But there are still reasons to be skeptical that self-evidence—even when formed through dialogue—establishes the substantive legitimacy of values. Etzioni rightly rejects mere consensus as a ground for normativity. Empirical legitimacy does not alone establish substantive legitimacy. But adding self-evidence to consensus does not escape the problem. The fact that a wide swath of people believes values to be self-evidently moral does not make them self-evidently moral. On what grounds does one know that they are not mistaken?
A long tradition of philosophical reasoning about self-evidence dating back at least to Aristotle holds that self-evidence means something more than the fact that everyone holds, accepts, claims, or understands that a value, good, or proposition is true or moral. To be sure, a self-evident value, good, or proposition is one that is not demonstrable. Reason does not derive it from prior premises but rather presupposes it. Aquinas showed that self-evidence could be applied to practical reasoning—deliberations about the ought. But knowing reliably that something is self-evident requires more than observing a widespread perception that something is self-evident. As philosopher John Finnis explains:
That [a principle is self-evident] does not mean that it is understood and accepted, even implicitly, by everyone. If it were understood and accepted by everyone, that fact would be neither ground for inferring the principle nor compelling evidence for its objectivity. Correspondingly, the fact that it is not universally accepted is neither a ground for denying it nor compelling evidence against its objectivity.Footnote 2
What makes a value, good, or proposition self-evident is that its denial is self-refuting. Finnis proposes that we call an argument that shows something to be self-refuting a “retorsive argument.” For instance, argues Finnis, to deny that the truth is a good worth knowing is to assert that it is a truth worth knowing that the truth is not a good worth knowing, a self-contradictory assertion. That the truth is a good worth knowing is self-evident.Footnote 3 But establishing this self-evidence requires an argument, the sort of “deliberations” that Etzioni abjures. Observations of widespread perceptions are not enough.
Another problem with grounding normativity on observations about self-evidence is that they say little about moral claims that rest on more developed forms of practical reasoning, claims that may well run against popular perceptions of self-evidence. Imagine, for instance, an abolitionist who, during an era when slavery is both legal and widely practiced, argues, based on both religious claims and natural law reasoning, that slavery is immoral and ought to be ended. He lives in a land in which few find his claims to be self-evident and finds little help from overseas, either. Yet he believes that slavery is wrong based both on his understanding of divine revelation and on natural reasoning about what human dignity implies—these are his warrants. Some parts of his argument may rely on what he believes to be self-evident—for example, that the person has dignity and cannot be used as a mere means. But the fact that the majority of people around him do not share either his view of what is self-evident or of what revelation and reason show to be the truth about slavery does not move him. The views of others about self-evidence, far from attesting that his views are wrong, are precisely the views that he wants to change. Now it may be the case, following Etzioni's logic, that eventually, through the development of democracy, an open dialogue will yield a widely held view that slavery is unjust. But this possibility, or even its eventual reality, alone does not establish the injustice of slavery. Nor does the lack of such a reality during his own time change the abolitionist's confidence in his views. Popular perceptions of self-evidence do little at all to help us assess the normativity of the abolitionist's beliefs. Rather, normativity rests on more robust forms of reasoning.
Self-evidence is insufficient as a basis for normativity for still another reason. Often controversies over justice revolve not around the validity of basic moral values but over whether exceptions to them exist and what they consist of. Etzioni explains that the norm that lying is wrong is widely viewed as self-evident only when exceptions are made for situations in which telling the truth is quite costly—as when a Nazi knocks on the door asking if one is hiding Jews. Certain highly consequential acts and policies in the political realm, though, have been justified precisely by means of the argument that exigencies demand departures from prohibitions that are normally binding. In the Second World War, the United States and Britain conducted carpet bombing in Japan and Germany respectively, culminating in the dropping of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Involving as it did a direct intention to kill civilians in order to break enemy morale, this bombing contravened the jus gentium regarding behavior during war. Commented General Curtis Lemay, the U.S. architect of these policies, “I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.” Nuclear deterrence, a cornerstone of U.S. and Western European defense policy during the Cold War, arguably rested on a threat that similarly contravened the prohibition against killing innocents.Footnote 4 Both carpet bombing and nuclear deterrence enjoyed widespread popular support. The debate over torture in the United States since September 11 runs similarly. It is likely that most Americans would report that the prima facie wrongness of torture is a value that they straightforwardly hold: no demonstration required. But whether it is justified against terrorism suspects is widely disputed. In all of these cases, wide agreement on the self-evidence of a basic value can be attained only through setting aside controversies over exceptions whose justice is not at all self-evident. Moral theorists have debated whether such exceptions can be justified.Footnote 5 But their debates virtually always involve practical reasoning that far exceeds claims about what is self-evident.
A final problem with self-evidence is one to which Etzioni alludes: open dialogue may well result in profound disagreement about what is self-evident. A possible (and positive) result of open dialogue is a clarification of disagreement, he argues. For example, East Asians and Westerners might come through dialogue to see more clearly their differences in attitudes toward the elderly. The differences between Westerners and East Asian societies, as well as the Islamic world, likely extend further, to attitudes toward family, sexuality, economics, and many other matters. Following Alasdair MacIntyre, one might argue further that the reasons for such disagreement lie in the role of religious and philosophical traditions in shaping what people believe to be ensconced in the moral architecture of the universe.Footnote 6 But if traditions strongly shape people's judgments about what is good or true at a basic level, then they will play a strong role in allowing or halting cross-cultural agreement about what is self-evident. But if that is the case, then judgments about self-evidence are themselves dependent on systems of practical reason that play little role in Etzioni's analysis of normativity.
All of these criticisms point to my own view that self-evidence is inadequate to establish the normativity of moral values. Practical reasoning carried out within philosophical and religious traditions—or what Etzioni calls “deliberations”—is difficult to avoid. Here I make no judgment about which tradition is best. But, Etzioni might object, this is surely a discouraging conclusion for the project of widening and deepening the sphere of agreement upon core moral values that are crucial for global justice, a project that seems to underlie his analysis. Put differently, if empirical legitimacy can be widened and deepened, will this not contribute to the greater achievement of substantive legitimacy—that is, justice? And do not the various traditions of practical reason, diverse as they are, induce a fissiparous rather than a unifying dynamic?
Expanding the sphere of agreement on human rights, the laws of war, global warming, and poverty is a worthy goal. But the road to agreement need not traverse the way of self-evidence, an approach that looks for what people apprehend straightforwardly, apart from the substantive reasons that emerge from practical reasoning. An alternative approach, one that can be called deep dialogue, seeks agreement by asking partners to a global dialogue to reason from within their traditions but also to commit themselves to finding regions of overlapping values through a conversation that involves comparison, translation, interpretation, and charity of spirit. They come to the table equipped with the full set of their epistemological and moral commitments but then seek to find commonality. Imagine, for instance, three representatives to a high-level global conference dedicated to finding a common protocol to combat global warming. They include a devout Muslim, an East Asian Confucian, and a secular Western European who works for a human rights organization. Each brings the commitments of his or her tradition to the table. The Muslim draws from what the Quran and the long subsequent tradition of Islamic commentary and thought say about the environment. The Confucian draws from her tradition in similar fashion. The European draws from values that are rooted in the Enlightenment tradition. There is no search for a lowest common denominator, restrictions on the types of reasons that may be invoked or common commitment to self-evidence or direct apprehension as the epistemological keys to success. Yet through the interlocutors' conversation they find that there are productive and significant regions of overlap between their traditions. They arrive at some common norms that they can recommend to the world.
There is pragmatism to this method. It is difficult to say ex ante where and to what extent a given group of interlocutors will find consensus. The outcome will be different depending on who the parties are, what the issue is, and how the conversation goes. Something very much like this process took place in the negotiation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as described by legal scholar Mary Ann Glendon in her book, A World Made New.Footnote 7 Involved in the process to varying degrees were a Lebanese Thomist, a Chinese Confucian, a Bengali Muslim poet, a dubiously Communist Russian intellectual, a Hindu, and Eleanor Roosevelt, each committed to his or her own tradition as well as to achieving agreement. Gradually, through fits and starts, they hammered out a Declaration. “We agree about the rights, but on condition no one asks us why,” commented philosopher Jacques Maritain, who was also involved in the process.Footnote 8 But it was not so important that the interlocutors agreed on why rights were valid. The Declaration did not require agreement at this level. It only required that an overlap could be found in values, commitments, and beliefs that were themselves sustained by traditions of practical reason. Taking a route other than the road of self-evidence, then, does not preclude reaching the destination of global agreement on moral values—at least some agreement on some values.
