I would like to thank Graciana del Castillo for her remarks regarding After War. I will focus my response on what del Castillo finds to be the major shortcoming of my book—the main policy implication. In After War, I conclude that current approaches to reconstruction, which typically rely on military occupation, are more likely to fail than to succeed. This outcome is not due to a lack of planning, effort, or political will, but is instead is the result of the array of incentives and constraints limiting what occupiers and policymakers can rationally design and implement in foreign societies. In considering alternative strategies for exporting the ideas, values, and beliefs underpinning liberal democracy, I argue that the U.S. should assume a default position of military non-intervention and free trade (unilateral if necessary). Del Castillo is sympathetic to this position as a “preventive measure,” but does not seem convinced of its suitability as a primary strategy. For example, she points out that offering trade preferences to the Taliban following 9/11 would hardly have brought liberalism to Afghanistan. I agree. However, I do not think this point undercuts my argument for a default position of free trade and non-intervention. Let me clarify why I believe this to be the case.

There is an important distinction between regime change and nation-building/reconstruction, although the two are often pursued in sequence. The U.S. military has demonstrated relative efficiency in toppling existing government regimes (although, as Vietnam indicates, even regime change is not an absolute certainty). For example, three weeks after the initial Iraq invasion in March 2003, the U.S. army had moved into Baghdad. Likewise, the Taliban fell quickly in Afghanistan not long after the U.S. invasion in October 2001. Removing existing regimes has been relatively easy compared to subsequent nation-building and reconstruction efforts, which have proven far more difficult. After War is focused on understanding the reconstruction and nation-building aspects of foreign intervention following conflict.

Offering the Taliban trade preferences following 9/11 may not have led to movements toward liberal institutions, but has the current approach succeeded where free trade would have failed? The Taliban has been removed, but is there any evidence that the country has moved any closer to liberalism following the collapse of the regime? The insurgency in Afghanistan is extremely strong, and the existing government is extremely weak. The recent presidential elections were characterized by fraud and corruption, further threatening the little legitimacy the government possesses. Opium production continues to be a main driver of the Afghanistan economy. U.S. military commanders are warning that without a drastic change in strategy, the effort in Afghanistan will fail. The Obama administration is debating whether to continue with the counterinsurgency effort in the continued hopes of establishing a strong central government—something that has never existed in Afghanistan—or shifting to targeted strikes against members of al Qaeda.

What does the situation in Afghanistan mean for future reconstruction efforts? For many it has led to calls not to abandon military intervention as a means of exporting democracy, but instead for “more resources,” “better planning,” “improved coordination,” and “stronger political will” in future efforts. While these popular mantras may warm the heart, they provide false hope by ignoring the real constraints facing occupiers and policymakers attempting to design and impose liberal democratic institutions in foreign societies. The reality is that free societies are not centrally planned and imposed from the outside. In fact, the standard methods employed in reconstruction efforts—central planning by elites, reliance on large-scale government bureaucracies, and force—are the very antithesis of liberalism. My argument in After War is not that the U.S. should never use military force or that free trade is a magic bullet for spreading liberalism. Instead, I suggest that the U.S. should be extremely hesitant to use the military if the goal is to establish liberal democratic institutions in other countries. Free trade and military non-intervention is not a panacea, but it is one means of spreading liberal ideas, values, and beliefs. Given the failures of recent reconstruction efforts to achieve their stated end of spreading liberal democracy, such alternatives deserve serious consideration.