Introduction
After a brief decline in its popularity at the end of the Cold War, the late nineties witnessed a renaissance in Realist research as a result of a variety of detailed empirical works by a group of scholars who have become known as the neo-classical Realists.Footnote 1 These writers seek to move beyond the basic insights of Waltz's parsimonious version of neo-realism by investigating the interaction of both systemic and domestic pressures in the foreign policy decision making process, thus providing a richer explanatory account of why states choose certain foreign policies over others. Neo-classical Realists generally agree that ‘the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities […] however […] the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level’.Footnote 2 Neo-classical Realists thus seek to build upon Waltz's work by including several intervening variables in their analysis in order to explain the foreign policies of states, for example, the efficiency/inefficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus, the perception and misperception of policymakers, interest groups and elite consensus.Footnote 3
As part of this resurgence, but somewhat separate from the main core of neo-classical Realists, stands Power Preponderance theory initially set forth by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth.Footnote 4 Put very simply, this theory argues that the sheer magnitude of US power is such that other states will not balance against it in the foreseeable future. Such an assertion represents a further step away from the main tenets of neo-realism. For Waltz, the primary pressure on states arises from the anarchical nature of the international system that results in unrelenting competition between states. In the absence of a supranational authority, state survival can only be attained through self-help strategies. In order to ‘achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy […] must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves’.Footnote 5 An accretion of power by any state (or coalition of states), whether it be an ally or an enemy, is viewed as a possible security threat by other states and, as such, ‘elicits the opposition of others’.Footnote 6 Two methods of countering such accretions of power are available to states, they can react ‘by building up their own capabilities (internal balancing) [and] or by aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances (external balancing)’.Footnote 7 As a result, the balancing of power between states is a perennial feature of international relations.
In a recent issue of this journal, Campbell Craig put forward an amended version of Preponderance theory seeking to explain why US unipolar predominance has turned out to be not simply a ‘moment’ and as such represents ‘a serious anomaly for neorealist theory’.Footnote 8 This anomaly, Craig contends, is no mere ‘blip’ but signals the decline of the neo-realist paradigm and its replacement by William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks' Preponderance theory, although their explanation of contemporary state behaviour continues to be rooted in Realist arguments concerning the balance of power.Footnote 9 In so doing, they identify three causal factors that together explain why unipolarity is likely to persist.Footnote 10 The first factor is the US' geographical position. Separated by vast oceans, the ‘potential security threat’ posed by the US is thus reduced. Second, the vast disparity in material capabilities between the US and potential rivals is so large that any attempt to catch up will prove too costly and will end in failure. This dominance is not simply confined to the military sphere but covers a wide spectrum of capabilities including its economy, technological level; and demography. Moreover, even if a rival power thought it could potentially balance militarily against the US' actual manifest power, it would think again once US latent power is factored in.Footnote 11 Even though the US is the predominant military power, it has had to tap only a small proportion of its resources to do so, therefore, its potential for military expansion far exceeds any potential rival, thus acting as a further inhibitor on other states' ambitions. If a coalition of states attempted to balance in concert, Brooks and Wohlforth contend that they would come up against the well known difficulty, especially in today's high-tech military environment, of coordinating their policies while the US would retain its advantage of being a single unitary state. Finally, the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union left states with the fait accompli of a unipolar world. Unlike other periods of history in which other powers could begin to balance against an emerging hegemon and successfully stymie its attempts at predominance, at the end of 1991, states were confronted by a colossus bestriding the world and little could be done to alter this fact on the ground.Footnote 12
Craig contributes to this theory by adding a fourth factor – the revolutionary effect of nuclear weapons on state behaviour. Following Waltz, Craig argues that thermonuclear weapons are ‘the greatest of all unit-level changes in modern history and perhaps all history’.Footnote 13 The guarantee of mutually assured destruction (MAD), should nuclear weapon states with a second strike capability go to war, has radically reduced the probability of such states actually engaging in large scale war against each other. Because deterrence depends on fear, argues Waltz, to ‘create fear, nuclear weapons are the best possible means’.Footnote 14 It is argued that nuclear weapon states will be prevented from engaging in such an exchange because of the risk of unleashing total destruction upon themselves. Moreover, such weapons make nuclear wars fought for gains meaningless because the guaranteed levels of losses on all sides far outweigh any potential gains. Waltz therefore concludes that to fight nuclear wars ‘is impossible and that to launch an offensive that might prompt nuclear retaliation is obvious folly’.Footnote 15
Craig synthesises Waltz's arguments on the inhibiting effect of nuclear weapons with Preponderance theory and believes that in so doing each aspect of Brooks and Wohlforth's thesis is further strengthened. Because of the ‘stopping power of water’, it is argued, a long distance conventional campaign by the US is highly improbable.Footnote 16 Craig concludes from this that the only feasible war with a state or a coalition of states from the Eurasian land mass would be a nuclear one. These states thus ‘equate a major war among them with nuclear war’ and as we have seen above, the costs of such a war prohibit such action.Footnote 17 Second, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union leaving just one superpower exacerbates the collective action problem by increasing the tendency for states to free ride – choosing to wait for others to balance against US preponderance rather than incur the costs themselves. The costs are so exorbitant that no state is willing to be the first to step into the ring. With the advent of thermonuclear weapons the previous fear that if they did not endeavour to balance they ran the risk of future attack is less applicable because states know that ‘if things go badly they can obtain a small nuclear arsenal and feel confident that they can avoid the fate free riders sometimes faced in earlier eras’.Footnote 18 Finally, the enormous capability gap between the US and other states is said to dissuade other states from balancing and nuclear weapons only reinforce this tendency. This, Craig contends, is because the main reason states engage in balancing is in order ‘to prepare for war’. Now that this balancing incorporates the nuclear aspect in which the US has a clear lead, it is said that ‘the power gap disincentive becomes overwhelming’.Footnote 19
How do states really behave?
Despite Craig's claim that Preponderance theory fails to include ‘a leading “unit-level” explanation of great-power peace and international stability: the fear of nuclear war’, Brooks and Wohlforth make it clear that their three factors should be taken together with the pre-existing nuclear situation and the declining importance of direct control of external territorial space in accruing economic benefits.Footnote 20 Immediately after outlining their three main factors they state quite clearly, that these ‘factors characterize an international system that is already primed against traditional power balancing due to nuclear weapons […] All the major powers have or can quickly produce nuclear weapons. With a secure second-strike capability, their territorial integrity is better secured than that of any past great power, and the security threat inherent in concentrated power is diminished.’Footnote 21 Rather than introducing something new to the debate, Craig simply further explicates (rather adroitly it has to be said) a factor that had already been accounted for.Footnote 22
Second, there are two major internal contradictions within this work that fundamentally undermine the logic of his argument. The first is in relation to technological innovation and MAD; the second has to do with the disconnect between nuclear and conventional weaponry which Craig fails to fully consider. Despite acknowledging Keir Lieber and Darryl Press' work on the possible end of MAD as a result of the US moving ahead with its anti-ballistic missile defence projects and a first strike nuclear capability, he fails to comprehensively answer why this would not undermine his key tenet that the security afforded states possessing a second strike capability relieves them of much of the pressure to balance. Craig's reply differs according to the type of nuclear weapon state. For smaller states, he contends that the US would have ‘much less reason to use its new first-strike capability against a nation that cannot threaten to destroy the US, and has no ambition to defeat America in a war’.Footnote 23 Certainly, there is something to this argument. Any conflagration outside of the borders of the state(s) in question could easily be dealt with using the US' more sophisticated conventional arsenal. However, if a first-strike knock out capability became a reality, an attack directed at the smaller state's territory may well include a pin-point first strike in order to eradicate the nuclear threat in advance of other military operations. Although Craig gives a list of rather unconvincing reasons that may constrain the US (for example it would be exposed as a ‘brutal and vulnerable state’), the core reason would appear to be that the smaller state could not destroy the US.Footnote 24 However, there are many forms of conflict short of an all out attack on the US that America may deem of such vital interest that such action is no longer ruled out. An attempt, for example, at regional hegemony through territorial expansion in the Middle East deemed contrary to US interests or the emergence of a terrorist state from which continual large scale attacks emanate may well be enough to put the nuclear first strike option on the table if the country concerned is a smaller nuclear weapon state.
According to Craig, for both minor and major nuclear weapon states, the possession of an invulnerable second-strike capability will be enough to deter the US from attacking them. But this is a complete non-sequitur, given that Lieber and Press' work indicates that it is exactly the second strike capability which major powers rely on that is being currently undermined. In the near future, they argue, US capabilities will have reached a level at which a nuclear first strike could successfully deal a knock-out blow to any opponent. Craig himself does not appear to dispute their findings, simply stating that, this ‘would mean the end of Mutual Assured Destruction as it existed during the Cold War’.Footnote 25 But if such a condition pertains, all of his arguments fall like a house of cards. In the second instance, even if a first strike capability alongside a ballistic missile defence cannot provide an absolutely foolproof defence, its very existence would provoke a new arms race. If state behaviour concerning nuclear weapons is indeed motivated by fear, then even the potential possibility of the US attaining such a goal would prompt a re-evaluation by others. Indeed, judging by the reaction of some of the major powers to the proposed deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defence, major powers will react in just such a manner.Footnote 26
In using Waltz's own work on how nuclear weapons affect state behaviour, Craig appears to further bolster the case for Power Preponderance theory. Craig exploits what at first sight seems to be a contradiction in Waltz's work. Namely, Waltz argues that a second strike capability decreases the likelihood of a major war between nuclear states. The possession of such a deterrent, Craig argues, helps explain the lack of balancing observed in the contemporary world. A unit level change that solved the problem of state security in an anarchic environment would not only be revolutionary it would render Waltz's main theoretical contribution to International Relations defunct. Yet, Waltz is very clear that despite the assurance that MAD provides, international politics continues to be ‘a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties do most to determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system’.Footnote 27 As such, Waltz is clear that, ‘Nuclear states continue to compete militarily.’Footnote 28
Craig's error is that he treats security qua territorial security rather than considering a more encompassing view of state security. Although Waltz does begin with the core premise that ‘states seek to ensure their survival’, he also proceeds to argue that they ‘strive to maintain their autonomy’.Footnote 29 It does appear from this that, as Brooks and Wohlforth point out, survival and autonomy are treated synonymously when they should be treated separately.Footnote 30 However, the two are interconnected. In order to safeguard their security, states seek to ensure that others do not impinge upon their ability to maintain their capabilities. This requires protecting vital strategic interests which, if affected, would negatively impact upon their relative power position. Those that have the capability therefore seek to project power beyond their borders to ensure that those essential external networks that help provide the life-blood of the nation are not threatened.
Indeed, contra Craig, Brooks and Wohlforth do not follow the minimalist view of security based upon simple survival. They fully realise that if ‘counter-balancing is driven only by the fear of invasion and loss of sovereign statehood at the hands of the hegemon, then even the strictest Realist might doubt its relevance to states with secure second-strike capability’.Footnote 31 But they clearly state that this is not the only motivating factor behind counter-balancing. Rather, states also ‘balance against nonexistential security threats’.Footnote 32 Moreover, they conclude, ‘the more we move away from core territorial security and invasion to other uses or threats of force, the less certain we can be about the limits nuclear weapons impose on US security policy’.Footnote 33 In the arena of ‘secondary’ security issues the usual logic of counter-balancing with conventional military forces still holds sway it is just that at this moment no country or coalition of countries is quite up to the task.
Conjunctural analysis versus theory: when is a blip simply a blip and not an anomaly?
Will Power Preponderance theory eventually replace Waltzian neo-realism, or is it merely a form of conjunctural analysis whose explanatory potential pertains to the unipolar ‘moment’ – limited by the very subject it seeks to analyse? Craig seems to be unsure on this point. Initially, he is rather sanguine concerning the prospects for Preponderance theory contending that the unipolar ‘moment’ represents a serious anomaly for neo-realism. Moreover, its inability to explain this anomaly in comparison to Preponderance theory indicates that a paradigm shift is occurring in favour of the latter.Footnote 34 Yet, he concludes that, ‘over the medium-term future there should be no recurrence of a balance-of-power system’ with the medium term being the next few decades.Footnote 35 These are two very different claims – the latter chiming with Brooks and Wohlforth's own position.Footnote 36
Such a temporal limitation would have the effect of relegating Preponderance ‘theory’ to a form of conjunctural analysis that successfully explains a blip (albeit approximately a 50 year one) in the perennial counter-balancing behaviour of states. In other words, it successfully identifies and analyses ‘a space of time within which a particular combination (or conjunction) of causes exercises a predominant (causal and imaginative) influence over the course of events and the production of ideas’.Footnote 37 Rather than attempting to identify and explain long-term behavioural patterns and their causes, such conjunctural analyses are necessarily ‘temporally restricted (and causally contingent) in their direct operation to the period in which this combination of causes is working itself out’.Footnote 38
This enriches our knowledge of a particular period in international relations but it doesn't necessarily undermine the central tenets and findings of neo-realism. The debate concerning what neo-realism does and does not seek to explain has been well rehearsed and does not need to be reiterated in detail here.Footnote 39 But it is worth repeating that neo-realism is a structural theory of International Relations and, as such, sacrifices ‘richness and depth for a simple, rigorous theory that holds widely across time and space’.Footnote 40 It thus provides a parsimonious account of the general pattern of behaviour to be expected of states at the international level, it does not attempt to explain the actual policies adopted by states in any particular historical period.Footnote 41 Its aim is to explain the striking similarity in the behaviour of states throughout the millennia (balance of power) and it does so by identifying the defining features of international relations. As Waltz characterises it, ‘Balance-of Power politics prevail where ever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive’.Footnote 42
As others have already argued, the various alleviating factors set out by Preponderance theory are rather problematic. First their use of the balance of threat theory by Stephen Walt that takes geographic proximity as one factor that states take into account when balancing against other states (the other two main ones being aggregate and offensive capabilities) is problematic. As Christopher Layne points out, this theory is most useful when the system is multipolar and power is more or less balanced – a situation when assessing the intentions of each state becomes highly important. But in a unipolar world, the danger of leaving the overwhelming accumulation of power unchecked is clear and obvious to all other states.Footnote 43 The distance separating the US from potential rivals is hardly reassuring given its capabilities of projecting that power on a global scale. Second, although US power is indeed preponderant at the moment, it is precisely this concern that will in the future drive otherwise rival states to form alliances and aggregate their capabilities as a counter-balance. Third, their argument that other states were confronted with a fait accompli after the collapse of the Soviet Union is a good one, but there is evidence that states are already engaging in so called ‘leash slipping’ whereby states seek to gain a certain level of independence in security matters so that they can ‘slip free of the hegemon's leash-like grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the US to respect their foreign policy interests’.Footnote 44
This does not mean that the insights that Power Preponderance theory provides are not important for explaining the unipolar condition that obtains in the contemporary period. However, rather than representing a paradigm shift it is best suited at explaining why the time lag between the collapse of the Soviet Union and counter-balancing activity has turned out to be far longer than most analysts expected. But such conjunctural analysis is best viewed, alongside several other conjunctural analyses, as supplementing rather than supplanting neo-realism.Footnote 45 In a few decades international life will return to normalcy and we will see, in the words of Christopher Layne that, the ‘US enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons. American primacists conflate balancing (a grand strategy pursued by individual states) with the attainment of balance in the international system (a more or less equal distribution of power among the great powers). That balancing efforts have not yet produced a balance of power does not mean states are not trying to offset US hegemony, although these balancing efforts will require time to bear fruit.’Footnote 46
