In Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, Götz Nordbruch examines the intellectual influence of Nazism on writers and politicians in Syria and Lebanon in the 1930s and 1940s. Nordbruch stresses throughout the book that the intellectual debates about Nazism's potential role in Syria and Lebanon must be seen within their historical context, for the writers and organizations involved with this issue always filtered Nazi ideas and potential German aid through the lens of their own political needs. By so doing, Nordbruch complicates the long-extant claim that Arabs gave strong support to Germany as a counterweight to British and French colonialism and that Nazi ideology provided strong underpinnings for Arab nationalist discourse in this period.
What comes through in the text most clearly is the dynamism of the intellectual debate that took place in Syria and Lebanon in the interwar and World War II periods. As Nordbruch explains, Nazism was just one of many intellectual movements available for discussion. As a result, for every five writers who wrote positively about elements of Nazi ideology, five others discounted them just as fervently using ideas culled from Bolshevism or the French Revolution. The Kataʾib, or the Phalange, stood as the organization most publicly supporting German political ideas for much of the period; the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, in contrast, stood largely in opposition to Nazism, in line with Soviet policy. Members of both groups joined the many other writers and politicians active in Syria and Lebanon who constantly debated and negotiated not only Nazism but also political and nationalist positions generated throughout Europe and the Arab and Muslim lands.
Nordbruch successfully analyzes the nuances and sophistication of these debates taking place throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Ten years after the French established the mandates of Syria and Lebanon, writers in both countries sought to construct a society and government that could successfully bring independence to their countries. The intellectuals and politicians of the day did not advocate the indiscriminate adaptation of European governmental and political ideologies. Rather, they dissected elements of the British, French, Soviet, and fascist systems that they felt could work within Syria and Lebanon. In regard to Nazi Germany, many writers discussed the success of German youth groups, the German concept of the national volk, Adolf Hitler's role as the representative of the German people, and the benefits the Arabs could accrue from establishing the totalitarian style of government modeled by the new German polity. As Nordbruch explains, however, support for any of these elements did not mean a wholesale acceptance of Nazism or a concomitant rejection of those governmental structures perceived as coming from an opposing political tradition, such as those from France or Russia. The choice was not between France and Germany but between a collectivist political structure and a voluntaristic one and between authoritarian strength and liberal democratic participation. Writers analyzed how best to integrate these elements into their definitions of national and governmental independence.
These debates did not take place in a vacuum, however; local writers and politicians responded to political events taking place around them throughout the 1930s and 1940s. For example, the authoritarianism presented by Germany in the early 1930s lost some of its appeal in 1936, when France appeared ready to sign new treaties with Syria and Lebanon. In this atmosphere, liberalism and Western-style representative institutions came under heavy discussion. This shift was aided by the fact that German governmental representatives based in these two countries proved reluctant to extend tangible aid to Arab individuals and groups who sought out German governmental support for their efforts at gaining independence. In 1940 and 1941, as war raged, the German government made the decision to be more proactive in the region, hosting expatriate Arabs in Berlin and promising aid to such actions as the Rashid Ali coup in Iraq. This relationship proved short lived, however, as German support was limited and the British and Free French forces made advances toward the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from Vichy French control. By 1943, the new situation demanded that local politicians engage with the Syrian and French officials in their countries and not with German concerns elsewhere in the Arab world.
The book provides an exemplary analysis of these changing intellectual trends while debunking many of the theories about the influence of Nazi thought on Arab nationalist ideology in the interwar period in Syria and Lebanon. It will be useful for specialists in the field as well as graduate students who have a strong grounding in the history of Syria and Lebanon between 1933 and 1945. However, the density of the intellectual debates that Nordbruch discusses will make it difficult for undergraduate students to understand the text. Overall, the book is a remarkable addition to the literature on Arab nationalism and on intellectual discourse in the interwar and World War II periods in Syria and Lebanon.
