This ambitious economic history of Argentina covering more than a century until 1989 is the first of its kind in many years published in English. The only comparable works are an influential synthesis by Aldo Ferrer in the 1960s and some extraordinarily detailed research by Carlos Diaz Alejandro, widely admired in its time, published in 1970. Since then, many specialized articles and papers have appeared in Argentina and elsewhere. Roberto Cortés Conde's objectives include an attempt to integrate the newer research into a book that marks a crowning conclusion to his work over almost fifty years on the history of the Argentine economy. Most of his previous work addressed the so-called belle époque of 1870–1914, when Argentine economic growth advanced at almost unparalleled speed. He is well known for at least three books on the late nineteenth century, including a magisterial work on the financial collapse of 1890 commonly called the Baring Crisis.
The period 1914–1989 breaks down into several subperiods: 1914–1929 marks an era of wartime disruption and temporary recovery led by primary exports; next came the depression and the wartime adjustments from 1930 to the military coup of 1943; the era of Juan Perón in 1943–1955 followed; lastly, the more than forty-year-long phase from 1955 included a string of short-term policies under a succession of military and civilian governments against a backdrop of secular decline. This period culminated in a bout of hyperinflation in 1989. By and large, the economists agreed about what went wrong in Argentina during the second half of the twentieth century, a consensus summarized in one word: Perón. Raúl Prebisch, the noted Argentine economist who later served with distinction at the head of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, made the first analysis of Perón's misdeeds soon after his fall from power in 1955. As he then argued and illustrated convincingly, Perón ruined the farm export sector by discriminatory taxation; he made strategic miscalculations in efforts to develop domestic manufacturing; he enhanced the power of unions and set up prolonged struggles over the distribution of income; he dissipated foreign reserves and investment resources; and he created a gigantic and highly inefficient state sector through nationalization. Later authors led by Diaz Alejandro adopted the Prebisch analysis as their starting point, and few economists of any repute since found much to say on Perón's behalf. The leading economic historians evaluated positively the policies of conservative economists, (who included Prebisch himself) during the early 1930s, an era that produced the Central Bank, exchange control, tariff protection, and subsidies to farmers and cattlemen. In a later period, they also found a few complimentary remarks on policies in the 1960s, particularly in the latter half of the decade during the regime of General Juan Carlos Onganía.
Cortés Conde's interpretation does not differ much from his predecessors, and he cites Prebisch and Diaz Alejandro widely in his book. His innovative contribution consists mainly of detailed analysis of short-term policies, principally in the spheres of banking, monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal policy. In these areas, his work seems most likely to make an impact on future research. In the present book, he adds relatively little to the pre-1930 period on which he has written so widely in the past, but provides interesting insights, particularly on financial and exchange issues, on the early 1930s. As he makes abundantly obvious, he has no love for Perón and follows the extant critiques of the peronista regime. Most striking is his work on the effects of price distortions instituted by the regime on the supply of capital goods, and secondly on the inflationary consequences of government policies. The book ventures into some less well-charted territory on the post-1955 period. The sections on the presidencies of Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) and Arturo Illia (1963–1966) are very instructive; less innovative is a segment on the better-known period of the late 1960s under Adalbert Krieger Vasena, the inventive economy minister in the Onganía government. Cortés Conde has interesting insights into the catastrophic military regime of 1976–1983 and into the inflationary policies of its elected successor led by President Raúl Alfonsín. Like his predecessors, he has included a gigantic quantity of statistical data, much of which, with the help of research assistants, he assembled personally. He enjoys enormous, well-merited prestige for his technical insight and for the quality of his statistical data. I recall many academic meetings involving debates on Argentine statistics. Some participants would favor the figures of the United Nations, for example, while others argued for the government's figures. Third, invariably meriting serious consideration, were “Roberto's figures.”
Some of the connecting segments in the book show very fine understanding of Argentine political history as well as of economic development. Critics of the book will note its orthodox overall interpretive scheme and question the relevance of some of its data. The latter part of the book in particular, although joined together by overviews, reads like a journal as if the author scribbled down his views on every short-term policy during the last fifty years and reproduced them all verbatim in this book. Cortés Conde is best defined as an historical economist and as a statistician, who applies the techniques of the dismal science to a limited range of historical data. Unfortunately, the book cannot be judged well written or copy edited. If Cambridge University Press were to plan a second edition of the book, the editors would be well-advised to take a much more careful look at the text they propose to republish.
