Some of the most indelible images of American politics over the past decade are Black Americans in the streets protesting police brutality and racial injustice. Anger over the killings of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Ahmed Arbery, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and countless others have led Black Americans to demonstrate and boycott, to pressure political leaders to change policies that impact communities of color. At the same time, on average, Black voters report feeling less angry about the incumbent president on the American National Election Studies than white voters for eight out of 10 elections from 1980 to 2016 (Phoenix, 13). Turnout of Black voters in the 2016 election dropped precipitously from the 2012 election. While turnout among Black voters grew from the 2014 midterms to the 2018 midterms, it still lagged behind that of white voters. Where was the anger on display in marches of the Black Lives Matter movement in the 2016 and 2018 elections? How can we reconcile these seemingly incongruous images of the role of anger in the political participation of Black Americans?
The Anger Gap offers an answer. Anger is an approach emotion, meaning that it leads people to engage more rather than run away. When people recognize that a threat is impeding their goals and can identify someone or something to blame for that threat, their emotional response is anger rather than other negative emotions like fear or sadness. Black Americans and white Americans do not see the same types of events and policies as equally threatening and do not react in the same way. Countering threats requires a sense of agency and efficacy. Black citizens are more likely to respond to political threats with resignation rather than anger and are subsequently less likely to participate in electoral politics than white Americans. On the other hand, when Black Americans do become angry about politics, group identity may tamp down the expression of anger or that anger may be translated into support for participation outside the political system.
While theories of emotion in politics argue that anger motivates participation in electoral politics, Phoenix's book provides an added corrective and nuance to this theory. Phoenix argues that Black Americans are more constrained in their opportunities to express anger and more likely to feel resigned to unfairness in the formal electoral process. Anger is a dangerous emotion for Black Americans. As Phoenix explains, Black anger is risky for those who feel and use it: “You risk being labeled a threat, targeted, monitored and brought down by agents of the system you challenge” (p. 17). If Black Americans feel resigned to a political system that is unresponsive at best and, at worst, harmful to their lives, livelihoods, and full citizenship, then anger is difficult to leverage within the political system. Thus, when Black Americans become angry, their anger increases support for contentious politics like protests, but is less potent for increasing participation in elections. Black anger leads to support for actions that may dismantle the political system rather than ones that replicate the unjust system.
The scholarship on political participation shows that despite lower levels of resources than white voters, Black voters participate at high rates (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady Reference Verba, Schlozman and Brady1995) and that anger can help motivate collective action and voting (Valentino et al. Reference Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings2011). Phoenix argues that civic resources need to be matched with the right emotional resources and there are times and messages that dampen Black participation. Anger messages may lead white Americans to the ballot box but may keep Black Americans at home or participating in political activity directed at helping other Black Americans (Banks, White, and McKenzie Reference Banks, White and McKenzie2019). Black political activity is affected both by individual-level emotions, but also by collective agency and identity, and Phoenix argues that this double consciousness must be accounted for in theories of political emotion. To that end, Phoenix shows that the positive emotions of hope and pride can be activated to compel participation across a variety of electoral activities. Using data from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) and the American National Election Studies, he shows that pride increases the probability of Black Americans donating to a candidate, volunteering, working collectively with others, contacting officials, protesting, and boycotting. Pride, particularly racial group pride, is especially powerful because it resonates with Black cultural and religious discourse about the ability of Black Americans to survive and thrive despite difficult circumstances.
In the last empirical chapter, Phoenix uses the CMPS to map out how anger and pride affect Asian Americans and Latino/a Americans. The findings reveal that different emotional messages are mobilizing to different groups. This chapter raises larger questions that scholars can tackle in future work. Where does that leave politicians who must appeal across racial lines? Should parties be targeting different emotions to different groups and is there a cost if emotions are not easily contained or messages fall flat? Overall, Phoenix provides a compelling narrative about why Black Americans feel less angry and more resigned about the state of the political world. While pride is useful as a rhetorical motivator, as Phoenix points out, it is powerful in part because Black Americans are denied the full spectrum of emotion. Racial equality will also include the ability to feel angry and use that as motivation for voting.
