In his challenging book on the Republic and the Phaedo, S. argues that images and image-making are the key to understanding the relation of soul, world and Idea. According to S., beyond Plato's criticism of images, there is a ‘parallel, positive Platonic view of images (eidola, eikones) and of image-making (eidolopoikos)’ (p. 121). On this view, for Plato, images go beyond the ‘literally visible’ and hence have philosophical significance. Thus, S. pays special attention to the dramatic content of the dialogues – generally somewhat downplayed by scholars of the analytical tradition – and, more precisely, to the dialogue form itself, which he understands as ‘an image constructed of images’ (p. 9). The result is an innovative, ‘down-to-earth’ interpretation of the immortality of the soul, the world and the realm of the Ideas, considered as the interdependent components of a ‘dialectical triad’. According to this interpretation, the immortality of the soul is to be understood as atemporality in this life, that is, in the world of the soul's experience, rather than deathlessness. As for the Ideas, they are ‘substances separable only in the definitional sense’ (p. 256). They are manifested immanently in human dialogue (logos), and interpreted as ‘the highest form of praxis’ (p. 391), which is reflected on the condition of the soul that is justice.

The book comprises an introduction, nine chapters and a conclusion. S. begins by focusing on the Republic (Chapters 1–5). He subsequently turns to the Phaedo (Chapters 6–8) and, finally, applies the conclusions to the rest of the Republic (Chapter 9).

The introduction addresses some basic methodological issues, maintaining that ‘the dramatic content (along with the analytical content seen in context) is precisely what does give us Plato's own presence, presents his own views and engages the reader’ (p. 13). Indeed, the first chapter positions the argument of the Republic – understood as being primarily about the soul – by focusing on the philosophical significance of the role of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Within this framework, S. examines the nature of the city-soul analogy arguing, in Chapter 2, that the form of the argument explains Plato's choice to create an image of the just city rather than of the just man. He goes on to analyse Socrates' account of capacities (dunameis) in Book 5. On S.'s account, capacities are interpreted as kinds of image-making, that is, as the soul's capacities for interpretation. The ontological implications of this assertion constitute the key to understanding the interrelation of the soul and the world, which S. endeavours to investigate in the following chapters.

Chapters 3 to 5 examine the images of the Cave and of the Divided Line and, finally, the question of education and the soul's eye. S. takes the re-descent to the Cave, which ‘represents the effects of education and the lack of it’ (p. 121), to be ontologically necessary not only for the philosopher but also for the Ideas themselves, given that the latter are not independent from the soul and the world of its experience. The ontology he posits becomes clearer in his dynamic interpretation of the Divided Line in Chapter 4. On S.'s account, ‘the Cave and Divided Line images introduce us to Plato's vision of just how the soul as image-maker at various levels elaborates, reads out, its world of experience’ (p. 78). The Divided Line is an image of the act of interpretation, that is, of our capacity for constructing images (eikasia) in increasing order of value. The understanding of this capacity in relation to both subject or knower (soul) and object or known (Idea) is the work of philosophy. As a primary image, the Divided Line represents the essential unity of subject and object. By seeing ‘correctly the image as image’ (p. 173), the dialectician is continually driven to a higher level of consciousness but also, finally, back to the individual, which, embodying the same dynamic structure of interpretation at each level, is continually situated in a renewed noetic context.

In order to develop his reading of the soul and the Ideas as interdependent entities, S. turns to the Phaedo for the next three chapters. Chapter 6 deals with the arguments for immortality, paying attention to the dramatic context and the role of myth. Focusing on the notion of separateness with respect to the Ideas and the soul, as well as on the soul's capacity for separating considered as a special kind of image-making, S. finds in the Phaedo ‘the unseen necessary hypotheses that precede the construction of the Line and are embedded in it’ (p. 211). Chapter 7 is devoted to Simmias and Cebes' deficient image-making taken as the starting point of the discussion. S.'s thesis is that Socrates' interlocutors are ‘dramatic foils’ (p. 257) whose role is to help the reader see images as images. Dealing with Socrates' own correct image-making, or interpretative capacity, Chapter 8 promotes a reading of his hypothetical method and the Ideas as explanatory, as dealing with the relation of soul, knowledge and existence. Thus, based on the Phaedo, S. elaborates his reading of the immortality of the soul and the independence of the Ideas as ‘atemporal experience wholly in this life’ (p. 386).

In Chapter 9, he goes back to the Republic and engages with explaining the notions of soul and Idea as exposed in the last books of the dialogue in line with his above outlined reading. Particular attention is paid to the story of Gyges and the myth of Er. Finally, S.'s conclusion provides an overview of his arguments, with special focus on the reader's being turned ‘from ontological darkness to the light’ (p. 392) of the ‘dialectical wholeness of meaning’ (p. 388).

For space reasons, I will limit my critique to some general points. To my mind, while S.'s methodological approach concerning the philosophical importance of the dramatic content and the dialogue form is compelling and, probably, the book's main strength, his novel ‘down-to-earth’ reading of the immortality of the soul and of the realm of the Ideas is less convincing. Most importantly, such a reading seems to compromise the eternity and immutability of the Ideas, since the latter are seen as having ‘something of a quasi-temporal dimension’ (p. 15). Furthermore, Plato's unquestionably ambiguous attitude towards images and image-making should not lead to overplaying the philosopher's positive evaluation of the latter. Moreover, albeit insightful, S.'s discussion of contemporary views on the role of myth in Plato (including the views of Brisson, McCabe, Mattéi) seems somewhat limited, as it does not exploit quite thoroughly the rich extant literature on this topic. In addition, it could be objected that S.'s analysis of capacities downplays the generality of Socrates' definition of dunamis (477c), since it focuses on the soul's capacities' ‘accounting for the activity of perception’ (p. 68) and, more precisely, on the distinction between knowledge and belief, without making as much of the prior definition and distinction concerning powers as a special ‘class of realities’ (genos ti ton onton).

Nevertheless, beyond these remarks, one should recognise the undeniable merits of this book. S. advances many interesting ideas, while using primary sources in an erudite way and engaging in a fruitful dialogue with contemporary scholarship. He enriches the logico-deductive analysis by combining it with an examination of the dialogues' dramatic context, generally less favoured by the analytical approach. Despite its difficulties, his interpretation raises important issues and is original and internally coherent. His study, presented in a quality edition, will therefore be of interest to students and scholars of both analytical and continental philosophy, as well as to anyone who has a particular interest in ancient philosophy, and in the Platonic tradition more especially.