Few scholars paid attention to developments in southern Thailand before the last decade, but now a cottage industry of books, articles, and papers about the insurgency there has established itself, all purporting to “explain” the surge of violence in the Muslim areas of the region—Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and even some districts of Songkla. The explanations vary widely: historic separatism, resurgence of cultural nationalism, ongoing violence perpetrated by gangs involved in the drug trade, a peasant revolt by the poor, loss of legitimacy from political repression and internal colonialism, and the introduction of radical Islam associated with international terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda and Jema'ah Islamiya (JI). In fact, all of the explanations contain some truth, even though they often focus on different parts of the elephant. Conspiracy of Silence is definitely one of the most important books in this corpus. It is a must read for those interested in the insurgency in the South.

The core of Zachary Abuza's argument is that the insurgency is primarily about “ethnic cleansing,” driving Buddhists from the area, establishing a pure Islamic state governed by Sha'aria, and, more specifically, ridding the region of control by the Thai state. But, as Abuza notes, this insurgency is not like any of the others that have preceded it over the past half century. The instrument by which this is to be accomplished is, quite simply, “terror.” This means that the lives of virtually all Buddhists are in danger, although even more Muslims have been assassinated, purportedly to intimidate the wavering moderates and those who do not sympathize with the aim of a pure Islamic state. More important, perhaps, is the targeting of Muslims who collaborate with the Thai government by holding official positions as administrators, teachers, or in the military or police. At even greater risk are Muslims who are suspected of providing intelligence to Thai authorities, but the overall effect has been a mass exodus of Buddhists from the region and significant declines in personnel willing to accept postings to the area.

The “conspiracy of silence' refers to the anonymity of the insurgents and the absence of any demands or goals. One of Abuza's most significant contributions is his willingness to take on the issues of who is behind these attacks. Many scholarly discussions attempt to finesse the topic simply by arguing that the identities of the insurgents are largely unknown. Abuza suggests several areas that are at odds with this conventional wisdom: 1) There are significant linkages between madrassas of Central Asia and Egypt with Islamic schools in the insurgent area. 2) Local madrassas and pondok schools are sources of recruits for the insurgent movement. 3) Insurgents have received training in tactics in Indonesia, Malaysia, and even locally, so that the cant about lack of involvement abroad is demonstrably specious. 4) There are clear command-and-control linkages, a fact that makes the incapacity of Thai government intelligence to identify the perpetrators of the violence all the more puzzling. 5) There are known links to transnational terrorism, specifically Jema'ah Islamiya. These issues are well documented in the book, but Abuza notes that the Thai government, from Taksin to the current government, “has been in utter denial over the goals and nature of the insurgency” (p. 144), probably because they challenge the integrity of the Thai state.

The book joins other research in pointing to a “culture of impunity” for military and police who are commonly suspected of violence toward Muslims. The fact that no one has been held accountable for the massacre at Tak Bai or the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, a lawyer who defended persons accused of insurgency, reinforces feelings among Muslims that they cannot obtain justice in the Thai state. Armed groups of Buddhists undertake a kind of vigilante justice or retaliations for what are believed to be Muslim attacks (but could sometimes be gang-initiated violence). Given the atrocities committed by both sides, the conflict clearly takes on the character of a civil war.

So what is the role of religion in the southern violence? One of the book's most intriguing contributions is the discussion of conflicts within Islam. Abuza draws distinctions between various forms of Salafism, which may range from inculcating purity of spirit to violent jihadism, and Wahabism, a Saudi brand of Salafism. These various permutations of Islam are scattered throughout the region in the religious schools. These schools are often simply entrepreneurial; that is, they constitute the livelihood of the schoolmasters. As money flowed into the area to support religious schools, there was an acute shortage of teachers. At the same time, there was a steady flow of prospective teachers from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan seeking jobs for Koranic scholars. Some of these teachers (ustadz), using their influence and moral authority with students, became instrumental in recruiting for radical Islamic movements, especially Permuda, the youth wing of the BRN-C (National Revolution Front-Coordinate), the most commonly mentioned organization associated with the insurgency. In fact, the strands of Islam are so diverse that they cannot be explicated here. Abuza does excellent work providing a description of these organizations and their possible roles in the conflict.

Few scholars immersed in the topic have been willing to take up the issue of the relationships between the insurgency and transnational terrorism. More than any other scholar, Abuza provides linkages between international terrorist groups and the southern Thailand conflict. Most of these ties appear to be on an interpersonal level, such as contacts with Hambali, the noted Al Qaeda and JI operations chief arrested in Ayutthiya. What is most significant is the inept performance of Thai security forces, who arrested respected members of the area for casual associations with suspected JI members who may or may not have been known to have any associations with suspect groups. Abuza argues that there is little evidence of significant collaboration between JI and the insurgency; however, he also suggests a level of interaction between local Muslims and a continual stream of cross-border JI associations that foretell possible future involvement of international terrorist groups, should a victory over the insurgents by Thai forces appear imminent.

Because the evidence is so carefully documented, it is difficult to be “critical” of this work. One error that needs to be noted is that Surin Pitsuwan, former foreign minister, is not “a Pattani Muslim” (p. 234); rather, he is from Nakorn Sri Thammarat and not a Malay speaker. This is important because many researchers assume that all Muslims, especially if they are from the South, can represent the people of the region when, in fact, they cannot. More importantly, as noted, the considerable reliance on news media (that the author acknowledges are often biased) and interviews with government officials (that he sometimes characterizes as incompetent) should be a caveat for accepting characterizations of various persons in the region as contributing to the climate of violence.

It is impossible to obtain a complete picture of the southern Thailand conflict without the contributions of this book. After all of the other explanations of the insurgency are adduced, it provides the missing piece. Abuza's singular perspective providing details and interpretations not duplicated in other discussions is what makes this book so valuable for understanding what is taking place. In the corpus of literature on the contemporary southern Thailand insurgency, it easily ranks as one of the top two resources.