“The Mega-Project is dead. Long live the Mega-Project!” This is the theme of Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff's savvy and important study of the changing dynamics of major urban public investments since World War II. Emerging from a supposed prehistory of minimalist local government and private investment, “the mega-projects era,” 1950–70, witnessed a revolutionary change as energized city governments, in league with business and unhampered by significant local opposition, used generous federal funding to promote unprecedented urban renewal projects, new highways, and airport facilities.

However, from the late 1960s through the 1970s, local governments were shaken by civil disorders and placed on the defensive by neighborhood activists, preservationists, and environmentalists. During this transitional era when few mega-projects were built, urban regimes were reactive rather than proactive, emphasizing concessions to and containment of antidevelopment forces. But since the early 1980s, momentum for mega-projects again grew as local governments perfected a “do no harm” strategy utilizing “mitigation,” indirect financing, and a shift to less disruptive projects, such as airport terminal improvements, light rail systems, convention centers, and sports arenas.

The authors combine rich empirical studies of post–World War II public entrepreneurship and coalition building, both locally and nationally, for major urban transportation projects, with illuminating chapters on urban theory in relation to changing public investment strategies, and they conclude with speculation on the future of major urban infrastructure projects. The core chapters offer three detailed sets of case studies of transportation infrastructure—highways, showcasing Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CAT), “The Big Dig” about which author Altshuler acquired insider knowledge as Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation during the 1970s; airports, with detailed analysis of the diverse experiences of Atlanta, Chicago, and Denver; and rail transit, including Atlanta's MARTA, San Francisco's BART, and Los Angeles's subway and light rail projects.

Discerning common patterns, the authors draw major lessons from the changing mega-project strategies in the post-1980s environment. Unlike earlier “cookie-cutter” plans for urban renewal projects or standardized interstate highway projects, successful infrastructure projects have become non-routine, necessitating the expert construction of political consensus among highly contentious local constituencies. Except for light rail projects in Los Angeles and Portland, where environmentalists took the lead, business interests—particularly land developers and commercial property owners—remained the core constituency for mega-projects. Yet “public entrepreneurs”—like Mayor Federico Peña in connection with the Denver International Airport (DIA) and Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn in connection with L.A.'s Red and Blue Lines—were also indispensable.

There also has been a paradigm shift from the insouciant “you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs” attitude prior to the urban riots of the 1960s to a “do no harm” planning philosophy that prioritizes avoiding controversies, notably by siting projects—whether below grade, in tunnels, or on the metropolitan periphery—so as not to offend settled neighborhoods. The mitigation principle—a new mega-project imperative—has evolved from a commitment to ameliorate harmful impacts, such as airport noise, to seductive benefit programs promising new subsidized housing, added neighborhood amenities, and other forms of so-called green pork.

In terms of federalism, Washington's 90% payout under the interstate highway program is a thing of the past, yet cities, under the new dispensation of “bottom up federalism,” now have more latitude in defining projects and are less constrained by “earmarked” funding requirements in spending federal money. Since California's Proposition 13 and the tax revolt of the late 1970s, mega-project financing has steered clear, to the extent possible, of local tax increases. Alternatives include indirect financing through tax abatement and long-term leases for developers; new “visitor taxes” on hotel rooms, restaurants, and car rentals; regional sales tax earmarks; and lottery revenues. When costs cannot be passed on, they can be hidden. Altshuler and Luberoff argue that a large part of the escalating costs of mega-projects—for example, from $7 million an urban freeway mile in 1980 to $54 million in the early 1990s—was a product of political pressures to underestimate initial program costs in order to avert voter backlash.

This new world of mega-projects, however, is built on ever-more-fragile economic foundations. Once-mighty highway and airport projects, which conferred major regional economic benefits, have been replaced by more politically appealing, yet economically marginal, sports stadiums, convention centers, downtown malls, and light rail projects. The book ends with a speculative chapter on 9/11's impact on infrastructure projects. Despite the initial sharp decline in airline passenger traffic, ongoing concerns about recurrent terrorism and security, and growing budget deficits, the authors optimistically conclude that the era of mega-projects is not yet over.

This admirable book is not without weaknesses. Despite the authors' recognition of dramatic increases in infrastructure spending by local governments during the first half of the twentieth century, they treat this period as if it were of only preparatory importance—rather like that of the Israelites in the desert before (Robert?) Moses led them into the promised land. Readers will have to look elsewhere, for example, for analyses of how early growth dynamics in such western cities as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle spawned activist development-oriented local governments, featuring bureaucrats rather than mayors as the central public entrepreneurs, and producing world-scale water, power, port, and bridge mega-projects in the years before World War II.

Notwithstanding a footnote (p. 65) commenting on the unhelpful disconnect between regime theory in urban politics and in international relations, the authors virtually ignore how economic globalization since the 1970s has internationalized the competitive logic and infrastructure priorities of local governments. For example, there is a short treatment of Southern California's Alameda Corridor mega-project creating a separated-grade freight rail link from the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the downtown rail yards. Yet virtually no attention is given to the new globalized trading patterns that have provided a powerful impetus to regional port, trade corridor, and airport development projects, especially during the 1990s. The authors note the arguments for diminishing returns from interstate highway investment since the 1970s, but not the evidence for the increasing regional economic dividends from trade infrastructure investment.

Finally, the authors may be too sanguine concerning the future of urban mega-projects. Voter opposition to publicly subsidized sports stadiums and convention centers is mounting. Dwindling federal transportation dollars threaten to sever the surface transportation alliance between highway and mass transit interests. Strained federal and state government budgets may not recover for years. For critical trade infrastructure, security, not capital investment, is the new watch-word. Despite these caveats, Mega-Projects is a major contribution to urban development policy and should attract a broad interdisciplinary scholarly audience, as well as urban policymakers and stakeholders.