The renewed interest in work in political theory has given a common focus to an otherwise temperamentally, methodologically, and ideologically diverse group of scholars. That work should be fertile ground for different modes of inquiry is not surprising, touching as it does so many branches of social science, from economics to anthropology. Julia Maskivker's recent Self-Realization and Justice nicely illustrates the benefits of working across political theory's methodological boundaries. Although she owes more to Rawls than the history of political thought, her book is shaped by a serious engagement with figures as varied as Aristotle, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Thus the book should be of interest to not only analytic political theorists but also those engaged in historical or textual studies—and empirical scholars interested in inequality. Maskivker's book argues that self-realization is a human good that is within the purview of distributive justice, and that a right to the freedom from employment is the means by which this good should be made accessible.
After an introduction and overview of the book, the first step of Maskivker's argument is to establish that self-realization is the type of good that properly falls within the sphere of distributive justice. Drawing on empirical literature in psychology and sociology, Maskivker calls the drive for self-realization an intrinsic “human need to develop and refine our talents” (18). While higher-order goods like self-realization have too often been considered dependent on variation in taste or preferences, she calls it a human need. But Maskivker's argument does not support a Universal Basic Income, which is neutral with regard to vision of the good life. By contrast, Maskivker supports a Participation Income that would furnish “the opportunity to engage in non-economically productive, yet worthwhile activities” (6). In other words, her argument aims to support undervalued talents rather than those who prefer to withdraw from society altogether.
In addition to the Aristotelian emphasis on self-realization and human flourishing, the book also defends a seemingly republican account of freedom. For Maskivker, allowing the labor market to assess the value of talents is an injustice. Some areas of competence are highly valued while others are not demanded at all. She argues that the labor market's unequal distribution of the value of work vitiates claims that freedom from employment validates “free-riding.” On her account, people with unmarketable talents are at an arbitrary disadvantage because their opportunities for self-realization are not “independent of the choices or preferences of others” (44). Without a mechanism to participate in the creation of its rules, the labor market forecloses opportunity for people with undervalued talents. Thus the norms of reciprocity do not imply an obligation to participate in a “cooperative scheme” whose basic rules have a “substantive bias” in favor of those “with the most power, luck, or strategic advantage” (74). Lest she be accused of arguing that the state support loafers, idlers, and cheats, Maskivker defends the Participation Income as a mechanism to decouple income and employment while still requiring citizens to develop their talents and aptitudes. Providing citizens with a reasonable exit from work would imply an obligation to “pay back society with some sort of meaningful contribution,” especially those that are not “valued by the market” (125).
The book's guiding spirit is Bertrand Russell, and accordingly its explicit ideal is not “meaningful work” but “meaningful leisure.” Throughout, the main beneficiaries of her argument seem to be not unemployed factory workers, those who care for the young and old, or the range of contingent and precarious workers, but artists, intellectuals, and respectable flaneurs. Thus liberated, these individuals would serve the public interest by elevating the leisure of others, allowing citizens to abjure “vacuous idleness” and “use their time smartly” (129). Some readers will be troubled by this conclusion. Fortifying the arts and elevating public culture is certainly a worthwhile goal, yet some might wonder whether such a balm for the soul is as important as a boon to the wallet. For them, regulation of the labor market might be a more effective means of redressing its substantive bias. On this analysis, raising the minimum wage and providing more generous unemployment benefits might be better ways of stimulating a more egalitarian labor market.
All the same, Maskivker's argument is powerful, particularly in light of empirical research in the social sciences on inequality. Sociologists, economists, and political scientists have noted that the dispersion of wealth not only is profoundly unequal, but also is partially explained by changes in the economy that accord higher value to specific skills, training, and credentials related to the finance sector. More important, these changes are the result of political decisions that systematically excluded the input of some stakeholders in favor of others (see especially Greta R. Krippner, Capitalizing on the Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance [Harvard University Press, 2012]). In other words, empirical work confirms the assumptions about the labor market that underpin Maskivker's argument. Whether or not readers are led by the facts to the same conclusions, her analysis of the normative issues at stake should engage further conversation and debate.
All told, the book is a welcome contribution to an exciting and growing literature on issues around work. Although students of distributive justice will feel most at home with Maskivker's methodology, those working in the history of political thought will find her engagements with thinkers such as Aristotle, Smith, Hume, Mill, Russell, and Hayek stimulating and suggestive. Regardless of methodology, political theorists should be thinking more about work, what it means, who should do it, and under what conditions. Maskivker's book is a good place to start.
