My book tells the story of the rise and fall of anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Judaism. In her review, Dr. Ben Shitrit lamented the disappearance of this unique brand of modern Jewish identity, which she referred to as “tragic” — and the circumstances that led to its fall were certainly horrific. In order to understand why this anti-Zionist movement was unable to regain its strength after the Holocaust, whereas the more moderate parts of ultra-Orthodoxy were able to rebuild, it is important to explain the somber chain of events that led to its fall.

There were some two to three million ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews living in East Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, according to my estimations. At that time, this was a movement in retreat: Jewish youth were attracted to secularism and seemed to prefer many modern alternatives to the religious way of life, including Socialism, Zionism, and the Bund (Jewish labor party). The most prominent and promising option for the youth was emigration, but it was well-known that immigrants who left Europe would abandon the observant way of life. Jews who wanted to begin a new life in America also desired to become American in their looks and lifestyle. Many immigrants to the United States worked on the Sabbath, the Jewish day of rest, and did not follow the kosher dietary laws. Jews who immigrated to Mandatory Palestine at that time were not much different in their attitude toward observing the Jewish laws, and the Zionist movement was known as anti-religious, although this was more a matter of image than policy.

In reaction, many ultra-Orthodox leaders advised their followers not to emigrate outside Europe. Ultra-Orthodoxy stood firm against any type of change, whether it was secularization or immigration. The leaders of this movement believed that they could survive the anti-Semites, just as Jews had survived hostile regimes in the past. They failed to anticipate the cruelty and brutality of the Nazis and their assessment of anti-Semitism proved dramatically incorrect. They could not envision Auschwitz — though who could?

After the Second World War, this movement was beaten and defeated. It lost most of its followers to the crematoriums, and even those who survived were angry and hostile. The most famous example is the author and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Elie Wiesel, who describes in his novel Night that as a young boy he grew up in a Hungarian Hasidic family but after the war renounced his belief in God. After the war, ultra-Orthodoxy rebuilt itself in two major centers: New York City and the State of Israel. Its main concerns were to increase its numbers in order to regain its former size while remaining a strict religious anti-modern community. In order to secure this goal, ultra-Orthodoxy decided to adopt a pragmatic approach to politics and join the political process in order to benefit from what liberal states can offer religious minorities.

In Israel, ultra-Orthodox supporters had two options to choose from. One was the anti-Zionist Neturei Karta, the movement that my book discusses in detail. This movement rejected the existence of the state and constantly demonstrated against it. The other option was Agudat Yisrael, which decided to join the political process, establish a political party, and even join coalition governments in order to receive political power and influence. The second path won so overwhelmingly that Neturei Karta has almost completely disappeared and now numbers no more than a handful of followers. By comparison, ultra-Orthodoxy in Israel in 1948 was no more than a couple of thousand followers. Today, it is estimated at about one million strong. The sharp rise of this community can be understood with regards to its moderate political stand, which allowed it to collect many benefits from the state, mostly by exempting its children from military service and by generous financial support from the state to its educational institutions.

In New York, meanwhile, two major Hasidic courts were established after the war: Chabad and Satmar. In the case of Chabad, a major transformation has taken place. The last Rebbe of Chabad, Menachem Mendel Schneersohn, was an anti-Zionist prior to the war. In 1951, he took control over the Hasidic court, and during this process, he softened his opposition and shifted his focus to outreach to non-observant Jews. Chabad has adopted right-wing politics and hawkish views on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their anti-Zionism has turned into ultra-nationalism. Satmar, on the other hand, remained an anti-Zionist movement, and its leader Yoel Teitelbaum changed little in the wake of the War. Satmar has attracted those who supported this type of political engagement. This is currently the only anti-Zionist option available to ultra-Orthodox Jews. All other branches of Jewish Orthodoxy in the United States have become enthusiastic supporters of the State of Israel, and many also hold hawkish opinions.

In conclusion, practical considerations have over-ruled ideological rigidity. This was the conclusion many ultra-Orthodox followers reached as a result of their new conditions after the Holocaust. Their main consideration was the survival of their way of life and their demographic growth. The way to achieve this, they concluded, was to take advantage of the benefits one can have from being a loyal citizen of a liberal democracy, to the point that Satmar could even endorse a woman (Hillary Clinton) as candidate for president. Realpolitik won over ideological purism.