This book has now come to its end. The motivation for writing this book was originally triggered by the social turn toward benevolent authoritarianism, which has led me to examine the interdependency between rights-based identities and the identity of the democratic State for the realization of rights.
8.1 Legal Life
With the CRC, law has shown itself capable of creating legal life independent of a social context. The delinking of law from its social context is made possible in child rights because, in contrast to CEDAW and CERD, the CRC is not constructed as a protection against discrimination. The child in the CRC is based on the legal definition of age alone. Contrary to what might be thought, the absence of legal life is not social death. Law casts its shadow over every aspect of modern Western life. Rather, to not have a legal life means to exist in the shadows of law. The consequences of law then will affect every part of your life, but you will not have the capacity to affect what is coming your way. The relation between the individual and the State is one made from law. Without legal life, you will not be a part of the only mode through which the State must engage with predictability and security in relation to individuals. This mode takes the form of claims as rights and obligations. It is therefore no small matter that adults fighting on behalf of children were able to create a legally binding treaty giving children legal life with the adoption of the CRC in 1989.
8.2 A Monist Identity
The CRC created its own legal life with the help of age, not from any reflection of social life as socially constructed identities are made, but rather from the movements of the Earth circling the Sun. The CRC came up with an identity independent of the social construction by relying on a place outside the control of the social. This identity relies only on one single data point – age – making the identity free from social life and thus achieving a monist identity construction, bringing the child out from the land of the shadows of law into its center. With the monist identity of the CRC, law on its own made a life and a relationship based on the rights of the child and the obligations of the State. The child identity – now free from abusive and harmful social and traditional practices for its definition – created a new field of both law and advocacy that came to be known as child rights.
8.3 Social Construction
Creating a rights-holding identity free of social construction is a way to avoid embedding the subordination that created a common identity in the first place into the rights themselves. However, there are unexamined ethical and social downsides to a monist construction. The monist construction precludes children’s agency to shape their own identity. The strengths of the feminist movement and the civil rights movement have been the ways in which women and black people through social construction have been able to split open a critique of the social structures and practices that forms the group identities though which rights are being claimed. The reshaping of one’s identity is a central part of the ethics of self-determination. There is no way for children to contest the use of age as the definition of their identity.
The split within identity construction is the site of both internal conflict and contradiction but also of resistance and hope. W. E. B. Du Bois has termed this internal conflict double consciousness. It is the place where one understands the larger social conflict of one’s identity, that what you think of yourself might not be what others see in you, but through your ability to think and give meaning to the world around you, this insight will also help you reshape the society that both traps and makes you what you are. As painful as this is, it also gives resistance a place to anchor from within, to reshape, to challenge the social norms and to redefine oneself. This is what a monist identity construction precludes. What it gains is an indisputable identity and what it loses is an ethics of ambiguity where doubt and openness to be wrong and willingness to redo are made external to the identity construction itself.
8.4 A Perpetual State of Exception
When Sweden decided that it was a humanitarian superpower with a mission to morally lead the world toward greater humanitarianism, the incorporation of the CRC became a symbolic act of significance. It also became important that the incorporation be done without any of the normal democratic safeguards in place that maintained a distinction between Sweden as a sovereign liberal-democratic State and its role as a humanitarian superpower in the international community. This meant the elimination of a correlation between the hierarchy or norms and levels of public authorities when interpreting the direct applicability and meaning of the CRC in concrete cases. As a humanitarian superpower, it was not possible to acknowledge that there could be any distinction between the interest of the UN Committee monitoring the CRC and the Swedish State as represented by the public authorities. This is how Sweden ended up with individual police officers conducting judicial review on the police statute with the help of the CRC.
The question of where the child rights movement gains its authority to represent children remains unanswered. Who granted this movement the legitimacy to argue for major social and political changes on behalf of children, especially where there is no requirement from within the child rights movement itself to have children as part of its movement? What makes one set of adults better equipped than another set of adults to argue for radical social change that carries large social costs, to prefer a benevolent authoritarianism to a democratic legal order? This freedom of individual police officers to conduct judicial review and individual civil servants in concrete cases is not only permitted but now also obligated as per the instruction for how Sweden incorporated the CRC. It might have been possible to turn a blind eye to this as it was a case of benevolent, and not a malevolent, authoritarianism when the Swedish commitment to democracy was considered unshakable. Now that Sweden has abandoned its identity as a humanitarian superpower with the last election and instead made the former neo-Nazi-associated Swedish Democrats the second-largest political party in Sweden, the dismantled democratic safeguards that were made in the name of child rights, remain dismantled even when Sweden no longer sees itself as a humanitarian superpower and the second-largest political party is questioning democracy as foundational for all people within Swedish society.
8.5 The Universalism of Positivism
One way to control and “win” an argument is by not making the counterargument possible to articulate, to eliminate any possibility of doubt or conflict via exclusion of the counterargument. At the center of the international community is the split interest of the sovereign State. The international order is characterized by the idea that the State compromises between its concrete short-term and abstract long-term interests to preserve human rights.
Where international child rights advocates will push for the eradication or at least drastic softening of the sovereign veil that prevents them from fully accessing the individual child within the State, they also risk dismantling the understanding that as a rights regime child rights is dependent on the State as an object of suspicion – both as the only recognized violator of rights and its protector. The CRC, with its monist child-rights construction that does not have any children (on whose behalf one argues) capable of articulating a different set of priorities, is exceptionally well suited to this type of universalizing positivist push, made possible not by natural law but by the positivist argument that the CRC is almost universally ratified, with only the United States standing outside the treaty today.
The question of whether child rights are a part of universal human rights or if child rights constitute their own universalism is important to answer from the perspective of democracy. If child rights are their own universalism, without the possibility of relying on the domestic constitutional and democratically established protected freedoms, we need to identify where child rights derive their source of authority. Ronald Dworkin’s definition of positive rights rejects the idea that rights preexist legislation.Footnote 1 Kaarlo Tuori points out that it is the deliberate decision to make law that is the most significant characteristic of positive law.Footnote 2 Other characteristics of liberal positivist law are that law is both descriptive and prescriptive, both objective and subjective; in other words, dual and not monist.Footnote 3
8.6 The Identity of the State
Just as I began this book about the child-rights identity the world took a sharp turn. At first, I thought it was a turn to the right, but I now think it took a turn into the right’s side ditch of the road. Strongmen such as Trump, Orbàn, Modi, and Erdogan came to power. Sweden followed suite with the Swedish Democrats. Scholars and writers from a large spectrum of the Western world have in an amazingly short time begun the production of a self-critical archive in defense of democracy with a voice of urgency that the literature on democracy usually does not possess.Footnote 4
I initially did not understand how the authoritarian desire to elect anti-democrats was not limited to a right–left binary. The desire of this type of political agenda is in large part a politically right agenda, but there are also peculiar elements that are shared by the left and then often made in the name of human rights and in particular child rights. The benevolent authoritarian impulse that ended in the eagerness to comply with the UN Committee monitoring the CRC has been lingering for a long time outside the right–left binary; it instead cuts across with its own version of “us or them,” measured in the dedication to the child rights regime itself. This takes the shape of the benevolent authoritarian. What is good and what is bad will be defined by the “us” or “them” binary, rather than by ontological definitions of what is good and what is bad, and democratic safeguards will be seen as bad when they go against an expansion of the child rights regime as defined by the UN Committee.
The turn into the ditch happened about the same time that my daughter was coming of age, and the youth literature taking place in futuristic fantasy lands and places became part of an imaginary world we discussed at home. What was striking in this literature was how the fight in these imaginary societies always seemed to take place between authoritarian good and authoritarian evil forces. It was seldom that the solution against oppression in the books was that people installed a democratic national parliament and called a national election to settle the issue. I asked my daughter if she did not think that it was odd that her books in general did not look to democracy as a method for settling conflicts between divergent interests addressing people’s most fundamental rights, instead of everyone running out into the forest to fight. She explained to me that democratic processes would not make much of an action story. She is probably correct about that, but another thing is also correct, namely that legislation through national democratically elected parliaments for solving the social problems of the day is not seen as very capable in fulfilling its task, since the democratic legislative process is not only slow but also very often ambivalent. The challenge of the climate crisis is not only a factual challenge, but also the democratic challenge of our time. Democratic processes and parliaments are not necessarily well equipped to respond to crisis, as was demonstrated by Tingsten in his study of the 1930s when these parliaments transferred their power to the executives of the State. What Tingsten did not know when he wrote his study of the transfer of democratic powers to the executives in the 1930s was that a Second World War was to break out where the battle between good and evil was to shine brightly, and still the support for the Nazis in Europe was overwhelming. The climate crisis will not come to an end anytime soon and any such transfer of power from parliament to the executive or the Courts can easily be understood as benevolent and possibly a necessity. I am not comparing the Nazis with the climate crisis but I am comparing what might come in the wake of the reactions to the effort to fight the climate crisis. Democratic processes lend themselves to doubt and ambiguity in search of nuance while authoritarian acts that seem sure of themselves are not met with the same level of scrutiny – this despite the fact that the social problems that authoritarians were asked to resolve seem to persist even after their governance – Trump’s America is not greater after the American people voted him out and, at the same time, the social problems that began under the Democrats’ watch persist as well. I began to see that what authoritarianism abhors, regardless of whether benevolent or malevolent, is ambivalence, and that within this, there is an urge toward monism, not only in the creation of the child-rights identity but also in law in general. Democracy is an ambivalent process, as embedded within it is the idea that the counterargument might be correct.
I now believe that the move into the ditch cannot be measured within a scale of right-to-left, but instead is a fundamental shift in how we see the world, and it is much more connected to a sense of urgency and emergency than a straight line between right and left political positions. It is not only in child rights that one is trying to eliminate ambiguity, or the possibility for internal critique. The authoritarian wave currently sweeping across the world is not a movement between the right and the left, the unwillingness to accept ambiguity is not a right–left trait but rather a question of efficiency, absent the willingness to spend the time it takes on deliberation in the hope of identifying the nuances of a problem and having the courage to carry doubt and at times to be wrong – and to admit being wrong. The impulse to monism not only appears in the CRC, even though the CRC was the first clear human rights treaty to express this, and it is not an impulse that is seen only in Sweden but it is also an impulse invoked about rights and law in general, when ambiguity and deliberation are seen as standing in the way of the desired outcomes, regardless of whether they be right or left on the spectrum.
8.7 Complex Intersectionality
The monist child rights construction is effective, and it has a valid purpose to shield child from the harmful practices and traditions that serve to justify the abuse of children, whether that be child spanking or female genital mutilation. There are many good reasons for using a monist construction. However, the downsides to this construction must be addressed through policy and legislation. At the heart of the critique against a monist construction is the idea of inclusion. One important way in which agency and the structural social inequalities can become a part of the child rights movement is through the complex intersectionality between the monist construction of the child identity, by allowing for the socially constructed identities that comes with gender, race and sexual orientation. Child rights theory and advocacy can find agency through complex intersectionality without losing the important protection of the monist child-rights identity construction.
8.8 Conclusion
The adoption of the CRC by the General Assembly in 1989 is a historical statement of the hope and joy experienced by the world at the end of the Cold War.In this respect, it is a symbol of unity, one that reflects for the first time in generations a global gathering around a common agenda for children of the world, built not on religion but on human rights. It is in this spirit that one is to understand the monist construction of the child and the exclusion of cultural and sociological determinants in the construction of the child-rights identity.
However, before we begin to argue for any further expansion of the child rights regime, we must make a fundamental choice about power, whether it be authoritarian or democratic, before even getting to the point of arguing for a concrete child rights agenda. The monist child-rights identity makes child rights into a regime without a concrete body, absent a body for individual free will to anchor within and to legitimize both freedom and its limit. This also means that the child-rights identity cannot be adjusted by the very person holding the rights that come with the identity. This, the ability to define and contest one’s assigned identity has been at the center of the evolving democratic national State during the whole of the struggles during the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries for social equality and against structural identity-based inequality of oppressed groups of people. This power to self-identify and to contest assigned belongingness is withheld from children – as defined by the CRC.
This lack of a required body and will for the identity construction of the child means there is no place from which the child rights movement – which purportedly represents children, yet is led by self-appointed adults – can open itself up to an internal critique and seek adjustment as a movement. Invulnerable to the forms of internal critique that normally help other social movements to evolve and remain significant social actors for social justice and change over time, the child rights movement faces increasing irrelevance for the very subjects it intends to serve.
A grave consequence of the monist child-rights identity – and its difficulty of representation when confronted by the requirements of a democratic legal order – is that it becomes impossible to find the legitimate interpreter for the drastic societal changes it calls for. Once a nation abides by a legal definition of its subjects that is external to its own political process, the law can no longer be changed through political, democratic means. This tendency is further exacerbated when a nation-state such as Sweden decides to take on a monist approach to law itself by building its national identity on international human rights, rather than on its own democratic legal order.
My claim differs from what is often described as system fragmentation, wherein human rights break through the sovereign veil through national court systems or the regional courts. Rather, I am describing a paradigmatic shift in law itself: the elimination of the duality of the subject identity of the nation-state when it no longer distinguishes between moral rights and law. Even in theory, there is no place for democratic political expression through legislation or lawmaking within the CRC regime. The only way for human rights to be part of a democratic legal order is by being governed by democratic institutions that can challenge the monist subject construction, whether it be formed by national identity or by the CRC. Monism should be challenged so that it does not fall into authoritarianism and away from democracy.
Despite all the shortcomings of the CRC and its monist construction of the child-rights identity, its weakness is in a way also its very strength. Even if these children and young people in the underserved immigrant areas were never included in the imagining of who was to hold child rights, the children in these areas – regardless of what they have done or where they come from – are equal holders of rights with every other child. When all society’s resources and goodwill are emptied out, it turns out that these rights are the only weak but possible resource that, if well mobilized, remain as a resource for the child who has neither individual capital nor communal status. Therefore, I will end this book by again calling for child rights scholars and participants in child rights advocacy to examine what from a Gramscian perspective would be a false hegemonic image of children, representing a very narrow span of children and interests. I want to refer to the original reason for my choice of using the narrative method and its historical link to critical race theory (CRT) as my methodology throughout this book. The origin of CRT is when Bell chose the concrete child over the dogma of the civil rights movement when he questioned whether they could serve two masters at the same time. Bell does not reject the civil rights struggle and its goals, but he is critical of the movement’s blind spots to the downsides and costs of their agenda. When Bell asks if the movement could serve both his clients, the individual black children he represented as a civil rights lawyer, and the wider national interest to desegregate racist American schools, he responded with the hope of advancing a dialogue within the black and civil rights community for how to address this conflict between the children he represented and the nation. As a result, he sparked a whole new way of looking at law and social justice that rejuvenated the civil rights movement into what was to become a new way of looking at rights and intersectionality. My hope is that this book on child rights, legal theory and social advocacy, despite at times being critical, will be understood as mostly critical of the most significant blind spot within child rights, how monism precludes agency and self-identification for children to truly own their rights-holding identity. For adults to demonstrate to children the value of democracy, children must be able to reap its benefits. Central to modern democracy is the power of playing a part in the shaping of one’s own identity as it relates to the larger society. As the CRC now stands, it does not allow for this.
