The intent, execution, problems, and eventual state-led solutions of India's early industrial project after Independence have been a perennial source of inquiry and consternation among historians of contemporary India. It was clear that Jawaharlal Nehru and many of the other founding fathers of newly independent India imagined a large role for the state in the ambitious industrial plan put forward by the government. But what was also clear was that the majority of the existing industrial capital stock in the country after Independence was in private hands. The primary form of this ownership was through Indian and British equity in managing agencies and their complicated holdings in various upstream and downstream concerns.
Since India's spate of nationalizations did not occur until the late 1960s, there was a twenty-year transitional period after Independence in 1947 where continual bargaining took place between the government and private-sector companies about how the aspirational Five-Year Plans put forward by the government would be executed. Pricing power, production licensing, growth targets, foreign aid agreements, and more were all determined by the government, but very few state-owned enterprises were in operation during this early period. Consequently, without private-sector cooperation, the government's ability to implement production programs was extremely limited. Could the government influence a small, inexperienced, and possibly reluctant capitalist class? Could private businessmen be convinced to internalize the longer-term goals required by industrialization? How could the government encourage businessmen to act in accordance with the Five-Year Plans without seeming too authoritarian? And why, ultimately, were the first three Five-Year Plans relatively unsuccessful, necessitating state intervention? It is this space that Nasir Tyabji's book occupies.
Covering the period from 1940 to 1970, Tyabji conducts historical event studies around important moments in the government-business relationship. After giving an overview of the capital accumulation processes and the laws that governed managing agencies during the colonial period, he proceeds to discuss one of the first big public debates over the role of the private sector in India: the Bombay Plan. Released in 1944, the Bombay Plan was a preemptive public document published by some of the leaders of Indian industry (including G. D. Birla and J. R. D. Tata) comprising their views on the planning process, their visions for the private sector's role in the economy, the relative importance of various industries, and what may be appropriate fiscal outlays by the government. The intent and sincerity of the Bombay Plan have been considered by many academics, particularly in light of the personal papers of the authors that have become available in the last fifteen to twenty years. In contrast to Vivek Chibber's relatively cynical view of Indian businessmen's intent in Locked in Place (2006), Tyabji maintains that the Bombay Plan was meant as a genuine policy prescription, and retroactively, the influence of big business can be seen in the fact that the financial allocations of the first three Five-Year Plans mirrored the Bombay Plan quite closely. But the real value in much of this book comes from the author's discourse analysis of various publications, domestic and international, that critique and debate the Bombay Plan and other events.
From the Bombay Plan, Tyabji moves on to a series of measures taken on tax policy that increased tension in the business-state relationship: first the interim government's budget in 1947, and then a series of investigations into tax avoidance and fraudulent practices of companies. The first budget session by the interim government in 1947 met with a walkout by most businessmen (who were also members of Parliament) on the topics of price controls, high postprofit tax rates, and other forms of potentially excessive government control. Effectively, this was the first big face-off where the business class showed its national power; stock exchanges were closed, industrialist-owned newspapers went on the offensive, and Nehru was ultimately forced to capitulate to the budgetary demands made by the business community.
Following the walkout, a further series of skirmishes took place in the 1950s as the income and sales tax departments narrowed in on various companies that were evading taxes and intentionally underreporting production, sales, and profits. These events comprise one of the most interesting parts of the book, as Tyabji's access to the elusive Nehru papers reveals how much the prime minister had to cover up in his early years for big businessmen, both with his own ministers and the state-level chief ministers. Even big houses like the Birlas and Tatas were guilty of evasion during this period. But more egregious cases emerged in the case of Sholapur Mills, in the Dalmia-Jain and Mundhra episodes, and where members of the “merchant-usury” class—who had incidentally come into industrial ownership in the postwar period—essentially financially gutted perfectly productive industrial resources. “Rather than using their accumulated capital in greenfield investments, they were engaged in the takeover of existing companies. This practice enabled them to evade evolution into industrial capitalists” (p. 128). Some of these gutted companies were so large that their too-big-to-fail nature forced government bailouts to prevent mass unemployment and social unrest. The details of these affairs as revealed through the personal letters of the highest political officeholders in India certainly force readers to recast their image of the captains of industry during India's early Independence.
Ultimately, Tyabji's and Chibber's narratives converge in that India's businessmen are found lacking during this period. Tyabji writes, “While Birla could adjust to the new circumstances, other businessmen, presumably deeply enmeshed in the usurious, speculative, and commercial modes of operation, could not easily do so” (p. 145). After the first twenty years of attempted social engineering by the Indian government, public sentiment toward private companies had eroded to such an extent that state intervention became necessary, in a much more hands-on way: through nationalization and abolition of managing agencies. Tyabji's book is a welcome addition to a relatively thin literature supporting state intervention. In postliberalizaiton India, perhaps the untrammelled praise of private enterprise needs to be reconsidered in this light.
