Edmund Husserl’s last and unfinished book, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936/1954, hereafter referred to as the Crisis), represents a key moment in the phenomenological tradition.Footnote 1 In his late 70s and suffering under the oppression of the National Socialist regime, Husserl realized that his work would remain largely unfinished, and he felt misunderstood or abandoned by many whom he had foreseen as the future of his movement, “phenomenology.” He found himself in a world engulfed in moral, spiritual, and philosophical crises, a world dizzied by the success of science and technology. The moment thus called for a defense of transcendental philosophy and for an expansion of phenomenology, and Husserl responded with a courageous reflection on the sciences and human culture that continues to fuel research in phenomenology. In the Crisis, Husserl—who had “lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence” (cited at p. 19)—reorients phenomenology toward history, the life-world, and a more robust account of intersubjectivity.
And yet, as Dermot Moran notes, the text is an “unfinished masterpiece.” Husserl had planned to write six parts, but during his lifetime he only published two of the three parts we now call the Crisis. His assistants and editor compiled Part III, and also included several lectures and fragmentary essays related to the direction of the project. As less a book than a patchwork of writings from 1934–1937, the Crisis is the perfect candidate for an “explanatory and critical introduction,” and there could not be a better guide than Moran’s introduction. Moran’s book is simultaneously an accessible introduction for non-specialists, an impressive contribution on the history of phenomenology, and an invaluable reference for students and scholars of Husserl. I strongly recommend this companion to anyone reading Husserl’s Crisis or seeking a deeper understanding of phenomenology in general.
Moran begins with an excellent survey that locates the Crisis in Husserl’s overall corpus. Indeed, the Crisis breaks new ground and introduces concepts that contrast with Husserl’s earlier “Cartesian” approach to phenomenology. Phenomenology, as Moran writes, is “the descriptive science of consciously lived experiences and the objects of those experiences, described precisely in the manner in which they are experienced” (4). Understanding the fundamental structure of intentionality—that is, the manner in which all consciousness is consciousness of something—required a rigorous method: the phenomenological reduction or the epochē, a “bracketing off” of our theories about the objects that appear to allow a pure description of the noetic act (intending) and noematic object (intended) that make up any conscious experience. Yet given the resulting perspective of the “transcendental ego” of the Cartesian approach, intersubjectivity and the shared life-world seemed difficult to account for. The Crisis offers a radically new approach to phenomenology, a “genetic” phenomenology. And yet, as Moran adeptly insists, for Husserl nothing of phenomenology had essentially changed in the Crisis, even if a new pathway was being opened through history and the life-world.
But what is this “crisis”? Facing the progress in science and technology, as well as the political barbarism emerging after WWI, Western culture had, according to Husserl (sounding like Weber), lost a sense of wonder for universal philosophy. This was coupled with a commitment to naturalism that had led to an utter failure to account for the “subjective contribution to the experience of the world” (9). Transcendental phenomenology thereby promised a single medicine for all cultural crises. Philosophers, when properly practicing as phenomenologists, have a responsibility to act as the “functionaries of humankind” (8) called to unravel crises by working out the very essence of European rationality. “Europe,” under Husserl’s pen, is not a political entity or ethnic category, but the teleological structure of Western rationality. Uncovering the instituting moments of European culture amounts to a “critique of pure reason” (36) and a defense of “universal critical rationalism” (14).
After an excellent chapter on Husserl’s life and writings, Moran provides a “toolbox” for reading this “unfinished masterpiece,” including discussions of the method of Rückfragen (backward questioning), “self-reflection,” “sense-bestowal,” “intentionality,” and several other key concepts. This is followed by Moran’s careful and lucid exploration of Husserl’s critique of modern science (Chapter 3, 66–98). As Moran rightly emphasizes, Husserl traces the sense of modern science back to Galileo’s “mathematization of nature,” thereby offering an “intentional history”: “Husserl’s intellectual reconstruction involves recovering the scientist’s own motivations and, indeed, also revealing what other forces were at work on him” (74). Galileo established modern science by approaching it as “entirely amenable to exact quantification” (76), while simultaneously rejecting perception and experience as secondary and merely subjective. Linked to Newton and Descartes, then, Galileo’s name henceforth invokes the radical shift in modern metaphysics where nature and mind are definitively split apart. Moran is also able to draw upon Husserl’s other late writings, such as the famous “Origin of Geometry” fragment, thus capturing the flavor of this entire phase of Husserl’s thought.
Chapter 4, “The crisis in psychology,” is a valuable exploration of Husserl’s attempt to establish phenomenology as a radical new science of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Husserl finds psychology in “permanent crisis” because of its erroneous naturalism, and Moran offers a convincing study of Husserl’s critique of psychology as well as a further clarification of Husserl’s notions of intersubjectivity and embodiment. The following chapter takes up Husserl’s account of history, which includes: the notion of the teleological progression of philosophy itself, “the existential structures of human culture” (156), the role of communalization (154), and the concept of “institution.” A phenomenology of the sense of history is required since, as Moran puts it, “[o]ne cannot live genuinely in a world where progress and disappointment are taken as mere arbitrary happenings” (163). This requires a return to the Greek theoretical attitude (against myth and tradition), and all of humanity, then, is metaphorically and metaphysically called to “Europe” as the telos of humanity, and as the universal form of reason.
The Lebenswelt, or the life-world, (discussed by Moran in Chapter 6), is an iconic concept from Husserl’s late works. The life-world is the world of experience, the world given to the natural attitude, and the very foundation of every gesture in the natural sciences. Any student of Husserl’s will appreciate the careful discussion of the enduring influence of the “life-world” in phenomenology and beyond (215-17). Moran’s book ends with two important chapters on phenomenology as a completion of what Husserl called his “transcendental-phenomenological idealism,” terms that he had fitted “with completely new meanings” (219). Indeed, transcendental phenomenology is meant to provide the grounding that can resolve the paradox that humans are “subjects ‘for the world’ and also objects ‘in the world’” (223). This leads to intersubjectivity and the constitution of the ego as essentially consistent across Husserl’s late work. There is, in short, no way of thinking of “being in itself” without thinking the structures of “constituting subjectivity,” and there is no way of thinking of subjectivity without revealing the subject as always already caught up in intersubjective and pre-reflective activities constituting the world as such.
Any student of the history of philosophy will want to study the Crisis carefully, both for its historical significance and for its continuing influence, and Moran’s introduction is the perfect companion.
