There is something embarrassing about money. Everybody is seeking it but at the same time they are reluctant to talk about their bank balances and stock holdings. As a society we have so much of it that we can install 7000 saffron curtains all over Central Park, send tourists into outer space, and analyze the gas on the surface of Titan, yet we fail to spend it on millions of poverty-stricken people who die of disease or starvation each year. We do open our pocketbooks sometimes, but only when television images of massive destruction overwhelm our sensibilities. Money often dominates our consciousness and bombards us in the headlines: Our national debt is 7.7 trillion dollars and it's increasing by more than 2 billion dollars a day; corporate executives of Enron walk away with millions while their employees lose their jobs and their pensions; and we had an endless fascination with Martha Stewart, who is worth millions, but went to jail trying to save a few thousand.
We would like to think that medicine is on a higher plane, above the hurly burly of the marketplace, yet headlines every day make us wonder whether commerce has intruded excessively. We read that negative studies have been suppressed, that high-level researchers at the NIH have received payments from industry that may have compromised their judgment, and that confidential information from ongoing clinical trials may have been leaked by researchers who were being paid to talk to investors and that some doctors accept bribes in exchange for using devices or prescribing drugs.
How we go about getting money and how we spend it is a critical reflection of our values. Every budget, from one in the smallest household to our federal government's reflects not only our needs, but also our desires, our wishes, our altruism, and our beneficient leanings. On a national level we are making value judgments when we provide tax cuts to stimulate business and at the same time cut preschool education programs, when we merge businesses and then to enhance profitability lay off thousands of workers, and when we risk damage to the environment to satisfy our insatiable demand for oil.
Many of us were brought up thinking (and singing) that money is the root of all evil. Needless to say, money itself is not inherently evil, yet its powerful influences affect us, whether we admit it or not. In its simplest terms, money can draw us away from important duties and responsibilities. As Jacob Needleman has taught us, money should be a secondary consideration in the pursuit of being human, yet it sometimes takes a primary position in our thinking.1
Needleman J. Money and the Meaning of Life, 1st ed. New York: Currency Doubleday; 1991:319.
In medicine the magnetism of money is a corrupter. It draws us toward self-gratification and away from concern for the welfare of the patient. For more than 2000 years we have relied on a countervailing force to blunt the corrupting power, namely professionalism, crudely described as a personal responsibility to put the best interests of the patient uppermost. Yet even in past times when medicine was not a highly paid profession, the schism between the doctor as businessman and professional was well recognized, as Al Jonsen aptly documents.
So is medicine a business or a profession? How does medicine stack up as a business? How are doctors faring, and what are the pressures on them? Have professional values managed to keep the patient at the top of the deck or has money trumped professionalism? Let us start by examining the influence that money has had on the organization and practice of medicine.
Although there may be no career as satisfying as one in medicine, there may be no profession today in as much turmoil. Nearly every day there is a new revelation about doctors who treat only patients who pay up front, about doctors who move from state to state to avoid huge malpractice bills, about doctors who have quit their practices to become investment analysts. Even the main characters in this disruptive drama change as less-skilled practitioners including nurses, pharmacists, opticians, and so-called complementary and alternative medicine practitioners show that they perform useful, less expensive tasks in convenient settings, win reimbursement for these services, and get expanded roles that encroach on those traditionally relegated to doctors.
Doctors face numerous conflicting goals: on the one hand, providing better treatments, increasing the range of services offered, improving patients' quality of life, communicating better with patients and families, and increasing patients' satisfaction, and on the other, reducing the use of services, increasing efficiency, shortening the time spent with each patient, providing only effective care, and containing costs. The latest wrinkle is “pay-for-performance,” an idea that has found favor at the federal level. Paying physicians to provide high quality care is not an inherently bad idea, but it puts the focus even further on money as a prime goal in patient care.
A small number of doctors are quite satisfied with their practices, mostly those who demand cash up front before seeing a patient, the highly paid specialists, and a few who exploit the vanity of well-heeled patients who want to look forever young and seek those Botox and collagen injections. Yet many physicians are disgruntled, retiring early, and seeking other careers. Hassles with insurance companies are a daily experience, paperwork is staggering, and to deal with stagnant incomes, primary care physicians, many of whom leave medical school with debts greater than $100,000, work longer hours and squeeze more patients into their already busy schedules. It's hardly surprising that there is a large flight of young people away from primary care specialties into what are now widely known as “lifestyle specialties”: emergency medicine, hospitalist medicine, anesthesiology, dermatology, and radiology.
During the last few decades of the 20th century when the science of medicine reached new heights, the role and authority of physicians has ebbed. At one time, physicians were the major players on the national scene in the organization and delivery of healthcare, yet even though many have moved into leadership positions in major healthcare institutions, their voices and influence on policy issues, including reimbursement, healthcare coverage, and the structure of the delivery system, have been muted. How did this happen?
In my opinion, money has been a major factor, with the public having gained the impression that physicians and professional organizations have been far too self-serving. For several decades, organized medicine has mounted a persistent and rigid resistance to national health insurance, an insistence on preserving lucrative self-referrals, and a repeated focus on squeezing the profits out of the system by preserving uncontrolled fee-for-service reimbursement. These efforts have made us look more like a guild than a profession.
The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid heightened these attitudes. After having tried to obstruct these initiatives, we settled right in to use them to our advantage. When we were paid in a fee-for-service system, we did little or nothing to reduce the irrational use of expensive diagnostic tests, some of us ordered tests just to increase revenues, and we successfully frustrated multiple efforts to contain costs. When we have been paid in capitated systems, we were accused of holding back on diagnostic tests and specialist consultations to preserve our own incomes. One could argue that no matter what the payment system, we acted more like rational profit makers, less like professionals.
Whereas in the distant past we devoted part of our practice time to the care of people who had no insurance, we failed to act or even speak out as the number of uninsured grew. We did little about mounting and compelling evidence that socioeconomic factors were among the most important predisposing factors for asthma, diabetes, and lung cancer. We knew about startling variations in practice from one part of the country to another, and even between one doctor and another in the same community, but we continued to practice idiosyncratically, often on the basis of our own personal opinion and experience, and made few efforts to improve the quality of our work. And we have been far too slow—some say miserly—in implementing electronic strategies that protect patients from common medical errors. We've even become cranky when asked to teach, an obligation previously considered almost sacrosanct, and many have begun to demand compensation for their time spent with students and house staff. Money, it seems, mattered more than professional duties.
We also did little to counter the widespread view, outside of medicine, that healthcare should be considered as just another commodity. While we tried to survive in an increasingly competitive system, we sometimes took our eyes off the intended focus of our attention, the human aspects of patient care, while we became engulfed in the latest marketplace concepts such as market share, price competition, business strategies, consumer demand, financial risk, investment capital, and that special, elusive item, the bottom line. We often failed to point out the serious consequences of relying on a free market in medicine, such as the neglect of healthcare for the poor. Market values work well when the product is toothpaste and tomato soup, but certainly not as effectively for healthcare. Imagining that there is a modicum of morality in the marketplace may be as fanciful as believing in the tooth fairy. Although markets are not immoral, as Al Jonsen asserts, they are amoral.
Our willingness to accept the consequences of market values has cost plenty in the quality of patients' experiences with the healthcare system. Care is fragmented as patients move from one health plan to another and from one doctor to another. They may have to wait weeks to see a doctor and when they do, their visits are brief and often restricted to discussion of only one pressing problem rather than the constellation of their clinical problems or the whole nature of their health. When they are admitted to the hospital, their records from elsewhere are often unavailable, and they often end up undergoing the same tests they had only days before. And while patients are undergoing treatment in the hospital, the house staff and clinicians change so often, patients find it impossible to know who is in charge. Finally, once they leave the hospital, even the best informed patients are baffled or overwhelmed by insurance plan benefits, bills, and claims, not to speak of mastering care regimens that in the past were provided in the hospital.
This focus on money has had substantial effect on ourselves and on our patients. There may be no better instantiation of the perverse influence of money and the failure of professionalism to counter these trends than the influence of money from the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device industries.2
Kassirer JP. On the Take: How Medicine's Complicity with Big Business Can Endanger Your Health. New York: Oxford University Press; 2004:251.
Industry also engages physicians in numerous other well-paid activities. They pay doctors to consult with them on marketing as well as scientific issues, for developing educational materials, for becoming members of their speaker's bureaus, for sitting on their boards, and for participating in their research studies. Payment is sometimes in stock or stock options. Once again, because everybody is doing it, few people pause before signing up, especially because the deals are so enticing.
Are these financial arrangements with industry the exception, or are they the rule? Quite frankly, nobody really knows because they are all well hidden. When I first went to the New England Journal of Medicine as Editor-in-Chief in 1991, we only occasionally found it difficult to find unconflicted academics to write editorials, but by the time I left in 1999, it sometimes was necessary to ask five or six people before we found one who had no financial conflicts. One survey several years ago found that about one-quarter of faculty in the life sciences had such arrangements, but in some specialties the number is probably much higher. The disclosure statements of an American College of Cardiology consensus conference on conflict of interest in August 2004 indicated that two-thirds of the cardiologists at the meeting had financial arrangements with industry.3
Popp RL, Smith SC. ACCF/AHA Consensus Conference Report on Professionalism and Ethics. Journal of the American College of Cardiology 2004;44(8):1725–61.
Popeo DJ, Samp RA. Comments of the Washington Legal Foundation to the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education concerning request for comments on the January 14, 2003 Draft “Standards to Ensure the Separation of Promotion From Education Within the CME Activities of ACCME Accredited Providers.” Washington Legal Foundation; 2003 Jan 29.
The problem, of course, is that none of these arrangements is really free. All of them come with some kind of hitch. All of them produce conflicts that put an individual in a position in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest, in this case, financial gain. It is a situation in which an individual has competing interests that cannot be realized simultaneously, and the regard for one duty (in this case, personal finances) tends to lead to disregard of another. In the case of these financial arrangements, making a personal financial choice over a professional one violates a code, a promise, or a professional responsibility. Although conflict of interest does not automatically yield bias, it can.
Many physicians believe that they cannot be bought or even swayed, not by meals, and not even by thousands of dollars of personal income from a company. And there is some rationale for this belief. After all, they have been trained in science to be objective observers, and they have been inculcated in evidence-based medicine, which is based on rigorous evaluation of facts. I wish it were true that they were immune to influence; clearly by spending approximately $16 billion a year on marketing to doctors, the industry acknowledges that doctors can be influenced. To deny it, in my judgment, is to ignore norms of human behavior. A great deal of research has been undertaken recently in psychology that shows that gifts engender an obligation of reciprocity, and that this obligation is not only strongly felt, but is one of the most powerful instruments of influence in our society. The “rule of reciprocation” holds that we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided to us. Favors such as gifts, meals, and invitations obligate us to a future repayment of some kind. We are susceptible to such pressures not only because we have internalized a societal norm of reciprocity but also because we find it unpleasant to be beholden to someone, that is, to be in a chronic state of indebtedness.
Thus, I believe that gifts and monetary payments can and do influence physicians, as they do ordinary people. If true, then what are the principles that should guide us in dealing with financial conflicts in medicine? Here is my list: (1) Financial considerations should never compromise physician decision-making, either in clinical practice or research. (2) Medical information must be kept free of bias from financial entanglements. (3) The profession should be accountable for avoiding an inordinately high cost of care. (4) Assuming that financial ties will continue, all arrangements must be transparent, and as a corollary, attempts must be made to protect patients when there is a risk of harm.
Are we living up to these principles? Are these conflicts actually affecting our primary responsibility?
Let us look at a few examples, one that involves practice guidelines, a second, a research study, and a third, an FDA decision.
First, one involving clinical practice guidelines: The national cholesterol education program at the NIH regularly updates its practice guidelines when new data come available. The latest, reported in July 2004, was a combined effort of the American Heart Association, the American College of Cardiology, and the National Institutes of Health. The participants started by reviewing the clinical trials published since the last guidelines were issued. The organizations selected an impressive group of nine well-known individuals to do the analysis, and their recommendations included greater lowering of LDL with diet, exercise, and greater use of statins. Soon it was revealed that seven of nine had financial deals—either paid speakers or consultants for companies that make statins. Not with just one company, but three to five of them. These connections made it difficult to know whether their recommendations might have been influenced by the participants' relations with the statin manufacturers.5
Kassirer JP. Why should we swallow what these studies say? Washington Post 2004 Aug 1:B3.
Second, a research protocol: In 1999, 17-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died at the University of Pennsylvania 4 days after receiving genes imbedded in a common cold virus. The boy had only a mild deficiency of a particular enzyme but was participating in the research study because he thought that the results might help others. Neither he nor his parents had been told that the principal investigator of the study and the university had financial stakes in a company that might have benefited from the outcome of the work. Some wondered whether financial inducements had influenced the decision to move ahead with these studies with less caution than was appropriate. The principal investigator denied that money had anything to do with it. Perhaps so, but we are left to ponder his motives and those of his institution that allowed the study to go forth.6
Washburn J. Informed consent: Alan Milstein says he wants to rescue us from unscrupulous doctors, undisclosed risks and greedy institutions. But is he a shining knight, or an enemy of medical progress? Washington Post 2001 Dec 30:W16.
Third, an FDA decision: In February 2005, an FDA advisory panel met to assess whether the risk–benefit profile of various Cox-2 inhibitors made by Merck and Pfizer warranted removing the drugs from the market. This was a highly visible decision because of the increased risk of cardiovascular complications of some of the drugs, especially Vioxx, and because of Merck's decision to take Vioxx off the market only weeks before. The 32-person panel voted 31:1 to keep Celebrex on the market; there seemed to be little controversy about this decision. However, the votes on Bextra and Vioxx were much closer. The panel voted 17-13 to keep Bextra on the market and 17-15 to allow Vioxx to return to the market. But there was a hitch: Soon after, the New York Times reported that 10 of the panelists had financial ties to both companies that made these two drugs and that they had voted 9-1 in favor of keeping both drugs on the market. If none of these conflicted panelists had voted, neither drug would have been recommended for return to the market. The votes would have been 12-8 opposed for Bextra and 14-8 opposed for Vioxx. This was a decision that could have affected millions of people.7
Harris G, Berenson A. 10 voters on panel backing pain pills had industry ties. New York Times 2005 Feb 25.
What do these examples tell us about the advice and performance of the physicians with financial conflicts? One possibility is that their recommendations are completely objective and that anyone else with the same expertise would make exactly the same conclusions and recommendations. A second possibility is that none of it was intentional, yet in some subconscious way, their close ties with the company or companies yielded biased recommendations. A third possibility is that the doctors on industry's payroll were simply being greedy, that they were knowingly profiting at the expense of patients' welfare and at the expense of the validity of the knowledge that we all depend upon for our medical decisions. The problem is that we have no way of knowing which of these interpretations, or possibly some other, is correct, which leaves us guessing about motives. That is the essence of the problem with financial conflicts.
So what do we do about all of this? How do we guard against the assault on professionalism that such conflicts engender? How can professionalism be used to counter the excesses of commercialism? Professionalism is fundamentally a pact with society. In recognition of certain behaviors and attributes, society confers professional status on us. These privileges are not bestowed, but are earned, and they must be renewed repeatedly for the status to be preserved.
Professional behaviors include technical competence that is valued and that adds value, a commitment to self-improvement, a commitment to self-monitoring and self regulation, and a commitment to use the unique knowledge and competence for the best interests of our patients. This last requirement should include a commitment to resolve conflicts of interest in our patients' favor. The great Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis added that professionalism includes an important public and social purpose. He pointed out that success in a profession should be measured by more than financial return.8
Reynolds PP. Reaffirming professionalism through the education community. Annals of Internal Medicine 1994;120:609–14.
But professionalism also has a moral dimension, a fundamental covenantal relationship between a physician and his or her patient. It is grounded in the moral obligations that are the basis of the nature of the doctor–patient relationship. These obligations are formulated from fundamental human concepts of right and wrong, not from economic or contractual models. They take notice of the trust that patients have in their doctors, the enormous social investment of the public in medicine, and the fiduciary responsibility of physicians to protect the patient's best interests. As Cardinal Joseph Bernadin once said, “[the] moral center of the doctor-patient relationship is the very essence of being a doctor. It also defines the outlines of the covenant that exists between physicians and their patients, their profession, and their society. The covenant is a promise that the profession makes … a solemn promise … that it is and will remain true to its moral center. In individual terms, the covenant is the basis on which patients trust their doctors. In social terms, the covenant is the grounds for the public's continued respect and reliance on the profession of medicine” (p. 352).9
Kassirer JP. Medicine at the turn of the century. Annals of Thoracic Surgery 2000;70:351–3.
Is money trumping professionalism? Certainly the pharmaceutical money tsunami is having major adverse effects. It tends to distract faculty into emphasizing profitable research and to neglect their teaching duties. It replaces openness with secrecy, it privatizes knowledge, and it replaces part of the social commons by commercializing discovery. In many instances, it downplays knowledge as a social good. It has also created a culture within which the design of studies is sometimes jiggered to create positive results, in which unfavorable results are sometimes buried, where communication of results is sometimes hindered for commercial reasons, and where bias in publications and educational materials has gone completely unchecked.10
Krimsky S. Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research? Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield; 2003:247.
All of this amounts to a threat to the validity of the medical information that doctors use from day to day, a threat to patients enrolled in clinical trials, and an assault on the public's trust of medicine. These financial conflicts can undermine the faith of doctors in the advice of their professional organizations, cause the public to distrust medical research, threaten government funding, reduce enrollment in clinical trials, and damage the fundamental trust between individual patients and their doctors.
This litany of problems is a painful reminder of where we have come. It is a sorry story of the extent to which financial conflicts have permeated medicine. So what do we do about it?11
See note 2, Needleman 1991; Brennan TA, Rothman DJ, Blank L, Blumenthal D, Chimonas SC, Cohen JJ, et al. Health industry practices that create conflicts of interest: A policy proposal for academic medical centers. JAMA 2006;295(4):429–33.
We must stop deluding ourselves that the largesse of pharmaceutical companies and device manufacturers does not have an influence on us. Such arrangements can have a pernicious influence on even the most senior clinicians and investigators.
We must find ways to preserve the real benefits of collaborations with industry: the entrepreneurial spirit that has created MRI scans, stents, bioengineered drugs, and artificial knees. These breakthroughs enhance our ability to care for the sick. But we must appreciate that even though someone offers us a financial deal, we have free choice and are under no obligation to take it. Financial conflicts are optional, and plenty of doctors refuse to be seduced by the largesse of the drug reps, the so-called unrestricted educational grants, or the lucrative consultation deals that are often consummated after research projects end.
We should acknowledge those who opt out of “deals” as the heroes that they really are. We should reward physicians who decide to have no financial conflicts with industry. We should name them first to be the ones to evaluate drugs and devices and to testify to the FDA. We should appoint them to be the next leaders of our professional organizations and editors of our medical journals.
Because of the moral aspect of the physician–patient relationship, the standards on conflicts of interest in medicine should be at least as high or even higher than those of other professions. We could take a page out of the standards followed by reporters from the most ethically savvy media outlets and accept no gifts, no meals, and no free continuing medical education. We should not participate in educational ventures funded by industry. This is an exceptionally high standard, higher than the ethical guidelines of any of our professional organizations, but it must be this high if we are to maintain the public's trust.
We must be highly skeptical about the most popular approach to managing conflicts of interest, namely disclosing the relationships. Disclosure of the conflicts may be better than no disclosure at all, given the largely hidden nature of the current arrangements, but this “buyers beware” approach assumes that individuals armed with disclosure information are able to judge whether the conflict might have or has had an influence, for example, whether information is biased. Unfortunately, disclosure requires people to assess a person's motives and guess whether his actions may have been affected by any conflicts. They may assume, incorrectly, that a financial conflict is evidence at face value that an individual is incapable of producing unbiased information.
We must reform our academic institutions and our professional organizations. Our medical schools and medical centers must develop enforceable conflict of interest policies, and faculties must not get cowed into implementing edentulous policies because of institutional commitments to drug companies. Not one powerful medical center has declared war on financial conflicts. None has outlawed faculty participation in speaker's bureaus, or participation in consulting arrangements that are thinly veiled marketing efforts.
Our professional organizations must stop living high off the hog. Lavish receptions, personalized luggage tags, internet kiosks, and rodeos do not enhance doctors' education. Drug company-sponsored symposia during major medical meetings that feature high-powered industry-paid speakers should be eliminated. Organizations should stop offering companies their membership and conference participant lists in exchange for payments.
We must reform the process of clinical practice guideline development because it has such an enormous impact on the quality of patient care. We must end the practice of perfunctory disclosures followed by business as usual. We must admit that the usual approach to announcing conflicts is often a sham. Some say that because so many of the top academic physicians are involved with industry, they could never find enough people with sufficient expertise to deal with the complexities of the clinical problem. I believe that this notion is fallacious. In most instances, we should be able to find nonconflicted people to judge just about any product. There is real risk that like-minded people with “unique” knowledge may have similarities of thought and come up with a uniform conclusion that is biased or even completely wrong.
Teaching about the effects of conflict of interest must start when students first walk through the doors of the medical schools, and it must be reinforced every year thereafter. Nearly all schools have courses in medical ethics, but conflict of interest is not a consistent part of these curricula. Needless to say, the schools may find proscription of gifts and meals difficult to justify if their faculty are heavily involved with industry themselves. From the beginning, students and house staff should be encouraged not to take gifts or meals. House officers must be encouraged not to meet with drug salesmen outside their institutions. Students must be made to understand the obligation of reciprocation and its consequences to professionalism.
Enormous energy and resources of physicians, researchers, the government, and private industry have yielded unparalleled progress during the last century in diagnosing and treating disease and alleviating suffering, and we should never underestimate the impact of these achievements on the lives and the health of our patients. In contrast, I have painted here a bleak, perhaps even shameful picture of professionalism at the beginning of the 21st century. Many of us have failed the profession in some palpable way.
How we act on these issues reveals our values and what we stand for. We must face fundamental issues about money squarely. We should be asking whether questions such as how much money we really need and how much money is necessary for any given purpose are being neglected as the urge to make more and more becomes the dominant force. We must ask whether we have the right order of our priorities as a profession. As members of our profession, we alone must be its keepers. We must continue to be vigilant whenever the consequences of a market-dominated system go too far and prevent us from giving the kind of care we believe to be appropriate. We must decide, one by one, whether we want to join the cavalcade of drug-company-dependent doctors or whether we have the fortitude to opt out.
