The relationship between multinational corporations (MNCs) and developing country governments as a subject of research in political economy had its heyday in the 1970s, marked by works like Peter Evans's (1979) Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil and Raymond Vernon's (1971) Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. After a long break, recent research has revisited the issue, starting with Nathan Jensen's (2006) important book Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. While Vernon and Jensen focus on conflict between MNCs and host governments, Evans and the studies of Jenny Rebecca Kehl focus on the link between domestic development and multinationals. Kehl's central question concerns when and why developing countries will be able to strike mutually beneficial agreements with multinationals, and when these can be harnessed for economic development. Her central thesis is that maximizing benefits depends on sufficient host government capacity, democratic accountability, regulatory standardization, and development policies that favor free production and consumption.
Like most studies that focus on institutional variables and development, Kehl's book does not resolve the circularity of the argument that if countries had all the required institutional attributes for economic development, they would likely already be rich and developed. Examples of capable and democratically accountable governments in poor states are few and far between. However, her analysis is more sophisticated than many that point to a vaguely defined “quality of institutions.” Her main focus is not how countries attract investment, when such blanket statements may matter, but on how countries use it successfully for their developmental aims. This question is in itself already a step forward. Her research design is promising: a quantitative panel study of 147 countries over 35 years (1971–2006), followed by detailed case studies of a major multinational's (General Motors) investments in Mexico, India, Nigeria, Kenya, Chile, and Malaysia. The cases serve to highlight different aspects of the analysis. For example, the Kenyan case focuses on ineffective bureaucracies, whereas the Nigerian case emphasizes the negative effect of corruption.
The weaknesses of the work lie partly on the theoretical side of the book, especially how institutions are supposed to help reap benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI), and partly in the statistical analysis. Regarding the former, the terminology is at odds with mainstream political economy—here, a political economy is a framework that emphasizes “factors such as market access, market size, trade practices, taxation, and the level of intervention in market forces” (p. 4). The author contrasts this with an institutional approach, in which accountability, political stability, and government capacity feature prominently. Political economy is thus coterminous with economic neoliberalism. Underlying the analysis, then, is an assumption that developing countries give away investment incentives in a race to the bottom, but that in doing so, they also give away the benefits of foreign investment. In other words, unless host countries impose performance requirements of various kinds, they cannot reap the benefits of FDI. This statement probably has to be qualified: Export-oriented investment should be beneficial even in the absence of any performance requirements because at the very least, the employees are taking home a salary they would not have otherwise earned. Differentiating between different investment motivations among MNCs, for example, by country or sector, would therefore have provided a stronger theoretical foundation.
The quantitative analysis, an attempt at a multistage model, is the weak spot in the empirics. It begins with a test of the effect of institutional variables on FDI (although we are left in the dark if this refers to stocks or flows), then tests the effect of institutions on growth of the GDP. Unfortunately, the approach is not based on any standard economic growth model. Neither are there controls for unobserved heterogeneity, such as fixed effects (or one of the recent methods for time-invariant variables), and most problematically, there is no recognition of the obvious endogeneity in such a long time series: High economic growth in the past implies that a country can build better institutions in the future, which in turn leads to more success.
Even if one accepts the somewhat haphazard specification of the model, one wonders what the substantive implications are. In an equation including democracy and an interaction of democracy and foreign investment (p. 30), we are told that democracy has a positive effect on the ability to harness FDI for growth because of its “comparatively high coefficient of 9.40.” Not only does the individual coefficient lack any informational content without the interaction, but there is also no interpretation of the substantive meaning, even though it would be easy to calculate in a linear model. Giving the reader a sense of what the regression results mean in practical terms is by now standard practice. A few pages later, the author discusses how ideas and policies for dealing with MNCs spread across the world in a diffusion process, but even though this clearly matters, it is ignored in the statistical analysis.
The book is stronger in the case studies. The six countries are compared on four indicators. Additional leverage is gained through comparisons of the operations of General Motors across the cases. The case studies provide interesting facts—for example, Kenya lacks an investment code, so that all deals with investors are essentially ad hoc. The cases then analyze how these different institutional contexts affect GM's operations. There are a few omissions that relate to the theoretical gaps; for example, again, when FDI is market seeking then having a (relatively) large domestic market should provide the host government with more negotiating leverage than a much smaller country can hope for. There are also some odd statements, such as, “As demonstrated in the Asian Financial Crisis, however, the rapid growth of the Asian Tigers was not sustainable in most cases” (p. 19). What about the spectacular growth rates that developing Southeast Asia returned to shortly after the crisis? Nonetheless, the reader learns a wealth of interesting details about how GM engages with host governments and local constituents. Most of the information on the respective country policies towards FDI is drawn from the Market Research Reports of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service. Given this rich source material, it might have been used to greater effect, since clearly the choice of FDI policy is closely related to growth as well. Perhaps the most useful contributions lie in the explicit comparisons in the conclusion. For example, the author provides some evidence that investors accept a higher tax rate in Chile because the investment environment is stable and transparent, whereas they require lower taxes as compensation for riskier locations such as Malaysia.
Overall, the verdict emerges that predictable institutions matter most, and that democracies get more out of their bargains with MNCs if they create the necessary institutional environments. Despite some weaknesses in theory and statistical analysis, Foreign Investment and Domestic Development is useful for students of MNC–host country interactions and investment policies more broadly.
