Robert Bartlett aspires to contribute both to “an adequate assessment of ancient sophistry” and to a “correct understanding of the achievement of Socrates or of the meaning of ‘political philosophy’ as founded by him” (2–3). This characterization of the project raises two general concerns. First, in staging a confrontation between “Socratic political philosophy” and “sophistry,” Bartlett already shows himself to be in thrall to Plato's own categories of analysis and their corresponding intellectual and ethical evaluations. A more even-handed approach would acknowledge that Plato presented Protagoras and other itinerant philosophers and teachers of rhetoric in a distorting and uncharitable light. Plato's own seductive and successful rhetoric often leads readers to ignore the sophists’ internal diversity and their own self-understandings. “Sophists” understood themselves as philosophers or wise men, and not as argumentatively slippery, subversive quacks. By analogy, we might be wary of commencing an investigation of Richard Rorty's thought by studying Bernard Williams's volume Truth and Truthfulness, which labels Rorty a “denier.” Conversely, we can defamiliarize our customary perspectives by recalling that Socrates himself was labeled a sophist, without any special explanation, fifty years after his death in a speech delivered by the Athenian orator Aeschines (Aesch. 1.173).
Second, the categories of “sophistry” and “political philosophy,” even as they are employed within the Platonic corpus, are not particularly coherent. Because sophistry and political philosophy present themselves in diverse and often inconclusive ways across Plato's texts, Bartlett's approach assumes greater conceptual stability than the dialogues warrant. At the end of the Protagoras, for example, Socrates confessed his ignorance and proclaimed the need to investigate virtue and its teachability all over again; are we then entitled to regard him as espousing a particular political philosophy? In that moment, at least, he is needling his interlocutors (and other audiences, of course, including us) to think again about fundamental ideas that we often take as given. While undermining Protagoras's pretensions, he is inviting listeners to undertake an individual ethical project (361d). The political implications of that project are left unclear—perhaps intentionally.
When Socrates makes positive arguments relevant to political philosophy, on the other hand, he ostensibly disagrees with himself from text to text. The clearest example is that Socrates’ s anatomy of the human soul varies considerably if we compare, for example, the Meno and the Protagoras (where Socrates presents himself as an intellectualist, i.e., a psychological monist) with, for example, the Phaedrus or the Republic (where Socrates presents a theory of the tripartite soul). Still different anatomies of the soul are offered by characters in (for example) the Timaeus and the Laws. Intriguingly, the precise character of each of these respective anatomies is, in itself, controversial: for example, does the tripartition of Republic IV still produce a unified conception of the soul? The same diversity characterizes Plato's presentation of the sophist, a figure that shifts its shapes as we read the Sophist, the Gorgias, the Republic, the Euthydemus, and other dialogues. It is plausible to view the dialogues as discrete entities, which were designed to explore specific questions within the framework of particular minidramas—an approach that Bartlett's fruitful, detailed exegetical work would seem to support.
Bartlett's initial categories promote his idea that Plato's Socrates identified and shed light on permanent or persistent human questions. How would we know, without begging any questions, whether Socrates's questions are permanent or not? It would be quixotic to suppose that this question can be decisively settled through conducting empirical research or through examining the questions that have already surfaced. More importantly, why should our questions be any more permanent than our answers? In Plato's Laws, the human being is a thauma, a “puppet” and a “wonder.” Did Plato claim to grasp that thauma so well as to constrain future questioning? Think of a comparison from other fields. The chief advances in twentieth-century physics came about because intrepid scientists asked new questions, such as whether the speed of light may be constant or whether all possible worlds exist. As a result of such questions, the agenda of physics has been entirely transformed, as new puzzles—such as Schrödinger's cat—have come to light and given rise to a novel slate of questions, all despite the continuing existence of the “same” physical universe. The Platonic dialogues offer—to my knowledge—no hint of a “multiverse” theory, but what if, as many physicists now believe, Everett's “many-worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, implausible as it may initially sound? Wouldn't Plato and Socrates applaud the pursuit of new and even disturbing questions? If “Plato” and “Socrates” stand for anything, do they not stand for endless, radical questioning of authority, including authoritative pronouncements about what our questions should be? True, radical questioning may be harmful to politics—depending on circumstances, audiences, customs, and many other factors—but surely it is central to doing philosophy, even if it does not, all by itself, constitute a political philosophy.
In grappling with the Protagoras, Bartlett elaborates provocative interpretations of the initial framing device, of Socrates's relationship to Hippocrates, and of Socrates's exposition of the hedonistic art of measurement. One widely discussed question is whether Socrates advocates hedonism in his own name or for purely ad hominem or dialogical reasons. Bartlett endorses, though he does not explicitly argue for, the ad hominem interpretation. Scholars often adopt this view because Socrates's apparent espousal of hedonism in the Protagoras conflicts with his familiar arguments against hedonism in other dialogues. By contrast, Bartlett holds that the dialogue's dramatic action reveals that Socrates's chief aim is to expose Protagoras as a fraud; the arguments based on hedonism are designed to further that aim, rather than to advance Socrates's own project. While I am sympathetic to Bartlett's stance, it also raises a host of challenging questions that Bartlett leaves unaddressed. If Socrates adopts hedonism solely for rhetorical purposes, and in a way that leaves his own position so ambiguous, then why is he, too, not a “sophist,” particularly when we recollect how often he emphasizes the need to say all and only what one really thinks?
These questions are critical to our understanding of the dialogue's conclusion, which links hedonism to Socrates's account of courage and of the unity of virtue in general. After examining the dialogue's arguments about courage, Bartlett concludes, “This is the most important purpose of the discussion of hedonism: to apply hedonism to the case of courage, thus denuding it of its noble, self-sacrificial character” (98). In making this point, Bartlett builds on Roslyn Weiss's The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies (University of Chicago Press, 2006). Weiss argues that Socrates triumphs over Protagoras by foisting on him an understanding of courage that is based, untenably, on a hedonic calculus. This hedonistic understanding fails to convince because it presents the courageous as superior to the cowardly in a single, and apparently irrelevant, respect: that of calculating their own pleasure accurately. Such a characterization would betray ignorance of the point of courage: if courage concerns itself with nothing more than one's own gratification, then it hardly seems admirable. Bartlett's discussion furthers our understanding of Protagoras as a confused thinker with little to offer prospective students—and possibly, and more disgracefully, as a coward himself.
Two difficulties, however, repeatedly surface in Bartlett's account. First, he often implies that Socrates subscribes to a notion of courage as “steadiness,” which is “the basic capacity to stick to one's convictions regarding the good that is a necessary supplement to those convictions” (89). No doubt this conception of courage is familiar: it calls to mind Robert Louis Stevenson's The Great North Road, in which Mr. Archer labels courage the “footstool of the virtues.” This conception, however, raises the paradox of the “courageous villain” in an acute form, in cases where those “convictions regarding the good” are misguided. In fact, it is potentially compatable with Protagoras's own suggestion that courage might characterize those who are unjust and immoderate (349d).
More importantly, Socrates, at least in this dialogue, argues explicitly that courage and all the other virtues are knowledge (or wisdom). Courage is not a supplement to knowledge, or necessary to knowledge, or necessary to the effective rule of knowledge in the soul, or anything of that sort. Courage is knowledge, full stop. That thesis does not imply that courage is calculative or instrumental knowledge, to be sure, but Plato presents Socrates, in this dialogue at least, as endorsing the unity of virtue on the grounds that virtue is knowledge, even if he does not elaborate fully or precisely what that thesis involves. Although it is possible to argue (with Roslyn Weiss, for example) that the unity-of-virtue thesis depends on Socrates's introduction of hedonism, Socrates in fact inclines toward that thesis much earlier, as in his introduction of the analogy of the different virtues with “pieces of gold” (where gold is apparently equivalent to knowledge), and in his repeated expressions of surprise when Protagoras rejects the identity of virtues such as justice and piety (329c–d, 331b, 331e, 359b; cf. 333b, 361b, with John M. Cooper, “The Unity of Virtue,” Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 1 [1998]: 233–74, who also observes that in his Great Speech Protagoras himself conceives of virtue as a unity).
The second difficulty is that at 351c–d Protagoras introduces into the discussion nonhedonistic criteria of evaluation, such as what is praiseworthy or noble; he hesitates to say that “the pleasurable” is identical with “the good.” Arguably, his reservations are nothing more than rhetorical window-dressing. How can we judge, in a principled way what Protagoras intends at that moment? If I understand correctly, Bartlett bases his condemnatory interpretation of Protagoras's remarks on Protagoras's belief that the noble is advantageous to its possessor. Bartlett points out, reasonably enough, that Plato's Protagoras has not clearly accounted for the interrelations of nobility, wisdom, courage, and advantage. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to maintain, with Bartlett, that only “self-sacrificial” courage is “moral,” or to hold that proposing any link between the noble and the advantageous is ipso facto suspect on the grounds that any such association would strip nobility of its beauty and worth. Dissociating what is noble or just from what is advantageous to the ethical agent is characteristic of modern moral philosophy, particularly in its Kantian guise, which envisions a sharp distinction between “egoism” and “altruism.” By contrast, the eudaimonistic position that characterizes most classical philosophy contends that what is noble or just is, when properly understood, advantageous to oneself, although not in any reductive or narrowly self-interested way. Virtue constitutes an ordered condition of the soul that is equivalent to its health. Hence, even if Protagoras's view of the advantageousness of nobility is unfortunately narrow or misguidedly reductive, his position could be rehabilitated through a widening of our conception of “advantage,” such as we find in many other Platonic dialogues and in other ancient philosophical texts.
This point does not reveal, one way or another, where Protagoras's real commitments lie. One could hardly disagree with Bartlett's view that the dialogue casts Protagoras in a dim light. Tentatively, though, I would say that Bartlett too freely associates “nobility” with (merely) “political” virtue, and by extension with the superficiality of ordinary or conventional people. If “nobility” and “advantage” can find a legitimate place within the eudaimonistic framework, then conventional virtue can be viewed more sympathetically and less dismissively than Plato's Protagoras (and Bartlett) may have assumed. Unquestionably, conventional virtue stands in need of further development in order to know itself. If Socrates was working through familiar confusions in order to elaborate whatever may be compelling in ordinary ideas, then he may have been friendlier to the ordinary citizen than we often suppose. That point is, after all, relevant to the understanding of Platonic political philosophy.
