Georgia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, and non-Georgians comprise more than one-tenth of the population. However, Georgian national identity focusing on primordial “national” attributes, the conceptualization of a Georgia exclusively for Georgians, and the stylization of minorities as “guests,” especially in the early independence years, have eroded the position of minorities in the country. Moreover, building the Georgian national identity as ethno-religious—or by superposing a specific faith and church, namely the Georgian Orthodox Church, onto the concept of Georgian ethnicity—has put Georgian religious minorities such as Muslim and Catholic Georgians in an ambiguous situation via-à-vis Georgian national ideology. Ethnic minorities are perceived as guests rather than a part of the native populations and seen as completely distinct from Georgians. For instance, AzerisFootnote 1 and Armenians speak distinct languages, profess distinct faiths, and have their own national cultures, so they do not have the attributes to become Georgians. Religious minorities who are ethnically Georgian but have adopted Islam, like Muslim Ajarians, or different denominations and sects of Christianity, on the other hand, may be culturally close to the majority of Georgians and speak Georgian, but they do not fulfill the sufficient criteria to become “fully Georgians,” as they do not have an affiliation with the Georgian Orthodox Church, which has become one of the pillars of Georgianness over several decades since independence.
Georgian ethno-religious nationalism, which bases Georgianness on an ethnic affiliation to Kartvelian roots and religious adherence to Georgian Orthodoxy, determines one’s level of inclusion in the nation; those who do not fulfill these criteria, such as Azeris, are excluded from the nation. This article demonstrates that Muslim Ajarians, despite partially fulfilling the criteria for being ethnic Georgians and being Georgian speakers, also face exclusion from the Georgian identity since they departed from Georgian Orthodoxy. In addition, Muslim Ajarians, especially their places of worship in public spaces, are less tolerated, unlike the case of Azeris, who have no chance of becoming “proper Georgians.” This article argues that, although minorities—especially Muslim minorities—experience various similar difficulties in Georgia, Muslim Ajarians (among Muslims) are more discriminated against and are subjected to differential treatment, such as in the form of conversion, than Azeris especially. This article suggests that there is lesser degree of pressure on the Azeri community because Georgians recognize their religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, the concept of ethnodoxy, defined by Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (Reference Barry2012, 644) as popular beliefs or ideologies that link “a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant religion,” helps us understand the differential treatment of Muslim Ajarians: In ethnodoxy’s terms, Georgian society sees them as “apostates” who do not belong to the dominant group, yet they approach Azeris differently.
This article is based on the findings of five different field research efforts carried out in Tbilisi, Batumi, Kobuleti, Khulo (Ajaria), Gardabani, and Marneuli (Kvemo Kartli) in Georgia in 2015 and 2017. During the field research, 30 semistructured in-depth interviews were conducted with scholars; Azeri, Muslim Ajarian, and non-Muslim religious leaders; NGO representatives; politicians; and ordinary members of the community.Footnote 2 The occupation distribution in this study group is as follows: ten experts, ten men of religion (including a Baptist cleric), two scholars, a lawyer, a Member of Parliament, a businessman, a PhD student, and a high school student.Footnote 3 Of those interviewed, eight were ethnic Azeris, and eight were Muslim Ajarians. Most of the interviews were conducted in English and Turkish. Only one interview, the one with an expert from the Council of National Minorities under the Public Defender, was made in Georgian with the help of a translator. The study also presents some quotes from the interviews that were conducted by some NGOs.
Azeris and Muslim Ajarians in Georgia: A Brief Background
Georgia is a littoral state of the Black Sea, located at the crossroads of the Caucasus. The country has mostly been a buffer zone between empires, if not a war zone, with the Southern Caucasus being a battleground for the empires to the east and the west of Georgia, as well as nomads who traversed the region. Georgia was one of the first nations in the east to adopt Christianity in the first half of the fourth century, and to form its own national church, which gained autocephality over time.
Azeris of Georgia, the most populous minority in Georgia, are a Turkic Muslim community and live mainly in the southeastern part of the country, within the districts of Bolnisi, Dmanisi, Gardabani, and Marneuli in the Kvemo Kartli region. They are amalgamation of various Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes that came to the South Caucasus after the 11th century. They were predominantly settled in Eastern and Southern Georgia during the period of Safavid dominance in the 16th and 17th centuries (Balci and Motika Reference Balci and Motika2007, 340; Sanikidze and Walker Reference Sanikidze and Walker2004, 21–22). Due to the Soviet policies since the 1930s, the Turkic-speaking groups neighboring the Azerbaijan SSR, including Azeris of Georgia, have been identified with Azerbaijan, and the terms “Azeri” and “Azerbaijani” were designated for these groups. According to data from the 2014 census results, of the total 3,713,804 Georgian population, 233,024 identified themselves as “Azeris” (see Table 1). They mostly live in the Kvemo Kartli (177,032) and Kaheti (32,354) regions, and in the city of Tbilisi (15,187).
Population of Georgia by three major ethnic groups and Ajaria.
Different sources are used to generate this table: Broers (Reference Broers2008, 277); RFE/RL (2013); National Statistics Office of Georgia (2002, no: 6, 29; 2014, 15–16; 2016a; 2016b; 2017).
Muslim Ajarians, the second largest Muslim group after Azeris, mostly inhabit the districts of Khulo, Keda, Khelvachauri, Shuakhevi, Kobuleti, and the city of Batumi in the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, and the neighboring regions of Guria and Samstkhe-Javakheti. Even though the dissemination of Islam in the Southern Caucasus and Georgia dates back to the seventh century (Minorsky Reference Minorsky, Arnold, Basset and Hartmann2012), the intensive Islamization of Georgians and Ajarians in particular occurred only after the region was subordinated to the Ottoman empire during the 16th century, especially after Batumi and the surrounding region permanently became part of the empire in the 17th century and Islamization completed by the end of the next century (Quelquejay Reference Quelquejay, Bianquis, van Donzel, Heinrichs and Bearman2012). Ajaria unified with Georgia as a result of the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, and Ajarian Autonomous SSR was established in 1921. After the late 1920s, campaigns targeting the Islamic identity of Ajarians were launched. Consequently, they were removed from the census lists as a separate group after 1937, and were made to change their names until the 1960s (Hoch and Kopecek Reference Hoch and Kopecek2011). During the glasnost period and afterward in the early 1990s, the church, in cooperation with the state authorities, conducted a campaign to promote mass conversion of Muslim Ajarians to Orthodox Christianity. The 2014 census demonstrated that the Muslim Georgian population in Ajaria was approximately 132,000 and concentrated in the rural areas (84,101), while the remaining inhabit the urban localities like Batumi and Kobuleti (48,751).
While Muslim Ajarians are Sunni Muslims, Azeris in Georgia both belong to Shi’i and Sunni Islam. The distinction between Shi’ism and Sunnism among Azeris, which was insignificant during the Soviet era, came to prominence in the post-Soviet period as Sunni Azeris were more open to the influence of Turkey, whereas Shi’ites were influenced more by Iran and Azerbaijan.
Ethno-Religious Nationalism in Georgia
The influence of religion increased quite globally in the last quarter of the 20th century. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, different religions filled the “ideological vacuum” left by the Soviet ideology to various degrees (Huntington Reference Huntington1997, 96), and religion became one of the most influential sources for post-Soviet national identity. It also helped to support social order in communities that were struggling with the economic, social, and ideological challenges of the transition period. Finally, it turned into a source of legitimacy for politicians (Agadjanian Reference Agadjanian2001, 476; Balci and Motika Reference Balci and Motika2007, 338; Curanovic Reference Curanovic2013, 330; Filetti Reference Filetti2014, 223–224; Huntington Reference Huntington1997, 97).
In Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church became a source of national identity, providing social order, protection, and morale, which people needed during the transition period. Thus, religion became the primary marker of Georgian national identity. In the 19th century, when a more liberal and inclusive understanding of Georgian nationalism existed, the writer Ilia Chavchavadze, known as the father of the nation, defined Georgianness by founding it on three pillars: “fatherland, language, and faith” (Nodia Reference Nodia2009, 88), with the Georgian language being the primary marker of Georgianness and the unifier of different ethnic groups throughout Georgia. With the inclusion of Ajaria in 1878, he also included the idea of the common history of Georgians to the concept, probably to embrace the Georgian Muslims of Ajaria (Nodia Reference Nodia2009, 90–91). In the last quarter of the 20th century, however, the priority changed, and affiliation to the Georgian Orthodox Church was turned into the essential marker of Georgian nationhood. Indeed, the general public in Georgia perceive the Georgian Orthodox Church as the institution that united and protected Georgians, Georgian nationhood, and its culture and language when Georgia had been surrounded by enemies and the big powers. It is also the most trusted institution in the country, probably due to the respected personality of Patriarch Ilia II.Footnote 4 For instance, a Georgian scholar from Tbilisi State University drew attention to the Georgian Orthodox Church’s significance for Georgians: “The Georgian Orthodox Church is the most important [institution] for Georgian society. The minority disagrees with it, but for the majority, it is the most important [institution] in our life …, and every sociological survey proves Ilia II is the most trusted person.”Footnote 5 Another scholar from Tbilisi State University highlighted the historic importance of the church for the Georgian people: “Historically there was not a Georgian state. What held Georgians together was the Georgian church and the language. Unification [came] under the religion against our enemies, the Muslims. The Orthodox religion is surrounded by Muslims.”Footnote 6 That is to say, the fragmented nature of the Georgian state, the existence of different Georgian princedoms, and foreign dominance in the region throughout centuries rendered the Georgian Orthodox Church the only institution uniting Georgians living under different state structures. In other words, the historical weakness of the state strengthened the church and its role in society.
The Georgian Orthodox Church is perceived by minorities as a powerful and influential institution in Georgia, also influencing the minority policies. Since the early 1990s, governments have acquiesced to the church in the political domain. Because the church has the power to mobilize people and influence public opinion, governments have sought its support. Members of some religious minorities interviewed reproached the Georgian Orthodox Church for intervening and limiting progress on the solution of problems, especially regarding places of worship, religious buildings, and plots of land that were confiscated during the Soviet period. They believe that the church, having such influence on governments, has their requests refused.Footnote 7
The Georgian Orthodox Church is criticized on the grounds that it abuses its power, privileged position, and influence to hinder solutions to the problems of national minorities (U.S. Department of State 2014). Almost all the religious minorities—primarily the Georgian Muslims, Armenians, and Catholics—suffer from the Georgian Orthodox Church’s privileged position and its primacy over disputed sites (Berglund Reference Berglund2016, 529). Georgian Muslims are also annoyed by and uncomfortable about the church’s interference in their problems on religious grounds, for example, regarding their request for the construction of another mosque in Batumi. For instance, one Georgian scholar stated that, although all religions are constitutionally equal in Georgia, the reality is different. The scholar added: “When you want to build a mosque, the Patriarch does not oppose to it, but the lower echelons of priests do. They say this is the Georgian land and so on.”Footnote 8 The Mokhe incident is an example of this conflict. Here, a site used as a mosque before the Meskhetian Turks’ exodus in 1944 was claimed by both Christian and Muslim Georgians. The Georgian Orthodox Church then got involved in the issue and claimed ownership of the mosque. As a result, no proper solution has emerged.Footnote 9 According to an Evangelical Baptist cleric, “Mokhe is a real embarrassment not only to the state [but also] to the Georgian culture.”Footnote 10
In post-Soviet and post-communist societies, the superimposition of a faith on a specific ethnicity and/or the intertwining of ethnic or national and religious identities is an emerging phenomenon (Agadjanian Reference Agadjanian2001; Curanovic Reference Curanovic2013). This article considers the concept of ethnodoxy, which Karpov et al. (Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012) define as “a belief system that rigidly links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant religion,” to shed light on the differential treatment of Muslim Ajarians, who are ethnically Georgians but religiously Muslim. Doing so, it compares their situation to that of Azeris, who are ethnically and religiously distinct from Georgians in Georgian society. The social identity theory, which provides the authors with the micro-level theoretical framework, is a practical ground accounting for how “ethnoreligious identities” form and escalate into popular beliefs. Moreover, according to the social identity theory, “individuals categorize themselves with a social group” (Karpov et al. Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012, 641) and social groups or categories are set by persons who collectively share the knowledge that they are part of a same (in-)group, while others, who are believed to be different after a social comparison process, constitute an outgroup (Stets and Burke Reference Stets and Burke2000, 225). Group identity, in this case related to ethnodoxy, consists of two blended identities, namely ethnic and religious identities. In other words, individuals identify themselves with and/or are “categorized” into two social identities. Social categorization crystalizes group boundaries as well as increases ingroup favoritism and solidarity, yet exacerbates discrimination and enmity therewithal toward the outgroups (Barry Reference Barry2012, 28–29; Karpov et al. Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012, 642; Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Jost and Sidanius2004, 282).
Karpov et al. (Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012, 642) argue that when boundaries between groups are religiously and ethnically defined, members of “faith outgroups,” most likely those who have close contact with ingroup members, “are likely to be perceived not just as religiously different, but also as ethnically alien and, potentially, harmful and hostile.” In other words, welding ethnic and religious identities may bring about the marginalization of ethnic and religious others. Moreover, those ingroup members who embrace a different creed are most likely to be excluded and marginalized by the group regardless of their ethnic similarity, a belief which is coined as “exclusion of apostates” by Karpov et al. (Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012, 642). By contrast, the new converts are also marginalized and not genuinely accepted, for religion and ethnicity are equally essential for the group. Besides, they are not completely trusted by their new fellows. Moreover, the group members, belonging to the group by birth, feel that their faith is superior to others’, regardless of their actual commitment, and seek protection from other faiths.
Ajarians and their Muslim Georgian identity are not accepted by their Christian fellows and are marginalized on the grounds that they are Muslims. Furthermore, during the interconfessional incidents summarized below, some Georgians, especially those indoctrinated that Ajarians were Christians in history, express that “Ajarians are Georgians too,” but they imply that they should convert to Georgian Orthodoxy, for they do not acknowledge the Muslim-Georgian category. As for Azeris, they are complete outsiders, and their identity is also ethnically and religiously blended. Although they are a faith (out)group to Georgians, Georgians are more tolerant of the identity of Muslim Azeri than they are of Muslim Ajarians.
State Policies Toward Minorities
Sabanadze (Reference Sabanadze2010) describes three phases of Georgian nationalism from the late 1980s to the present day. This periodization is also reflected in the policies on minorities in the country, from exclusion to attempts at inclusion and the management of minorities. During the first phase of Sabanadze’s periodization, between 1988 and 1992, radical Georgian nationalism (Sabanadze Reference Sabanadze2010, 89) and the “ethnocentric discourse” of Gamsakhurdia (Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009, 121) prevailed. National minorities were treated as if they were “guests” and sometimes as “the fifth columns” for neighboring countries (Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005, 46; Suny Reference Suny1999–2000, 163). Such slogans as “Georgia for Georgians,” which were popular in public meetings during this period and which suggested that the Georgian culture and language were superior to others in the region, irritated national minorities (Gahrton Reference Gahrton2010, 23; Hewitt Reference Hewitt2013, 54). As the Chairman of South Ossetian Supreme Soviet, Torez Kulumbegov, contended in 1992, “The Georgians have had it impressed on [minorities] for too long that they are a special people, that they have a special land, that even the sun shines in a special way. This leaves its mark, especially on young people” (Niedermaier 2008, 46).
Moreover, the definition of Georgianness as being Orthodox Christian and ethnic Georgian, conflating ethnic identity and religion, ultimately alienated minorities and mobilized minority nationalisms in the country (Aydıngün Reference Aydıngün, Aydıngün, Asker and Şir2016, 4). That is, although Georgian nationalism was initially a reaction to the Russification of the country, it was also against other minorities, whose nationalisms revived in response in the 20th century. This especially applied to the autonomous groups having their own entities and cadres. In other words, the ethno-religious formation of Georgian nationalism, as well as “aggressive nationalizing policies” in the most extreme cases, triggered secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while in other cases isolated minorities (Sabanadze Reference Sabanadze2010, 92). During this period, this radical nationalist rhetoric oppressed Azeris in Kvemo Kartli. They were regarded as “latecomers” and not welcomed like many other minorities. Some nationalist organizations even told them to leave the country between 1989 and 1993. Their houses were burned in Bolnisi and other places, and many villages were deserted as they were forced to migrate. More than 10,000 families left the country due to this tense situation in Georgia (Aydıngün and Asker Reference Aydıngün, Asker, Aydıngün and Balım2012, 173). While Gamsakhurdia’s ethnocentric discourse alienated national minorities in this period, the then-president described Ajaria as the “cradle of Georgian Christianity” (Hoch and Kopecek Reference Hoch and Kopecek2011). Ajarians, although they were Georgians, could integrate to Georgian identity only after a conversion process due to their religious adherence. Therefore, since the late 1980s, a proselytization campaign has targeted them (Pelkmans Reference Pelkmans2002), and especially the urban, educated elite, and young professional Ajarians have converted to Orthodox Christianity (Wesselink Reference Wesselink1992, 40).
Following his return to Georgia in 1992, Shevardnadze managed to stabilize the country after two conflicts with the breakaway regions. Unlike in the previous era, Shevardnadze’s rhetoric on minorities was more “civic” and did not provoke any separatism on the periphery where Armenians and Azeris lived. However, as Sabanadze (Reference Sabanadze2010, 103) asserts, Shevardnadze also “made no particular effort … integrating nationalist minorities and improving interethnic relations.” He neither offended Georgian nationalists nor continued the previous antagonization of minorities (Berglund Reference Berglund2016, 523; Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005, 47). Many Azeri or non-Azeri interviewees and experts stated that Azeris were sidelined in mainstream society, the employment area, and higher education during this period and afterwards due to the state’s policies and lack of state language (Broers Reference Broers2008, 295; Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009, 125–126), and were even left uninformed of the agenda and realities of the country.Footnote 11 Therefore, Azeris started to migrate to Azerbaijan and Russia for education and employment (Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009, 126). This outflow had increasingly continued until the Saakashvili reforms. However, the low representation of Azeris in state structures and local administrations was a norm (Broers Reference Broers2008; George Reference George2009; Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009), which still continues according to many Azeri interviewees.
For more than a decade after the early 1990s, the local strongman, Aslan Abashidze, enjoyed his de facto independent rule from Tbilisi, acting like his 19th century predecessors of “valley-lords” (Pelkmans Reference Pelkmans2002, 254) and like Ajaria is his fiefdom. However, he did not pursue secessionist policies and remained integrated into Georgia (Mitchell Reference Mitchell2009, 173). Indeed, he depicted himself as “a champion of Georgian unity” (Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005, 54). He supported the Georgian policy of proselytization in Ajaria, giving privileges to the church and baptizing himself and his children. Moreover, while the Georgian Orthodox Church was backed financially by grants for maintenance, Islam by no means was supported by regional authority in Ajaria (Balci and Motika Reference Balci and Motika2007, 347; Hoch and Kopecek Reference Hoch and Kopecek2011; Sanikidze and Walker Reference Sanikidze and Walker2004, 12). Instead, it was supported by the local communities and organizations headquartered in Muslim countries (Pelkmans Reference Pelkmans2002, 261–262).
A Shift in Minorities Policies under the Saakashvili Administration
After Saakashvili came to power, the state’s rhetoric on minorities began to change, as did the conception of Georgian national identity, which came to include both civic and ethnic elements (Aydıngün Reference Aydıngün, Aydıngün, Asker and Şir2016, 4–5). Metreveli (Reference Metreveli2016, 708) describes the nationalism of the Saakashvili period in Georgia as hybrid, bearing the elements of both the civic notion of nationhood and ethnic particularism. During this period, minorities were encouraged to integrate into the nation and were treated as equal citizens of Georgia regardless of their ethnic and religious background. Employment of national minorities in local administrative bodies was promoted (Metreveli Reference Metreveli2016, 706). The Georgian language was acknowledged as the backbone of the Georgian nation, yet minorities’ having competence of the state language was supported (Berglund Reference Berglund2016, 524–527). Language training programs like 1+4 were initiated; quotas were allocated for minority students in higher education institutions, and adult language programs were organized to end the isolation of minorities. However, Metreveli (Reference Metreveli2016, 698–700) draws attention to a contradiction between Saakashvili’s discourse and policy, or between his speeches and acts. While his discourse had a more civic tone and fostered the integration of minorities into the nation, his acts exemplified the Christian background and Eastern Orthodox roots of Georgia. For instance, he initiated the restoration of the five-cross flag, was blessed by Patriarch Ilia, and recited his oath at the grave of David the Builder. During his rule, the Georgian Orthodox Church was privileged in terms of state funding, tax exemption, and property restitution, which were unlikely to be understood as inclusive and to the advantage of minorities. In fact, Saakashvili’s reforms in minority policy were at times perceived by minorities as assimilationist policies. Minorities, including Azeris, were generally skeptical toward the reforms made to restore the country’s territorial integrity and solidify state power in the regions, as well as the infrastructural projects that supposedly aimed to eliminate the isolation of the periphery (Berglund Reference Berglund2016, 528; Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009, 130). Even though Abkhazia and South Ossetia turned out to be examples of failure in this period, Ajaria became a success story for the Saakashvili administration in his effort to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity after Abashidze evacuated Ajaria (Mitchell Reference Mitchell2009, 177). The central authority exerted its control over Ajaria and reduced Ajaria’s autonomy to a minimal level after a series of legislation changes and reforms (George Reference George2009, 143–144).
Saakashvili gave priority to civic integration and developed new policies to strengthen the integration of ethnic and religious minorities. Overall, he worked toward solving problems related to issues such as religion, language education, and unemployment. He also aimed at limiting the influence of religion and the Georgian Orthodox Church on minority policies. In 2011, the Saakashvili government established a new religious administration, Administration of Muslims of All Georgia (AMG), for Muslims of Georgia, particularly Ajarians and Azeris, who constitute the majority of the Muslim minority.Footnote 12 Headquartered in Tbilisi, it aims to monitor and respond to the needs of the Muslim minority and limit the influence of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran (Prasad Reference Prasad2012, 9) over the Muslims of Georgia. AMG currently includes two muftis, one being Ajarian and the other Azeri, representing Georgian Muslims and Sunni Azeris, respectively, and a Sheikh representing the Shi’ite Azeris. The Administration of Muslims of All Georgia, together with the State Agency on Religious Affairs (the agency), which was established in 2014 to regulate the religious domain, were perceived by some NGOs, experts, and clergy as surveillance mechanisms.Footnote 13 Many interviewees (Muslims, NGO experts, and a cleric from the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia) stated that the agency was actually established to control Muslims. The agency was also criticized on the grounds that it hardly produced any solutions to the problems of minorities (Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center 2016, 10). This was also brought up during the interviews in this study. An expert from Georgian Democracy Initiative (GDI) remarked that the government has started the agency to ensure that religious minorities peacefully live in the country. However, the agency does not properly implement its authority, but chooses to prolong the issues. As the problems remained unsolved, disputes between the religious groups have continued.Footnote 14
According to an expert at the Tolerance Center, the agency interferes in Muslims’ affairs. He says that, by funding the Administration of Muslims of All Georgia, the state intends to control everything.Footnote 15 For an Evangelical Baptist cleric, another factor that does disservice to Azeris is that the Muftis of the AMG are accountable to the government and not to the people.Footnote 16 The Muftis (of Sunni Azeris and Ajarians) and the Sheikh (of Shi’ite Azeris) are actually both appointed by the state and not elected by the community despite a so-called election (Aydıngün, Köksal, and Kahraman Reference Aydıngün, Köksal and Kahraman2019, 298–299). As a result, Azeris, be they Shi’ite or Sunni, have increasingly trusted the independent Muslim religious organizations that have been sidelined by the state. Similar criticisms are expressed by Muslim Ajarians and local and national NGOs.Footnote 17 The Muftiate in Ajaria, part of AMG, was discredited for disregarding the needs of the Muslims in Ajaria, such as their request for the second mosque in Batumi (Gavtadze and Chitanava Reference Gavtadze and Chitanava2015; Jam News 2017; Nikuradze Reference Nikuradze2014). Since the state funds to a particular organization, the AMG, through the agency and neglects other Muslim religious organizations, it creates a hierarchy between religious organizations, and fuels discrimination by favoring a particular religious entity among many,Footnote 18 in brief, the overall state management of religious minorities are criticized by many (Köksal, Aydıngün, and Gürsoy Reference Köksal, Aydıngün and Gürsoy2019, 327, 335). Aside from criticizing the government for establishing new institutions, some Azeri interviewees expressed their frustration with the religious vacuum that had allowed room for the inflow of various religious groups and sects to the region. Therefore, the government’s regulations, which were intended to limit the influence of religious groups coming from neighboring and overseas countries, were welcomed by some Azeri intellectuals.
Integration of Azeris versus (Un)acceptance of Georgian Muslim Identity of Ajarians
As some studies demonstrate (Aydıngün Reference Aydıngün2013; Broers Reference Broers2008; George Reference George2009; Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009), minorities in Georgia have had various difficulties since the country’s independence, and one of the most acute problems negatively affecting their integration to Georgian society has been the language obstacle. Azeris generally do not have a good command of the state language, which prevents them from fully integrating into Georgian society. This adds to the various problems Georgian Muslims (Ajarians) encounter due to being a religious minority (adherence to Islam) and puts them in an ambiguous situation vis-à-vis Georgian national identity. In other words, Azeris are confronting problems associated with a language barrier, whereas Muslim Ajarians are dealing with an acute religious barrier imposed by the dominant national ideology in the country.
The language barrier hinders participation of Azeris in the social-cultural life of the country, makes them feel isolated (Broers Reference Broers2008; Wheatley Reference Wheatley2009, 125–126, 131), disenfranchises them in the parliament and in regional municipalities (Aydıngün Reference Aydıngün2013, 820), and affects their economic situation by reducing employment opportunities in the state sector (Yılmaz and Öğütcü Reference Yılmaz, Öğütcü, Aydıngün and Asker2016, 258).Footnote 19 Azeri intellectuals interviewed in Tbilisi and Kvemo Kartli underlined that a poor command of the Georgian language and a low level of education were the greatest problems experienced within the Azeri community. For Georgian interviewees, Azeris’ incompetence in Georgian is the main factor hindering their integration, estranging them from the current developments in the country and embedding their problems beneath the surface.Footnote 20
Since the Saakashvili era, policies have been put into practice to help Azeris gain a command of the Georgian language and to lift a major barrier to their integration. In 2005, a five-hour Georgian language course was included on pre-university curriculum. In 2009, a quota system was introduced to facilitate the university entrance process for minority students: the entrance exams were carried out in minority languages, including Azeri. Furthermore, two Georgian language teaching programs were initiated so that more teachers could teach Georgian to the minority community: “Teach Georgian as a second language” and “Georgian language for future success” (Gürsoy and Tulun Reference Gürsoy, Tulun, Aydıngün and Asker2016, 104–105). The so-called 1+4 program for minority students was a major development in this regard. In the first year of this program, students took one year of Georgian language training, and starting from the second year they continued their university education (Yılmaz and Öğütcü Reference Yılmaz, Öğütcü, Aydıngün and Asker2016, 251). As an expert from the office of the Public Defender of Georgia pointed out,Footnote 21 thanks to this program, fewer Azeris began to migrate outside the country for higher education and more Azeris to send their children to Georgian universities. This trend was also confirmed by a report of Caucasus House (The Centre for Cultural Relations Caucasus House 2016, 20–21). According to surveys conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) between 2008 and 2017, Azeri respondents’ trust in the educational system also increased from 42 to 73 percent.Footnote 22
However, as some NGO reports and studies reveal (Bending Reference Bending2012, 59; Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Saferworld 2011; Dvali and Badasyan Reference Dvali and Badasyan2014, 26), despite the state programs, reforms, and integration policies for minorities summarized above, lack of mastery over the Georgian language has remained a problem, and as an Azeri expert from the Civic Integration Foundation (CIF) argued, the policies for minorities have not produced the anticipated results.Footnote 23 Quantitative data also revealed similar results. A CRRC survey conducted in 2018 showed that half of the Azeri respondents still considered incompetence in the Georgian language to be ethnic minorities’ most significant issue in Georgia (Caucasus Research Resource Center 2018). In addition, the level of Georgian language among Azeris was found to remain low (Caucasus Research Resource Center 2017b, 2019). Some Azeri interviewees approach the language program skeptically. According to them, even if Azeris have a good command of the Georgian language, this will not be enough for their full integration into society. Some Azeris claim that they are not equally treated even when they are fluent in Georgian, and they have little opportunity for upward mobility.Footnote 24 Integration policy may not be effective due to the actions of both sides. In addition, while one side calls these policies necessary for integration, the other may perceive them as assimilation. Interviews demonstrate that Azeris’ willingness to integrate into Georgia is questionable. The same Azeri expert from CIF claims that Azeris continue to live in concentrated communities, such as the one in Marneuli, even when they come to Tbilisi for education. In addition, he also stresses that they do not interact with Georgians much or learn the language well.Footnote 25
While inadequate use of the state language is the primary reason for the integration problems that Azeris experience, for the Muslim Ajarians, however, it is basically the religion that causes discrimanatory administrative practices toward them and unacceptance by their counterparts. As Pelkmans (Reference Pelkmans2014, 440) asserted, when religions and religious practices became public for all faiths in the post-Soviet period, or when the domestication of religion was reversed, Georgian identity was increasingly identified by religious terms, but being a Muslim and Georgian at the same time became problematic for Ajarians. Indeed, Muslim Ajarians have been regarded, in ethnodoxy’s term, as ethnic aliens and excluded from the Georgian identity due to their affiliation with Islam.
Furthermore, Gurchiani (Reference Gurchiani2017, 517) noted that since medieval times, some Georgians who adhered to a religion other than Orthodoxy have not been considered as Georgians anymore. For instance, Georgians who embraced Roman Catholicism have been labeled as French (also Papists) (Tolerance and Diversity Institute 2014a, 54), Georgians baptized in an Armenian Apostolic Church as Armenian (Gurchiani Reference Gurchiani2017, 517), Georgian Muslims as Tatar since the 19th century,Footnote 26 and Jehovah’s Witnesses are called Americans in post-Soviet Georgia. Even though religious minorities in Georgia are discontent with the fact that Eastern Orthodox Christianity defines the boundaries of Georgianness and they are not perceived as complete Georgians, Georgian society in post-Soviet Georgia “expects its members to be Orthodox Christians” (Gurchiani Reference Gurchiani2017, 527).
Like Georgian Baptists, some non-Eastern Orthodox Georgian minorities in the country tend to “demonstrate their authenticity [oldness, nativeness, and Orthodox mentality] by being ‘culturally orthodox’” without being affiliated with the Georgian Orthodox Church not to be “disenfranchised” from Georgianness (Eastwood Reference Eastwood2015, 28), or like many Ajarians, they may take the shortcut way of converting in order to be accepted as Georgians. However, Ajarians who continue to adhere to Islam constantly need to emphasize their “ethnic Georgian roots,” as a Caucasus House report indicates (The Centre for Cultural Relations Caucasus House 2016, 24). Similarly, many Muslim Ajarian respondents in my field research emphasized that their Georgianness is mostly seen as unacceptable by the majority of Georgian societyFootnote 27 and they need to prove that they are Georgians too. For instance, a Muslim Ajarian student stated during the interview that they were Georgians but “incomplete Georgians.”Footnote 28 Similarly, an acting Muslim Ajarian man of religion stated, “They do not see us as Georgian, [but] I am a Georgian to the last drop of my blood.”Footnote 29 A non-Eastern Orthodox Georgian scholar expressed, “I am Catholic, [but] I do not feel that I am not Georgian. But [being] Catholic and Georgian [at the same time], it is strange. For me it is nothing.”Footnote 30 So it is clear that not only Muslims’ Georgian identity is questioned in Georgia. Since the independence, Georgian Catholics have faced persecution, discrimination, and verbal offence, and have had to emphasize their Georgianness since their faith is affiliated with the French (Sutidze Reference Sutidze2017; Tolerance and Diversity Institute 2018).
The interviewees commonly stated that Muslim Ajarians are the most oppressed minority because of their in-between situation, that is, being both ethnically Georgian and Muslim. This ambiguity challenges the general understanding of Georgianness, which is based on Eastern Orthodoxy and a Georgian ethnic background. Muslim Ajarians’ “in-betweenness” is not tolerated, although Azeris, who differ both ethnically and religiously from the standard Georgian, enjoy greater tolerance. In fact, an Evangelical Baptist cleric argued that those who do not fit the definition of “standard Georgian” are perceived as second-class citizens and are susceptible to discrimination regardless of “whether [they] are Meskhetian, Roman Catholic, Baptist, Shia, Sunni, or Azerbaijani.”Footnote 31
A European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) specialist argues that Georgian Muslims are one of the groups that were subjected to differential treatment because of their faith: “If you are a proper Georgian, you have to be Christian. [Otherwise] it is contradictory with the [Georgian] identity.”Footnote 32 However, he adds that “Azeris are fine. They are understood as Azerbaijanis, and they can practice their religion. They have their mosques … Georgians respect [them] at least to some degree.”Footnote 33 An expert from the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC) also asserts that Ajarians, whose Muslim identity is not recognized, are the most problematic religious minority in Georgia, although Azeris’ identity is naturally accepted.Footnote 34 Referring to Azerbaijani–Georgian relations, an Azeri NGO representative states that “the pressure on Azeris is lesser due to [Georgia’s] relations with Azerbaijan; besides, Ajarians are part of their nation, while Azerbaijanis [Azeri’s of Georgia] are not.”Footnote 35 The favorable state of Georgian-Azerbaijani relations in the region and Azerbaijan’s support for Azeris in Georgia positively affect the Azeri minority in terms of limiting the pressure of Georgian state and the proselytizing initiatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church towards Azeris.
Muslim Ajarian respondents also think that Azeris are more comfortable than Muslim Georgians in terms of their relationships with the state. One of the primary reasons for this is that, as in the case of Georgians, ethnicity and religion are also conflated in the Azeri case (Aydıngün Reference Aydıngün2013, 819). An Azeri former Sheikh agreed with this view: “We are called Azerbaijanis, [but] we call ourselves Muslim…. We, Azerbaijanis in Georgia, are associated with Islam, we link confession to ethnicity. It is not possible to be a non-Muslim Azerbaijani.”Footnote 36 Since they are not ethnically Georgian, they are generally not expected to be Orthodox Christian. Besides, Azerbaijan and Iran support Azeris.Footnote 37 Azeris are cognizant of the differential treatment of two groups in Georgia. For instance, an Azeri man of religion stated, “We are different from Ajarians. There is no such pressure on us.”Footnote 38 For an Ajarian man of religion from Khulo district in Ajaria, “Azeris are already Muslims for Georgia. Georgians consider them as such. They say that Azeris are already Tatar-Muslims…. I say I am a Georgian and Muslim, [but] it causes difficulty.”Footnote 39
Another Azeri religious leader thinks that there are different problems in Ajaria and Azeri-populated regions and Azeris have bigger problems than the Ajarians. However, he believes that, since Ajarians, who are ethnically Georgians, are Muslims, they are more ill-treated than Azeris due to the fact that religion and nation are intertwined in Georgia.Footnote 40 Moreover, a member of the new generation Azeri who speaks Georgian fluently pointed out, “We [Azeris] are seen as more natural than Georgian Muslims. Georgian Muslims and Catholics are in a worse situation. A Muslim Ajarian cannot say that he/she is a Muslim in the presence of a Georgian [Orthodox]”Footnote 41 because Georgians believe they cannot be in any category other than “Georgian Orthodox.” Therefore, the Muslim-Georgian category, and other non-Orthodox Georgians, are regarded as a deviant category (Khalvashi and Batiashvili Reference Khalvashi, Batiashvili, Komatsu, Karasar, Dadabaev and Kurmangaliyeva-Ercilasun2011, 247; Corso Reference Corso2013).
Interconfessional Incidents between Muslim and Christian Georgians
The integration of Muslims in Georgia and acceptance of their identity as it is relates to the perception of Islam in Georgia. Even though Islam can be considered a category of traditional religions, Catholicism, Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church in Georgia, and Judaism, for example, which all are tolerated to some extent and come after Georgian Orthodoxy in the hierarchy of religions, it is generally considered “foreign” to Georgian national identity, even irreconcilable with Georgianness, and a latecomer in Georgia (Balci and Motika Reference Balci and Motika2007, 336; Khalvashi and Batiashvili Reference Khalvashi, Batiashvili, Komatsu, Karasar, Dadabaev and Kurmangaliyeva-Ercilasun2011, 246).
The perception of this irreconcilability of Islam with Georgianness, and being a Muslim with being Georgian, can be traced back to the incidents that took place between 2012 and 2016 among Georgians who adhered to different creeds, that is, Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam in the Georgian periphery. These interconfessional/intercommunal conflicts took place in Nigvziani-Lanchkhuti (Guria) in 2012, Tsintskaro-Tetritskaro (Kvemo Kartli) in 2012, Samtatskaro-Dedoplistskaro (Kaheti) in 2013, Chela-Adigeni (Samtskhe-Javakheti) in 2013, Kobuleti (Ajaria) in 2014, Mokhe-Adigeni (Samtskhe-Javakheti) in 2014, and Adigeni-Adigeni (Samtskhe-Javakheti) in 2016.Footnote 42 These incidents were evidence of the fact that Georgians tolerate the representation of Islam by Azeris, who actually have “the right” to be Muslim in the public eye. However, they hardly accept or tolerate Georgians’ adherence to Islam and the existence of Muslim Georgians (Mikeladze Reference Mikeladze2013, 93–94). Therefore, Georgian Muslims, particularly Ajarians and Ingiloys,Footnote 43 have been encouraged to convert to Eastern Orthodox Christianity since the final years of the USSR (Aydıngün, Köksal, and Kahraman Reference Aydıngün, Köksal and Kahraman2019). Almost all of the seven interconfessional incidents took place between Georgian Muslims and Georgian Christians.Footnote 44 Conflicts between the two groups broke out when Georgian Muslims initiated to have their own religious buildings and graveyards, both of which were contested by their fellow (Christian) villagers.Footnote 45 An expert who is affiliated with GDI stated that the people involved in those conflicts were “like a population which is split into like Orthodox Christians and Muslims.” She added, “Yes, they can live peacefully, but when it comes to the religion, there are some kinds of disputes and tensions between these people.”Footnote 46 According to the Public Defender of Georgia, the reason for such incidents was the religious identity of Georgian Muslims and the rejection of Islam and its symbols in public spaces by non-Muslim fellows (Ketsbaia Reference Ketsbaia2015; The Public Defender of Georgia 2013; UNAG, MDF, GDI, TDI and ECMI 2015).
The rhetoric used by the Christian residents of these places demonstrates two points: (1) Muslim Georgian identity is hardly accepted, although some Eastern Orthodox Christians are former Muslims; (2) the worship places of Muslims and the sight of Muslims themselves in public space are hardly tolerated. The words of a resident of Nigvziani village, who opposed the construction of a Muslim prayer house, is evidence of this: “Has there ever been a mosque on a Christian territory? Aren’t you familiar with the history? … Now they say they are Georgian Muslims; I have never heard of such a thing before” (Mikeladze Reference Mikeladze2013, 27). Similarly, residents of Tsintskaro village expressed their discontent about the existence of a Muslim prayer house in their neighborhood as follows: “They can set up a mosque somewhere in a remote part of the village. Which Christian would be happy to have a Muslim praying next to him?” and “No-one has stopped them from praying. Now they want a mosque to be established.… This is a Christian village and an official mosque will not be opened in Tsintskaro” (Mikeladze Reference Mikeladze2013, 37–38).Footnote 47 The case of Tsintskaro village confirms that Muslim Ajarians receive differential treatment by their Christian fellows because of their ambiguous identity. Although Azeris live in the village, the conflict only took place between Georgians of different faiths, and Azeris were kept out of the conflict (Mikeladze Reference Mikeladze2014, 23).
The head of the Samtatskaro administration was against the Muslim prayer house in the village because, according to him, “this is Christian land and the whole village is against Muslims’ prayer” (Gavtadze and Chitanava Reference Gavtadze and Chitanava2017). In Chela, a group of people who opposed the installation of a minaret to the already active mosque in the village said that they only protected “the position of Orthodox people” and “Muslims live here, but they are guests and their religion is a guest too” (Nikuradze Reference Nikuradze2013). During the confrontation over the minaret in Chela, Muslims claimed that they were insulted by the police who called them “Tatar” and were told that Georgian Muslims did not exist and Georgians had to be only Orthodox (Nikuradze Reference Nikuradze2013). Moreover, a woman from Kobuleti who did not want a boarding school for Muslims to be opened in Kobuleti stated, “There is not a single Muslim living here. And for us, Christians, who live here, this is a very scary situation. We do not accept and will never accept such things. We don’t want them here.… We are not against their religion. They can pray as much as they want in their countries, in their lands, but not here, where true Christians are living” (Popovaite Reference Popovaite2014). Similar arguments can be heard regarding the incident of Mokhe. On the controversial building of Mokhe, which is claimed by both Muslim and Christian residents, Christians said, “It is evident through the stones [that it was a church] and territory is also Christian” (Gavtadze and Chitanava Reference Gavtadze and Chitanava2017) or “I am against [building the mosque], it is Georgian land! I am Christian, should not I be against it?” (Tolerance and Diversity Institute 2014b). Finally, the residents of Adigeni village, who argued against a separate Muslim graveyard in their village, said, “Today they require the cemetery, but who knows, maybe tomorrow they will require the mosque. My child is growing up, I want him to be Christian, as well. They [Muslims] are also Georgians, they should read history…. Let them make another cemetery and we, Christians, will leave this place” (Tolerance and Diversity Institute 2016).
From the rhetoric of the Christians in these places regarding Muslim prayer houses and other structures, it can be concluded that in rural Georgia there is a quest for the public space in the periphery, where Muslim and Christian Georgians meet and live together. As Mikeladze (Reference Mikeladze2013, 94) argued, Christian Georgians in these settlements perceive the land as sacred and avoid sharing it with others. Even though Muslim Georgians/Ajarians, such as imam of the Chela Mosque (Democracy and Freedom Watch 2013), identified themselves with other Georgians, their attitude is not equally appreciated by their counterparts, who urge that Muslims should return to the religion of their ancestors to be considered as “full Georgians.” Muslim Ajarians endeavor to be both Muslim and Georgian in a world of either/or. The likelihood of progress in their efforts depends on Georgia’s stance: she may develop a more civic national identity, which accepts all the ambiguities of its citizens, or she may embrace a more cultural and ethno-religious identity that does not tolerate those who position themselves in gray zones.
Conclusion
In addition to its traditional role in society, religion has increasingly been identified with the national culture, tradition, history, and lifestyle in Georgia and elsewhere in post-Soviet spaces (Metreveli Reference Metreveli2016, 700–701; Mchedlov Reference Mchedlov2005, 84), and it became one of the most influential sources for Georgian national identity. Affiliation with the Georgian Orthodox Church, in the post-Soviet period, has been an increasingly important marker of one’s level of Georgianness and inclusion in the country’s national identity. The crystallization of faith in the Georgian national identity, which replaced the Soviet identity in the new era, and the definition of citizenship in primordial terms, such as ethnicity, rather than civic terms, put minorities in the country in a fragile position. Different minorities are accepted to varying degrees in accordance with their level of Georgianness, and the level of affinity of a group with the Georgian majority has a genuine impact on group relations. In other words, when a group is culturally distinct from the majority, it is more likely to be accepted. However, as Karpov et al. (Reference Karpov, Lisovskaya and Barry2012) argued, in accordance with one of the components of ethnodoxy, namely exclusion of apostates, those who departed from the dominant religion of the majority but are of the same ethnicity are most likely to face marginalization and/or exclusion from the group. In fact, as ethnodoxy envisages, in groups where strong ethnodoxy remains, “to be a member of a particular ethnic group, one must also adhere to its dominant religion and vice versa” (Barry Reference Barry2012, 27 [emphasis in original]).
Azeri identity has been historically accepted and tolerated, as Azeris are ethnically, religiously, and culturally distinct from Georgians. They are exposed to relatively more tolerance and less pressure than Georgian Muslims, even though the latter shares many cultural traits with the majority. Moreover, similar to the Georgian case, religion and ethnicity are also superimposed in the case of Azeris. Azeris are historically, religiously, linguistically, and culturally identified with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey. Furthermore, Islam is associated with traditional Muslim groups in the region, such as Turks, Iranians, and Arabs, who are all perceived to represent the “other” and “foreign” regarding Georgianness. A greater problem arises in the case of Muslim Ajarians, who are ethnically Georgian, speak Georgian, and are considered historically and culturally part of Georgia, but who religiously differentiated from the majority at some time in the past. Muslim Ajarians are neither considered as complete “others” like Azeris, nor full Georgians. They have always been “not-entirely-Georgians” or “incomplete selves” (Pelkmans Reference Pelkmans2006, 140), trapped somewhere in-between, in an ambiguous situation. However, such ambiguity or in-betweenness is not tolerated in South Caucasus.
Azeris and Muslim Ajarians have unique and, for members of the both groups, significant problems in their milieu. While the language barrier prevents Azeris from being integrated into Georgian society, the religious identity of Muslim Ajarians and identity politics pursued by the state and church, such as conversion policies, constitute the essential problems of Muslim Ajarians. In other words, Georgian Muslims’ prominent difficulty results from their religious identity, which they are struggling to defend, being both Muslim and Georgian in a country where faith and ethnicity are conflated.
Acknowledgments
This article draws on the paper “Azeris/Borchali Turks in Georgia: The Swing between Tolerance and Alienation,” which was presented at the Joint ESCAS-CESS Conference at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, June 29–July 2, 2017. I am grateful to Prof. Ayşegül Aydıngün for providing me with guidance, encouragement, and support during the process of research and writing this article. I would also thank Prof. Ketevan Khutsishvili, and the anonymous referees for their suggestions.
Financial support
This work was supported by OYP fund of Council of Higher Education, Turkey, under grant 38.03.00.01.09.4.2.20, and the Scientific Research Projects (BAP) of Middle East Technical University.
Disclosure
The author has nothing to disclose.
