This study provides a concise narrative of the relations between Rome and Persia from Septimius Severus’ rise to power to the death of Julian. Both emperors led campaigns against Persia, but in vastly different contexts and with widely divergent outcomes. Despite the title, the book deals not only with wars but also with peace.
E. does not set out to advance any provocative theses and does not make the (often trite) claim to give a revisionist account. Rather, it is a sound and sober histoire événementielle, which offers a complex, multi-sided view of the events and is also sensitive to the Persian perspective. The structure of the book straightforwardly and convincingly follows the chronological order.
The introduction provides concise references to modern research, a succinct overview of the sources and essential information about the geography and topography of the zone where Rome and Persia met. In an introductory chapter E. sketches the bellicose and peaceful contacts between Rome and Parthia from the time of Sulla to that of Caracalla, emphasising the impact of internal conflicts. The civil war at the end of the Roman Republic allowed the Parthians to advance westwards, whereas Rome later benefited from the competition between Arsacid rivals for the throne. Nonetheless, Rome did not manage to bring Armenia, the main area of contention, under her control in a lasting way. While the Romans had been gaining a stronger position in northern Mesopotamia, the ruling elites in this region were still happy to change sides if it seemed expedient. In general, however, the Roman policy of punitive actions and occasional intervention proved successful. The subsequent chapter deals with the consequences of the emergence of the Sasanians. E. contraposes the stabilisation of Persian power with the weakening of the Roman rulers since the 230s ce. The Romans did not change their strategy but were considerably less efficacious, although they benefited from the fact that in Armenia Arsacids still attempted to contravene Sasanian influence. The Sasanians successfully pursued an expansionist policy on both their eastern and their western borders. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the border region seemed to have faith in the stability of the Roman order. The case of Dura Europos, whose Jewish inhabitants still embellished the synagogue with frescoes despite Sasanian attacks, demonstrates this.
The increasingly successful administration of the Sasanian empire contributed to the Persian triumph over Rome described by E. in the third chapter. The Roman emperor Valerian was captured and humiliated by his Persian enemies in 260. E. provides a complex analysis that includes the question of whether the plague described by Cyprian affected the Roman army and the issue of religious factors. In both respects, he remains sceptical: a plague should have affected the Persian army as well, and Shapur I supported not only Zoroastrianism but also Manichaeism. With due care E. reconstructs several campaigns led by Shapur I. In his view the critical triumph of the war from a Persian perspective was the taking of skilled captives who improved the empire's infrastructure, whereas territorial gains remained insignificant.
Rome did not break down under the defeat but proved to be resilient, which became apparent with the invasion of Persia by emperor Carus. E. highlights the internal problems plaguing the Persian empire after Shapur I's death in 270, which entailed intra-dynastic rivalry. In contrast, the Romans – despite serious troubles – managed to concentrate their forces, especially under Aurelian, whose reign began in 270. Both empires also had to deal with troubles on other frontiers, the Rhine and the Danube on the one hand and the Kushan empire on the other hand. Carus was the first Roman emperor to mount a military campaign against Persia for several decades. He benefited from the fact that the Persian king of kings Bahram II was fighting a rebellion in the east; nevertheless, contingent factors caused the Roman invasion to fail.
It took some time before Rome could react to the fiasco. E. stresses the importance of Diocletian's extensive increase in military infrastructure from the Red Sea to the Euphrates and his approach to new challenges in the Arabian region after the fall of Palmyra. Galerius’ success against the Persians in Armenia in 297/8 led to the treaty of 299, which consolidated Roman dominance over Armenia. Peaceful relationships were to last for decades as the strong fortresses erected by Diocletian made any attempt at invasion much more risky than they had been in the times of Shapur I. The mobile troops of the Sasanians were now increasingly forced to engage in siege warfare as the Romans avoided field battles after their disastrous defeats under Shapur I. The peaceful period under Constantine ended with the beginning of a new conflict. Although the rulers of several smaller kingdoms adopted Christianity, E. cautions against overestimating the influence of Christianity. It was no gamechanger in foreign policy.
E. describes the lengthy conflict between Constantius II and Shapur II extensively. While both were distracted by challenges within their respective empires, their ambitions differed. Whereas Constantius II tried to preserve the territory the Romans had gained over the previous decades, Shapur II attempted to conquer Nisibis and other cities, initially without success. E., however, considers the extent of war, which culminated in the Persian invasion of Mesopotamia in 359/60, beyond military events, also highlighting the role of diplomatic exchange. He poses but cannot answer the question of why Armenia and Arabia played no major roles in this context (or perhaps better: are not described doing so).
Julian's single-minded invasion of Persia and his sudden death forced the makeshift Roman emperor Jovian to accept a treaty with Shapur II. This treaty included the surrender of Nisibis, the old bone of contention between Rome and Persia. Over the following decades, both powers acquiesced in the situation and avoided open war, although they continued to rival for influence in Armenia and Arabia.
Unfortunately, the publisher did not invest much in the book: the print space is narrow, and the quality of the maps and the images is poor. The book deserved much more care. First of all, it is what it promises to be: a reliable overview of an important subject. It is well written as E. expertly uses illuminating anecdotes and passages from the sources. The book also includes passages that elaborate on certain problems in great detail, such as the role of the captives under Shapur I or the commemoration of his victories over Rome. It is particularly instructive on questions of military strategy and numismatics.
E. makes use of international research in various languages and includes recent archaeological findings. In general, multiperspectivity is a strength of the book. While the history of Roman emperors shapes its structure, E. consistently takes into account the impact of political entities ‘in between’, such as Armenia and the Arabian tribes; furthermore, he considers the challenges facing the Persians in the east and their internal problems. He also critically assesses Roman reports of Sasanian claims to the Achaemenid legacy when he shows that the territorial desires of the dynasty were much more limited and mainly focused on Mesopotamia. Many chapters have titles that juxtapose Roman and Persian rulers.
Given the asymmetry of the sources, an account of Roman–Persian relations cannot be completely balanced. However, this book successfully integrates Persian and other eastern viewpoints with Roman ones to provide a complex and balanced narrative.
