For many years, the reputation of William Howard Taft, the only American ever to serve as both president and chief justice of the United States, has languished. In recent times, however, a number of scholars, including Lewis Gould, Kevin Burns, Jeffrey Rosen, and, truth to tell, this reviewer, have all authored studies of Taft, whose multifaceted career remains remarkable for its variety. Now Michael Korzi has completed Presidential Leadership at the Cross Roads: William Howard Taft and the Modern Presidency. Korzi seeks “to characterize Taft's presidency and especially his view on presidential leadership in an evenhanded as well as nuanced manner” (6). He emphasizes how frequently Taft's presidency “exhibits both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ characteristics” (7). To a great extent, though not completely, Korzi has attained his goal.
The book is far from a sustained biographical treatment of Taft. Rather, Korzi explores presidential leadership from several specific perspectives: (1) the nomination and general election in 1908, (2) the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, and Taft's cross-country tour from September to November, a trek during which Taft logged some 13,000 miles and delivered more than 260 speeches, (3) the reemergence of Theodore Roosevelt in 1910, and his own speaking tour, (4) Taft's use of the veto power during the 62nd Congress, (5) the election of 1912, and (6) an effort to place Taft in historical perspective as an example of moderate presidential leadership. Along the way, as evidenced by his detailed endnotes, Korzi makes productive use of contemporary newspaper reporting and commentary. And he chides other Taft scholars for their neglect of Taft's second cross-country tour in 1911. Such a lack of attention is “profoundly unfortunate,” the author writes, for the tour “constitutes a key moment in Taft's presidency and helps to reveal more fully his approach to presidential leadership” (171).
An important characteristic of this leadership, according to Korzi, was Taft's insistence on upholding both party principles and party promises, especially as seen in the Republican platform of 1908. To measure his success on the basis of 1912 election result—when Taft suffered a humiliating defeat—would be wrong, he adds. By projecting the finale of Taft's bid for reelection—coming in third, and winning only two states in terms of electoral votes—back over his entire term, one distorts both the character of his presidency and his model of leadership (210). In fact, “Taft exhibited a much stronger relationship with both his political party and public opinion in these tours than would have been acceptable to not just the founding generation but most nineteenth century politicians” (177). In his unprecedented quest for a third term, Roosevelt repudiated such a relationship—conduct that Taft found both incomprehensible and unforgivable. After his defeat, Taft wrote that TR was “the most dangerous man that we have had in this country since its origin, and that by preventing his election to a third term we are entitled to the gratitude of all patriots” (204). Indeed, by his loss, Taft had insured Roosevelt's defeat as well—an event that Taft saw as nothing less than a major triumph.
The New York Times, admittedly no friend of TR, reached a similar conclusion. The former president had been consumed by “a vindictive and treacherous enmity” towards his successor, reflecting “jealousy, wounded vanity, and implacable hostility. “In his demagogic hunt for votes, in his appeals to the passions of the ignorant and unthinking,” Roosevelt made certain that “very many who supported Mr. Taft's election, seeing it as impracticable, voted for Gov. Wilson to defend the Nation from the possible calamity of Mr. Roosevelt's success” (205). Traditional Republicans such as Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge both opposed TR, and even his opponent Woodrow Wilson found “the present insane distemper of egotism” displayed by TR offensive. Accepting the contention that Taft's break with TR had its origins towards the end of TR's second term, years before the events in 1912, Korzi invites us to consider the two competing conceptions of executive leadership both demonstrated and endorsed.
He observes that “the party model of presidential leadership was giving way to the modern (or stewardship) presidency” (209). Taft subscribed to the first, while by 1912 TR enthusiastically embraced the second. Further, Korzi adds, Taft's obvious gravitation towards a more traditional conservative political leadership should be seen as a reaction against what he labels TR's excessive push “towards an unbridled plebiscitary [sic] president.” It was not so much that Taft became more conservative by September 1912, as that TR had become much more radical. Indeed, according to Korzi, Taft held to a well-articulated theory of presidential direction, not to “an outmoded and outdated theory of leadership.”
Korzi concludes his book by insisting that Taft's theory “is far more robust than the literalist model and has value in a prescriptive sense as well as a proscriptive one, viz., as a critique of the excesses of the modern presidency” (222). As examples, he cites all our recent chief executives, but most frequently, the presidency of Donald Trump who held office as Korzi completed his manuscript. He notes a “lack of limitation, as well as the failure to sense one's own inherent weaknesses.” Further, Taft had objected strongly to “Roosevelt's notion that the president should dominate in legislative matters.” Both instances point to “an inflated sense of self.” Recent presidents have all demonstrated these failings.
Most important for Korzi has been a continuing erosion of “the conventional norms of political discourse.” Taft was not troubled by Wilson's election. Indeed, he welcomed it. Today, however, “few politicians [would] register the same equanimity upon the opposition's election.” Further, “when the parties see the election of the opposition as a grave threat to the republic, every four years no less, the political system is in an unhealthy state.” Such, he posits, is the situation today.
Although Korzi does not, we might well ask what Taft would have thought not only concerning the utter mendacity of Trump, Obama's successor from 2016 to 2020, but also the contemporary trend towards expansion and consolidation of executive authority. The author is correct to note that Taft declined to follow this model. In our time, a likely benefit from one who does might be the cooling of tensions between the main political parties. Such a presidency probably would not be that “spectacular,” but Korzi makes a good point when he concludes that “given our contemporary political context, this [could] well be a considerable improvement.” In sum, Korzi has forced his readers to consider how one might assess presidential leadership, using the contending models of Taft and TR as starting points. His book is a tribute to Taft, who had observed after his 1912 defeat that “I must wait for years if I would be vindicated by the people. . . . I am content to wait.”
