Mark Garrett Longaker's aims in this rhetorically gifted book are twofold. At the most general and historical level, a key purpose of this book is to show that “capitalism has always been thoroughly rhetorical” (11). While Longaker's primary intended audience is teachers and scholars of rhetoric, readers of the Review of Politics who have long appreciated the role of rhetoric within economic and political argument will find in his well-crafted discussions additional historical evidence for the ways in which rhetoric, capitalism, and political life have been braided together. The second aim of this volume is to show in more granular detail how a British philosopher (John Locke), a political economist (Adam Smith), a rhetorical theorist (Hugh Blair), and a sociologist (Herbert Spencer) each sought to cultivate “bourgeois virtue” among their contemporaries by teaching “rhetorical style.” It is in reference to this second aim that readers will find both illuminating historical analyses and elements worthy of additional critical scrutiny.
The substantive chapters provide insightful contributions into the intellectual history and rhetorical/pedagogical commitments of each thinker under investigation. This is true despite some conceptual confusion that seems to affect the initial setup of this study. In particular, Longaker locates British Enlightenment rhetoric—and belletrism and the plain style more specifically—in reference to the supposed historical separation of civic virtue from civil society. As he argues, “This distinction between civic virtue and civil society separates the modern from the ancient” (8). Similarly, Longaker situates his investigation into rhetorical style in terms of the alleged “transition from public virtue to private conscience” that culminates in a modern world “marked by atrophied publicity and hypertrophied privacy” (9). Despite these broad and contestable assertions, when the author recalls J. G. A. Pocock's warning about the difficulties of sustaining these distinctions, and when he turns to thinkers like Locke and Smith who seriously trouble these separations and with them the alleged withering of civic virtue (7), Longaker's analyses correctly and productively complicate these reiterated narratives about modernity and the eclipse of virtue within it.
Turning to the substantive chapters, we are presented with historically sensitive and intellectually sympathetic treatments of Locke, Smith, Blair, and even the mercurial, “dithering” Spencer. We are also offered readings of these diverse thinkers that will likely raise significant questions for students of political thought. Take, for example, Longaker's discussion of Locke. Although Locke “did not imagine himself as bourgeois” (5) and did not live in a market-oriented society, Longaker nonetheless presents Locke as the “arch-bourgeois theorist of stylistic clarity” (13). While readers of Locke certainly know about his commitment to clarity (in thought, in words, and in speech), it is a bit more surprising (particularly so long after the Macpherson thesis) to see Locke's commitment to clarity-as-transparency translated into a self-conscious bourgeois investment.
The trouble here is twofold: first, it is unclear why a quality like rhetorical clarity should be treated as a bourgeois virtue or, for that matter, bound to any particular economic arrangement as opposed to a virtue of human communication as such (as Aristotle and many others have appreciated); second, while Longaker has done an effective job connecting the value of clarity to Locke's epistemological, political, and pedagogical commitments, he has not convincingly shown how these commitments supply the ethical basis for a distinctly bourgeois economic orientation. That “style talk” is more than mere style talk but also a form of discourse that advances certain ethical and political ideals seems clear, but pinning these conceptions to a specific economic or ideological framework needs more elucidation than observing, for example, that Locke was writing during the formation of early capitalism. A related difficulty here is that throughout this book “bourgeois virtue” (which Ben Franklin and Deirdre McCloskey have taught us is not a performative contradiction) is treated synonymously with rhetorical qualities like clarity, probity, moderation, and economy. While Longaker has clearly established the importance of these specific qualities to the various thinkers featured within this study, it remains unclear why any of these qualities are either uniquely bourgeois or definitive of ethics within commercial societies. More broadly speaking, and regardless of the modes of economic production, the ethical link between practicing or affecting a specific communicative style (like clarity or propriety) and possessing an enduring and normative disposition of character (like justice or courage) remains deeply elusive to this reader.
Despite these reservations, the substantive chapters of this book repay close reading owing to the careful way that Longaker highlights and synthesizes important intellectual and historical currents that shaped a diverse group of English and Scottish thinkers across three centuries. With more and more political theorists taking up the “rhetorical turn” within the study of ideas, this book will certainly find an appreciative audience among students of political thought. This is especially true in relation to Longaker's fine treatment of Adam Smith and his illuminating discussions of Blair and Spencer.
The exceedingly light critical touch that Longaker brings to bear on all of these thinkers is partially compensated for by a concluding chapter that features several intriguing provocations aimed at scholars of literature, rhetoric, history, and economics. For example, he claims that “rhetorical style and bourgeois virtue are associated today as they were in the British Enlightenment” (133) and “capitalism has always been self-consciously rhetorical” (135). Since Longaker did not direct a provocation toward scholars of politics or ethics, I conclude this review with a provocation/question that might indicate at least one possible point of connection and fruitful collaboration between students of rhetoric and students of politics: there are rhetorical dimensions, styles, and excellences (or virtues) that characterize late capitalism and contemporary democracy, but how should we (as citizens of these regimes) assess the relative importance and normative status of these alleged virtues (and vices) within diverse and rapidly pluralizing societies?
