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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Political writing possesses a polemical intensity in these post-Iraq-invasion and Bush-second-term days that exceeds just about anything that has appeared since the time of the Vietnam War. The college bookshop in the small Virginia town where I live has a political-science section divided into “Democrat” and “Republican” subsections, with a largish “General” section left to house the rest. Unless some employee makes an egregious shelving mistake, this book will not find its way into the Republican corner.
For all its “no punches pulled” rhetoric, The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told about Iraq is fairly carefully referenced and, despite being designated as a “primer” by the authors, bears the marks of a fair amount of trawling in the seas of media-disseminated information and available government records. According to the authors, Bush's five biggest lies are: (1) that al-Qa

ida had ties to Saddam Hussein's regime; (2) that Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons posed a significant threat; (3) that Iraq had embarked on a nuclear-weapons program; (4) that the occupying army would be greeted by the Iraqi masses as liberators; and (5) that a regime change would make Iraq a “democratic model” for the entire Middle East. By now, only the political equivalent of a flat-earther would believe that convincing evidence exists for any of these propositions. The book's strength lies not so much in making the case against these declarations (though it does that, of course) as in showing how Bush the younger and his retainers came to think they could peddle disinformation of such a magnitude.
The Scheers and Chaudhry suggest that the road to these falsehoods stemmed from nothing less than a conspiracy, thereby giving the lie to the cynical view of government that declares, with a proverbial shrug of the shoulders, that states and their agents are simply too inefficient or too indolent (or both) to succeed in mounting large-scale conspiracies. This was, and still is, a conspiracy, one far more deserving of impeachment in the eyes of the authors than Clinton's trysts in the Oval Office closet. According to them, Bush and his handlers had a “deliberate method of marketing a war” that would not have been supported had the American public been told the truth. Their rationale for doing this was the conviction that the installation of a “friendly” regime in an oil-rich Arab state would consolidate American power in the Middle East and, in the process, accrue political capital to the Republican Party while promoting the commercial interests of its corporate supporters. Given the fact that Halliburton, Bechtel, and other Bush-friendly enterprises have made a lot of money out of the occupation, and that the Coalition Provisional Authority was largely staffed by Republican Party trusties and affiliates, this, too, is hard to deny. A compliant media and a supine Democratic Party in the Congress ensured that, pockets of opposition apart, the public would quickly line up behind the Bush administration when it decided on the invasion.
A short book of this kind cannot, of course, provide the detailed historical background that made such neoconservative adventurism feasible. The authors acknowledge America's long-possessed imperial propensities, something even historians not on the left do nowadays (Andrew Bacevich's American Empire is a case in point), but, thus, leave it to other writers to chart this more or less complex history. The conditions put in place by these historical antecedents were hugely magnified by the events of 11 September. America dealt with this trauma by quickly seeking to wound someone else, and while some of this psychic venom (the result of what the authors call “a fear-induced trance”) was directed at the perpetrators and their supporters in Afghanistan, there was enough left over to motivate a carefully orchestrated campaign against Saddam.
The authors are not content to look at the conditions that enabled the invasion of Iraq and its increasingly painful aftermath. For them, the accession of the Bush administration to power is itself deeply symptomatic of a crisis in American democracy, and only a remedying of this underlying crisis can curtail such adventurism in both the short and long terms. For the Scheers and Chaudhry, the first thing that needs to happen is a repudiation of Bush by the American electorate. This book, published in 2003, obviously could not deal with the recent American election campaign. The accession of Bush to a second term is clearly a disaster for all who share the viewpoint of this book. Significant change will come only when America is deprived once and for all of the cudgels it can wield against those who do not jump when its leaders click their fingers. Historians, invoking the notion of “overreach,” remind us that no previous empire has enjoyed an indefinitely long life. At the same time, as Louis Althusser reminded his students, the future does last a long time. But how long can the people of Iraq afford to wait?