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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
Critics, fans and journalists alike, of the players' role in the prolonged major league baseball work stoppage of 1994–1995, generally ignore two key realities of the history of the national pastime. First, at least since the founding of the National League in 1876, baseball at the highest levels has been primarily a business. Neither owners nor players played mainly for “the love of the game.” For the latter it was a way to make a living; for the former it was a way to make a profit.
Critics, fans and journalists alike, of the players' role in the prolonged major league baseball work stoppage of 1994–1995, generally ignore two key realities of the history of the national pastime. First, at least since the founding of the National League in 1876, baseball at the highest levels has been primarily a business. Neither owners nor players played mainly for “the love of the game.” For the latter it was a way to make a living; for the former it was a way to make a profit.
Second, for about a century after the senior circuit's emergence, owner-player (read management-labor) relations were characterized by the clubs' domination, manipulation, exploitation, and deception of the athletes. The principal basis of that relationship was the so-called reserve clause that, as interpreted, turned a player into a virtual piece of property. He was tied to the first team with which he signed a contract until sold, traded, or released. The last rarely happened and, in the other cases, property rights merely transferred to the new team.
In his earlier award-winning study, Never Just a Game: Players, Owners and American Baseball to 1920 (1994), Burk labels the years up to 1920 as the “trade war era,” “the most representative and influential figure” of which was Albert G. Spalding, lover of baseball and quintessential capitalist (viii). During that era the worst abuses of the reserve clause were at times cushioned by the rise of new leagues trying to find a niche in the growing baseball entertainment business; the American Association, Western League, American League, Federal League all provided players an option and bargaining power. At times, even players unions—and the short-lived Players League—gained enough strength to ease temporarily the economic crunch. But every time, the competition either collapsed or was absorbed into the dominant structure and the players lost their leverage. Finally, in 1922 the US Supreme Court sanctioned management's cartel, further limiting the players' courses of action.
In this second volume, Burk divides the post-1920 decades into “the paternalistic era” or the age of Branch Rickey, and “the inflationary era” or the age of Marvin Miller. During the former, covering the years 1921–1965, baseball enjoyed stages of expansion and prosperity, especially in the post-World War One period. But these were followed by serious declines: the Great Depression and World War II, and the 1950s-1960s suburbanization and rise of alternate forms of entertainment that cut into baseball's fan base. In addition, with the exception of the abortive Pacific Coast League claim of major league status and brief Mexican League challenge, both in 1946, the players had no bargaining leverage nor jumping opportunities such as had been provided by the earlier trade wars. In fact, Branch Rickey's pioneering creation of an extensive farm system locked in more players at lower salaries. Even his oft-praised moves to bring blacks and Latinos into the major leagues can be seen as steps to enlarge the labor pool and press down wages. So, despite the publicity accorded the salaries of Babe Ruth and a few super stars, the players hardly benefited from baseball's seasons of prosperity, including, at first, the new income from media rights. And they gradually came to realize that fact.
Consequently, by the 1960s, even the basically conservative baseball fraternity could not avoid either the reform spirit of the decade nor an awareness of their own disadvantageous position. Several events illustrate this changing situation and mark entry into Burk's third era: Small owner concessions and creation of a pension plan in 1946, in part a reaction to the Mexican League threat; the beginnings of the Major League Baseball Players Association in 1953; the hiring of Miller in 1966; the inclusion of a grievance procedure in the 1968 Basic Agreement; the Curt Flood challenge to the reserve clause (1969–1972) and the Messersmith-McNally case that, through arbitration, effectively ended the reserve clause (1975). Under the threat of total free agency, the owners reluctantly began to negotiate with the union to set rules and to offer players long-term contracts at ever higher wages, something they could afford thanks to the cash cows of television, relocation and expansion.
Korr's somewhat more strident book differs from Burk's in two ways. Obviously, it covers less time, focusing on Burk's inflationary era, the age of Marvin Miller. Second, it draws much more on Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) internal documents and personal interviews with Miller and numerous players. But in going over much of the same territory as Burk, Korr delves more deeply into the motives, methods, and reasoning of Miller and into the behind-the-scenes debates and interrelationships of the union office and members. A labor economist who had worked for the federal government and the Steelworkers Union, and an old Dodger fan from Brooklyn, Miller was often blamed by owners, writers, and fans for destroying the “Golden Age” of baseball. He did inspire confidence in the players who he believed were “the foundation of baseball” (61) but who, because they had no leverage within the “one-sided [reserve] system that was structured to allow ownership to operate without interference” (64).
Miller's role in all of this as teacher and negotiator was undeniably crucial. But it was the players themselves who earlier “decided they had to challenge the owners in order to gain things that they thought they deserved” and then opened “the modern era of labor relations in baseball ( . . . ) with the decision to hire someone like Miller” (245). The combined impact of the MLBPA, Miller, and the law has been the end of the reserve clause, greater freedom for the players, and a remarkable increase in player salaries.
In portraying management, Korr is almost never sympathetic. Though not stupid in many areas of business, the owners did “foolish things” concerning the union, the result of “thoughtlessness and arrogance bred by years of unchecked control” (241). They stupidly tried to demonize the players whose abilities they were marketing to fans. They repeatedly misread the degree of union solidarity and the strength of labor law behind the union's position. “They equated compromise with surrender” and refused to negotiate about the reserve clause, the players' major concern.” A “false sense of security” made them condescending and dismissive before the players' requests (243).
The late Stephen Jay Gould, in a 1991 review, reached similar conclusions about the owners, players, and Miller; see his posthumously published Triumph and Tragedy in Mudville: A Lifelong Passion for Baseball (2003). “Baseball owners had prevailed by bluff and force, but they also had become complacent in the absence of any effective challenge for so long” (283–284). They used reference to baseball myth to divide and conquer “mostly young and uneducated players” (280). Miller raised player consciousness by speaking softly and reasonably and by moving slowly. His successes derived from that growing player solidarity, “powerfully abetted by dependable stupidity among owners” (283). Gould also quotes with full approval Red Barber's assertion that, thanks to Miller and the union, “we have the entire structure of baseball changed—the entire relationship between the players and the owners” (279); hence the title of Korr's book.
In short, the two works under review are in general agreement. Too often selfish, arrogant, exploitative of both players and the public, dishonest, overconfident, inept baseball owners and administrators brought trouble on themselves and basically deserve what perceived suffering—usually more to their egos than to their pockets—they have experienced since the 1970s. Generally they did not understand things then, and to a great degree they still do not. What they have yielded, they have yielded only under the greatest player association and legal pressure; in Korr's words, “it was the union that forced the changes on baseball against the efforts of the owners to retain the status quo” (10). The players, made aware of this after years of being mistreated and lied to, have been most reluctant to give back anything for fear of going back to the for-them-not-so-golden old days. The players, in other words, are not driven so much by greed but by a desire to get an equitable share of what their labor produces and of retaining what they and others before them struggled so long and hard to earn. They have had a vision of the game incompatible with that of the owners. And the press, fed documents and perks by the owners, certainly has not helped the players' cause very much.
My personal reading of that history coincides with that of Burk and Korr, so I have no fundamental argument with their conclusions. As a historian, I likewise have no quarrel with their methodology or their use of sources. We can always wish they had had more, but I find their documentation and interpretation more than adequate. I can only hope that both books will be read by more so-called experts who blame baseball's troubles primarily on “spoiled, selfish” players.