As part of the Oxford University Press series Ancient Warfare and Civilization, a set of narrative histories aimed at a wider audience, this volume is popular history at its best, a readable, engaging survey written by one of the world's leading experts on Carthaginian history. The book covers all three Punic Wars, from 264 to 146 b.c. It opens with a quick overview of the two states, both republics and traditionally friends until happenstance propelled them to war. H. stresses that the conflicts between Rome and Carthage should not be seen as some sort of clash between Western and non-Western powers, with the future of Western Civilisation at stake. Rather, he presents Rome and Carthage as two characteristically Western Mediterranean societies, both largely aloof from Hellenistic geopolitics if influenced by Hellenic culture and admired by Greek intellectuals.

The book's timing is such that H. does not discuss the stunning new discoveries off the Egadi Islands, remnants from the naval battle in 241 b.c. that effectively ended the First Punic War, which are only beginning to be published.Footnote ¹ These none the less promise to revolutionise our understanding of naval operations during the conflict. H., using seemingly respectable Polybian evidence, presents the First Punic War as dominated by quinqueremes, large warships crewed by 300 rowers and up to 120 marines. At this rate, the Roman force of 330 ships at Cape Ecnomus would involve 140,000 men, a number H. compares to the allied crews off the coast of Normandy on D-Day. The rams recovered so far indicate that both sides in fact deployed far smaller warships. The consistent size of the recovered rams indicates that they fit upon either small triremes or large biremes, which would require roughly half the crew of a quinquereme. The Roman fleet off Ecnomus may have been manned by no more than 75,000 sailors and marines. What Polybius describes as a clash of titans was more like a scrum of frigates.

One of the best aspects of the book is H.'s willingness to take a stand on various controversies, given that popular histories often cautiously hew to the consensus of the moment, or eschew analysis altogether in favour of unadulterated narrative. Thus H. argues that the First Punic War was initially primarily against Syracuse, with Carthaginian contingents only involved incidentally because they had allied themselves with the city. H. suggests that it was only after Syracuse was beaten that the Romans made the momentous decision to extend the war to Carthage itself. H. likewise suggests that the outbreak of the Second Punic War was essentially a mistake, with the Romans thinking that the Carthaginians would accede to their demand to recall Hannibal, allowing them to focus on Illyrian pirates, a threat much closer to home. Carthaginian defiance caught the Romans by surprise, forcing them to declare war as a face-saving measure, one they hoped could be ended quickly. As for the initiation of the Third Punic War, H. argues that the Romans did not want actually to fight and destroy Carthage. Rather, he suggests that the Roman invasion of 150 b.c. was designed to scare the Carthaginians back into submission after they violated the treaty of 201 b.c. through active resistance against Numidia. Had the Romans not overstated their demands in requiring the abandonment of the city itself, H. suggests the Roman army would have withdrawn, content with a Carthage that was further hobbled and humbled. Here it is difficult to believe that the Romans simply made a casual diplomatic error. Like George W. Bush's demand that Saddam Hussein go into exile to avoid the American invasion of 2003, the Roman order to relocate the city as a condition of peace was surely an offer they knew the Carthaginians would by necessity refuse, providing callow pretext for the already positioned legions to initiate an already decided upon war.

H. also dives into the age old controversy of whether or not Hannibal should have/could have marched on Rome following his smashing victory at Cannae. H. argues that Hannibal indeed made a terrible mistake in not doing so, suggesting that the Romans could only muster raw recruits to defend the city, and that a siege might have succeeding in starving them into submission. Yet Hannibal's record at sieges was terrible. He struggled mightily to capture Saguntum, taking eight months to overwhelm a relatively minor city. He failed to capture Tarentum by force, succeeding only through treachery, and could boast of nothing like the successful Roman sieges of Capua, Syracuse and New Carthage. It is doubtful Hannibal would have succeeded in besieging Rome and its seven miles of stout tufa walls.

The format of the Ancient Warfare and Civilization series is deliberately non-academic, with sparse endnotes and a barebones bibliography. This book not only succeeds admirably at what it sets out to do, but it exceeds the limitations of the popular history genre, combining complex narrative with many keen analytic insights. It makes excellent beach reading for history buffs, a quick study guide for a graduate student preparing for exams and a fine resource for the harried expert on Flavian poetry scrambling to prepare an undergraduate lecture about Hannibal.