Three decades ago, Charles Tilly defined state making as a form of “organized crime.” Ryan Gingeras, after paying tribute to Tilly in the introduction of his new book, focuses on the complex relationship between state elites and organized crime—in particular the production and trade of heroin in the Ottoman/Turkish context. The book covers the evolving nature of this relationship from the early 20th century, when the Committee of Union and Progress used criminal groups for political purposes under the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), to the 2000s, when the Ergenekon (a secret armed organization formed by politicians, high ranking military officers, gangsters, academics, and journalists) was revealed.
In this book, Gingeras not only presents a lively narrative of the intricate roles that the “underground world” played in the making of modern Turkey, but he also makes illuminating comparisons between Turkey and other states. The range of cases, from the United States to China, Mexico to Italy, Colombia to Japan, is impressive, and allows the reader to place the Turkish case in a wider context. The author situates his analysis into the general framework of state centralization—evoking the Tilly—in terms of the transition from “indirect” to “direct rule.” During the period of “indirect rule,” when the state lacked an independent bureaucracy, law enforcement “often fell to bandits or former bandits employed by local benefactors” (p. 49). By revealing the similarities between the Ottoman Empire and some other states, such as the United States, Mexico, and China, Gingeras shows that state agents' use of bandits for policing and/or clandestine activities had its own structural causes.
The book uses the interrelated mechanisms of ethnicity and migration to compare the Ottoman case with others. Mass migration in the 19th century filled cities with newcomers, upsetting the socioeconomic order. Establishing networks in their new locations, these newcomers gained a reputation for lawlessness and violence. The massive numbers of Albanian, Balkan, Caucasian, and Laz migrants flocking into the Ottoman lands from the mid-19th century onward shaped the state's perception up to the present of organized crime as an ethnically defined category, particularly since the state's heroin-related organized crime was run by these non-Turkish ethnic groups (pp. 29–36). The Ottoman and Turkish states viewed organized crime as ethnically based for another reason: the 19th-century integration of the Ottoman economy into European capitalism benefited non-Muslims by allowing them to create easier connections with various European states. The initial links between heroin trade and organized crime were thus established by Christians and Jews, who became heavily involved in the exportation of opium (p. 58). After the uprooting of the Christians from Anatolia, the ethnic groups mentioned previously appeared as the main actors in organized crime.
Although Gingeras makes comparisons between Turkey and other states throughout the book, his intention is not to develop a genuine comparative analysis. Therefore, the fact that comparisons are not made systematically and that the discussion does not propose a structured comparative methodology is only to be expected. The author often interrupts his chronological narrative to introduce comparisons with other countries when he deems it necessary to clarify his arguments on particular aspects of his main case—Turkey. Sometimes this results in the narrative being broken rather abruptly. For example, in the middle of discussing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) “crusade” against the opium trade in Turkey, Gingeras suddenly turns to the FBN “crusade” in New York City, a discussion that continues for five pages (pp. 138–43).
Additionally, although Gingeras sets up these comparisons, he does not handle his main case, Turkey, as a self-contained, closed entity. Just the opposite, his analysis shows that historical change cannot be explained by simply accounting for the interactions between agents. External factors also influence historical processes and outcomes. In order to understand the basic dynamics behind the relationship between the Turkish state and the Turkish mafia, Gingeras introduces an “externality,” namely the emergence of the United States as a major factor in Turkish politics and its worldwide counternarcotic policies. The analysis covers other externalities simultaneously, including the global political economy of the heroin trade, the international state system, and the emergence of the United States as a major power in the Middle East.
We may call these the structural dimensions of Gingeras' analysis. He presents them as the general contexts within which the Ottoman/Turkish case should be evaluated. However, although he is mostly successful in presenting these contexts, when it comes to showing the influence of the United States on the Turkish police he falls short of substantiating the argument. Gingeras argues that from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, under the influence of the United States, the Turkish narcotics police's “organization, labor codes and equipment” was “upgraded and regularized” (p. 156). However, despite this emphasis and the fact that one of the core chapters is entitled “Police Work,” the text is unable to substantiate the argument that the United States had a real influence on either the organizational structure or the policing practices in Turkey.
In addition to presenting the structural contexts, Gingeras also indicates that structures acquire their meaning only with actors. Hence, the author provides lively sketches of the leaders of major drug cartels and criminal groups such as Elie Eliopulos, Georges Baklacoğlu, and Leon Taranto in the 1930s (pp. 68–70); İhsan Sekban, Hüseyin Eminoğlu, and Nazım Kalkavan in the 1950s (pp. 84–93); Dündar Kılıç, Abuzer Uğurlu, and Behçet Cantürk in the 1970s and 1980s (pp. 217–30); and Abdullah Çatlı, Sedat Peker, and Drej Ali in the later periods (pp. 250–60). Up to World War II, discussion of the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish citizens of Turkey and their international connections (especially French and American) occupy a central place in the text. Following his discussion of the Turkification policies of the regime, Gingeras focuses on the Muslim migrants to big cities, first the Laz from the Black Sea region and later the Kurds and Turks (p. 123).
Gingeras continuously implies that an analysis focusing only on the policies of the United States and Turkey will not be sufficient to understand organized crime. One also needs to look at the networks established by the leadership of major drug cartels and criminal groups. Some of those networks are national, connecting urban and rural Turkey. Crime syndicates operated as middlemen for farmers, merchants, and smugglers in several parts of Anatolia. However, these groups also built truly global networks. In the 19th century, the East India Company linked the Ottoman Empire to England and China through the opium trade; in the 20th century the “French connection” linked Anatolia to Europe through Marseille and from there to the United States.
Old imperial trade networks provided a foundation for the mostly non-Muslim smuggling syndicates operating out of Turkey. After World War II, Muslim traffickers, who migrated to the big cities, replaced these groups. “The Great Turn” came with the 1970s. Gingeras describes changes in the political geography of drug trade, the transformation of Turkish syndicates from heroin-producing agents to heroin wholesalers and retailers, changing patterns of internal and external migration, the rise of political violence, Armenian attacks on Turkish ambassadors, and the emergence of Kurdish guerrilla warfare. All of these led the Turkish political elite to collaborate with the criminal syndicates in order to suppress these “threats to national security” (p. 236).
The major weakness of the book arises from the author's heavy dependence on one type of evidence: the archives of the FBN. As he states at the very beginning in “A Note On Sources,” “the book does not possess an exceedingly strong Turkish voice” because Turkish state authorities denied Gingeras access to the archives for the republican period (p. 15). In their absence, Gingeras seems to accept at face value most of the accounts of FBN officials in Turkey. This despite the fact that the FBN is a singular state body and naturally had interests and perspectives that were contradictory to those of other institutions, such as the FBI and CIA (p. 82). In fact, Gingeras reveals that on different occasions during the Cold War the “FBN either ignored or provided political cover for CIA-backed allies in Southeast Asia and Latin America” (p. 170). Even before the Cold War, the FBN was highly active in supporting Kuomintang against the Communists and facilitated their opium trade (p. 79). In the last analysis, what we have here is an organization that helped the US in orchestrating its world politics, sometimes battling opium production, sometimes facilitating its cultivation. More importantly, and as Gingeras himself shows, the FBN was shut down in 1968 because of widespread corruption in its ranks (p. 183). As these examples indicate, taking the FBN's documents on Turkey at face value or using them without incorporating alternative sources might be misleading.
In conclusion, Gingeras' book focuses on an important and neglected dimension of state formation in Turkey. He neither presents his arguments on the role of organized crime in state formations as a general rule, nor presents a simple historical narrative. Instead, he specifies the causal mechanisms that account for the variation of the phenomena at hand in different periods. Despite some pitfalls, which are largely the result of relying on only one type of primary source, Gingeras does well in combining structural and situational analysis with a special emphasis on networks.
