Michael Dutton's latest work offers a richly detailed empirical history of both the preventive and punitive aspects of social control as practiced by public security agents in China. In Dutton's narrative, the nearly fifty years of the revolutionary era are framed by the binary formulation at the heart of Maoist politics: the distinction between “friend” and “enemy,” which presents not merely a way of understanding the Chinese revolution, but a way of living it as well. Beginning with the Nationalist Party's bloody April 1927 coup to oust Communist collaborators and through the well-publicized 1976 arrest and trial of the Gang of Four, Dutton's book “tells the story of what happens when the binary of politics saturates the life world to become its doxa—when every facet of life turns on knowing who the enemy is and acting against that figure. It is at that moment that we arrive at that point when society and life become fused in politics” (4).
Working outward from that consequential moment, Dutton weaves a powerful and compelling story that offers a series of historic variations on this dyadic theme. Mao's 1926 answer to the question, “Who are our enemies, and who are our friends” provided a roster of those classes that could be counted upon to support the revolution, and those that would surely oppose it. He concluded with an ominous warning that the vacillations of the middle bourgeoisie would pose an ever-present danger to the revolutionary ranks and admonished his supporters to remain on constant guard lest such wavering breed confusion within the Party. In so doing, a mere four years after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1922, Mao defined philosophically what would ultimately become the two principal political tasks of the revolutionary era: the perpetual drawing and redrawing of the friend/enemy distinction through the vehicle of the disciplinary campaign and the taming of the revolutionary excesses generated by such campaigns through rectification. Political campaigns and the party purges connected with them proved invaluable to the early Chinese Communist leadership, not only in mobilizing the masses in support of regime goals, but moreover in inspiring passionate commitment for the process of socialist transformation. Likewise, the technique of rectification, as practiced through the unity-criticism-unity formula, provided the means necessary to tame the dyadic structure of the political without destroying the dynamism unleashed during mass campaigns. To police the Chinese revolution, then, was “to patrol that ever shifting thin red line that separated revolutionary friend from reactionary enemy” (4) using the disciplinary tool of the mass campaign and the technique of rectification.
Dutton maps out this process into the remote rural base camps to which the surviving remnants of the Communist Party fled in 1927, following their betrayal by the Nationalists, and details how the continuing fear of infiltration by covert enemies sparked periodic and violent “red terror” purges through the early 1930s. Brutal campaigns to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, members of various reformist factions associated with the Nationalist Party, and “opportunist” Trotskyites unfolded in rapid succession, claiming hundreds, if not thousands, of poor local peasants as both perpetrators and victims. The suddenness of the Japanese invasion overrode the Party's Jiangxi-era dogmatism and resulted in a broad call to arms to defend the nation. During the Yan'an era, the process of rescue and recuperation of wrong-doers evolved into a complex set of “techniques of disciplinary power” that proved invaluable nearly a decade later when the Communists gradually assumed control over China's cities and instituted mass education campaigns to promote the Maoist pedagogy. During the 1940s, the more lenient policy of “uniting with all who could be united with” briefly overlaid, but did not entirely subsume, the polarizing practices of the Jiangxi period, which resurfaced soon after the Communist victory in 1949.
A series of vehement politico-policing campaigns designed to sort out the “mass-line friend” from the “counterrevolutionary enemy” attended the consolidation of the Maoist party-state during the 1950s. Relying upon an uneasy combination of mass enthusiasm from below and Party direction from above, the new regime first attacked targets that manifested the “social ills” that plagued pre-Revolutionary urban society: prostitution, illegal drug use, and vagrancy. However, as the new leadership's ameliorative social strategies revealed covert webs of police and government corruption, these early crusades deepened into a full-blown political campaign to suppress a broad range of “counterrevolutionary” activities. According to Dutton, the campaign was carried out in large part by the newly emerging organizations of the centrally planned economy, particularly the work-unit (danwei) system, which formed the backbone of the Mao-era practice of mass-line policing. Presiding over this web of mass organizations was a tier of public security professionals that focused the brunt of their work on more specialized intelligence-gathering efforts. The initial interdependence of these two elements of the public security system rapidly came undone under fears that Soviet-style revisionism had infected the police bureaucracy and culminated in the imposition of an “all-around dictatorship of the proletariat” during the Cultural Revolution. Dutton's final chapter describes the transformation of the public security system during the post-Mao era under market reform, the unlinking of politics and policing, and the adoption of the contract as the organizing concept underlying public security work.
In his introduction, Dutton swiftly acknowledges his theoretical debts to Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt. Remarking upon Schmitt's “rendition of the political as a binary distinction between friend and enemy” (10), Dutton finds significant overlap with Mao's own revolutionary vision; Dutton further credits Arendt with placing the concept of the political at the center of all human endeavors and acknowledging the role of passionate commitment in driving moral political action. He reads both of these theorists through a distinctly Foucauldian lens, refracting both Arendt's concept of the political and the Schmittian either/or struggle through a prism of disciplinary devices and techniques. Yet Dutton himself is quick to point out that his careful study of Chinese policing is not intended as a theoretical treatise. It is, instead, an essentially empirical project, a richly detailed and well-written account of precisely where and how the “thin red line” was drawn by the public security agents, entrusted by state and Party leaders to distinguish the revolution's friends from its foes. Given the historical nature of the project, it is particularly unfortunate much of the author's source material remains confidential. Yet, despite this shortcoming, Dutton makes a significant theoretical and historical contribution to our understanding of the evolution of public security practices in modern China. Alongside other noteworthy contributions, including Elizabeth Perry's Patrolling the Revolution (Rowman & Littlefield 2006) and Frederic Wakeman's Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937 (University of California Press 1996), Dutton's sweeping and provocative work is a welcome addition that probes the relationship between political interest and coercive power.
