In recent years, the China-Japan relationship has been buffeted by historically focused nationalism, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, China's rising military power, and changes in Japan's security policy. Michael Yahuda's new book therefore comes at an important moment. In this scholarly but highly accessible account of the China‒Japan relationship since the end of the Cold War, Yahuda asks whether China and Japan can peacefully coexist as great powers (‘two tigers’) in East Asia.
In answering this question, Yahuda expertly navigates between an analysis of major structural shifts – such as the changing Cold War international order, domestic political and economic reforms in China and Japan, and shifts in the demographic make-up of both societies – and day-to-day events such as China's 1995 nuclear tests and Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yahuda's central argument is that structural change, occasioned by the end of the Cold War, fundamentally altered the China–Japan relationship. The collapse of the Soviet Union and shifts in the international balance of power brought about major changes in both countries’ strategic policy, domestic politics, and national identity. In China, the demise of the Soviet Union raised questions about the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party responded by rolling out a ‘Patriotic Education Campaign’ which emphasized, among other things, the CCP's achievements in defeating imperialist Japan. At the same time, the removal of the Soviet military threat to China's northern land borders allowed China's military planners to begin deploying China's growing economic resources into the development of new maritime capabilities directed towards the east and southeastern coasts opposite Japan. Similarly dramatic changes took place in Japan, where the end of the Cold War and reforms to Japan's electoral system caused Japanese politics to shift rightwards to the centre, and prompted the emergence of debates about Japan's identity as a ‘normal’ power. Although no Japanese consensus on these debates was reached, international developments such as the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, and US criticism of Japan's ‘chequebook diplomacy’ following the first Gulf War, pushed Japan into playing a more active regional security role.
One of the book's key strengths is that Yahuda not only provides a rich and remarkably balanced account of these simultaneous processes of transition in China and Japan, but that he also demonstrates how these transitions have interacted with one another to shape the bilateral relationship. For instance, China's Patriotic Education Campaign was primarily a response to a domestic legitimacy crisis facing the CCP and had very little, if anything, to do with actions taken by Japan. Yet the dramatic increase in popular anti-Japanese sentiment caused by the Campaign put China's leaders in the position of having to condemn Japan's efforts to play a more active regional security role. Importantly, however, Yahuda also reminds us that despite the marked increase in political tensions in the China–Japan relationship since the end of the Cold War, neither country holds a ‘monolithic view’ of the other. Instead, the book carefully charts numerous examples of contending perspectives held by elites in either country. For instance, in the late 2000s, the rapid succession of Japanese Prime Ministers Fukuda, Asō, Hatoyama, and Kan demonstrated divisions within the Japanese political elite over whether Japan should pursue a closer relationship with China or the United States. Similarly, Yahuda shows how in China, those in the central leadership and Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have viewed Japan as an important economic partner have frequently had to contend with ‘intense nationalist currents’ in other parts of the government. Even more significantly, Yahuda uncovers a number of key moments when leaders on both sides have taken steps to improve the bilateral relationship even in the face of strident anti-Japanese sentiment in China and strong political opposition in Japan.
An important theme running throughout the book relates to whether economic interdependence has reduced or enhanced political and security tensions in the China–Japan relationship. Readers looking for a simple answer to this question will be disappointed. Yahuda rightfully highlights the ‘sheer complexity’ of the China–Japan economic relationship and the myriad businesses, government departments, regional and global institutions, and third party countries that shape the production networks connecting the economies of China, Japan, and beyond. In the post-Cold War era, Yahuda shows that deepening economic ties between China and Japan have coincided with growing political and security tensions, but argues that these tensions would have been even greater without the mitigating effects of economic interdependence. Thus, Yahuda cautiously concludes that economic interdependence will help to constrain future armed conflict in the China–Japan relationship. Yet elsewhere in the text, Yahuda does not seem entirely convinced by this answer. In Chapter 4, Yahuda suggests that in the wake of Koizumi Junichirō's prime ministership, it was ‘mainly political and strategic factors,’ rather than economic ones, that drove Beijing and Tokyo to improve their bilateral relationship, and notes that the Hu Jintao-Abe Shinzo joint statement of 2006 paid little attention to the major economic relationship uniting China and Japan. In drawing these conclusions, Yahuda's careful analysis highlights at least two important issues for scholars interested in the economic-security nexus in Asia. First, how do regional leaders weigh up the political, economic, and strategic imperatives of their bilateral relationships and how do they rank these potentially competing interests? Second, which actors are involved in pulling the different political, economic, and military levers, and how can we better account for the non-state actors, such as multinational companies and small and medium enterprises, involved in shaping the economic dimension of bilateral relationships in the region?
At a time of major change in Asia's strategic order, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War provides a critically important analysis of the sources of conflict and cooperation in Asia's most important bilateral relationship. Yet as Yahuda expertly demonstrates, the political, economic, and strategic transitions experienced by both countries since the end of the Cold War have been largely inward-looking affairs in which neither country has been ‘willing or able to envision a regional order which was acceptable to the other’. Whether the two states can envision a new and peaceful regional order will require both sides to take greater account of the interests of the other.
