As citizens of the land of the free, Americans claim to possess a sense of democratic mission and moral virtue that makes their nation and its foreign policy exceptional. In the nineteenth century this resulted in American diplomats asserting an independent and generally uncooperative attitude. On the other hand, they were similar to European diplomats in showing a desire for national territorial expansion and a readiness to use coercive measures where necessary. The British prime minister, Lord Palmerston, declared in 1857, “These Yankees are most disagreeable fellows … They are on the spot, strong, deeply interested in the matter, totally unscrupulous and dishonest and determined somehow to carry their point.” Palmerston's observation is elaborated upon in Brian Loveman's readable overview of American foreign policy from 1776 to the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Loveman follows Palmerston in noting that American diplomats were not so different to those of other countries in aggressively promoting perceived national interests. What was distinctive about the United States was dressing up a unilateral approach to foreign affairs in the rhetoric of avoiding alliances and overseas entanglements. Loveman challenges the received wisdom that the United States was an isolationist nation in the nineteenth century. He considers that the United States acted just like the great European powers in executing an active foreign policy notably in the western hemisphere. This policy was motivated and justified not by a sense of republican virtue but simply by “no higher law” than the protection and promotion of America's national interests.
Loveman's work is valuable in showing that the western hemisphere has provided a laboratory for the various types of foreign policy later implemented in other regions of the world. Under the pretext of upholding sovereign rights and the urgent necessity of self-defence against external threats, the United States articulated the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 just as it would announce the Truman Doctrine in similar circumstances more than a century later. During the nineteenth century the United States proceeded to launch a variety of policies in Latin America, including preemptive military intervention, territorial acquisition, coercive demonstrations of naval power, and covert operations leading to regime change. The 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino treaty with Colombia is highlighted as marking the creation of the first United States protectorate. Loveman sees the Colombian model in use during the Cold War when allies of the United States found themselves treated very much as if they were Caribbean puppet regimes.
While Loveman has much to say about America's relations with Latin America, most of the latter half of his study concentrates on examining the policies of the United States towards other regions of the world. What is presented is a radical critique which typically castigates the cold-warrior mindset of a succession of presidential administrations. Loveman laments, “American foreign policy has demeaned and besmirched the idea and dream of America” (403). His hope is that President Obama can begin to reverse some of the damage.
