This excellent book contains about a dozen chapters, most of which are revised versions of previously published work written between 2005 and 2012. Allen Wood covers key figures such as Kant, Herder, Fichte, Hegel and Marx in a book focussing on the theme of freedom. Wood considers them as part of a broad tradition. He does not gloss over important differences between them, but insightfully captures continuities and agreements that are too often overlooked. Wood claims that ‘despite the controversies within this tradition, there is something unified and important in it, when it comes to themes of freedom, right, ethics, humanity, community, and history, which sets the classical German tradition apart from other strands in modern philosophy’ (2). These themes include the idea that freedom and coercion are not always opposites, that the problem is ‘wrongful coercion’ and not coercion per se (10).

Wood’s The Free Development of Each is an imaginative, penetrating tour de force, rich in philosophical depth, by one of the most important scholars in the field. I learned much from virtually every page and Wood’s clear style is as impressive as his sharp, analytical insights. While chapters were largely centred around one or two key figures, the discussion is motivated and driven forward by philosophical engagement rather than chronological reconstruction. So Wood begins his chapter on Fichte’s understanding of absolute freedom by considering his ‘philosophical conversion’ to Kantianism before moving to ask ‘what is absolute freedom?’ and addressing issues such as Fichte’s understanding of the I as will and freedom as a kind of moral commitment (164–94).

I limit myself in what follows to Wood’s discussion of Hegel. This is not because this is the only interesting material. I found Wood’s chapters on Kant some of his most impressive and provocative yet, and he rekindled my interest in Herder’s philosophy.

Wood discusses Hegel’s philosophy throughout, but the main discussion is reserved for two chapters in the last third of this book. The first of these chapters addresses what Wood calls Fichtean themes in Hegel’s dialectic of recognition (214–28). Beginning with the opening chapters of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Wood demonstrates that Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness is indebted to Fichte’s philosophy to such an extent that the arguments for his positions are not always presented and only make sense by importing Fichte’s arguments for the same. Wood conveys this point using acidic criticisms, such as: ‘Only the most stubborn, fanatical, and mentally unbalanced kind of Hegelian would pretend to find in Hegel’s text anything resembling cogent arguments to connect self-consciousness with desire, life, and the species process. But in Fichte there are some highly plausible lines of reasoning in support of Hegel’s conclusions, or at least something analogous to them’ (218). For Wood, the conclusions drawn by Hegel’s indirect argument are often the same as those from Fichte’s ‘direct argument’ (225). Wood’s point is that Hegel ‘in an original way’ confirms Fichte’s conclusions. Since they use different paths to arrive at similar points, ‘the two approaches are more continuous with each other than they are competing’ (226). So far, most attention on the connection between Fichte’s and Hegel’s treatment of mutual recognition has focused on the way it arises from property relations in the early sections of The Foundations of Natural Right and ‘Abstract Right’ in the Philosophy of Right. What I found especially worthwhile about Wood’s discussion of this issue is his focus on the Phenomenology and its discussion of self-consciousness, recognition and the master–slave dialectic, thus deepening our understanding of Hegel’s work in new ways.

Dealing with the ‘Morality’ chapter in the Philosophy of Right, Wood’s second chapter on Hegel focuses on the topic of responsibility for actions and consequences (229–51). Wood argues that ‘Hegel’s conception of morality differs in significant ways from Kant’s, and thus makes clear that “morality” in Hegel cannot possibly be merely a nickname for Kantian moral philosophy’ (231). For Hegel, the individual is ‘concrete’ in the ethical life of a rational community and this fact is ‘a historical phenomenon . . . in a given age’ (229). This distinction of morality from ethical life is not made by Kant or, perhaps, by many moral philosophers today. Exploring topics ranging across the doctrine of double effect, moral luck and others, Wood’s discussions stand out by the effort to engage the philosophers under discussion on their own terms.

Typically, any discussion of Kant and Hegel on morality focuses on Hegel’s empty formalism charge against Kant’s moral philosophy. What I greatly appreciate about Wood’s account is that he shows that their debate on this point is much deeper and substantial than many have argued before. It would have been interesting to know more about whether Wood thinks Hegel’s later discussion in ethical life about religion and the state—where Hegel claims religion can support rightful conduct in the state by providing individuals with moral principles to guide their actions—is a more fruitful point of connection with Kant’s discussion of the importance of the moral law in its different formulations for guiding individual conduct. But this is another strength of Wood’s account: it left me wanting more not because of incompleteness, but because it is so eye-opening.

In sum, this is one of the very best books I have read on this subject for several years. I do not agree with Wood on every point, but this is an important work from one of the very best scholars in the field today which is a true must-have for anyone working in the area.