I. THE MANY FACES OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
A. Definition of Compulsory Patent Licensing
The value of a patent is defined by the bundle of rights it vests in its owner.Footnote 1 Foremost among these is the right to exclude.Footnote 2 Various economic advantages accrue to the patent holder, including the ability to challenge infringers, attract investment, manage disclosure risks, manage competitor risks, establish favorable pricing, enter licensing agreements, and sell all or portions of the bundle of rights.Footnote 3
The United States Constitution establishes intellectual property rights as a means to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”Footnote 4 Proponents of strong patent rights typically assert precisely this benefit.Footnote 5 Skeptics, on the other hand, contend that our increasingly patent-heavy marketplace imposes legal costs and follow-on development constraints that cumulatively suppress economic development.Footnote 6 Nevertheless, even critics acknowledge that patent rights incentivize investment in technology that entails high research and development costs but is easily replicated, provided the technology is susceptible to description in patent claims.Footnote 7
Pharmaceuticals exemplify products that pair exceptional development costs with relative ease of reproduction.Footnote 8 Pharmaceutical product development often requires a decade of research and an investment of over $2 billion.Footnote 9 The large market for pharmaceutical products ensures the profitability of off-brand equivalents.Footnote 10 Thus, absent patent and regulatory protection, drug developers would have little hope of recouping investments.Footnote 11 Pharmaceutical market behavior underscores the theory: unpatented products are almost never developed by major producers.Footnote 12
While the peculiar economics of pharmaceutical development animate strong patent rights,Footnote 13 the humanitarian importance of health care produces unique counter-justifications.Footnote 14 In particular, the very pricing power justified by extensive drug development costs can run askew of social interests in affordable medicine.Footnote 15 A socially optimal drug price would allow drug companies to recoup reasonable development costs without leveraging patent exclusivity to achieve unreasonable, access-inhibitory profit.Footnote 16 In the poorest countries, a drug would be offered at or near its lowest economically viable price.Footnote 17 Patent rights alone do nothing to promote this balance.Footnote 18 Rather, patent rights support a drug company's efforts, if it should choose to engage in such efforts, to establish the highest price the market will bear.Footnote 19 In the U.S. and around the globe, laws have evolved to promote access and curtail monopoly pricing behavior.Footnote 20
In U.S. practice, technology access concerns have gained increasing weight in non-medical commercial contexts.Footnote 21 Where patent exclusivity was once considered near-inviolable, excepting use by the U.S. government itself, a patent-heavy technology economy demands a more nuanced approach.Footnote 22 Suspension of patent exclusivity may be justified, for example, when a substantial business endeavor has developed inadvertently upon technology already patented by another,Footnote 23 or where the patented technology is a small but critical component of a product consumers rely on.Footnote 24
Compulsory patent licensing is one mechanism to promote access.Footnote 25 A compulsory patent license is a government-mandated transfer of patent rights, typically subject to a royalty payment to the patentee.Footnote 26 In contrast to typical bargained-for agreements, the parties to a compulsory license would not have entered the arrangement but for government coercion.Footnote 27
The present paper particularly explores compulsory patent licensing in two contexts. First, under the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), national governments can compel patent owners to out-license technology in service of greater good.Footnote 28 These egalitarian compulsory licenses improve access to technology but undermine patent value.Footnote 29 Second, compulsory licenses are increasingly relied on as an equitable remedy in U.S. patent litigation.Footnote 30 Typically referred to as “ongoing royalties,” these court-mandated compulsory licenses are a modern alternative to injunctions against adjudged infringers.Footnote 31 TRIPS compulsory licenses and ongoing royalties arise under independent legal frameworks,Footnote 32 but necessarily invoke parallel economic considerations. While the wisdom of each has been discussed at length by others, this paper explores principles of royalty determination employed in each context. Considering both frameworks, this paper provides an analysis of where each succeeds and fails, together with an exploration of optimized royalty frameworks.
This paper concludes that a single optimized framework for royalty determination cannot adequately serve both U.S. patent litigation and TRIPS compulsory licensing, but both frameworks can be convergently reformed to improve predictability and market efficiency. Unique frameworks are necessitated by the incompatible motivating forces behind litigation and TRIPS compulsory licensing. Litigation seeks to enforce the power to exclude, addressing economic harm to patentees,Footnote 33 while humanitarian TRIPS licenses are designed to break down patentees' interests for the greater good.Footnote 34 Both frameworks necessarily recognize that violation of patent exclusivity is welfare-enhancing under at least some conditions.Footnote 35 However, where humanitarian ends are best served by readily available aid at access-motivated royalties, royalties in lieu of injunction require substantial justification at commercially-motivated rates. Nevertheless, shared economic principles are necessarily in play, as both systems posit that a patentee should be compensated by royalties for lost profits and market share.Footnote 36 This shared principle suggests that a common framework for royalty determination is possible in divergent contexts, though none exists at this time. Revision of both frameworks is needed, at least in part because neither sufficiently serves the interests of predictability and market efficiency.
This paper provides recommendations for refinement of both TRIPS and litigation compulsory licensing frameworks.Footnote 37 Tension over abuse of TRIPS licensing can be mitigated by tailoring compulsory licenses to recognize patentees' market interests. Specifically, licenses designed to benefit only underserved sectors of a national market would serve humanitarian ends without disrupting patentees' established interests. This paper further proposes that humanitarian purposes should number among the factors considered ongoing royalty determinations in the U.S.Footnote 38 Moreover, this paper provides a streamlined ongoing royalties framework recognizing market and humanitarian factors.Footnote 39
The following sections review the history and purposes of compulsory patent licensing before exploring modern application in litigation and humanitarian contexts. Comparison reveals that while the respective frameworks are irreconcilable, each would benefit from better balancing market and humanitarian interests.
B. History of Compulsory Patent Licensing
Historically, public patent systems and compulsory patent licensing were born in the same legal breath.Footnote 40 The Venetian Patent Statute of 1474, enacting the first statutory patent system, included “every feature that modern patent systems deem fundamental.”Footnote 41 Consistent with today's intellectual property ideals, the Statute's averred purpose was to encourage inhabitants to “invent and make things.”Footnote 42 The Statute's functional terminology is similarly prescient, describing “new and ingenious devices … of great utility.”Footnote 43 In addition, the Statute's two brief paragraphs provided for compulsory patent licensing by the Venetian government, stating that “our Government will be free, at its total pleasure, to take for its own use and needs any of the said devices.”Footnote 44 Thus, concern over access was present from the first inception of general patent systems.Footnote 45 Moreover, from inception, the right to exclude was not inviolable.Footnote 46
1. History of U.S. Compulsory Patent Licensing
Compulsory licensing is no less engrained in the fabric of the U.S. patent system. From the birth of the U.S. patent system in 1790Footnote 47 through the early 1900's, patent infringement was litigated as a tort claim with respect to which the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.Footnote 48 Thus, in early American jurisprudence, the government's sovereign immunity protected it from any legal action in patent infringement.Footnote 49 The government therefore had unlimited access to privately patented technology.Footnote 50 In 1910, Congress passed an Act adding that U.S. patent holders could recover “reasonable compensation” when technology is “used by the United States without license.”Footnote 51 The U.S. government continues to hold compulsory licensing power subject to reasonable compensation.Footnote 52 As explained by the United States Court of Claims, “when a patented device or invention is made or used by or for the United States, [the government] ipso facto takes by eminent domain a compulsory compensable license in the patent; the patentee obtains his Fifth Amendment just compensation for that taking.”Footnote 53
Certain federal statutory provisions further empower the government, in limited areas of public interest, to grant a compulsory license in favor of a third party. Examples are found in the Atomic Energy Act, Clean Air Act, Plant Varieties Protection Act, and Bayh-Dole Act.Footnote 54 Compulsory licensing has also been utilized in the U.S. as a remedy to antitrust violations.Footnote 55 Federal courts have commonly instituted compulsory license relief where necessary to “pry open to competition a market that has been closed by … illegal restraints.”Footnote 56 These compulsory licensing solutions embody two clearly discernible justifications: (1) compulsory licensing in service of public interest;Footnote 57 and (2) compulsory licensing when the patent owner has failed to make or use the technology.Footnote 58 Of course, these distinct justifications are interdependent in practice: public need is satisfied when the patent owner has satisfactorily used the technology, and patent owner non-use is of no moment when the technology serves no public need.
2. History of International Compulsory Patent Licensing
Like U.S. law, international agreements have long favored broad governmental power to break patent rights for the public interest. The Paris Convention of 1883, joined by 177 countries, Footnote 59 including the United States in 1887, was amended in 1900 to empower member states to sanction patent owners who failed to work their inventions.Footnote 60 Although never adopted by the United States, the provision held that a patent was forfeited if its owner failed to work the invention within three years of filing, absent justification.Footnote 61 Further revisions in 1958 classified the non-working of patents as an abuse of patent rights.Footnote 62 Compulsory licensing replaced forfeiture as the prescribed remedy, and the operative working period was recalibrated to the later of (1) four years from filing or (2) three years from grant.Footnote 63 While not explicit, the Paris Convention appears agnostic as to whether compulsory license recipients are governments or third parties.Footnote 64
In contrast to the Paris Convention's provisions relating to unworked patents,Footnote 65 a more explicitly humanitarian form of compulsory licensing is set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.Footnote 66 TRIPS is an annex to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), in effect since 1995.Footnote 67 TRIPS grants WTO member states broad discretionary authority to compulsorily license any local patent to its national government or to a third party.Footnote 68 However, the Agreement includes a number of general limitations on this authority. The license-issuing government must ensure, subject to local judicial review, that:
each case is assessed on its individual merits;Footnote 69
a reasonable effort to negotiate a license with the patent owner was undertaken, except (a) in cases of great urgency, such as a national emergency; (b) when the license is for public non-commercial use; or (c) when necessary to address anti-competitive conduct;Footnote 70
the scope and duration of the compulsory license are narrowly fitted to the license's purpose, and to supplying the granting government's domestic market;Footnote 71
the compulsory license is non-exclusive, non-assignable, and terminates when the motivating circumstances cease to exist without likely recurrence;Footnote 72 and
the patent owner's compensation is “adequate” in view of the “economic value” of the license.Footnote 73
Despite these limitations, the TRIPS compulsory licensing framework places great discretion in the hands of member nations. For instance, the agreement provides no guidance regarding the meaning of “adequate” compensation, nor the extent of negotiation required before a member nation can announce a unilateral royalty determination.Footnote 74 Moreover, TRIPS does not define what would constitute a “national emergency,” a “public non-commercial use,” or an “anti-competitive practice,” any of which circumstances obviates the negotiation requirement altogether.Footnote 75 Use by the government itself, e.g., to fulfill universal health care commitments or expand government-provided health care, appears exempt from negotiation requirements as public non-commercial use.Footnote 76 Further still, nothing in the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme requires that the compulsory license serve the public good.Footnote 77 Indeed, there are no limitations regarding the economic standing of countries that may pursue TRIPS compulsory licenses; a powerful, technologically advanced nation and a poor, developing one are equally empowered to employ compulsory licensing.Footnote 78 Nor are there any limitations regarding the technologies that might be compulsorily licensed, from pharmaceuticals to electronics to athletic equipment.Footnote 79 Finally, the TRIPS framework would permit a member state to license a technology and sell it domestically at higher prices or greater profit than the patent owner enjoyed.Footnote 80 The noteworthy flexibility of TRIPS compulsory licensing may be necessary to address a diverse range of public interests, as the Agreement serves 164 member states, including the United States.Footnote 81
In summary, the United States can exercise compulsory licensing authority under its sovereign immunity, under a number of subject-matter-specific statutes, or with respect to inventions created with federal funding.Footnote 82 International agreements favor, or at least permit, still broader compulsory licensing authority.Footnote 83 The Paris Convention permits compulsory licensing upon failure to work a patent in a given jurisdiction within four years from filing or three years from grant.Footnote 84 The TRIPS Agreement provides still more sweeping authority, presumably intended for public good.Footnote 85 While United States compulsory licensing provisions and the Paris Convention provision are formulated as condition-specific exceptions to a presumption of patent exclusivity,Footnote 86 TRIPS is permissive, allowing compulsory licensing so long as modest baseline requirements are met.Footnote 87
C. History of Ongoing Royalties as an Equitable Remedy in U.S. Patent Litigation
Separate from the statutory and treaty provisions discussed above, compulsory licensing as an equitable remedy holds a position of increasing importance in U.S. litigation.Footnote 88 Monetary damages for past infringement are typically paired with a prospective mechanism to equitably address any future infringement.Footnote 89 A permanent injunction is one common means of addressing future infringement, requiring the adjudged infringer to cease the offending activity.Footnote 90 Another means of addressing future infringement is to compel a license between the patent holder and the adjudged infringer.Footnote 91 The compulsory agreement allows the infringer to continue the offending activity, provided it compensates the patent holder at an established rate referred to as an “ongoing royalty.”Footnote 92
Compulsory licensing as an equitable remedy in patent infringement has deep roots in U.S. practice. In the 1800s, it was common to permit an adjudged infringer to continue its endeavors subject to an ongoing royalty, e.g., if a patentee had failed to work the patent.Footnote 93 For instance, in Hoe v. Knap (1886), the Court expounded that “under a patent which gives a patentee a monopoly, he is bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable or equitable terms.”Footnote 94 As summarized in a 1917 textbook on patent law, there was “much doubt expressed as to whether or not an injunction should under any circumstances be granted where the patent never had been used or ‘worked.’”Footnote 95
Patent working requirements remained a central, but non-statutory, component of courts' equitable remedy analysis until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Box Co. in 1908.Footnote 96 Continental Paper Bag enduringly bolstered the principle that, in the United States, the exclusion of others is “the very essence of the right conferred” and that “it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”Footnote 97 Thereafter, as aptly stated in the 1917 textbook, “permanent injunction follow[ed] a decision in favor of the complainant … unless some special reason exist[ed] for its being refused.”Footnote 98 The rule stood largely unperturbed for 88 years, until 2006, when the Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange released injunction practice from the judicially evolved moorings of Continental Paper Bag.Footnote 99
In eBay v. MercExchange, plaintiff MercExchange alleged that online auctioneer eBay infringed MercExchange patents relating to generic systems for selling goods over a network.Footnote 100 A jury found eBay liable for willful infringement and awarded MercExchange damages of $35 million.Footnote 101 MercExchange sought the then-expected remedy of permanent injunction.Footnote 102 The District Court acknowledged that “injunctive relief … is considered the norm,” but then observed that “plaintiff does not practice its inventions and exists merely to license its patented technology to others.”Footnote 103 Accordingly, MercExchange's “lack of commercial activity … rebut[s] the presumption that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.” Footnote 104 The District Court denied the injunction, favoring a minority position that “money damages are an adequate remedy to compensate the plaintiff for any continuing infringement,” particularly where the plaintiff has a history of licensing the technology. Footnote 105
MercExchange successfully appealed the District Court's departure from the then-established norm of injunctive relief in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), effectively reinstating the general rule of permanent injunctions.Footnote 106 The differing approaches of the District Court and CAFC in eBay v. MercExchange were ripe for Supreme Court attention.Footnote 107
In 2006, a unanimous Supreme Court emphasized that injunctions were not automatic, and formalized the extant tradition of applying a four-factor test for the equitability of injunction.Footnote 108 As is now well known, permanent injunction is appropriate equitable relief when a plaintiff demonstrates: (1) that it suffers irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that the balance of hardships between the parties warrants a remedy in equity; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.Footnote 109
Justice Kennedy's concurrence more poignantly captures the tectonic shift toward a more nuanced equitable remedies approach, asserting that an old standard can apply differently in modern times.Footnote 110 Contextualizing the eBay v. MercExchange decision, Justice Kennedy states that “to the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of granting an injunction against patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern simply illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then-prevalent.”Footnote 111 Justice Kennedy goes on to caution, however, that times are changing.Footnote 112 For instance, “[i]n cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases,” e.g., where patents are now primarily used for licensing purposes and the threat of suit is unduly leveraged in negotiations.Footnote 113 Justice Kennedy's comments contemplate modern products comprising many fine components, each of which may be individually patented by non-producing parties and, in apparent reflection on the parties in suit, modern business method patents that may have far greater economic significance than past examples.Footnote 114 Justice Kennedy's concurrence therefore emphasizes that a flexible array of equitable remedies permits adaptation to technological development and the evolution of industry.Footnote 115
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court technically did little more than apply a preexisting four-factor permanent injunction test in the context of patent law, the practical implications were expansive.Footnote 116 Where courts had previously construed permanent injunction as the “general rule” subject to “rare exceptions,” the Supreme Court's holding did much to eviscerate the presumption that injunction would typically be appropriate.Footnote 117 Instead, under the Supreme Court's admonition that injunction must not be “automatic,” the lower courts were called upon to engage in a more searching review of context-appropriate equitable remedies.Footnote 118
Since eBay v. MercExchange, ongoing royalties have become a common remedy in patent law, awarded in approximately one-fourth of all post-eBay findings of patent infringement.Footnote 119 Permanent injunctions, previously levied in 95% of successful patent infringement suits under the supposed general rule favoring that remedy, are now applied in about 75% of such cases.Footnote 120
Taken together, compulsory licensing mechanisms have been deployed for the general welfare of WTO and Paris Convention member states, and in the flexible application of equitable remedies in U.S. patent litigation. The following sections provide a more granular exploration of (1) the application of TRIPS Agreement compulsory licensing and (2) the application of compulsory licensing as an equitable remedy in U.S. patent litigation.
II. UTILIZATION OF COMPULSORY LICENSES AND CALCULATION OF ROYALTIES
A. Utilization of TRIPS Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses under the TRIPS Agreement have received widespread attention because they undermine the commercial ethos of patent exclusivity but promote egalitarian technology access, particularly in health care.Footnote 121 The Agreement's expansive mandate raised tensions around possible abusive application of compulsory licensing. In reality, neither a widespread disruption of patent rights nor a widespread improvement in health care has resulted.Footnote 122 From the effective date of TRIPS in 1995 through 2001, not a single country attempted to utilize the compulsory licensing power, much less abuse it.Footnote 123 Developing countries were doubtful as to whether their powerful global partners would indulge compulsory licensing of valuable intellectual property assets.Footnote 124 Moreover, industry players had warned would-be adopters to expect reduced foreign investment if unfavorable precedents prevailed.Footnote 125
Reluctance to challenge the power of patent-wielding corporations may have been tempered by the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which legitimized and approved member states' aggressive use of the compulsory licensing powers.Footnote 126 The Declaration states that TRIPS was intended to address “public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”Footnote 127 Still more explicitly, the Declaration states that TRIPS “should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”Footnote 128 The WTO member states therefore “reaffirm[ed] the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose; … [e]ach member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”Footnote 129
The first compulsory license was declared by Zimbabwe in 2002.Footnote 130 Zimbabwe may have been in a safer position than other nations to explore the uncharted waters of compulsory licensing due to its international isolation at that time.Footnote 131 In a shockingly brief and general notice, Zimbabwe's government identified the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS as a state emergency during which any authorized party could make, use, or import any patented drug or generic for treatment of HIV/AIDS or related conditions, with emphasis on anti-retroviral drugs.Footnote 132 Neither notice provided any suggestion that royalty payments to patentees were contemplated.Footnote 133
The effect of Zimbabwe's compulsory licenses was decisive. By 2004, the Zimbabwe anti-retroviral market was mainly served by locally produced generic pharmaceutical products.Footnote 134 Varichem, a privately owned Zimbabwean company established in 1985, produced the majority of Zimbabwe's HIV/AIDS drugs.Footnote 135 Local pharmacies were able to supply the HIV/AIDS drugs at severely discounted rates.Footnote 136 For example, Combivir was available for as little as $13 per month, about 2% of its U.S. price, and Zerit for as little as $12 per month, about 4% of its U.S. price.Footnote 137 By contrast to Varichem's locally produced generics, utilization of imported generics was much lower.Footnote 138 Even the cheapest imported generics were two-fold more costly than the most expensive local products.Footnote 139
Since Zimbabwe opened the door in 2002, approximately a dozen countries have utilized compulsory licensing.Footnote 140 To date, all compulsory licenses have related exclusively to pharmaceutical products.Footnote 141 For example, in 2004 and 2005, Indonesia, Mozambique, Malaysia, Ghana, and Eritrea followed Zimbabwe's lead and issued licenses for generic HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals, including anti-retroviral therapies.Footnote 142 Some nations have licensed one or a few individual drugs, while other nations have pursued panels of drugs or even entire product classes.Footnote 143 Much of the activity involving pharmaceutical compulsory licensing has involved drugs for suppressing HIV/AIDS.Footnote 144
Royalty rates under TRIPS compulsory licensing have varied. Indonesia declared a compulsory license with a 0.5% royalty (one half of one percent of the total sale price).Footnote 145 Mozambique's declaration discussed royalty payments and reasoning, stating that “[i]n consideration that the mentioned product … is not marketed in Mozambique by the international patent owners and that it is in the national interest to keep the final price as lo[w] as possible, the total amount of royalties due to the patent owners shall not exceed 2% of the total turnover of the mentioned products.”Footnote 146 In Malaysia, when GlaxoSmithKline was unable to match generic pricing, Malaysia offered a compulsory license royalty at 6% of the generic price, though the reward was never pursued by the patent holder.Footnote 147 Patentees' reticence may reflect public image concerns or a desire to avoid legitimizing the burgeoning use of compulsory licensing.Footnote 148
Between 2006 and 2008, Thailand boldly announced that negotiations, although attempted, were unnecessary given Thailand's public health needs, and announced a license for a suite of therapeutics for HIV/AIDS, cancer, and heart disease at a royalty of only 0.5%.Footnote 149 Interestingly, Thailand also incorporated a limitation of its powers, in that the generic drugs would only be available to Thai citizens on government insurance.Footnote 150 Thus, the Thai scheme excluded those citizens capable of paying commercial premiums for brand-name drugs.Footnote 151 Although Thailand's gross domestic product per capita is above the world average, the lowest-earning quarter of the population survives on less than two dollars per day, obviating access to drugs like the AIDS therapeutic Kaletra, priced at $2200 per year.Footnote 152
Given that some countries suffer greatly from diseases for which existing drugs have not been made locally attainable,Footnote 153 and further given the aggressive model provided by Thailand,Footnote 154 it may be surprising that compulsory licensing has not been more widely utilized. Phrased another way, why isn't a public health tool as powerful as pharmaceutical compulsory licensing a massively widespread practice in developing nations? There are a number of reasons, including pressure from developed nations,Footnote 155 pressure from global industry leaders,Footnote 156 and parallel trade agreements that effectively limit use of compulsory licensing,Footnote 157 as well as manufacturing difficulties.Footnote 158
Developing countries and their officials may avoid aggressive compulsory licensing maneuvers to remain in the good graces of international corporations and developed countries, avoiding weighty adverse economic repercussions.Footnote 159 Exemplary of the pressures that suppress use of compulsory licensing, Thailand faced reprisal for its use of compulsory licensing from both the U.S. government and from pharmaceutical producers.Footnote 160 After Thailand refused Abbott's request for renewed negotiations, the pharmaceutical giant announced that it would withdraw seven of its new products from Thailand's drug approval pipeline, meaning drugs already on the path to Thai market approval would be abandoned.Footnote 161 Abbott's proposed withdrawal would constitute an affirmative effort to inhibit the clinical availability of presumptively beneficial drugs to the people of Thailand.Footnote 162 Moreover, Abbott's proposed withdrawal of drugs from the Thai market would have been coextensive with a withdrawal of investment in the Thai economy.Footnote 163 The United States placed Thailand on “Priority Watch” statusFootnote 164 in its annual report on the global state of intellectual property rights, citing an “overall deterioration in … protection and enforcement.”Footnote 165 The report is intended to summarize barriers to commerce, and thus can influence world trade.Footnote 166 Although these actions were publicly condemned, the clear, multi-tiered threat to developing nations seeking to use compulsory licensing was not lost on the international community.Footnote 167 For instance, nineteen African countries have joined an agreement declining the compulsory licensing authority created under TRIPS, an apparent bid to attract investment from patent-protected industries.Footnote 168
For developing nations in regional or bilateral “TRIPS-plus” trade agreements, the risks of using compulsory licensing under the TRIPS agreement are compounded by their international commitments.Footnote 169 “TRIPS-plus” is a designation applied to trade agreements that narrow the opportunity to utilize TRIPS compulsory licensing.Footnote 170 Regional trade agreements can render illegal an otherwise valid use of TRIPS. Footnote 171 In negotiating these agreements, developed jurisdictions such as the U.S., Japan, and the European Union shift the forum for negotiation of intellectual property rights away from the WTO and receive concessions that strengthen the rights in exchange for market access.Footnote 172 The U.S. has been among the most aggressive engineers of agreements that limit use of TRIPS compulsory licensing, particularly in its regional free trade agreements.Footnote 173 A typical TRIPS-plus provision empowers patentees to control use of clinical data, such that any unfriendly license recipient must bear the enormous burden of developing their own clinical results to satisfy local drug approval requirements.Footnote 174 Such limitations do not violate the TRIPS agreement's liberalization of patent rights because the limitation restricts use of data, not patents.Footnote 175 Other provisions can limit the grounds on which compulsory licensing can be invoked, e.g., to government use, national emergency, extreme urgency, or to remedy anti-competitive practices.Footnote 176 These terms may be sufficient for countries with drug manufacturing capacity, but do not permit humanitarian third-party production for export by developed countries.Footnote 177 TRIPS-plus terms of regional trade agreements can also be legally complex or convoluted, further decreasing the empowerment and flexibility intended by TRIPS.Footnote 178 For instance, side letters accompanying U.S. trade agreements sometimes specify that the agreement does not prevent use of TRIPS, but the scope of the side letters can conflict with the spirit or letter of the agreement itself, obfuscating paths forward.Footnote 179
As deployed in the Thai example discussed above, the U.S. has also sanctioned countries that used TRIPS to license patent rights by downgrading their score in a U.S.-curated index of the jurisdictional strength of intellectual property protection.Footnote 180 This index, published as the Special 301 Report of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, aims to “use all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U.S. exports” and ensure “that U.S. owners of IP have a full and fair opportunity to use and profit from their IP around the globe.”Footnote 181 The report explains that it “identifies foreign trading partners where IP protection and enforcement has deteriorated or remained at inadequate levels and where U.S. persons who rely on IP protection have difficulty with fair and equitable market access.”Footnote 182 Countries with poor IP protection are placed on the “Watch List” or on the still more onerous “Priority Watch List.”Footnote 183 Thus, a downgraded ranking in the Special 301 report signals for decreased economic investment by the U.S., other developed countries, and patent-protected firms.Footnote 184
A further important reason behind limited TRIPS activity may be that developing countries lack the manufacturing infrastructure necessary to utilize a local compulsory license. In Zimbabwe and Mozambique, local manufacturers were identified prior to compulsory licensing,Footnote 185 but many nations may not have comparable local production resources.Footnote 186
In an effort to provide a generic drug pathway for infrastructure-poor developing nations, an export/import mechanism was developed. The original TRIPS agreement allowed a member state to license local production or importation, which was only a viable source of pharmaceuticals for nations with sufficient drug manufacturing infrastructure.Footnote 187 There was no provision to aid non-producing nations that would require an outside supplier.Footnote 188 Thus, in 2001, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health “recognize[d] that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement” and resolved to address it.Footnote 189 Further, in implementing the Doha Declaration, a 2003 WTO Decision stated that a member (e.g., a developed nation) can issue a compulsory license for export of pharmaceutical products to a “least-developed country.”Footnote 190 Patentee's “adequate remuneration” is typically paid by the exporting country, but calculated based on the economic value of the drug in the importing country.Footnote 191 The importing country must take reasonable measures to ensure humanitarian, rather than black or gray market, utilization.Footnote 192 These terms were formally ratified in 2017, with the understanding that compulsory license exports were to be used solely “in good faith in order to deal with public health problems and not for industrial or commercial policy objectives.”Footnote 193
Canada was the first, and perhaps only, country to utilize the TRIPS export provisions.Footnote 194 Canada implemented a compulsory license for local generic manufacturer Apotex to produce TriAvir, a patented HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral cocktail.Footnote 195 The goal was to provide the HIV/AIDS therapeutic to Rwanda.Footnote 196 Apotex was able to price the drug at forty cents per pill, while branded pills were marketed at twenty dollars apiece.Footnote 197 By the time Canada had exhausted negotiations with the patentee, navigated the necessary administrative steps with the WTO, and arranged for distribution to Rwandan recipients, five years had elapsed.Footnote 198 According to some reports, five major Indian generic manufacturers were by then also producing TriAvir, and some at even lower prices. Footnote 199 Some suggest Canada persisted in the TriAvir project for political reasons.Footnote 200
The upshot of TRIPS compulsory licensing is that developing nations are largely free, under TRIPS, to make or otherwise acquire generic drugs with very low royalties to patentees.Footnote 201 The licensing nation is generally required to attempt negotiation, but even that minimal requirement is obviated in a wide range of circumstances.Footnote 202 However, significant political and trade pressures suppress the use of TRIPS compulsory licenses.Footnote 203 Compulsory licenses have explored a range of royalties from 0.5% to 6% (e.g., 0.5% in Indonesia; 2% in Mozambique; 2.5% in Zambia; and 4% or 6% in Malaysia).Footnote 204 In Canada's unique export scheme, royalties were structured along a sliding scale from 0.02% to 4%, with actual royalties queued to the importer's level of development.Footnote 205 Because no patent holder has yet challenged an announced royalty rate, the licensing nation is effectively free to declare the royalty rate of its choosing, e.g., 0.5%.Footnote 206 The Doha Declaration leaves little room to suggest that there should be a Rule of Thumb, or any rule, for TRIPS compulsory license royalties.Footnote 207 Rather, the Doha Declaration encourages developing countries to focus on health.Footnote 208 As would be expected, the methodology applied to determine a reasonable royalty between two parties in a U.S. litigation forum are quite different.Footnote 209
B. Utilization of Ongoing Royalties
The first landmark case to explore post-eBay ongoing royalties was Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.Footnote 210 Plaintiff Paice held patents on drive train technology for hybrid electric cars, which Toyota hybrids were found to infringe.Footnote 211 Paice did not “actually manufacture any good” although it had been in the process of negotiating a licensing agreement with Chrysler.Footnote 212 The Paice jury was instructed to calculate retrospective damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”Footnote 213 These instructions called upon the jury to imagine a hypothetical negotiation, since “[a] reasonable royalty is the amount of money a willing patent owner and a willing prospective licensee would have agreed upon at the time of the infringement for a license to make the invention.”Footnote 214 While the jury was tasked with contemplating past damages at law, the court was charged with determining an ongoing royalty in equity.Footnote 215 The jury arrived at a lump sum for damages, which the District Court reverse-engineered to find a “royalty rate of $25 per infringing vehicle.”Footnote 216 The District Court then utilized that same value as the ongoing royalty rate.Footnote 217
Paice appealed, first, that the court had no authority to issue an ongoing royalty, and second, that even if the court had such authority, only a jury could determine the amount.Footnote 218 In upholding its authority, the Court of Appeals turned to 35 U.S.C. § 283, which states that the court can grant injunctions on equitable grounds in order to protect patent rights.Footnote 219 The Court of Appeals construed this statute, without explication, to provide for ongoing royalties and found that such royalties indeed prevent the violation of patent rights.Footnote 220 The Paice Court of Appeals further differentiated ongoing royalties from damages, explaining that while damages may entail a right to a jury trial not all monetary relief is properly characterized as damages.Footnote 221 Rather, ongoing royalties are a form of equitable relief that does not relate to what ought to have been done in the past, and is therefore within the court's purview.Footnote 222 Moreover, a court can modify or dissolve an injunction if it determines that the injunction is no longer applicable, as Rule 60(b) provides that a “court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding … [if] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”Footnote 223 Thus, an infringer operating under a court-ordered license is “permitted to continue by virtue, and with the imprimatur, of the [court].”Footnote 224
The Paice Court of Appeals went on to provide procedural insights regarding the assessment of ongoing royalties.Footnote 225 Foremost, denial of permanent injunction does not automatically justify an ongoing royalty.Footnote 226 Rather, as later summarized in Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., relief for ongoing infringement can take the form of (1) injunction; (2) court-mandated negotiation between the parties; (3) court-mandated ongoing royalty; or (4) at the court's discretion, no relief for prospective infringement.Footnote 227 Courts acknowledge that the fourth option of providing no prospective relief, while technically available, would be improper unless a damages award had already accounted for prospective infringement.Footnote 228 Moreover, the third option of mandating an ongoing royalty is considered less desirable than permitting actual negotiation between the parties.Footnote 229 Thus, “[i]n most cases … the district court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license amongst themselves … before imposing an ongoing royalty [rate].”Footnote 230 In other words, the Paice District Court missed a step.
The initial Paice ongoing royalty determination was also flawed, the Court of Appeals held, because it “provide[d] no reasoning to support the selection of $25 per infringing vehicle” and as such was not susceptible to review on appeal.Footnote 231 Paice therefore teaches that the court should not preside as the presumptive forum for royalty rate determinations, nor determine a royalty sua sponte when called upon to so preside.
Proper calculation of ongoing royalties was further elaborated in Amado v. Microsoft Corp.Footnote 232 Plaintiff Amado's patented database-to-spreadsheet interface was found infringed by the pervasive Microsoft Office software package.Footnote 233 Like Paice, “Amado [did] not practice the patent and ha[d] been unable to license it to anyone.”Footnote 234 The Amado ongoing royalty analysis began with the premise that “[t]here is a fundamental difference … between a reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement [(i.e., damages)] and [a reasonable royalty] for post-verdict infringement.”Footnote 235 Thus, following Judge Rader's concurrence in Paice, “pre-suit and post-verdict acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties' legal relationship and other factors.”Footnote 236 As unequivocally clarified in UroPep v. Eli Lilly, “the Court should calculate the post-verdict royalty rate by determining the rate that would have been agreed upon in a hypothetical negotiation occurring just after the verdict,” incorporating any “substantial shift in the bargaining position of the parties.”Footnote 237
The post-verdict negotiation standard necessitates exploration of whether the parties' bargaining positions have changed since the damages-relevant time of infringement, and if so by how much. Typically, “the basic assumptions informing the hypothetical negotiation in those two settings are often not dramatically different,” and should only produce a different answer where some change in positions can be articulated.Footnote 238 For instance, both the jury and the court are, in their respective royalty determinations, “required to assume that the … patent was both infringed and valid.”Footnote 239 Moreover, post-verdict continued infringement is not treated as “willful” when it is under a court-sanctioned license.Footnote 240 However, “[p]rior to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as the validity of the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that uncertainty,” while after a favorable judgment for the patentee “the calculus is markedly different because different economic factors are involved.”Footnote 241 The removal of uncertainty can produce a higher royalty rate.Footnote 242 Thus, UroPep explained that “the extent to which the imposition of an injunction is a realistic threat is an important factor that largely accounts for the difference between pre-verdict and post-verdict hypothetical negotiations.”Footnote 243
The injunction risk is least relevant when the court has already denied injunction, but more acute when a hypothetical negotiation occurs under the specter of an injunction that has been stayed solely for purposes of appeal.Footnote 244 Thus, “[w]here … an injunction is no longer proper, the Court is hard pressed to find in what material respect the situation is different [after trial] than it was during trial.”Footnote 245 However, where an as-yet-unrealized risk of injunction remains, the likelihood of success on appeal is a factor and the district court must evaluate the strength of its own verdict.Footnote 246 Needless to say, this seems to place the court in a biased position.
Evolution in market factors can also explain a change in royalty. For instance, if expected profits per sale are greater retrospectively than prospectively, or vice versa, the royalty can vary accordingly.Footnote 247 This possibility is in sharpest relief when jury royalties reflect conditions averaged over a lengthy past period and ongoing royalties reflect expectations averaged over a lengthy future period.Footnote 248
In practice, as summarized in UroPep, prospective ongoing royalty rates typically equal or exceed jury-determined retrospective per-unit damages.Footnote 249 Underlying this outcome, courts typically defer to the jury-determined royalty rate as a starting point for ongoing royalty calculation, crediting the jury's role as fact-finder.Footnote 250
Jury instructions for damages can matter greatly to the proper incorporation of jury-determined awards into the court's ongoing royalty calculation.Footnote 251 Depending on instructions, a jury can award “damages,” meaning remuneration for only past harm, or a lump sum amount intended to include a “paid-up license” that covers future infringement as well.Footnote 252 A damages-only determination leaves open the opportunity for ongoing royalties, but if the jury was also instructed to account for future infringement ongoing royalties may no longer be appropriate.Footnote 253
As the court openly acknowledges, ongoing royalty determinations “necessarily involve an element of approximation and uncertainty.”Footnote 254 For instance, the Whitserve court stated that while “damages calculations are not an exact science” the court can “make a fair and reasonable approximation.”Footnote 255 Indeed, Whitserve seems to demand a flexible approach; the CAFC's opinion expressly rejected a burgeoning 25%-of-profits “rule of thumb.”Footnote 256 On the other hand, Whitserve also admits that ongoing royalty calculation must be tied to recognizable guideposts.Footnote 257
Addressing the guideposts problem, Amado permissively approved utilization of the many-factored damages framework set forth in Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood,Footnote 258 while cautioning that application of the Georgia-Pacific factors is neither required nor limiting.Footnote 259 In particular, the Georgia-Pacific factors, as applied in ongoing royalties, are:
(1) plaintiff-patentee's past licensing arrangements, if comparable;
(2) defendant-infringer's past licensing arrangements, if comparable;
(3) nature and scope of the compulsory license;
(4) plaintiff-patentee's past licensing practices;
(5) the parties' commercial relationship;
(6) the impact of defendant-infringer's sales on defendant-infringer's business;
(7) expiration date of the patent in suit and duration of the compulsory license;
(8) commercial success and profitability of products made under the patent;
(9) utility and advantages of infringing approaches over alternatives;
(10) nature and benefits of using the patented invention, including commercial value;
(11) extent of defendant-infringer's use of the patented invention;
(12) royalties customary in the relevant industry for analogous inventions;
(13) portion of defendant-infringer's profits attributable to the patented invention;
(14) qualified expert testimony; and
(15) result of a hypothetical negotiation between the parties.Footnote 260
Detailed and substantive expert testimony on economic issues is critical to applying the analysis and determining appropriate royalty rates.Footnote 261 It may be summarized that ongoing royalties are calculated as a post-verdict hypothetical negotiation that will differ from a jury-determined royalty rate only if Georgia-Pacific factors, or other factors, indicate a substantive rebalancing of bargaining power.
Empirically, application of the loosely-guided ongoing royalty analysis typically results in a royalty between 1% and 20% of infringing product sales.Footnote 262 The ongoing royalty determinations in Paice and Amado are briefly described below as illustrative examples.
In Paice, on remand after failed negotiations but prior to the Whitserve's rejection of the Rule of Thumb,Footnote 263 the Court applied a “25 percent Rule of Thumb to defendant's profit margin of 9%,” arriving at a presumptive 2.25% royalty rate.Footnote 264 However, the Court realized that a 2.25% royalty rate, when applied to the cost of an infringing hybrid powertrain ($6500), amounted to $146 per unit sold.Footnote 265 The Rule of Thumb royalty therefore far exceeded the jury-determined royalty of $25 per vehicle, a result the Court apparently could not countenance.Footnote 266 The Court, on remand, began with the presumptive Rule of Thumb (here, 2.25% ongoing royalties), but reduced the royalties to 1.5% (or $98 per vehicle), citing the relatively low profitability of hybrid vehicles and that “the jury's award … [so] counsel[ed].”Footnote 267
In Amado, the jury awarded a $0.04 retrospective royalty for each infringing Microsoft Office product sold.Footnote 268 The District Court then calculated an ongoing royalty of $0.12, trebling damages on the theory that post-verdict infringement was definitionally willful.Footnote 269 The CAFC subsequently rejected the District Court's premise that it could simultaneously license ongoing infringement and penalize it as willful.Footnote 270
On remand, the District Court considered (1) Microsoft's unsuccessful good faith effort to cure its products with a software patch; (2) the great expense Microsoft would incur if required to disable existing products; (3) that Amado's technology was but a “minor portion of the greater product” with “nominal value … to the overall software;” (4) that “the vast complexity of the case created some likelihood of success for Microsoft on appeal, though not a high likelihood;” (5) the public's interest in Microsoft products; and (6) that Amado “did not compete with Microsoft in the market place and admitted to long ago abandoning any efforts to commercialize the patent.”Footnote 271 Because Amado had not been able to procure a permanent injunction, it did not gain the additional benefit of having “hold-out” leverage.Footnote 272 The District Court declined to apply the Georgia-Pacific factors, finding they were ill-fitted to the case because they were designed for a pre-verdict analysis.Footnote 273 After considering all of these issues, the Amado District Court stated that the proper royalty was “difficult to quantify” and stuck to the same $0.12 rate it had previously calculated on different grounds.Footnote 274
While detailed examination of lead cases such as Paice and Amado is instructive, broader empirical analyses are available in the literature. In post-eBay litigation, infringement entails a permanent injunction in about 75% of cases, as compared to about 95% pre-eBay.Footnote 275 Non-practicing plaintiffs received permanent injunctions in only 16% of cases, as opposed to 80% for all other plaintiffs.Footnote 276 In total, permanent injunctions granted to non-practicing plaintiffs accounted for only 7% of post-eBay permanent injunctions.Footnote 277 Plaintiffs suing market competitors prevailed in 84% of permanent injunction requests, while non-competitor patentees prevailed in only 21%.Footnote 278 Because the “non-practicing”Footnote 279 and “non-competitor”Footnote 280 pools include businesses that have attempted commercialization unsuccessfully, as well as businesses moving toward first commercialization, the injunction rate for true non-practicing entities is even lower than estimated here.Footnote 281 Overall, practicing plaintiffs, and particularly plaintiffs commercializing their patents in competition with defendants, are highly likely to be granted permanent injunctions.Footnote 282 Non-practicing and non-competitor plaintiffs should expect ongoing royalty arrangements instead.Footnote 283
Ongoing royalty rates post-eBay, where determined as a percentage, have ranged from 0.007% to 32% of sales, with a mean of 8.4% and a median of 6.1%.Footnote 284 The extremes of the range are non-representative. For instance, the 0.007% ongoing royalty awarded in Fresenius v. Baxter only covered unpatented disposable items that defendant Fresenius sold in conjunction with infringing hemodialysis machines.Footnote 285 By contrast, with respect to the machines themselves, the jury set a royalty of 1.7% and the District Court awarded a 3.4% ongoing royalty.Footnote 286 On the other extreme, in Boston Scientific v. Cordis, Boston Scientific (“BSC”) submitted an unconventional request.Footnote 287 BSC informed the Court that even though market-competitor Cordis was selling infringing cardiovascular stents, BSC preferred an ongoing royalty remedy.Footnote 288 The resulting 32% ongoing royalty incorporated a modest 2.95% royalty on infringing cardiovascular stents with a 29% bump to account for lost profits.Footnote 289 Thus, numerical summaries alone are informative but mask the diverse economics of the parties and products.
To the extent any numerical rules can be ascertained, it was empirically confirmed that ongoing royalty rates equaled or exceeded jury awards in all cases.Footnote 290 The mean increase between the two was 66%, but it is noteworthy that the jury-determined and ongoing royalty rates were identical in about half of all tabulated cases.Footnote 291
C. Pharmaceuticals are Unique
As explained by a U.S. Presidential Commission, the instinct to prioritize health care arises from the fact that health is a “primary good” that “helps people carry out their life plans, whatever they may happen to be.”Footnote 292 Moreover, illness, birth, and death are of great interpersonal importance; “all human beings are vulnerable to disease and all die.”Footnote 293 Yet pharmaceuticals are typically expensive, resulting in well-documented access inequalities in developing nations.Footnote 294 Consistent with the humanitarian importance of pharmaceutical access, TRIPS compulsory licensing has been applied exclusively to health care even though it is sufficiently flexible to address any technology need.Footnote 295
From a litigation perspective, patents may be more commercially valuable and more enforceable in the pharmaceutical industry than patents in many other fields.Footnote 296 A protected drug substance may be the single active ingredient of a multi-billion-dollar product.Footnote 297 By contrast, a software patent or engineering patent might only cover a tiny portion of a complex program or device.Footnote 298 Moreover, because chemical and biological entities can be molecularly defined, they are particularly well-suited to description in patent claims.Footnote 299 In terms of patentees' market dominance, national regulatory schemes and sophisticated patent practices can ensure a pharmaceutical producer's control of the entire U.S. market, and much of the world market, for their products.Footnote 300 Pharmaceutical companies typically achieve profit margins on the order of 20%, while the net profit margin for the S&P 500 is typically on the order of 10%.Footnote 301
Further still, pharmaceutical patent litigation will generally occur only after enormous investment by the patentee: infringers will only be motivated to copy a drug if the patentee has already shepherded it through FDA approval and into the market.Footnote 302 In other words, pharmaceutical litigation selects for plaintiffs that have worked the patent-in-suit. These factors together indicate that individual pharmaceutical patents might tend to shoulder a particularly high portion of covered products' commercial value and are likely to garner injunctions when infringed.Footnote 303
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRIPS ROYALTIES AND ONGOING ROYALTIES
TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. litigation produce opposed results for pharmaceutical product patentees. When TRIPS compulsory licensing is used, pharmaceutical product patentees are subject to very low, near-zero royalties and no direct means of recouping lost market share.Footnote 304 Consistent with humanitarian ends, pharmaceutical licensing has become the flagship exercise of TRIPS authority.Footnote 305 No member state has ever been denied its authority to enjoy a pharmaceutical compulsory license.Footnote 306 In sharp contrast, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry plaintiffs in the U.S. post-eBay litigation are awarded injunctions in 92% and 100% of litigated cases, respectively.Footnote 307 Thus, in U.S. practice, pharmaceutical patent infringers are almost never subject to ongoing royalty arrangements, even post-eBay.Footnote 308 This stark contrast underscores the existence of two functionally distinct compulsory licensing regimes, characterized by distinct goals and structural characteristics.
The TRIPS intellectual property framework is primarily humanitarian in nature, while the U.S. legal infrastructure is primarily capitalist in nature. Under TRIPS, compulsory licenses are available, with few restrictions, to address the unmet needs of a jurisdiction.Footnote 309 The 2001 Doha Declaration further specified that the target use was to address unmet health needs, consistent with the fact that all compulsory licenses have been for pharmaceutical products.Footnote 310 Based on the modest hurdles set forth in the TRIPS agreement, the underlying mission was certainly to open a wide door for low-cost use of patented products by countries in need.Footnote 311 In a sense, the goal of TRIPS licensing is to reduce the rights of pharmaceutical patent holders in favor of the health of individuals in developing nations that have been underserved by the pharmaceutical market.Footnote 312 The goals of litigation practice, by contrast, seek to remedy the losses of pharmaceutical patent holders in an equitable manner.Footnote 313 Calculation of ongoing royalties in U.S. litigation has evolved to turn on hypothetical negotiation and market factors.Footnote 314 However, where the U.S. pharmaceutical market may be considered satisfied by FDA approval of a pharmaceutical product, authorization of third-party use has often been found unjustified.Footnote 315 Thus, divergent goals underpin different outcomes between TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. litigation. These differences are further correlated with a number of structural distinctions that contribute to and reinforce the separation of regimes, as detailed below.
TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. patent litigation occur in different forums.Footnote 316 Although forum alone does not change economic principles, at least two forces are brought to bear in U.S. litigation that are largely absent in the TRIPS context. First, U.S. litigation directly raises the possibility that the patent-in-suit will be invalidated.Footnote 317 By contrast, TRIPS licensors do not appear to probe patent validity, perhaps because royalty rates are effectively self-determined.Footnote 318 Second, U.S. litigants face a likelihood of appeal, whereas no pharmaceutical company has yet appealed a developing nation's compulsory licensing decision.Footnote 319 A litigant with a remaining chance of obtaining an injunction might be credited with some “hold-out” leverage in hypothetical ongoing royalty negotiations.Footnote 320 Each of these factors might enhance a courtroom royalty rate over a comparable TRIPS royalty.Footnote 321
TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. patent litigation are also typically engaged by differing parties. U.S. pharmaceutical litigation occurs between commercial adversaries, while the moving party in a compulsory license is the government of a developing nation.Footnote 322 As a minimally funded entity seeking to market pharmaceuticals at presumptively minimal profit, the government of a developing nation would hypothetically negotiate a lower royalty rate than a profit-driven commercial competitor.Footnote 323 Some pharmaceutical companies may even be motivated by a shared humanitarian interest to negotiate a favorable royalty.Footnote 324
A TRIPS license and an ongoing royalty will also differ in the scale of the royalty income stream.Footnote 325 The premise underlying compulsory licensing is that the developing nation can acquire or produce generic drugs at a fraction of the branded product price.Footnote 326 Because the licensee's aim is to market generics at minimally profitable prices, royalty revenues will be substantially lower per unit than would result from licensing to a purely profit-motivated competitor.Footnote 327 Thus, the licensing national government's comparatively thin profit stream would result in a low royalty income for the patent holder. Interestingly, a free market licensor would likely seek a more financially motivated partner, but the availability of hypothetical alternative trading partners does not appear to fit the hypothetical negotiation model when licensing is compulsory.Footnote 328
It is not immediately obvious that percentage royalties awarded in TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. ongoing royalties are different. As discussed in this paper, TRIPS compulsory royalties have ranged from 0.5% to 6%, which is not prima facie inconsistent with post-eBay ongoing royalties, which have ranged from 0.007% to 32%.Footnote 329 However, this ongoing royalties range reflects the aggregate of U.S. litigation in all technology areas and therefore may be a poor metric for comparison to pharmaceutical industry royalties. Indeed, since pharmaceutical patent infringement uniformly results in injunction rather than ongoing royalty obligations in U.S. litigation, U.S. ongoing royalty statistics effectively exclude pharmaceuticals.Footnote 330 At most, it can be said that the rates offered in TRIPS compulsory licensing might not be grossly unfair, even before accounting for circumstantial factors that might justify low TRIPS licensing royalties.
The parties' competitive posture is also a critical factor in compulsory license valuation. On the one hand, both TRIPS licensing and ongoing royalties will tend to occur where the patentee is not substantially satisfying the infringer's market of interest.Footnote 331 In a world reduced to totally-served and totally-unserved markets, it would be simple to conclude that (1) in litigation, an infringer competing in a patentee's totally-served market will garner an injunction, not an ongoing royalty;Footnote 332 and (2) in pharmaceutical compulsory licensing, the government of a market totally-served by the patentee will not resort to compulsory licensing.Footnote 333 These simplified assumptions allow the fictional conclusions that (1) competition will never be sanctioned by either ongoing royalties or compulsory licenses; and (2) royalty recipients will always be non-competitors.
However, the simplified model does not reflect the market reality. Rather, developing nations can present high levels of income disparity, leading to convex demand curves.Footnote 334 Pharmaceutical companies may find that greatest profits in a convex demand curve market are obtained by selling at high prices to the richest consumers, rather than at much lower prices to the majority of consumers.Footnote 335 As a result, a pharmaceutical company might fulfill all of its commercial goals in a developing market without serving the lower-income majority. In that potentially common scenario, introduction of a compulsory-licensed low-priced generic would serve the public interest but directly compete in the patentee's intended market as well, eviscerating the patentee's profits. This scenario, like Boston Scientific v. Cordis, would justify a high royalty that subsumes lost profits in addition to licensing fees.Footnote 336
IV. A SINGLE STANDARD?
TRIPS royalties and U.S. ongoing royalties each entail a breakdown of patent exclusivity in exchange for a royalty established by mandated negotiation or by mandate alone.Footnote 337 In view of the fundamental similarity between the two compulsory licensing schemes, it is reasonable to explore whether they should share a single royalty determination framework.
Despite mechanistic similarity, TRIPS and U.S. litigation employ compulsory licensing to protect distinct interests. Compulsory licenses in U.S. patent litigation primarily balance and protect economic interests of commercial parties,Footnote 338 while compulsory licensing under TRIPS primarily protects humanitarian interests.Footnote 339 In TRIPS compulsory licensing, royalties appear to function as a token acknowledgement of patent holders' presumptive right to exclusivity.
Born of distinct motivating forces, logic does not militate a single framework for TRIPS royalties and ongoing royalties. Indeed, a commercial, profit-motivated framework will rarely result in a socially optimal drug price, and a social or humanitarian program will rarely maximize patentees' profits.Footnote 340 The two compulsory licensing systems are therefore similar in mechanism but are not reconcilable in their present forms. The shortfall occurs between the disregard for economic factors in TRIPS,Footnote 341 effectively permitting licensees to write their own licenses, and the emphasis on these factors in ongoing royalty determinations.Footnote 342 This distance, however, can and should be bridged. Disregard for economic factors is not necessary to the humanitarian ends of TRIPS licensing, and an alternative approach may increase participation in and efficiency of the TRIPS humanitarian endeavor. Indeed, as argued below, systematic consideration of economic factors in TRIPS royalty determinations would likely improve buy-in by industry and developed nations. At least because pharmaceutical companies and developed nations—through economic pressure and trade agreements—have been significant opponents of broad TRIPS licensing,Footnote 343 it is clear that their acquiescence would enhance utilization of TRIPS licenses, and thus access to medicine. TRIPS licensing was conceived, and must be preserved, as a humanitarian endeavor,Footnote 344 but can be reformed, as further discussed below, to promote efficient transactions for both developing nations and pharmaceutical patent holders.
The means of TRIPS humanitarian ends have typically been a low-royalty all-purpose license, which patent holders and developed nations have argued compromises rightfully procured exclusivity and profits.Footnote 345 A straightforward but important premise of this paper is that patent holders and developed nations would be more likely to acquiesce to compulsory licenses if they were tailored to minimize loss of market share and profits. In other words, an all-purpose license is unnecessarily broad. Nations seeking to license pharmaceutical products would likely avoid undesirable political and trade repercussions if they expressly avoided market interference. Conceptually, in a developing country with substantial income disparity, a pharmaceutical company only serves a small, wealthy portion of the populace. Compulsory licenses could specify that the existing market, i.e., the wealthiest citizens and other citizens who would have received full-price pharmaceutical products absent compulsory licensing, will not be granted access to TRIPS-licensed generics and generic pricing. Instead, only low-income citizens or those with government health care would receive the drug.
A possible complexity of pharmaceutical distribution would be the presence in the developing market of branded and non-branded products. Notably, however, this is already the case for off-patent drugs, and in many cases a plurality of generic forms are available.Footnote 346 In the U.S., generic drugs are subject to regulation by the FDA and are considered reliably equivalent to their off-patent predecessors, albeit with different pricing and packaging.Footnote 347 Developing markets are similarly acquainted with the availability of diverse generic options, but are distinguishable in that developing countries often have less reliable quality assurances.Footnote 348 While quality control is a well-recognized area for improvement in developing pharmaceutical markets,Footnote 349 generic recipients in a TRIPS licensing market with both on-patent and generic drugs would not be demonstrably less well served than in a market with only generic drugs. To the extent generic drug regulation is lacking,Footnote 350 the challenge and solution should be to improve generic regulation, not to grant generics a market monopoly and withhold the most assuredly safe products. To the extent branded pharmaceuticals are preferred in developing countries,Footnote 351 this only strengthens the argument in favor of a drug market that includes options for consumers, and further encourages participation of profit-motivated patentees.Footnote 352
Important questions arise as to how to determine the price and distribution of the branded on-patent pharmaceutical in a mixed market. These questions can be meaningfully addressed by comparing pre- and post-TRIPS license markets. For instance, the pricing and distribution of use of a product, which are necessarily tied to each other,Footnote 353 can be determined based on a pre-TRIPS license period in the licensing jurisdiction, and applied prospectively as the baseline for the market share attributable to the patent holder and the price of the on-patent pharmaceutical.
In order to determine a pre-license price and market in a jurisdiction, there must of course be a period of opportunity for pre-market sales. This period is referred to in this paper as the “working period.” Guidance for the length of this period can reasonably be drawn from the example of the Paris Convention Treaty, which sets forth a right to compulsory licensure after the later of (1) four years from filing or (2) three years from the grant.Footnote 354 As the Paris Convention Treaty is not specific to pharmaceuticals, and pharmaceuticals involve lengthy drug approval periods, a workable standard in the pharmaceutical field could add (3) three years from local drug approval and/or market access, if pursued, or (4) five years from earliest drug approval in a developed jurisdiction. The appropriate time periods would be open to further discussion, but should at minimum account for lengthy drug development and approval requirements. Patent owners would likely be motivated to enter jurisdictions promptly to capitalize on patent life, while companies inactive in a given territory would lose all market privileges by the end of the allotted working period (e.g., by failure to serve the market within five years of earliest drug approval in a developed jurisdiction). Developing nations might seek to exclude a patentee in order to minimize their apparent market share during the working period, but such approaches would be unproductive since delay efforts would merely extend the working period under prong (3), years from local approval and/or market access.
Establishment of such a working period will drive market efficiency. Pharmaceutical companies will seek to capture as much market share as possible by optimizing drug price and distribution, allowing the free market to calibrate the terms of any later-issued TRIPS license, if sought. In this sense, the subsequent TRIPS license could be efficiently designed to fill the gap in market satisfaction, meeting humanitarian ends without disrupting established markets. To the extent the margins are unclear, licenses should be designed to favor humanitarian use, affirming the supremacy of humanitarian ends to capitalist ends in TRIPS and policies relating to developing countries. Indeed, if a pharmaceutical company does not successfully market its drug in a jurisdiction within the time frame, the TRIPS license will permit generic sales throughout the entire market.
Arrangements of this kind are exemplified in Thai licenses that expressly provide for citizens on government insurance, or Thailand's deal with Novartis to provide free Glivec to citizens below a certain income level.Footnote 355 Alternatively, where the government provides undifferentiated universal health care, the licensing nation could offer ongoing royalties that approximate the patent owner's expected profits from the existing market. Parties may wish to collaborate in reducing black and gray market activity, although these concerns are not unique to compulsory licensing scenarios given the ubiquity of international price discrimination.Footnote 356
Royalty determinations in both TRIPS licensing and ongoing royalties suffer from a lack of predictability.Footnote 357 The root of unpredictability differs between the two frameworks. In TRIPS licenses, unpredictability encompasses two major factors. First, a pharmaceutical company may not be able to predict which countries may seek a license, or when.Footnote 358 Second, royalties are often set by license recipients themselves.Footnote 359 Concern over unpredictable timing of TRIPS licensing would be meaningfully addressed by establishing the working period discussed above. The working period would establish a timeline on which a pharmaceutical company might first expect a TRIPS licensing proposal. Addressing the need for predictability in the royalty determination itself requires a framework for that purpose. U.S. litigation provides a model framework for royalty determination that, while imperfect,Footnote 360 offers a sound starting point for improvement.
The ongoing royalty determination in U.S. litigation is rooted in economic logic, but has not been succinctly or clearly articulated. For instance, the court-approved Georgia-Pacific factors include a non-limiting set of 15 guideposts, consideration of which remains optional.Footnote 361 An advantage of the existing Georgia-Pacific factors is that they reflect important market considerations, including market history, market size, profitability, competition, and hypothetical negotiation.Footnote 362 However, the Georgia-Pacific factors do not seem well-suited to the task of prospective royalty determination because they do not contextualize the royalty as a change relative to an existing market. This contextualization is important in prospective royalty determinations in both TRIPS and equitable remedy contexts. In a TRIPS license, the relevant comparison would be to the market during the working period. In an ongoing royalty determination, the comparison is to the time of first infringement. Thus, a revised framework explicitly based on comparison to an existing market is needed, and would be relevant to both TRIPS and litigation royalty determinations.
In U.S. patent litigation, the courts' touchstones are: first, whether the plaintiff-patentee works the invention and, second, whether the defendant-infringer works the invention in a competing manner.Footnote 363 These same premises can apply in TRIPS licensing: whether patentee worked the invention within the working period, and whether the proposed license would impact the patentee's existing market, should be touchstones in TRIPS royalty determination. In the U.S., where parties compete in the market, injunctions typically ensue.Footnote 364 On the other hand, where plaintiff-patentee is non-practicing, the case is ripe for ongoing royalties.Footnote 365 In TRIPS licensing, the equivalent recommended in this paper is that a TRIPS license should not extend to portions of the market served by patentee, but should be available with royalties for unserved markets.
U.S. courts are reluctant to engage in royalty determination, and prefer for the parties to negotiate a license.Footnote 366 This is consistent with the TRIPS requirement that parties first attempt negotiation prior to compulsory licensing.Footnote 367 If the parties fail, the U.S. court next looks to the jury verdict on damages as a baseline, which reflects a hypothetical negotiation at the time of first infringement.Footnote 368 The equivalent baseline for TRIPS royalty determination proposed here would be the market served during the working period.
In U.S. determinations of ongoing royalty, the prospective royalty is determined by comparing present markets to baseline.Footnote 369 If little has changed since baseline, the court sets the ongoing royalty to match the damages royalty.Footnote 370 Courts take this path about half of the time.Footnote 371 In other cases, the court reasons that the relative bargaining power of the parties has shifted.Footnote 372 Although the CAFC pointed to the Georgia-Pacific factors, determinations in this context are nearly unguided.Footnote 373
A new test for ongoing royalty damages should be designed to fit within the court's existing workflow. In other words, the test should be designed to apply after a court has found infringement, decided upon damages, and held that injunction is inappropriate. The test's function can then be simplified; it need only reveal whether the bargaining positions of the parties have shifted. The test can consist of a concise list of factors, each of which might or might not have shifted:
i. Whether the general market value of the patented technology has changed;
ii. Whether the license would interfere with new business interests of the patentee;
iii. Whether the infringer's actual or prospective profit margins have changed;
iv. Whether failure to obtain a license would now be of greater detriment to the infringer's business interests;
v. Whether tangible evidence showed defendant, at the time of first infringement, would have substantially doubted the patent-in-suit's validity or applicability, now resolved by verdict; and
vi. Whether the infringing acts serve a humanitarian purpose.
Although multi-factored balancing tests can be difficult to apply, the above test is not a balancing test in the traditional sense. Rather, factors that have not changed are effectively removed from the case, and those that have changed can be treated as mathematically cumulative. In that sense, the above factors function more as a checklist than as a balancing test.
Having distilled the comparison to baseline that characterizes ongoing royalty determinations in U.S. litigation, the framework can be applied with minor adjustment to TRIPS licensing royalties:
Whether, or how much of, the market that has been satisfied by the patented technology during the working period;
Whether the license would interfere with the market served by the patentee;
The generic producer's expected profit margin; and
Whether the infringing acts serve a humanitarian purpose.
A challenge with implementation of a more nuanced TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme is that there is currently no effective adjudicative body for TRIPS compulsory licensing. Indeed, TRIPS calls for resolution of any challenge in local courts of the licensing jurisdiction.Footnote 374 The WTO would need to create or assign a tribunal for TRIPS royalty evaluation. Administrative rules should seek to minimize the length and cost to developing nations of seeking a TRIPS license from the tribunal.
Finally, the reasoning developed in this paper recommends that both U.S. courts and the above-contemplated tribunal should consider mixed-equity remedies when an infringer's activities include both competing and non-competing infringing activities. Competing activities can be enjoined, while non-competing activities can be addressed by ongoing royalty. Such an arrangement provides consumers with the broadest equitable access to the patented technology and its applications.
V. CONCLUSION
TRIPS compulsory licensing and U.S. patent litigation ongoing royalties are fundamentally similar but remarkably different in application. While TRIPS compulsory licensing is largely humanitarian and the remuneration is a secondary consideration, ongoing royalties are an exercise in economic reasoning. Both can be more finely tuned.
In U.S. patent litigation, ongoing royalties have evolved beyond existing frameworks, creating tension as courts attempt to negotiate murky economic waters with an ill-suited, optional 15-factor test. Instead, a new set of factors designed to reveal shifting bargaining power would streamline and clarify ongoing royalty calculations.
Fear of political or commercial reprisal for compulsory license undertakings could be greatly mitigated if the licensing governments were forthright in working with pharmaceutical companies to avoid or address market interference. Allaying these fears could enhance market efficiency and achieve TRIPS's humanitarian ends. Establishment of clear principles for royalty determination, on the same principles that have evolved for U.S. ongoing royalty determinations, and an adjudicative WTO body would serve these purposes.
While TRIPS compulsory licenses and U.S. ongoing royalties ultimately exist in different spheres, many of the economic principles prove universal. Accordingly, an understanding of each regime can inform the best application of the other.
