This book offers a theoretically relevant and methodologically innovative analysis of the causal mechanisms that led to the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance in the late 1970s. Its provocative argument renews the debate among Asian Cold War specialists about the exact cause of this alliance breakdown and contributes to the current scholarly debate about the relevance or appropriateness of applying Western international relations theories, such as Realism, to the analysis of China's contemporary foreign policy behavior. Categorically challenging recent well-researched works which attribute the causes of the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance to non-material factors (ideological, perceptual, and historical-cultural factors), Nicholas Khoo makes a sweeping Neo-realist argument that the multiple effects of Sino-Soviet strategic rivalry and the resultant Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation (the Soviet factor) constitute a necessary and sufficient cause. Playing the devil's advocate, by insisting on proving a mono-causal structural cause of the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, Khoo makes an error of oversimplifying the multi-causality and cumulative effect of other key variables leading to the termination of the alliance.
Attempting to systematically explicate the causal mechanism of the breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance in the late 1970s, Khoo innovatively employs a comparative-historical methodology (i.e. the method of process tracing) to explore the mechanisms through which increased Sino-Soviet strategic rivalry/conflict (antecedent condition) and the resultant Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation (independent variable or X) correspondingly generated increased Sino-Vietnamese conflict (dependent variable or Y). He elaborates on this correlation by drawing on detailed evidence (particularly from Chinese sources) within cases to show that increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation is causally associated with increased Sino-Vietnamese conflict, leading China to view Vietnam's alliance with its principal enemy, the Soviet Union, as a growing security threat. To enhance causal inference through process analysis, he divides the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangular relations from 1964 to 1991 into 5 periods. The bulk of the case analysis focuses on the preceding four periods from 1964 to 1979 (chapters 2–4). In the fifth case, which covers the period 1985–1991, he tests the validity of the Soviet factor as the necessary cause (Y, only if X) by tracing a strict causal linkage between the decreased Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the decreased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation made possible by China's ceasing to see the Soviet Union as its principle enemy during this period. In chapter 6, Khoo provides an additional analysis of the case of the Chinese-Soviet-American triangle in the 1950s to further support his important claim that the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict is located in China's Realist strategic thinking, not in ideology.
In terms of the levels of analysis, according to Khoo, the rivalry between the two most powerful states in the Socialist international system, namely the Soviet Union and China, is the overriding determinant of the trajectory of Sino-Vietnamese cooperation or conflict. In other words, any major shift in the trajectory of Sino-Vietnamese relations has its source in the development of Sino-Soviet relations. To prove that, he attempts to show that a variety of bilateral issues in Sino-Vietnamese relations, domestic politics in China and Vietnam and personality factors such as the operational code of individual decision makers (especially Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan etc.), played no causal role.
This book is not without flaws. First, Khoo's assignment and measurement of the value of “cooperation” and “conflict” is not always consistent across all cases, which leads to a somewhat arbitrary typological classification and exaggerated casual correlation of these variables. To be precise, he variably measures the level of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in terms of the level of “Soviet economic and military aid,” “Vietnamese political alignment with the Soviets” or “level of Vietnamese receptivity to Soviet counseling.” As indicators of “Sino-Vietnamese conflict,” he variably points to “Beijing's reduction of Chinese economic and military aid,” “Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the Soviet aid,” “Hanoi's rejection of Chinese advice,” or “Beijing's outright support for the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge.” As a result, the linkage between X and Y appeared more linear and casually linked than they actually were. For instance, in chapter 3, which covers the period 1968–73, he empathizes Hanoi's political alignment and receptivity to Soviet counseling about strategies against the U.S. as the most important indicator of increased Sino-Vietnamese cooperation that caused increased Sino-Vietnamese conflict (pp. 49–54, 60). On the other side of the same coin, Sino-Vietnamese cooperation also soared up during the period 1971–73. After the U.S.-backed coup to depose King Sihanouk in March 1970, followed by the U.S. invasion of Cambodia to destroy the Viet Cong's sanctuaries and supply lines, Hanoi briefly shifted its position on the Sino-Soviet rivalry by tilting closer to Beijing. So, the American factor too played an important role. Moreover, in the ensuing years 1972–73, China pledged and dispatched substantial emergency economic and military aid, while the Soviet aid to Vietnam continued to flow uninterrupted (pp. 86–7).
Second, Khoo de-emphasizes the importance of major turbulences in Soviet-Vietnamese relations and Vietnam's serious reluctance to rely on a faraway power (the Soviet Union) for help against its powerful neighbor (China). Soviet-Vietnam cooperation itself cannot be simply explained as a residual product of Sino-Soviet rivalry. As a result of his overriding focus on Sino-Soviet rivalry (dictated by the Neo-realist framework), Khoo overlooks the multiple effects of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution on Sino-Vietnamese relations. One needs to examine why China turned out to be Vietnam's principal enemy, to use Khoo's term, in the aftermath of Mao's Cultural Revolution proper 1966–68, which compelled the Vietnamese to see their national interests converge with the Soviets'. In light of newly available Vietnamese archival sources, Chinese over-enthusiasm blended with a strong dose of Chinese chauvinism in Vietnam during this period caused significantly deep mutual resentment and bilateral differences to emerge. Also, the Cultural Revolution brought about devastating consequences on China's economy in the first half of the 1970s, which in turn significantly undercut its ability to satisfy Vietnam's growing demand, accompanied by its strong dose of entitlement, for Chinese aid after the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973. Although Khoo does a good job of refuting other alternative explanatory variables, he is unable to address, let alone convincingly refute, this important competing explanation.
Third, Khoo reduces the effects of bilateral issues to “exacerbating factors,” “symptoms,” “amplifiers,” or “additional corrosive effects.” Here, he unjustifiably negates the role of irredentism and nationalism in causing Vietnam to align with the Soviets against the Chinese after 1974. He argues that if the Soviet factor were removed from the equation, there was no reason why, with a little skillful diplomacy, bilateral disputes over territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the question of overseas Chinese in Vietnam could not have been worked out (p. 97). He is correct to the extent that the Soviet factor is a major necessary factor that enabled Vietnam to be less compromising to the Chinese demand on the two issues after 1974. However, it is not a sufficient cause because Vietnamese anti-China nationalism in response to Chinese irredentism and opportunistic expansionism, another independent variable, also caused it. A variant of Vietnamese nationalism has its source in Vietnam's perception of China's opportunistic use of Vietnam's sole reliance on Chinese aid to pressure Vietnam to accept its claims over the two island groups in 1956–58. After 1974, irredentist/counter-irredentist nationalism also independently produced the spiral dynamic of mutual hostility and mobilization of force along the Sino-Vietnamese border, which in turn derailed subsequent bilateral efforts to de-escalate the armed conflict, let alone reach a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, there is little discussion of this important issue in chapter 5, which covers the period 1975–79. Due to the lack of archival materials, I suspect, Khoo speculates “while conflict simmered around a number of contentious bilateral issues, China did not make these bilateral issues a litmus test for Sino-Vietnamese relations; rather the concern was the Vietnamese position on the Soviet Union” (pp. 116, 152). Obviously, the eruptive force of irredentist nationalism over the two islands lasted well beyond the life of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation and Sino-Vietnamese normalization at the Cold War's end.
Last, but not least, in terms of sources, the book, as Khoo admits (p. 13), relies much more on archival materials from the Chinese side than the Soviet and Vietnamese. This casts doubt on the reliability of his sources used to refute new arguments advanced by more recent works that rely on archival sources from multiple archives (e.g. Lorenz Luthi's The Sino-Soviet Split). But, this book is a very valuable resource for scholars who are interested in the method of historical-comparative analysis; it also raises an important theoretical research agenda (i.e. the principal enemy theory) regarding the conduct of Chinese foreign relations in the 21st century.
