R. T. Mullins is a researcher and lecturer in philosophy and theology at the University of Lucerne, and a docent of dogmatics at the University of Helsinki. He is a prolific author, having published vastly on the topics of divine eternity, the coherence of theism, the Trinity, the divine attributes, models of God, divine providence, and a host of other topics related to the doctrine of God and models of God. His other books include The End of the Timeless God (Oxford University Press, 2016), God and Emotion (Cambridge University Press, 2020), and Eternal in Love: A Little Book about a Big God (Cascade, 2024).
Having concluded in The End of the Timeless God that the idea of an atemporally eternal God is unbiblical, incoherent, and undesirable, Mullins provides a follow up in From Divine Timemaker to Divine Watchmaker wherein he explores the theological and philosophical implications that follow in light of God’s temporal eternity. Mullins intentionally undergoes this exploration within the boundaries of what he calls ‘the standard Christian story’ (xix). As a result, he is focused primarily on a Christian conception of God rather than Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim concepts of God. This is further evidenced in the chapter wherein he explores the implications of divine temporality for the doctrine of the Trinity. It is also worth noting that he develops ‘the standard Christian story’ (SCS) from the texts of the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible rather than from ecumenical creeds, councils, or denominational statements of faith.
After discussing some preliminary issues and clarifying key terminology concerning ‘the doctrine of God’, ‘models of God’, and ‘divine action and creation’, Mullins begins his in-depth exploration. He intends to explore five primary questions. These questions here are quoted from the Conclusion of the book.
1. What is time?
2. How is God responsible for the existence of time?
3. What does it mean to say that God is temporal?
4. What kind of structure might God give to a time series?
5. What are the implications for theological doctrines such as the Trinity, creation, providence, and life after death? (287)
Mullins gives time a substantival definition: ‘Time is (i) a natured entity that makes change possible, (ii) the ontological source of moments, and (iii) that which orders the moments’ (108). He previously in the book argued that there are problems with the alternative view to the substantival view of time, namely the relational view, which defines time as: ‘(i) an ordered series of events, and (ii) each individual moment is identified with a collection of simultaneous events’ (69). The primary problem with the relational view of time, as Mullins sees it, is that events are given priority over the temporal relation. Time is understood as a relation that unites events – it is a relation rather than a substance. The problem here is that an event is typically cashed out in terms of a ‘happening’ at a time. Swinburne defines an event (Mullins adopts Swinburne’s definition throughout the book) as, ‘a substance having a property at a time’ (88). But a relational view of time presupposes itself in a circular definition. What is time? Time is the relation between events. What is an event? An event is a substance’s having a property at a time. But events are supposed to be explanatorily prior to time, yet the relational theory of time and the traditional story of events need time in order to define and explain events themselves. Thus, we are caught in a viciously circular definition of time. In light of this and other problems on which he comments, and in light of the positive payouts that the substantival view of time offers, Mullins opts for the latter.
How is God responsible for the existence of time? Mullins first discusses three different ‘creationist’ accounts of time, wherein God is said to be the efficient cause of all temporal reality. But on creationist views, including ones such as William Lane Craig’s, to which Mullins is sympathetic, we run into a series of problems. Most of these problems stem from a commitment to the relational theory of time, where change is what brings about new events and thus new temporal moments. According to Craig, God’s pre-creation moment is an atemporal moment. Since it is atemporal, it does not occur at a time, which means it is not an event. Ergo, the ‘moment of creation’ is both the first event and the first moment of time. But if an event must occur at a time, then time must exist prior to the event; yet there is no time prior to this first event. So, we seem to have a contradiction on our hands. The best way out of this problem, according to Mullins, is to adopt what he terms an identification explanation of God’s responsibility for time, which rejects the claim that God is the efficient cause of time. On the identification view, time is somehow identified with God himself.
To say that time is identified with God himself isn’t to say that God is numerically identical to time, though some religious traditions hint towards something such as that. Rather, it is to see time as a sort of attribute of God or as a necessary concomitant of God’s existence. Both Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke argued for such a concept of God’s relation to time. The precreation moment, therefore, is a temporal moment. But since no change exists prior to creation, the precreation moment has no beginning and no metrication. However, this is not an infinite moment that would fall afoul Hilbert’s Hotel because the moment comes to an end at the moment of creation. In other words, it is not an actual infinite moment.
So, God is responsible for time in that time is cashed out in terms of one of God’s attributes. Consider the substantival definition of time which Mullins adopts above: Time is ‘(i) a natured entity that makes change possible, (ii) the ontological source of moments, and (iii) that which orders the moments’ (108). God is the prime candidate for this. God too is a natured entity. Being a personal being capable of performing actions and bringing about change, God is able to be the source of moments of time (even on the substantival view of time, change differentiates moments of time though it is not the source of said moments). And since God is a perfectly rational and intentional creator, he is able to bring into existence events precisely at the moments he desires to, ergo making him that which orders moments.
So, what does it mean to say that God is temporal (question 3 above)? To say that God is temporal is to say that God enjoys both temporal succession and temporal location. Divine temporalists and divine atemporalists agree that God exists without beginning and without end. However, they differ on the two affirmatives just mentioned. If God experiences temporal location and temporal succession, then this entails that God undergoes temporal change, which creates friction with the traditional doctrine of divine immutability, which claims that God does not change. Mullins persuasively argues that this isn’t a problem since the kinds of changes that God would undergo in temporal changes are accidental changes rather than essential ones. All perfect being theists agree that God does not undergo change in any of his essential properties, otherwise he would cease to be God. Undergoing changes in accidental properties does nothing to alter the divine nature, so God is perfectly safe from changing into not-God. Classical theism denies that God undergoes any change at all, which is a point of contention they have with neoclassical theists and open theists. However, all of these models can and do affirm that God’s essential properties undergo zero change, thus keeping God actually God.
What kind of structure might God give to a time series? This gets into discussions of the ontology of time, which explores the question of which moments of time exist. There are several options available within the philosophy of time literature: eternalism, presentism, growing block, shrinking block, morphing block and hyper time, fragmentalism, eschatological presentism, and moving spotlight. The two most popular options in the literature are eternalism and presentism, and Mullins focuses most of his attention on these options. However, his discussions of morphing block and hyper time and eschatological presentism alone merit the price of the book as he creatively and winsomely engages the works of Hud Hudson, Samuel Lebens, and J. T. Turner. After noting the strengths and weaknesses of all of the options and their implications for significant Christian doctrines, not in the least of which is life after death, Mullins opts for the presentist story. Presentism claims that the only moment of time that concretely exists is the present moment. The past no longer exists, and the future does not yet exist. He dedicates an entire chapter to addressing the grounding objection to presentism, persuasively arguing – similar to how Trenton Merricks and others have argued – that the grounding objection often supposes an equally or more so bloated ontology than does presentism and an unnecessary commitment to strong versions of the truth maker theory. After addressing these challenges to presentism and alleviating the worries that come with them, Mullins concludes that presentism is perfectly at home with Christian doctrine.
Two loci of Christian doctrine that Mullins discusses in light of divine temporalism are the doctrines of the Trinity and providence. Concerning the Trinity, the divine temporalist has no problems whatsoever in affirming that the numerically one God exists as three distinct persons, each having his own first-person perspective and set of de se beliefs. However, the divine temporalist most likely will need to dispense with the doctrine of the eternal relations of origin, which claims that the Father is the atemporal efficient cause of the Son and (with/through the Son) of the Spirit. If combined with divine temporalism, this doctrine would entail that the Son and Spirit are ontologically subordinate to the Father, making them heteroousios with him. However, Mullins convincingly argues that this isn’t a unique problem to the divine temporalist but for the divine atemporalist as well. Simply saying that the Father is the efficient cause of the Son yet not in such a way that the Son ever begins to exist no less entails ontological subordination for the atemporal understanding of divine eternity as it does the temporal one. Following figures such as Paul Helm, Mullins concludes that the doctrine of the eternal relations of origin entails something akin to Arianism and should be rejected regardless of how one understands God’s eternity.
Concerning providence, Mullins explores three major options for the divine temporalist, though these are not the only options they have. These options are theological determinism, Molinism, and open theism. Each of these has their strengths and weaknesses, though Mullins leans in a Molinist direction. Of particular interest in this article, however, is his defence of the open theist story of providence. In particular, he addresses the alleged possibility of ‘divine bodgery’, which claims that, if open theism is true, then God could potentially ‘bodge up’ his plans for the future. Mullins explores a number of options that gives the open theist a way out of this charge, intriguingly concluding that God is no less able to bodge up the future than he is on theological determinism and Molinism. This is, arguably, one of the most interesting chapters of the book – at least in my opinion.
In conclusion, Mullins has provided a robust exploration of the implications of divine temporalism for models of God and Christian doctrine in the work at hand. While many readers who have commitments – in particular – to classical theism will likely not be persuaded by Mullins’s arguments, it is safe to say, at least, that the argumentation is careful, nuanced, and worthy of genuine consideration. Mullins has not set out to argue for a particular model of God. Rather, he has sought to provide his readers with options from which they can choose as to how they approach doctrines such as the Trinity, providence, and eschatology and how they can work with a temporal cashing out of God’s eternity. This book will be of interest in particular to other professional theologians and philosophers, as well as graduate students. For the interested laity in this subject, I would better recommend Mullins’s Eternal in Love: A Little Book about a Big God, which tackles similar questions at a more lay-friendly level.
