Introduction
The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a sustained concern with attaching conditions to the receipt of welfare benefits. This has frequently been tied to efforts to encourage (some might say compel) benefit claimants into work via a mix of carrots and sticks. Brown's Labour government introduced a new disability benefit – the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – which attached work-related conditions to the receipt of disability benefit (DWP, 2008a, 2008b). The UK Coalition government intends to continue this approach, with plans to migrate all existing Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants on to ESA in the next three years (Coalition government, 2010).
Whilst the theoretical defences and governmental rhetoric around conditionality have been extensively interrogated from a number of theoretical and philosophical standpoints, what has been lacking, with the notable exception of Dwyer (Reference Dwyer2000), has been a consideration of how welfare service users themselves interpret conditionality. Thus, this article foregrounds voices which have so far been largely silent in the policy and academic discourses on conditionality: those of individual citizens. The firm focus is on the empirical – on welfare service users’ own perspectives – and this article should not be read as a theoretical critique of conditionality in welfare, which has been thoroughly covered elsewhere (Deacon, Reference Deacon2002 and Reference Deacon2004b; Dwyer, Reference Dwyer2004 and Reference Dwyer and Powell2008; Fitzpatrick, Reference Fitzpatrick2005).
Giving primacy to the viewpoints of welfare service users enables a reflexive consideration of how far the conditionality regime fits in with citizens’ normative perceptions of social justice and the welfare state's role in the provision of welfare benefits. The research considered how individuals interpreted conditionality and how far they employed arguments based on paternalistic, contractualist and mutualist reasoning in their thinking and attitudinal stances. By accessing both disabled and non-disabled people's attitudes to the extension of conditionality operable on disabled people, the research also explored whether the viewpoints of these two groups differed, as might be expected given their contrasting relationship to the reforms introduced.
Conditionality can be defined as: ‘the principle that entitlement to benefits should be conditional on satisfying certain conditions, most commonly undertaking work-related activity such as job search’ (Stanley and Lohde, Reference Stanley and Lohde2004: 1). The three theoretical defences most frequently posited in defence of conditionality are based on mutualist, paternalist and contractualist arguments (Deacon, Reference Deacon2004b and Reference Deacon, Beem and Mead2005). The mutualist defence is heavily influenced by the work of communitarians, such as Etzioni, Selznick and Sacks, and centres on the notion that we have obligations towards one another that arise independently of the actions of government (Deacon, Reference Deacon, Collins and Rossiter2004a, Reference Deacon2004b and Reference Deacon, Beem and Mead2005). Thus, conditionality is simply upholding and instilling personal responsibility, an essential pillar of a functioning and well-ordered society.
The paternalist defence argues that conditionality is an exercise of power and compulsion, which, where appropriately employed, actually operates to further the affected individual's own interests (Mead, Reference Mead1992 and Reference Mead and Mead1997; Driver, Reference Driver, Hale, Legget and Martell2004). The paternalist standpoint is grounded in the idea that the non-working poor demonstrate a lack of competence, that work is good for the self, and that a degree of compulsion is necessary to get those most demotivated and demoralised back into the folds of citizenship and society, through the world of paid work (Mead, Reference Mead1992 and Reference Mead and Mead1997; Deacon, Reference Deacon, Collins and Rossiter2004a, Reference Deacon2004b and Reference Deacon, Beem and Mead2005). Contractualist arguments form the third defence of conditionality, whereby welfare can be justly utilised to enforce the obligations of claimants, within a broader framework of contractual duties, which fall on both the state and individual citizens (Deacon, Reference Deacon, Collins and Rossiter2004a, Reference Deacon2004b and Reference Deacon, Beem and Mead2005). Conditionality is constructed as a policy tool for ensuring that citizens meet their reciprocal duties, but these are framed within, and often themselves made conditional on, government's responsibilities.
Influenced by Titmuss's (Reference Titmuss1958) ‘Social Divison of Welfare’ thesis, the term ‘welfare service users’ is used in this article to encompass all citizens, given that we are all dependent on the different forms of welfare to a greater or lesser degree. With regard to disability, the social model perspective is adopted. The social model of disability was first advanced by the Disabled People's Movement in the 1970s to place emphasis on the disabling barriers that prevent disabled people from participating as equals in society. Disability is defined as ‘all the things that impose restrictions on disabled people; ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education to excluding work arrangements, and so on’ (Oliver, Reference Oliver1996: 33).
Policy background
The Labour government replaced invalidity benefit (IB) with ESA for all new disability benefit claimants (DWP, 2008a and 2008b). Under ESA, those receiving the employment component of the benefit are expected to take part in work-related activity or risk benefit sanctions (DWP, 2006 and 2007; Welfare Reform Act, 2007 and 2009). These reforms built on New Labour's longstanding emphasis on improving the employment opportunities and extending the obligations of disabled people, with relevant policy initiatives including anti-discrimination legislation, the New Deal for Disabled People, Access to Work and Pathways to Work (Johnson, Reference Johnson2005; PMSU, 2005).
At the start of a claim for ESA, potential recipients are placed on a basic age-linked allowance, which is paid at the same rate as Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) (CPAG, 2007). ESA applicants receive this basic rate while they undertake a thirteen week assessment phase which determines which, if any, component of the benefit they are eligible for (Allirajah, Reference Allirajah2005; CPAG, 2007; Disability Alliance, 2008). ESA is linked to a new personal capacity assessment, the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), which is supposed to focus on capabilities rather than functional impairments, whilst also guaranteeing eligibility for disability benefit for those who reach a limited capability for work threshold (DWP, 2006, 2007 and 2008b; Disability Alliance, 2008; Grover and Piggott, Reference Grover and Piggott2010).
On the basis of the WCA, claimants are split between those for whom some work-related activity is a feasible goal (who are placed on the employment component of the benefit) and those for whom work is simply inappropriate, due to the nature and/or severity of their impairment (such claimants receive the support component, which is set at a higher level than the employment element and is completely unconditional). There are also those who ‘fail’ the Work Capability Assessment, and are classified as fit to work. These claimants are refused either component of ESA and placed instead on JSA.
Research by the Department for Work and Pensions has revealed that two-thirds of all ESA claimants either withdraw before the assessment process is completed or find their claims rejected on the basis of fitness to work (DWP, 2009: 4). Thirty-eight per cent of all ESA claimants do not complete their claim, whilst as many as 36 per cent are judged ineligible for ESA after being found capable of work by the WCA (ibid.). Worryingly, a recent BBC documentary uncovered evidence that some eight thousand benefit claimants are appealing their WCA decision every month, with 40 per cent having the original decision reversed (BBC Scotland, 2010).
Once the assessment phase is complete, those on the employment component of ESA are expected to attend regular work-focused interviews, agree an action plan and are required to undertake, as resources allow, work-related activity (DWP, 2006 and 2007; Welfare Reform Act, 2009). Quite how one should define ‘work-related activity’ or ‘as resources allow’ is not yet clear. The 2007 Welfare Reform Act rather vaguely defines the former as ‘activity which makes it more likely that the person will obtain or remain in work or be able to do so’ (Welfare Reform Act, 2007: s13(7)). Failure to meet these conditions, however loosely defined, can result in reductions in benefit levels, which are cut in a series of slices, ultimately to the level of JSA (DWP, 2006). Twinned with these sanctions, which operate as the ‘stick’, is the promise of the ‘carrot’ of increased support and financial assistance to help disabled people back to work, including improved fiscal incentives for disabled people seeking and finding work, and measures to change prevailing attitudes towards disabled people among key stakeholders, such as employers and GPs (DWP, 2006). A disabled person's rights and responsibilities are thus institutionally intertwined, as their responsibilities to work are extended so too are their rights to better support to supposedly enable them to participate on an equal basis in the formal labour market (DWP, 2007).
The introduction of ESA has attracted critical attention from academics, with some querying the focus on improving individuals’ employability rather than looking to the wider societal barriers which can constrain disabled people's involvement in paid work (Puttick, Reference Puttick2007; Houston and Lindsay, Reference Houston and Lindsay2010). Concern has also been expressed regarding the ‘dependency culture’ rhetoric, which so often suffuses policy announcements around the reforms, and the likely impact of creating divisions between different groups of disabled people on the basis of assessed capacity to work (Piggott and Grover, Reference Piggott and Grover2009; Grover and Piggott, Reference Grover and Piggott2010).
Despite the tough economic climate, there has been no suggestion of a relaxation of the conditions attached to ESA, and the national migration of all existing IB claimants onto ESA commenced in April 2011 (Coalition government, 2010). The Coalition government appears to share New Labour's committment to extending conditionality to disabled people, with early indications suggesting they may well be even more strident in the utilisation of a contractual, conditional framework towards the disability benefit claimant population (Duncan Smith, Reference Duncan Smith2010; Wintour et al., Reference Wintour, Elliott and Sparrow2010). Indeed, the Coalition has announced plans to time limit contributory ESA for those on the employment component to 12 months. Furthermore, the Welfare Reform Bill (2011) includes proposals to extend possible sanctions for ESA claimants judged to have some capability to work, such that they may face the complete suspension of benefit for failure to keep to the terms of a new ‘claimant commitment’. Given this policy context and the imminent extension of ESA to the 2.6 million current IB claimants, it is vital to explore how convincing individual citizens find the moral and philosophical arguments advanced in defence of conditionality.
Methods
This article is based on the findings from three focus groups that were facilitated to explore the application of welfare conditionality to disabled people. Two focus groups were organised with disabled participants, and one with non-disabled participants. The format was identical for all three focus groups, which explored the applicability of conditionality to disabled people per se, rather than discussing the precise nature of the ESA reforms. The groups started with an introduction to the principle of conditionality, with attitudes gauged through the discussion of initial vignettes concerning conditionality's utilisation in three fictional instances: to a pregnant woman to encourage attendance at health care appointments; to a disabled person to support them back to work; and to parents of truanting children to improve school attendance. Open questions explored different justifications for conditionality, introducing paternalist, contractualist and mutualist arguments, and asking for participants’ views on these welfare perspectives and their applicability to disabled people. The questions elicited considerable discussion, and the researcher did not need to employ her prepared prompts, suggesting strong involvement and engagement in the topics explored.
For all three focus groups, a purposive sampling strategy was adopted with a reliance on snowballing to recruit appropriate participants. The groups followed a semi-structured format in order to keep the discussions focused and to enable effective comparison both within and, importantly, across groups (Morgan with Scannell, Reference Morgan and Scannell1998). Focus group data were analysed using detailed qualitative data protocols, involving immersion within the text, annotation of the text, the search for emergent themes, thematic coding and comparison between focus groups. Ethical concerns were paramount, and at all times the researcher kept within the ethical guidelines provided by the British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002). Anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent were prioritised, with focus group participants asked to treat each other's remarks as confidential.
Critically considering the lessons learnt from any research project should be married with a reflexive examination from the perspective of the researcher (Vernon, Reference Vernon, Barnes and Mercer1997; Moore et al., Reference Moore, Beazley and Maelzer1998; Beckett, Reference Beckett2006). A long-standing issue in disability research concerns whether it is appropriate for non-disabled researchers to research disability issues (Barnes and Mercer, Reference Barnes, Mercer, Barnes and Mercer1997; Priestley, Reference Priestley, Barnes and Mercer1997). In this instance, the researcher herself is disabled; however, as someone with an invisible impairment, her identity as a disabled person is not immediately evident. The researcher chose not to disclose her impairment to the participants, although took the decision that if asked or challenged, she would be prepared to reveal this. Thus, in her role as a moderator she appeared as a non-disabled researcher. This caused no problems and the disabled participants were very willing to share their experiences in talking to someone whom they probably thought to be non-disabled. The research was not about the researcher's own experience of work-related conditionality and it was felt that discussing herself, and her impairment, would distract from the participants’ views, which were the centrepiece of the research.
Findings
As part of an exploratory study seeking to uncover emergent themes, the three focus groups generated data of considerable value and depth. The following analysis outlines three recurring themes: barriers to work; conditionality itself; and the idea of a welfare contract between citizens and the state. The viewpoints expressed provide a valuable snapshot of people's attitudes to, and concerns with, the extension of conditionality to disabled people. Further research would be valuable to assess how far the arguments that emerged in this study reappear in other contexts and with different groups of welfare service users.
Barriers to work
Justifications for the introduction of ESA and the consequent extension of work-related conditionality to disabled people tend to emphasise the supply-side of the labour market and frequently neglect demand-side factors, which may make disabled people's engagement in paid work more problematic (Roulstone, Reference Roulstone2002; Roulstone and Barnes, Reference Roulstone, Barnes, Roulstone and Barnes2005). Supply-side analyses concentrate on the potential employee, while an emphasis on the demand-side looks more to wider societal and structural processes within and beyond the labour market. In relation to disabled people, supply-side issues encompass employability, skills, experience, confidence and the character of disabled people and their attitude to work, whilst demand-side barriers include concerns such as discrimination, stigma and access issues.
In the focus groups, many of the disabled participants highlighted the persistence of disabling barriers, with some talking directly from personal experience. New Labour's onus on the ‘missing million’ (DWP, 2006 and 2007) focused on the need to increase disabled people's employability and encourage them into work via conditionality. Disabled people themselves talked more in terms of an aspiration to work, which is undermined by both disabling barriers and the impact of their own impairment: ‘Most of us, if we were able to work, would: if all our access needs could be met and everything, and we could physically do it. I'd love to be able to work but at the moment I can't’ (Gail, Disabled People's Group One (DG1)).
Comments frequently emphasised the persistence of physical barriers and the importance of addressing these as a pre-condition to getting more disabled people into work. In terms of particular issues, disabled people mentioned discrimination by employers as a recurring problem. Lucy (DG1), Alice (Disabled Group Two (DG2)) and Gail (DG1) all discussed the endurance of employer discrimination as a fact of life for disabled people, and Richard (DG2) spoke of his own experience of discrimination. Indeed, Richard (DG2) felt the locus of the whole problem was with employers: ‘The government is trying to get disabled people to go and find jobs, but the problem, no matter what the government puts in place, is the employer. If the employer doesn't want to know, they won't make reasonable adjustments and you just don't have a chance.’
Alongside discrimination, disabled participants spoke of the endurance of physical, attitudinal and organisational barriers. Many participants placed considerable stress on the impact of stigmas around disability and the stereotypes with which disabled people often have to contend. Both disabled and non-disabled participants suggested that there is a common fear of disability, which can make it harder for disabled people to be included as equals in society.
Interestingly, whilst much of the discussion in the focus groups with disabled participants focused on the negotiation and endurance of disabling barriers to work, the non-disabled group (NDG) had much less to say in this regard. Part of the explanation for this may be lack of personal experience of the issues of living in a disabling society, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. Indeed, the NDG placed more emphasis on a lack of confidence and motivation as potential reasons why some disabled people do not work, and this fits more closely with New Labour's own analysis which describes disabled people as lacking ‘the skills and confidence that they need’ to participate in the labour market (DWP, 2008a: 93). In terms of living with an impairment, John (NDG) citing Richard Branson (who has dyslexia) as a role model said: ‘So. . .[being disabled] doesn't have to hold you back, and a lot of people think that because they've been diagnosed as disabled that's it, they're on the scrap heap. But it's not the case. Things have changed and you need to change with them rather than just give up.’
The view that John articulates of some disabled people ‘giving up’ is not one which the disabled participants shared. Instead, they talked about their constant efforts to work and participate, be it as volunteers, carers or paid workers, reflecting the competing discourses used by disabled and non-disabled participants in discussions of work and disability. Disabled participants spoke about their desire to work as a personal aspiration, and/or one which they felt many disabled people shared: ‘there are so many disabled people who want to work but aren't able to because of people's attitudes’ (Dave, DG2). Some of the non-disabled participants did appreciate that disabled people often want to work: ‘I think a lot of disabled people, given the chance, would want to work if they felt they could’ (Adrian, NDG). Others, such as John (NDG), implied that some disabled people needed a bit of motivation to get into work: ‘I personally feel that people need to be enticed to help themselves.’ Much of the rhetoric on work-related conditionality and disabled people rests on views, such as John's, which suggest that disabled people need extra incentives, and conditions, to get into work. Such a perspective is clearly evident in the 2008 White Paper, which argues that the obligations and potential sanctions which conditionality introduces are necessary to engage some disabled people (DWP, 2008a).
A further barrier highlighted by many of the disabled participants, and one which receives less attention in the disability studies literature, is the impact of the impairment itself. The social model approach, which seeks to turn the corrective lens on to society rather than disabled individuals, has been criticised for neglecting the experience of impairment (Abberley, Reference Abberley1987; Crow, Reference Crow, Barnes and Mercer1996; Hughes, Reference Hughes1999). Indeed, many of the participants spoke of their impairment as a factor preventing them from doing as much as they would like: ‘I'd love to be able to work more than I do but I know I just can't physically do it’ (Anne, DG1).
Some disability theorists would maintain the emphasis on society, arguing that a radical reworking of the conception of work is required which discards the idea of the normative able-bodied worker (Barnes, Reference Barnes2000; Roulstone, Reference Roulstone2002). Nonetheless, the disabled people involved in this research saw their impairments as acting as an independent barrier to work, which had to be negotiated alongside the barriers implicit in the disabling society in which we all live. This reinforces the arguments of those who call for a better analysis and understanding of the role of the body in social policy (Twigg, Reference Twigg2002).
When considering the problems faced by disabled people wishing to enter work, it would seem self-evident that the personal experiences of those living with impairments should be listened to and closely noted. Yet, New Labour, and now the Coalition, seem to neglect this in their policy approach, which concentrates too much on supply-side issues, with a neglect of demand-side barriers. This suggests an incorrect analysis of the problem, and the work-related conditionality solution may be ill-fitted to cope with the problems highlighted by the disabled people participating in this research.
Conditionality
A clear contrast can be drawn between the views of disabled and non-disabled participants towards the appropriateness of applying work-related conditionality to disabled people. Remarkably, in discussions of a fictional scenario where a depressed individual was compelled to work sixteen hours a week after a medical examiner deemed him able to work, all the non-disabled participants felt this was right, whilst all the disabled participants disagreed, thinking it was wrong and likely to worsen the impairment. Disabled participants, such as Isobel (DG2), were concerned that: ‘you're constructing circumstances where the depression is going to get a lot more serious. . .’. Dave (DG2) agreed, arguing: ‘it's wrong because it's putting pressure on people, saying “you must do this”. That can have further implications on the person's health so it's not right.’
In criticising the application of conditionality in this scenario, some disabled participants stressed that an effective approach should focus on encouragement rather than compulsion. Richard (DG2) suggested the perversity of making a disabled person seek work given the persistence of discrimination: ‘that person is going to have to go looking for jobs and the employers are just going to look on him negatively if he's got depression. That guy is going to go through interview after interview getting knocked back and he is just going to go down and down.’
The non-disabled defenders of conditionality for disabled people employed both contractualist and paternalist justifications. In terms of contractualism, John (NDG) stressed disabled people's obligation to contribute where possible: ‘If they [disabled people] just sort of sit back and give up, then yeah, their benefits should be reduced because they're not doing a great deal to try and improve things for themselves, to maybe get more integrated into a working life. At the end of the day, everybody else has to pay tax, and a certain amount of taxpayers’ money is going to benefits and they should try their best to contribute as well.’
Whilst Andy (NDG) was also in favour of conditionality in this context, he employed the contractualist argument that disabled people's obligations must be linked to the government's responsibility to provide appropriate support. Referring to the scenario of the depressed individual, he said: ‘I think it's reasonable as long as he's given the right support and maybe monitored whilst he's working to make sure that it's not affecting his condition.’ In terms of paternalist arguments, emphasis was placed on the value of work for disabled people alongside the need to motivate disabled people into work. Comments included ‘People going to work, having a routine, being with people, having to have a wash and get dressed and comb their hair and go out, it's all really important’ (Rochelle, NDG). Interestingly, some disabled participants also recognised the value of work, but felt that conditionality was a blunt and inappropriate device to apply to disabled people. Kathy (DG1) said, ‘I do personally think that work is a good thing, by and large, but I don't feel people should be forced into it when it's not appropriate.’
In terms of the operation of conditionality, participants identified it as a carrot and stick approach. Whilst this concerned some of the disabled participants, it was seen as an effective policy mechanism by several of the non-disabled group, who seemed relaxed about using welfare instrumentally to encourage and prevent certain types of behaviour. In contrast, Jane (DG1) was concerned by the use of compulsion and punishment and would have preferred an emphasis on encouragement and support to enable people to meet their responsibilities: ‘I generally agree that people should take some responsibility for themselves, and add some structure to their day. But it's about encouraging people to feel they can, not bending their arm up their back.’
When considering attitudes to conditionality for disabled people, it is undoubtedly interesting that disabled people and non-disabled participants’ views differed, and further research would be worthwhile to explore the extent to which the viewpoints uncovered here are representative of the British population as a whole. Importantly, whilst disabled people in this research were unanimously opposed to the application of conditionality to disability benefit claimants, when asked for their views on the appropriateness of attaching conditions to benefits such as JSA or the Sure Start Maternity Grant, they were far more positive. Indeed, in respect of attitudes to conditionality per se, the viewpoints of the disabled and non-disabled participants were far more closely aligned. It would be interesting to explore whether antipathy to conditionality is strongest when one is a member of the target group to whom it is being applied and weakest when one is least likely to be directly affected. Again, this might be a fruitful area for further, more extensive research.
The contract idea
Research participants were also asked for their opinions on whether viewing the relationship between disabled benefit claimants and the state as a contract with rights and responsibilities on both sides might be an appropriate way to look at the situation. All the non-disabled participants thought this was a good idea and were enthusiastic about its potential. There was also some support for a contract amongst disabled participants, with Dave (DG2) seeing it as having scope: ‘I feel it could be a good thing to have a contract so that both sides understand precisely what is expected of them, so you know what the government expects from you, and you also know precisely what kind of help you can expect from the government. It could be much clearer.’ Those disabled participants less supportive of the contract notion expressed concern that the contract might not be understandable to all disabled people, whilst Isobel (DG2) said that defenders of the contract approach must accept: ‘that this is social engineering at its most crude and I think it's important to recognise that this is an experiment that may not necessarily be successful’.
The extent to which participants thought in terms of the obligations of disabled people and government being welded together was notable amongst disabled participants, with several listing the preconditions that the government would have to meet before disabled people could be expected to work: ‘You're not going to accept a job until you know that you've got the right support. [Otherwise] that's like going to work and you don't know who's looking after the kids’ (Jane, DG1). Anne concurred, arguing: ‘They [the government] need to listen to our views a lot more. There must be the support there because we can't do anything without the support that we need so that must be in place to enable us to do anything, be it volunteering or paid work’ (DG1).
The discussion above has highlighted just three of the many themes that were explored in the focus groups. Giving more weight to the voice of service users themselves on the applicability of, and issues with, extensions of work-related conditionality should be a key governmental priority. Truly contractual governance would need to listen more and moralise less in any efforts to construct a welfare state that can ensure that the communally defined rights and responsibilities (of both contractual parties) are met. Furthermore, there is an a priori question regarding the appropriateness of viewing the relationship between the state and citizen in contractual terms, or whether welfare entitlement should instead be provided as of right, or on the basis of need. This latter question would benefit from more wide-ranging qualitative research with welfare service users to expand the evidence base of citizens’ perspectives on welfare.
Conclusions
This article has examined a small-scale research project on citizens’ attitudes to the extension of work-related conditionality operable on disabled people. Interestingly, while policy makers and academics variously deploy paternalist, contractualist and mutualist arguments in conditionality's defence, participants in this research articulated viewpoints that reflected the first two perspectives on welfare but made no reference to mutualist notions in their arguments.
The flaws with conditionality are reinforced by the qualitative research findings, where many of the disabled participants spoke of their desire to work being impeded, not by a lack of ‘employability’ but by the daily experience of discrimination and various barriers to inclusion. Indeed, the research suggested that the government's conditionality prescription for raising the employment rate of disabled people is likely to fail. Sanctions and conditions are a bitter medicine, unlikely to provide a remedy, particularly when the problem is with the disabling structures and practices of society, rather than any individual deficits with disabled people. Worryingly, uncovering the weaknesses with conditionality places doubt on the whole premise of first New Labour's and now the Coalition's rhetoric and ideology – that rights and responsibilities can be stressed and the duty to work emphasised to create a more inclusive and socially ‘just’ society. For too long, politicians have instrumentally deployed the notion of a contract binding the rights and responsibilities of citizens to those of the state to further its attempts to individualise the social and press a moral agenda that overplays individual agency to the neglect of structural inequities.
This article also stresses the central importance of listening to disabled welfare service users themselves as the real experts on disability benefits and broader policy. Whilst politicians’ fondness for focus groups and consultations is suggestive of a grounded perspective, the disabled participants in this research felt ignored and most definitely not listened to by politicians. If the Coalition government is to further reform the welfare state, it is critically important that it pays heed to the views of those at the sharp end of any further extensions of conditionality. Indeed, doing so is a vital prerequisite to any claim to contractual welfare. It is fitting that the final word be reserved for one of the participants in this research, Mike, who asked that the government demonstrate: ‘a much better understanding of what disability actually means to individuals before making policy decisions which affect millions of disabled people’ (DG2).
