Power to the People: Energy in Europe over the Last Five Centuries is an important, ambitious, complicated, and dense volume that takes on the topics of energy and growth, energy transitions, and efficiency of energy use over five centuries of European history. The book is organized chronologically into three time periods: pre-industrial economies, the first Industrial Revolution, and the second and third Industrial Revolutions. Each of these three time periods is covered by one of the three authors. So one is in some sense getting three short and closely-related monographs in one volume.

One of the central arguments of the book is that “energy is more important to economic growth than generally believed among economists” (p. 368). Indeed, it is striking that most growth models omit energy entirely. The chapters on pre-industrial economies focus on the idea of constraints. The main constraint was land, since land enabled plants to transform solar energy by photosynthesis into energy for use by humans and animals. Wind and water energy provided relatively small amounts of supplemental energy through wind and water mills. As the population grew, the focus was on getting more out of the land through more labor inputs, better management, and exploiting synergies with animals. Over time, energy production and consumption became more efficient, but there were limits, and per capita energy appears to have fallen. The main exceptions were England, which had large coal deposits, and the Netherlands, which had large peat deposits. The argument here is related to Wrigley's argument in his 2010 book Energy and the English Industrial Revolution and his earlier work, but it includes a detailed analysis of Europe and not just England.

The chapters on the (first) Industrial Revolution highlight the extent to which coal relaxed the constraints for energy consumption. In 1820, well into the Industrial Revolution, 69 percent of energy consumed in eight European countries was still produced by land in the form of food, fodder, and firewood. Less than 2 percent derived from water and wind. The remainder, 28.9 percent, came from coal. In 1910, less than a century later, land produced just 15 percent of energy. Less than 0.5 percent derived from water and wind; coal produced 83.5 percent; and oil produced 0.8 percent. The transformation was unprecedented. After 1850 per capita energy consumption began to steadily rise. The increase differed substantially across countries, with Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands having much higher energy consumption, because they had larger and more accessible coal and peat deposits. Urban populations rose, capital increased, and production rose.

The idea of a coal development block made up of coal, steam, and iron is used to frame the analysis. Coal facilitated the production of iron, which enabled the production of steam engines, which were powered by coal. In the early days, most of the steam engine capacity was directed towards mine drainage. Incredible amounts of learning had to occur with respect to coal, which had to be coked; iron production, which had to be changed to address the impurities in coal and coke relative to charcoal; and steam engines, which had to evolve in terms of efficiency and change to produce power in a more useful and consistent manner. All of this occurred slowly, eventually allowing the newer generations of steam engines to provide power for industry. These newer steam engines, together with iron and steel, also enabled a transport revolution through railways and steam shipping. While some economic historians, particularly those with a deep knowledge of the Industrial Revolution, may already know parts of this story, the framework of the block analysis together with the supporting tables and figures is fairly persuasive.

The final chapter on the first Industrial Revolution may be the most controversial for economic historians, particularly those who do not believe coal was crucial to the Industrial Revolution. Here, Paul Warde, the primary author of this section of the book, wisely does not try to prove that coal was the only or main cause of the Industrial Revolution. The argument is simply that “cheap energy was a necessary condition of the Industrial Revolution” (p. 209). For the per capita consumption of energy to reach the observed levels in Europe, the firewood requirements would have been astronomical. Even if one modifies the assumptions towards lower levels of consumption, greater efficiency, and greater reliance on wind and water, the land area needed to provide that amount of wood remains implausibly large. While I agree with the discussion of energy consumption, I am less convinced that cheap energy was a necessary condition of the Industrial Revolution. Some type of industrial revolution might have taken place in the absence of coal. The thing the authors could have emphasized is that the counterfactual industrial revolution would look very different than the Industrial Revolution that Europe experienced. In particular, levels of consumption would almost surely have been far lower. The authors lay out evidence that development block led to higher capital intensity, labor, productivity, and wages and that falls in energy prices and capital reinforced this relationship.

The remaining chapters examine the second and third Industrial Revolutions and the rise of oil as the dominant fossil fuel. The discussion is framed in terms of three blocks: the ICE (Internal combustion engine)-oil block, the electricity block, and the ICT development block. While I found these chapters deeply interesting, economic historians who are not focused on energy transitions, electricity, or the second and third Industrial Revolutions may find them of less interest.

Most economic historians would benefit from reading this book, particularly anyone who is interested in growth over the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. Given the contemporary interest in and importance of energy, the first two parts of the book (or sections thereof) would fit nicely into undergraduate or graduate economic history courses. While these courses would most naturally be European economic history courses, the authors do bring in the United States as a comparison at points. Students in an American economic history class would find the material relevant, particularly if paired with material on the roles that abundant coal and oil played in U.S. growth.