In this study of the effects of a major government program on the attitudes of recipients, Syracuse University professor Suzanne Mettler takes on “claims that government programs undermine good citizenship” (12). She argues that it has become a common public impression that receiving entitlement and other welfare-state benefits induces dependence in beneficiaries, making for poor citizens. But Mettler shares what amounts to the social democratic perspective that sees entitlement programs as “social rights” that should, if anything, lead to a heightened sense of belonging to the political community and so a raised likelihood of participation in it.
To be sure, it has long been a staple expectation of analyses of rent-seeking that, say, tariff protection or agricultural subsidies tend to induce not political lethargy but instead high rates of mobilization aimed at protecting those programs. But Mettler is responding to the dependency claim and argues that beneficiaries of the famous—but, she says, woefully understudied—G.I. Bill program were transformed by that program in positive ways, particularly in making them much more prone to healthy civil and political engagement. The G.I. Bill (formally the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act) offered World War II veterans subsidized home loans, up to a year's unemployment benefits, and, primarily and most famously, vocational or college education. A full half of eligible veterans—nearly 8 million people—took advantage of the Act's educational and training benefits.
Based on a survey of about 1,000 veterans, Mettler finds that those who used the program manifested notably higher rates of participation in voluntary organizations and various forms of engagement in the formal democratic political process than those who did not. This finding remained true even after she controlled for various factors that might explain why some vets signed up for these benefits while others did not. Veterans who used the G.I. Bill participated at higher rates even than non-using veterans who achieved the same level of education or income.
Furthermore, she says it did more than get the former to sign up for their PTA. She argues that it “left many with highly positive views about how government had played a role in transforming their life circumstances” (110) and with the notion that “they owed something back to American society” (115). Mettler draws the conclusion that the program's “inclusive design, its fair manner of implementation, and its transformative socioeconomic effects … communicated to beneficiaries that government was for and about people like themselves, and thus it incorporated them more fully as citizens” (106). She contrasts the resulting “public-spiritedness” with “selfish individualism,” and suggests that such civic views differ from the notion that “Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem,” which she quotes—to all appearances, disapprovingly—from Ronald Reagan's 1981 inaugural speech (11).
Mettler's conclusions about the effects of enrollment on civic engagement specifically complement the parallel but distinct claims by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Theda Skocpol that universal-benefits entitlement programs give middle-class voters a (material) stake in modern welfare states and the social democratic policy preferences that sustain them politically.
What is especially useful here is Mettler's attempt to trace the influence of enrollment in the G.I. Bill while controlling for the veterans' family backgrounds, preexisting level of education, and factors that complicate a causal analysis. Mostly to add the details that can enliven popular books, she supplemented her survey with twenty-eight detailed interviews. And she made innovative use of the more limited number of African-American men who served in the ranks and then tried to take advantage of the G.I. Bill's provisions, concluding that enrollment helped spur their eventual participation in the civil rights movement.
However, these achievements are joined by the profound flaws inherent in Mettler's project of translating this study into a wider interpretation of either the effects of or the proper role for government. She argues that the G.I. Bill demonstrates that government programs can induce support for a positive role for government more generally, and she laments the absence of new and exciting transformational programs like that today.
But are we sure that the G.I. Bill induced the effect on attitudes that Mettler is claiming? The survey questions enabled Mettler to compare beneficiaries' and nonbeneficiaries' levels of civic and political involvement. However, such involvement is an awkward, even odd, proxy for people's attitudes toward the proper role of the state in society. Respondents could just be directly asked about their views, but Mettler's survey elicits spoken sentiments on this subject only by asking G.I. Bill beneficiaries if they felt they “owed something back to American society.” This means she cannot assess whether they had a stronger sense of debt to their society than nonbeneficiaries did. Furthermore, the survey did not try to measure an obvious proxy for people's attitudes toward the proper role of the state: their voting preferences, that is, not how often but for whom they voted.
This omission is very important because those voting preferences might well not be what Mettler should logically be predicting. By the 1980s, many soldiers discharged in 1945 were in their late 50s and early 60s—at the prime of their careers as voters. If Mettler is right about what attitudes toward government are induced by G.I. Bill enrollment, then G.I. Bill beneficiaries should have been voting in ways that set them in opposition to the kind of “government is the problem, not the solution” policy agendas that surfaced in the 1980s. So they should have largely voted against Ronald Reagan, and certainly more heavily than non-G.I. Bill-using vets. But is that the case? How would her claims be affected if a majority of the respondents had voted for Reagan in 1980 and 1984, as is statistically likely given their age, race, class, and gender? For that matter, did they favor “ending welfare as we know it” in the 1990s? These are curious omissions from her survey instrument.
Since we can guess the answers to those questions, we can ask, What would they mean for Mettler's interpretation? Perhaps that not all government programs are equally sensible and that citizens know that. Mettler acknowledges that the G.I. Bill “bore less resemblance to New Deal legislation”—which tended to give benefits to all workers or as an entitlement—and more “to an older American tradition of social provision geared for citizen soldiers” who were less numerous and who had “earned” the benefit (18). The G.I. Bill also reflected a tradition in which government benefits were temporary and, not coincidentally, designed not to provide long-term income support but a one-time intervention that could permanently boost recipients' life-chances, in this case through home-ownership and especially education. There is substantial evidence that even conservatives skeptical of government remain supportive of programs that fit such a description, which is why such broad political coalitions support the mortgage-interest tax deduction, funding for quality public education, and Head Start. Each is designed to create citizens able to strengthen society in turn, rather than remain dependent on it.
Members of the “greatest generation” seem to have decided for themselves whether all government programs had equally positive effects. Concluding that some passed that test while others did not could explain why they could feel a sense of debt, want government to do some good, and still be skeptical that every program met that test.
