In recent years the public eye has focused steadily on the Supreme Court's freedom of religion jurisprudence, particularly in cases that involve the claims of religious institutions and businesses. Yet, with little notice from the public, the Court has quietly chipped away at another core First Amendment freedom that protects institutions: the freedom of association. This is the right of groups to exercise autonomy over their own traditions, dogmas, and practices, and the demise of this right imperils not only religious institutions but also the many other associations that endow human life with richness and meaning.
In his lucid and timely book Why Associations Matter, Luke Sheahan argues that the Supreme Court misunderstands the nature of associations, thus leaving these institutions with feeble constitutional protection. With philosophical insight and lawyerly skill, Sheahan both diagnoses the Court's missteps and offers it a new path by proposing a concrete “judicial test” for freedom of association claims. Most importantly, he thoroughly and persuasively provides an answer to the question raised by the book's title: Why do associations matter? His book not only sheds light on a particular jurisprudential question, but, in showing the necessity of addressing this broader foundational question first, it also demonstrates the inexorable link between constitutional law and political theory.
While the US Constitution's text does not refer to “freedom of association,” the Supreme Court has derived protection of “expressive associations” from the Free Speech Clause, noting that individuals often combine into groups in order to communicate ideas. Sheahan argues that this speech-centered approach reflects an incomplete view of associations: “The reduction of expressive association to speech demonstrates that the Court will only uphold the right of association if it amplifies the speech of individuals, but not if it reflects a group dynamic or an associational goal that cannot be reduced to individual speech” (104). A group, in other words, is larger than the sum of its parts and exists for ends other than expression. Hence, Sheahan joins John Inazu in arguing that the First Amendment's Assembly Clause is a more natural home for associational freedom. This clause was explicitly designed to protect groups as groups—not just in their acts of expression, but in their authority over internal decisions that allow the group to maintain its structure and fulfill its aims.
The Court's decision to neglect the Assembly Clause decades ago and instead only protect associational speech stems from a problematic “theoretical lens” that Sheahan calls the First Amendment Dichotomy. Like the society of which it is a part, the Court has the tendency to cognize only the individual and the state, diminishing the essential and central role that associations play in human life. Sheahan points the reader to the work of political sociologist Robert Nisbet in order to elucidate the deep roots of this state/individual dichotomy in Western thought. Nisbet explains that Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau all treat the state and the individual as ”two basic conceptual units” (4), dismissing and even despising associations. Indeed, for these thinkers, associations only serve to undermine the unity of the state, in which the true good of the individual is found. Sheahan argues that the Supreme Court's “ethos” has been shaped by this tradition. It “treats associational activity as essentially state activity, protected only insofar as it supports state objectives” (9). For example, in discussing associations, the Court regularly focuses on their role in facilitating the expression that is necessary for a well-functioning democracy.
But, Sheahan explains, focusing solely on this function inappropriately politicizes associations (82) and fails to recognize their primary purpose, which is social rather than political. He points the reader to Nisbet's thesis that human beings are social creatures in a constant “quest for community” and that associations are an essential part of this social reality. While the functions of associations vary—worship, service, and even seemingly trivial ends such as playing chess (69)—they all provide human beings a context within which to exercise their social nature. Rather than being instruments of an individual's speech, associations “speak to their members” (56), shaping the very people they become. Further, because of their “social authority,” associations play the important role of shielding otherwise weak individuals from the power of the state, earning their nomenclature of “intermediate” associations. Because of these two essential functions, Sheahan aptly states, “associations are not merely a way of organizing human life. Associations are human life” (15).
Sheahan's book primarily addresses the 2010 case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (CLS), which, he argues “effectively removed freedom of association from the pantheon of First Amendment rights” (101). In this case, the Court upheld the decision of Hastings Law School to strip a Christian student group of official university recognition simply because the group declined to extend leadership and voting membership to those who did not share its views on faith and morality. Affirming the constitutionality of the public law school's “accept-all-comers” requirement for student groups, the Court removed First Amendment protection from an essential group function—the use of authority to “integrate members . . . around shared dogma” (31). Sheahan argues that the fundamental flaw in the Court's approach is its embrace of the First Amendment Dichotomy, neglecting the group itself and recognizing only the individual and state. “The Court's analysis focused exclusively on accommodating the individual's desire to join a group” (110), and the Court erroneously treated the school's student group forum as a form of state speech, effectively permitting only the student groups that would “accomplish state objectives” (116).
Many First Amendment scholars have critiqued the Court majority's reasoning in CLS, but Sheahan is the first to argue that even the dissent misunderstands freedom of association in that its objections were “arranged . . . on the grounds of speech and not association” (105). Sheahan thus proposes an altogether new “judicial test” that would require the Court to evaluate whether a given policy “inhibits the functional autonomy of the group” (148). Borrowing its name from a Nisbet term, this “functional autonomy test” would require strict-scrutiny analysis for any restrictions on freedom of association. Under this test, “a government entity may not impede an association's exercise of authority except where the right of exit is placed in jeopardy” (148). Sheahan also proposes legislation that would require courts to apply the test above.
Why Associations Matter is valuable not only for its nuanced discussion of associations and masterful legal analysis, but also for the important reminder that the Supreme Court does not operate within a vacuum. The ideas that shape Western thought are the ideas that shape Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that jurisprudence in turn shapes culture; indeed, the Supreme Court itself is a formative association. Sheahan's book thus serves as a bridge between the work of legal scholars such as John Inazu who lament the Court's abandonment of freedom of association and the work of political theorists such as Yuval Levin who reveal that institutions, which are formative by nature, are now seen as merely “performative” stages of individual expression. While it will take more than corrected caselaw to revive a more accurate understanding of associations and restore their role in society, full constitutional protection of associations is a critical step for those seeking to accomplish this noble task.
