Few other topics have received as much attention in the field of Iranian studies or have been the subject of as many contentious political debates as those of Iranian national identity, nationalism, and the relationship between ethnic minorities and the state. Over the past century in Iran, nationalist ideologies, in particular, have served as rallying points for opposition movements, rationalizations for repressive state policies, and, more recently in combination with religion, as bases for the legitimization of a quasi-theocratic state. Asghar Schirazi’s new book, Iraniyat, Melliyat, Qowmiyat, is an outstanding and timely addition to the burgeoning literature on these topics, surpassing other recent works in the depth and breadth of its coverage, objectivity, and careful attention to the pertinent historical contexts for the ideas in question.

The book consists of an introduction, four extensive chapters, and a comprehensive bibliography. It opens with reviews of a number of current theoretical perspectives on nationalism and provides operational definitions for its three major foci, the ideological orientations that the author labels as Iraniyat, melliyat, and qowmiyat. He defines “Iraniyat” or “Iran-garāʾi” (lit. Iranism or Iranianism) as a set of beliefs that seek to protect Iran as a territory, state, or cultural entity (civilization). In its modern form, the concept has been embraced by intellectuals in their efforts to promote a distinctly Iranian cultural identity and by rulers to bolster or expand their authority. Melliyat or Melli-garāʾi, as defined by the author, is an ideology that promotes popular sovereignty and the rights of a people, as citizens of a nation-state rather than subjects of a ruler, irrespective of their religious, ethnic, or political views. And finally, the term “qowmiyat” (which can be translated as “ethnicism”) refers to ethnies or ethnic groups, whose loyalties are based mostly on shared language, religion, real or imagined common ancestry, and territorial claims that may extend beyond the borders of a single state. The five chapters that follow the introduction explore these themes over a century-and-a-half of Iranian history from the 1800s to the onset of the Second World War and the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941.

Chapter 1 provides an extensive survey of the writings of several renowned scholars, including Gerardo Gnoli, Bert Fragner, Ehsan Yarshater, Shahrokh Meskoob, Ahmad Ashraf, and Hamid Ahmadi, on the three themes of the book in the pre-Qajar period. As the author notes, the concept of mellat (nation), in the modern sense of the term, rather than in its more traditional reference to followers of a religion, did not enter the political discourse in Iran until the last decades of the nineteenth century. However, this did not mean that an Iranian identity needed to be “invented” or “imagined” de novo in the late nineteenth century. As Schirazi’s extensive review shows, certain elements of a distinctive Iranian cultural identity—forged in the pre-Islamic or, more specifically, Sasanian period—had persisted long after the advent of Islam:

In the next chapter, the author focuses on the gradual rise of nationalist thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Influenced by their encounters with the West, a number of mostly secular intellectuals introduced the ideas of the nation, national unity, popular sovereignty, homeland, and patriotism at a time when their country was still in a state of economic, political and social backwardness and faced frequent threats from outside powers. They stressed the need to protect Iran’s territorial integrity and independence, criticized the corruption and arbitrariness of the rulers, and extolled the virtues of modernity and progress. A major difference between Iranian and European nationalism, therefore, was the fact that the latter was born in the context of an already modern civilization, whereas, in the case of Iran, the rise of nationalism, in many ways, preceded modernity. The chapter presents the ideas of several groups of prominent nationalist thinkers in the late Qajar period, including the secular nationalists Akhundzādeh, Kermāni, and Tālebof; “conservative nationalists” Marāghehʾi (in his Travels of Ebrāhim-Beyg) and Malkum Khan; enlightened Qajar officials Prince Abbas Mirzā, Hājj Mirzā Āqāsi, Amir Kabir, Moshir al-Dowleh; and the pan-Islamist “al-Afghani.” The author then explores the impact of the ideas of these thinkers on Qajar society and politics through a detailed examination of the press, the formation of anjomans (political societies), schools, libraries, and new historiographic genres. The final section of the chapter describes the reactions of the various ethnic groups, including the Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, and Baluchis, to the rising nationalist sentiments and, more generally, the ramifications of these developments for the Tobacco Revolt of 1891‒92 and the impending Constitutional Revolution:

Chapter 3 focuses on the Constitutional Revolution of 1906‒11, which, in Schirazi’s view, turned the idea of nation with its emphasis on the principles of popular sovereignty and citizens’ fundamental rights into reality. The chapter starts with a review of Mohammad-Ali Forughi’s remarkable treatise on Hoquq-e asāsi yaʿni ādāb-e Mashrutiyat-e doval (Fundamental Rights as Norms for Constitutional Governments) that laid out the legal framework for constitutional government in great detail. The chapter then draws a comparison between the position of secular constitutionalists vs. Islamists (mashruteh vs. mashruʿeh) and analyzes the ways in which both viewpoints were incorporated in the 1906 constitution. The influence of nationalist viewpoints on the 1906 constitution is reflected, for example, in the repeated use of the term mellat (nation) in its modern sense, i.e. as the source of legitimacy for the government.

Similarly, the word vatan (homeland), which traditionally referred to an individual’s birthplace, became closely associated with Iran, not merely as a birthplace, but as the progenitor of the nation (mām-e vatan). It may be interesting to note that even a cursory look at the fierce debates between the proponents of a secular approach to constitutional governance and those who insisted on basing the new order on Shari’a laws reveals a striking similarity to the debates and maneuverings that took place in the drafting of the Islamic Republic’s constitution some seven decades later—a topic that Schirazi’s earlier book, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (1997), addresses masterfully and in great detail. The remainder of Chapter 3 offers a review of the impact of the constitutional movement on its contemporary press, literature, political parties, and civic life, as well as on various social classes, tribes, women, and ethnic minorities.

Focusing on the period between the First World War and the 1921 coup by Reza Khan, Chapter 4 analyzes the domestic and international conditions that led most supporters of constitutionalism and democracy, including the liberal intellectuals, to modify their positions in favor of a powerful centralized state capable of ensuring national unity, protecting the country’s independence and territorial integrity, and moving the country along the path of modernity and progress. The principal reasons for this turnaround, according to Schirazi, were “the fear of external and internal threats and the danger of the loss of the country, its independence, and the calamities and disorders that were tearing the county apart and threatening its territorial integrity” (p. 630). The external threat in question came from the two old imperial powers, the tsarist and later Bolshevik Russia and Great Britain, and the Ottomans who were driven by a pan-Turkist ideology which resonated strongly with some Turkish-speaking Iranians. The internal threats became manifest in several secessionist movements, often supported by outside powers, in Azerbaijan, Gilān, the Kurdish areas, and Khuzestān. It was clearly in response to these threats that nationalist sentiments—or, in Schirazi’s terminology, Iraniyat—became more dominant. National unity, independence, and protection of Iran’s territorial integrity, they argued, required a commitment to greater unity, a single common language (Persian), a centralized government, and above all a capable and powerful leader—even if this meant giving up on the democratic ideals of the constitutional movement.

Finally, Chapter 5 offers a critical evaluation of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign with a focus on the three main themes of the book. He is given credit for ending the chaotic conditions that had pushed the country to the edge of collapse by pacifying the rebellious tribes and defeating secessionist movements; he is also praised for creating a modern army, a centralized bureaucracy, improving the country’s infrastructure, creating a public education system for both sexes, and various other measures to build a modern state. The bulk of the chapter, however, is devoted to citing examples of his autocratic manner of rule, intolerance for any form of dissent, brutality in dealing with rebellious tribes and those that he distrusted (including several prominent state officials who fell out of favor), and his seemingly insatiable appetite for landed properties that were often seized by force from their private owners. Reza Shah is also criticized for implementing a Persian-only language policy in schools, government offices, and the media, as well as for adopting a uniformist definition of Iranian national identity (Iraniyat) based heavily on the presumed Aryan origins of all Iranians and the Persian language.

Schirazi’s criticisms of Reza Shah’s autocratic rule and “uniformist” (yeksān-sāz) cultural policies are well-founded and meticulously documented. While many of the justifications for these policies—political stability, national unity, and modernization—were the same as those that many enlightened Iranians had come to embrace after one of the most turbulent periods in the country’s modern history, the undemocratic and ruthless manner in which the policies were implemented turned many of them into ardent critics and opponents of Reza Shah. And yet in any critical evaluation of Reza Shah’s rule, it is important to keep in mind that the time he was in power, the 1920s and 1930s, was one in which authoritarian and repressive regimes were the rule no matter in which direction he and his countrymen gazed. The regimes in Turkey, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Germany, Spain, and Latin America were hardly more democratic, tolerant, or non-“uniformist” in their policies toward and treatment of their “subalterns” or “others” than the Iranian regime under Reza Shah. Furthermore, the focus on the authoritarian character and policies of the autocrat at the top tends to ignore the fact that the creation of numerous modern institutions in both public and private sectors and the greatly expanded opportunities for education and training at home and abroad enabled a whole new class of bureaucrats, professionals, technical experts, educators, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, women, artists and ordinary citizens to contribute to the building of a more dynamic and modern society.

One of the merits of Iraniyat, Melliyat, Qowmiyat is the inclusion of the perspectives, reactions, and involvement of members of various ethnic groups, beyond the Persian-speaking majority, in intellectual debates, journalistic coverage, and political movements over the period that the book covers. Given the nature of the topics covered by the book, the author’s scholarly commitment to inclusiveness and pluralism is particularly germane and critical. It is somewhat surprising, then, that the book pays little or no attention to the status, the views, and the fate of Iran’s religious minorities—the Zoroastrians, Christians (Armenians), Jews, and Bahāʾis—in connection with the topics and developments that it covers. Given the expressed commitment of the liberal nationalists to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens regardless of their religious affiliations, how can an analysis of the most significant and formative political movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ignore the fate of religious minorities?

In its detailed reliance on primary sources, judicious attention to the works of other scholars on the topic, and, above all, by carefully locating his analyses and arguments in their appropriate historical, political, and cultural contexts, Asghar Schirazi’s Iraniyat, Melliyat, Qowmiyat is an extraordinary scholarly achievement. It is an indispensable contribution, not only to the study of Iranian cultural identity and nationalism, but also to Iran’s modern intellectual and social history. One can only hope that its prodigious author is working on a sequel that would cover the period from where the book ends (the outbreak of the Second World War) to the present.