In his book , James R. Stocker investigates the role of the United States leading up to the eruption of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. His motivation behind Spheres of Intervention is to “shed light on a number of disputed aspects of the history of US foreign policy and of Lebanon’s national history, including the role of Lebanon in US Middle East policy, the impact of US policy on the Lebanese state, and the origins of the Lebanese Civil War” (p. 5). Utilizing declassified documents as well as biographies of major policymakers during the time period of the study—including those of presidents and state department officials—Stocker weaves in leading policymakers’ discussions and decisions with regional and international dynamics to shed light on how the United States viewed events in Lebanon in general, and the Lebanese government in particular.

One of Stocker’s interesting contributions is the detailed review of the American diplomatic record, which reveals rich debates among policymakers, particularly contradictory advice that came from different elements within the U.S. government. In addition, he exposes the inability of the United States to truly understand the impact of domestic and regional dynamics on weakening the Lebanese state and making Lebanese citizens lose trust in their government’s ability to protect them. While the United States did seem to want a stable Lebanon, and did provide limited political and military assistance, the book highlights that in many instances, the U.S. government was unable to have any effect or influence on its ally Israel. In fact, several times after the 1967 war, the United States tried to discourage the Israeli government from overly harsh reprisals for border attacks by Palestinian militants that would put extreme pressure on the Lebanese government. However, as Stocker reveals, these efforts were relatively fruitless. This is extremely important, as the perception among the Arab public in general, and in Lebanon in particular, is that Israel does not do anything without a green light from the United States.

The book clearly uncovers what has been argued all along by Lebanese academics and policymakers, namely, that Lebanon has never been left alone to make its own decisions freely. Given its strategic location and relative weakness, it was a pawn in the larger dispute between Israel and its more powerful Arab neighbors (Egypt and Syria) during a period of intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In many cases, these constraints left the Lebanese government with suboptimal options to pick from, especially when it came to issues dealing with the Palestinian militant groups.

While Stocker does a good job in laying out the regional and global forces at work during the time period of the study, his assessment of local dynamics, especially in Lebanon, is weaker. With respect to the United States, Stocker does mention that the American involvement in Vietnam distracted policymakers, but when it comes to policies in the Middle East, U.S. policymakers have always had a plethora of individuals and groups who have influenced, and at times constrained, their policies. Some of this discussion seemed to be lacking important details if we are to fully understand the policies of the United States in the region. It would have been fruitful to identify which domestic groups and individuals played an important role in shaping Middle East foreign policy during this period. Similarly, it is not until Chapter 5 that we get a glimpse of Lebanese domestic politics after the 1967 war. But this is important, as the book is intended to focus on the collapse of the Lebanese state, and while the United States might have played a role in this, domestic actors and their relationships with regional actors should not be underestimated.

Another extremely important yet conspicuously missing element from the analysis is the role of the “Arab Triangle” in the lead-up to the 1973 war. After the humiliating Arab defeat in 1967 and the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria forged a consensus on war and peace. The so-called triangle combined the largest Arab state (Egypt), with the richest (Saudi Arabia) and the most Pan-Arab (Syria). The significance of this Arab Triangle, and its implication for the shift in U.S. policy in the region in 1973, is extremely important. First, it was a sign of the decline of Egyptian hegemony in the region and the beginning of the rise of Saudi Arabia as a regional power player. Second, while Egypt and Syria continued to rebuild their military, the Saudis, along with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat tried to enlist U.S. support to pressure Israel for a diplomatic settlement. When this failed, Egypt and Syria launched the fourth Arab–Israeli war on October 6, 1973. However, on October 17, in a gesture of support for their Arab brethren, the Arab members (led by Saudi Arabia) of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that they would reduce their oil production until Israel withdrew from the occupied Arab territories. And on October 19, Saudi Arabia halted all oil shipments to the United States. The use of oil as a weapon prompted U.S. policymakers to rethink their relationships in the Middle East and created a new incentive to seek a peaceful settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

This is crucial for understanding the Lebanese context, as it made Lebanon even less important in the U.S. calculations and elevated the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States in the region. In addition, it made the United States prioritize the Egyptian–Israeli negotiations and push aside the Palestinian issue, a major factor in the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war (which Stocker mentions briefly, at p. 141). In fact, Henry Kissinger famously said: “The Arabs can’t make war without Egypt; and can’t make peace without Syria.”

Despite these omissions, overall Spheres of Intervention is a well-written and important addition to the literature surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East during the Cold War in general and its actions—or lack thereof—in Lebanon, in particular. Therefore, it should be of interest to academics, policymakers, and students interested in having a better understanding of politics in the Middle East between 1967 and 1976. These were defining years that played an important role in changing the Middle East state system, and a decade that still has an impact on the region today. This book is also timely, given that the United States seems to be repeating some of the unsuccessful strategies of this period when it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as well as its approach to the Lebanese government as it deals with nonstate actors on its territory.