Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and the Escalation of Contention

Social scientists have developed a substantial body of theoretical and empirical scholarship on social movements and contentious politics (McAdam Reference McAdam1982; Tilly Reference Tilly2003; Tarrow Reference Tarrow2011). A central concern in this literature is how social movements emerge, develop, and transform their strategies of contention (Tezcür Reference Tezcür2014; Durac Reference Durac2015; Gomes Reference Gomes2023). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (Reference McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly2001) argue that contentious movements are shaped through the relational interaction between political opportunities and mobilizing structures available to collective actors.

Within this framework, political opportunities refer to the broader configuration of political constraints and openings that condition collective action, including regime openness, repression and elite alignments (Gomes Reference Gomes2023). Mobilizing structures entail the formal and informal organizational resources through which collective actors coordinate action, recruit participants and sustain contention over time (McAdam Reference McAdam1982). For political opportunities to generate collective action, they must be activated through mobilizing structures and interpreted by actors as meaningful opportunities for contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly Reference McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly2001). Using this relational framework, this article offers a deeper, context-specific understanding of the internal processes and political reconfigurations that define post-transitional contentious politics in Ethiopia.

It specifically examines how the interaction between shifting political opportunities and preexisting mobilizing structures, including wartime organizational experience and dense social networks, contributed to the militarization of the Amhara Fano movement. To conceptualize this shift, the study draws on Charles Tilly’s framework in The Politics of Collective Violence (2003), which posits that collective violence is rarely the product of spontaneous rage; rather, it constitutes a form of political interaction through which actors pursue claims, negotiate power, and challenge authority. Crucially, Tilly contends that when institutional channels for peaceful contention become constrained, actors may redirect their organizational resources and mobilizing capacities toward violent forms of collective action.

To specify the micro-level processes underpinning the militarization of the Fano movement, the study is guided by three mechanisms identified by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (Reference McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly2001). The first is brokerage, which links previously unconnected actors and networks for collective action. The second, category formation, involves the construction of collective identities through boundary-making between “us” and “them” to reinforce group solidarity. The third is decertification, which entails the withdrawal of recognition or legitimacy by political authorities or states from a given actor or collective claim. Together, these mechanisms serve as interpretive tools to unpack how the Amhara Fano movement partially overcame internal fragmentation, intensified collective identity, and experienced escalating contention through processes of delegitimation.

Research Design and Methods

This study adopts an interpretive case study design that allows researchers to use “established theoretical propositions” in examining particular cases (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1971, 692). Drawing on the relational approach to contentious politics, the study provides an interpretive analysis of the political conditions through which the Amhara Fano evolved into an insurgent actor. To examine how these conditions were experienced and discursively framed, the study employs process tracing as a within-case analytical method organized around three key thematic phases in the transformation of the movement. The first examines how the failure of transitional leaders to fulfil expectations amid shifting alliances generated disillusionment within the Fano actors. The second phase examines the role of the TPLF-central government conflict in enabling loosely coordinated Fano actors to partially organize, recruit fighters, build social networks, acquire military experience, and accumulate weapons. The third phase assesses how the state-led disarmament campaign contributed to the decertification of the legitimacy of the Fano and its political claims.

Data were drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected through interviews conducted between September 2024 and January 2025 with government officials, leaders of the Amhara Fano, representatives of Amhara-based parties, and scholars. Accessing leaders of the Amhara Fano proved particularly challenging, as they often operated in remote areas. This difficulty was mitigated through the use of personal networks: the author, having been born and raised in Gojjam, leveraged local connections to establish contact with the Fano division known as Amhara Fano in Gojjam. For other divisions, perspectives were reconstructed through a review of media interviews given by their leaders across various YouTube channels. To supplement the primary data, books, scholarly articles, and working papers were also reviewed.

The analysis is shaped by the positionality and field familiarity of the researcher. As an interpretive study, the research does not claim value-neutrality but instead seeks to reconstruct the meanings and perceptions through which contentious politics unfold. The author’s background in Gojjam provided contextual access to local networks and regional political nuances. Yet efforts were made to mitigate potential bias through triangulation of interviews with actors from diverse political backgrounds, media sources, and documentary evidence.

The Fano Movement: From Protest to Insurgency

Fano is a term traditionally associated with resistance against injustice and foreign invasion. It originally referred to “someone who travels of their own volition” or “a band of leaderless soldiers who are not accountable to anybody” (Tsehai Reference Tsehai2018, 13). This suggests that Fano fighters were volunteers motivated by personal conviction rather than formal command structures.

Historically, Fano has played a significant role in preserving the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. In the nineteenth century, Fano fighters were active along border areas such as the Ethio-Sudan and Ethio-Kenya frontiers (Tsehai Reference Tsehai2018). In the twentieth century, they were at the forefront of resistance against the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941). Beyond defending the state from external threats, Fano also contributed to struggles against domestic injustices. A notable example is the Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM) of the 1960s, which adopted the term Fano to mobilize protesters, chanting: Fano, go to the bushes; Fano, go to the bushes; like Ho Chi Minh, like Che Guevara (Bahru Reference Bahru2014). Due to its role in resisting both foreign and domestic oppression, Fano earned widespread societal recognition, which was expressed through poetry, music, and kererto.Footnote ¹ For example, one of the most renowned Ethiopian musicians of the time, Ketema Mekonnen (Reference Ketema1980), paid tribute to the Fano in his album:

This song reflects how Fano is represented in cultural expression as a figure associated with courage, selflessness, and bravery. The comparison to a host welcoming a guest suggests a normalization of armed action within this narrative tradition, framing participation in struggle as a socially embedded and expected role rather than an extraordinary act.

The historical use of the term Fano has no inherent ethnic connotation; rather, it referred broadly to Ethiopians, as volunteers from various ethnic groups have mobilized in defense of the integrity of the state (Tsehai Reference Tsehai2018). For example, resistance against the Italian occupation encompassed diverse ethnic groups, although the movement was strongest in Amhara-inhabited areas (Sbacchi Reference Sbacchi1985). Similarly, because the student body at Haile Selassie University comprised multiple ethnic groups, the ESM’s use of Fano was not ethnically specific.

It was only after the youth protests in the Amhara region in 2016 that Fano began to be associated with a distinct ethnic category. The adoption of the term by Amhara youths represents a symbolic gesture toward their struggle, aligning with Pierre Nora’s (Reference Nora1989) concept of lieux de mémoire, in which the past is selectively recalled and reinterpreted to serve contemporary purposes. To support claims that Fano constitutes a primarily Amhara domain, Amhara nationalists link it to the military traditions of their people. A leader from the Amhara Fano in Gojjam asserts that the Amhara embody a combination of warrior culture and patriotic spirit, and that the adoption of Fano reflects this military heritage.Footnote ² Indeed, some Western scholarship has described the Amhara as Ethiopia’s warrior people. Levine (Reference Levine1965), for example, observes that each Amhara man was expected to learn to fight independently, supply his own military equipment, and practice kererto.

These narratives were adopted by youths who call themselves Amhara Fano to provide historical grounding for their movement. They redefined Fano to encompass any youth committed to safeguarding the interests of the Amhara, thereby shifting it away from its earlier Ethiopianist framing.Footnote ³ Under this banner, they have engaged in both non-violent repertoires of contention and limited violent insurgency since 2016. Even after the political change in 2018, Fano continued to engage in small-scale skirmishes whenever it perceived threats to Amhara interests. For instance, it was involved in sporadic clashes with the Sudanese Armed Forces over territorial disputes.

Such collective action enhanced Fano’s reputation, facilitating the consolidation of public support as it transitioned into large-scale armed insurgency in April 2023 (Birhanu Reference Birhanu2026). A young Amhara articulated that “the Fano spirit is the only way to end the systematic marginalization of the Amhara by the state.”Footnote ⁴ He further emphasized, “the people should support them, either by joining as fighters or by providing logistical support.”Footnote ⁵ A leader of the Amhara Fano stated that this popular support is rooted in a framing of their struggle as one concerned with “justice, equality and peaceful coexistence within the country.”Footnote ⁶ He adds that these concerns are communicated effectively through social media platforms to link movement narratives with the wider public.

Beyond social media platforms, leaders of the Amhara Fano engage the public by leveraging their early positive relations with transitional leaders.Footnote ⁷ This contributed to the initial success of the Amhara Fano in controlling major towns in the Amhara region during its large-scale attack against government forces in August 2023. Although it later retreated to rural areas following a government counter-offensive, the Fano continues to maintain a formidable force capable of launching successive attacks. However, the movement lacks a centralized command structure and instead consists of multiple Fano units operating independently.Footnote ⁸

Two central problems stem from the absence of a centralized command structure. First, it undermines the movement’s overall effectiveness by creating coordination gaps.Footnote ⁹ The second issue concerns the difficulties of engaging in negotiations with the government. Prime Minister Abiy has publicly expressed frustration in Parliament, noting that the absence of a unified Fano leadership complicates efforts to determine which group to negotiate with (Abiy Reference Abiy2025). Attempts by individual Fano units to initiate dialogue are often met with suspicion by others. For example, an attempt by the Amhara Fano Popular Front (AFPF) to negotiate with the government in January 2025 was interpreted by other units as an act of betrayal (Eskinder Reference Eskinder2025).

The absence of an overarching organizational structure, however, does not imply a divergence of objectives among Fano units. Each unit articulates two key goals: ending what they describe as structural violence against the Amhara and increasing political influence at the center to promote transformative democratic governance (Messay Reference Messay2024). While the movement frames its objectives in terms of securing peace for the Amhara, the humanitarian cost of the ongoing conflict has been widely reported as severe. International Crisis Group (2023) notes that in government-controlled areas, reported abuses have included the rape of women, the execution of families in their homes, and the creation of an environment of fear.

At the same time, the conflict has also involved coercive practices by Fano fighters against individuals suspected of collaborating with the government. An interviewee from the Fano acknowledges that they have “targeted civil servants accused of serving the enemy.”Footnote ¹⁰ Addis Standard (2024) reports an incident in which Fano members killed two teachers in September 2024 in East Gojjam Zone. They justify the targeting of educators on the grounds that they opposed the reopening of schools, which they interpret as a symbolic return to normalcy under government authority.Footnote ¹¹

Political Conditions and Processes of Escalation

The transformation of the Amhara Fano movement into an armed insurgency was not a sudden occurrence; rather, it resulted from relational political conditions and processes that unfolded following Ethiopia’s 2018 political transition. These conditions included the initial alliance between Amhara nationalists and transitional leaders, the widening gap between transitional promises and practices, and the state’s gradual constraining of avenues for non-violent repertoires of contention (Birhanu Reference Birhanu2026). While these opportunities enabled the Fano to strengthen its organizational structure, the constraints were used to mobilize the public through narratives portraying the Amhara as facing an existential threat, depicting the government as illegitimate and framing armed struggle as the only means of ensuring survival.

Consistent with the view that collective violence is an interactive process between states and challengers (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly Reference McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly2001), this section examines the political conditions and processes that reshaped relations between the Amhara Fano and the state, thereby contributing to the movement’s transformation into an insurgency. It also analyzes the strategies used by the Fano to “exploit these opportunities” for collective action (McAdam Reference McAdam1982, 45). The analysis is structured around three interrelated themes: fractured promises, the TPLF-central government conflict, and the state-led disarmament and demobilization campaign.

TPLF-Central Government Conflict

The outbreak and intensification of the two-year conflict between the federal government and the TPLF further reshaped the broader political context in which the Fano movement operated. In the conflict, the government mobilized a coalition of forces, including the national army, regional security units, and the Eritrean military (Tronvoll Reference Tronvoll2024). Among the regional actors were Amhara forces such as the ARSF, local militias, and the Amhara Fano. The involvement of these forces was driven by two motivations: first, to seek retribution against the TPLF, which they accuse of perpetrating structural violence against the Amhara,Footnote ³² and second, to reclaim territories — specifically Wolkayt, Tegede, Telemt, and Raya — which Amhara nationalists argue were forcibly annexed to the Tigray region by the TPLF.Footnote ³³

Amhara forces were successful in capitalizing on the conflict to achieve these objectives. For instance, territories that had long been claimed as “lost” were retaken in the early days of the war. In these areas, the APP established de facto administrations by appointing local personnel to leadership positions (Yayehsew Reference Yayehsew2024). While revenge is a subjective concept that cannot be empirically measured, Amhara nationalists argue that “Amhara forces succeeded in avenging the TPLF by blocking its return to power.”Footnote ³⁴ This sentiment is echoed by Brigadier General Mulualem (Reference Mulualem2020), a survivor of the Northern Command, who testified that without the intervention of the ARSF, the TPLF might have succeeded in destroying the entire unit.

It may have been this resistance that provoked Getachew Reda, a senior TPLF figure, to publicly threaten that the TPLF would retaliate against the Amhara elites (Yayehsew Reference Yayehsew2025). His speech was widely circulated among Amhara nationalists, who interpreted it as a threat directed at the entire Amhara population.Footnote ³⁵ This interpretation was subsequently employed as a mobilizing tool to rally mass support for the nationalist cause.Footnote ³⁶ The Maicadra and Chenna massacres, along with the looting of property in the Amhara region during the war, further reinforced the rhetoric of Amhara nationalists. After occupying a local village known as Chenna in September 2021, TPLF forces were reported to have massacred approximately 200 civilians (Adane et al. Reference Adane2019). They were also accused of looting hospitals, schools, and industrial equipment (University of Gondar 2022). However, TPLF officials denied these allegations, insisting that they neither deliberately targeted civilians nor looted any property (Human Rights Watch 2022). Instead, they alleged that Amhara forces committed acts of violence against Tigrean civilians.

One of the Amhara forces accused by the TPLF of committing targeted killings against Tigreans was the Fano (Daniel Reference Daniel2024). This claim, however, was refuted by a participant in the war, who recalled that Fano had never engaged in the killing of civilians.Footnote ³⁷ Instead, he insisted, “we were cruel only in retaliating against TPLF forces who killed our mothers, sisters and children.”Footnote ³⁸ Verifying the claims of either side remains a difficult task, as wartime narratives are often shaped, and at times fabricated, by the opposing parties. In this context, Kalyvas (Reference Kalyvas2006) notes that war is not only a physical confrontation but also a discursive battle, in which combatants construct selective memories and justify their actions in order to gain legitimacy and mobilize support.

Beyond engaging in both the physical and discursive battles, Fano capitalized on the conflict to establish camps, recruit and train fighters, build social networks and amass weapons seized from defeated TPLF forces. It also leveraged the government’s logistical, security and administrative infrastructure to strengthen its military capacity.Footnote ³⁹ In particular, the Amhara regional government played a key role by arming youth and organizing military training programs aimed at mobilizing them into the ARSF and the national army (Yayehsew Reference Yayehsew2024). However, during this period, a noticeable tendency emerged among youth to prefer joining the Fano over enlisting in formal government forces.Footnote ⁴⁰ In response to this growing sentiment, the regional government intensified its recruitment efforts through a coordinated campaign carried out in partnership with universities across the Amhara region.Footnote ⁴¹ This collaboration was formalized during a meeting held in September 2021, at which the author participated as a representative of Debre Markos University.

Following the meeting, university teachers, including myself, were dispatched to various localities to encourage youth to join the national army. Together with colleagues, I visited rural areas in the East Gojjam Zone, where we conducted four meetings with youth. However, we found it difficult to persuade them. Many expressed deep distrust of the defense forces, claiming the army was dominated by Oromo generals.Footnote ⁴² Abiy Ahmed was criticized for allegedly replacing Tigrean generals with Oromo ones in an effort to control key sectors of the military (Yayehsew Reference Yayehsew2024). Consequently, Amhara youths expressed concern that the dominance of a single ethnic group in the army’s leadership fostered perceptions of ethnic favoritism.Footnote ⁴³

This perception led the youth to reject efforts to persuade them to join the national army. In one encounter, a young man stated: “If the purpose is to defeat the TPLF, why are you forcing us to join government forces? I personally want to join the Fano.”Footnote ⁴⁴ The widespread skepticism toward the army was further reinforced by the perception that it served as a tool of the ruling party. During past protests, government security forces had been accused of using lethal force against demonstrators (Amanuel and Asnake Reference Amanuel and Asnake2025). One youth at the meeting shared: “To tell the truth, I still remember that soldiers killed my friend just because he was at a protest.”Footnote ⁴⁵ These traumatic experiences have shaped youths’ attitudes, pushing them toward alignment with the Fano.

The wartime politico-military context functioned as a brokerage mechanism that enabled the partial formalization of the Fano as an organization, including the establishment of provincial commanders and organizational structures. For instance, the Amhara Popular Force, the precursor to the Amhara Fano in Gojjam, was founded on August 13, 2021 (Daniel Reference Daniel2024). The origins of the Amhara Fano in Wollo are also linked to the involvement of key leaders, such as Merie Wodajo, in the conflict and their subsequent public recognition. According to Denekew,Footnote ⁴⁶ members of the Fano gained practical experience in direct battlefield combat beyond their prior expertise in guerrilla warfare.Footnote ⁴⁷ He argues that this experience enabled Fano members involved in the armed struggle to lead more successful operations.

Fano members gained battlefield experience through their involvement in the war in collaboration with the ARSF. This is underscored by Brigadier General Tefera (2022), who served as the commander of the ARSF at the time and is now affiliated with the Fano. He asserted that “it was the combined force of Fano and the ARSF that curtailed the TPLF’s advance toward Addis Ababa.” He recalled that when TPLF forces advanced into North Shewa, the Prime Minister ordered him to lead his forces to that front, even though he had already been stationed on another battlefield. It was after “our forces pushed the TPLF forces back to Wollo,” Tefera stated, that “the Prime Minister announced his decision to lead the army” on November 23, 2021.

The alliance between the Fano and the government, however, ended with the conclusion of the conflict and the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (Associated Press 2025). One of the factors that strained the relationship was the claim that the Amhara were not represented in the agreement. Amhara nationalists argue that Amhara representation was essential, not only due to the involvement of Amhara forces but also because of territorial disputes and other political divergences with the TPLF (Messay Reference Messay2024). Without fair representation, the agreement was signed with controversial provisions.Footnote ⁴⁸ The most contentious of these was Article 10(4), which stipulates that both parties agreed to resolve “issues of contested areas in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” (Pretoria Agreement 2022).

The contested areas in this context refer to Wolkayt, Telemt, Tegede, and Raya. Amhara nationalists argue that attempting to resolve the issue in accordance with the constitution is unrealistic, as the TPLF had already annexed these territories prior to its promulgation (Birhanu Reference Birhanu2023). They contend that the provision signals that the government is willing to relinquish these lands.Footnote ⁴⁹ A specific clause in the Pretoria Agreement, which stipulates that displaced Tigreans from these contested areas would be returned, is frequently cited by Amhara nationalists to support this claim.Footnote ⁵⁰ To further complicate the situation, Amhara nationalists suspect that the federal government intends to assume administrative control over these areas and organize a referendum.Footnote ⁵¹ The referendum itself has become a source of contention. While the TPLF maintains that it should take place only after the return of displaced Tigreans, Amhara nationalists argue that these individuals were settlers rather than original inhabitants. As a result, they categorically oppose the referendum and instead demand unconditional ownership of the territories in question.Footnote ⁵²

In conclusion, the TPLF-central government conflict reshaped the political opportunity structure in ways that facilitated the escalation of the Fano movement through the activation of wartime mobilizing structures and subsequent post-conflict political realignments. First, direct participation on the battlefield created conditions for the Fano to expand its organizational capacity by recruiting fighters, building social networks, and acquiring weapons. Second, the post-conflict political settlement generated unmet expectations regarding territorial claims. During the war, the Prime Minister was reported to have affirmed that Wolkayt, Raya, Telemt, and Tegede were part of the Amhara region’s Gondar and Wollo areas and would remain so (Yonas Reference Yonas2024). However, the Pretoria Agreement reclassified these areas as “contested.” Compounding this ambiguity, the central government remained silent when Raya was reportedly recontrolled by TPLF forces in April 2024. Ethiopian Observer (2024) noted that only the Amhara regional government issued a statement condemning the TPLF and expressing concern that the war with the Fano had undermined its capacity to respond to what it described as renewed aggression.

State-Led Disarmament and Demobilization Efforts

Following the Pretoria Agreement, the government subjected the Amhara Fano to processes of decertification through delegitimizing narratives and disarmament operations. Government officials increasingly depicted Fano fighters as extremists, looters, bandits, and unruly actors (Messay Reference Messay2024). Notably, Prime Minister Abiy played a leading role in promoting this narrative, marking a sharp departure from his wartime stance, during which he had praised the Fano as the pride of Ethiopia (Yonas Reference Yonas2024). In a parliamentary speech, Abiy (Reference Abiy2023) accused groups operating under the Fano name of engaging in serious misconduct, including looting weapons from the army, perpetrating acts of sexual violence and unlawfully extorting funds.

For many within the Fano, the government’s abrupt shift in tone was perceived as a prelude to a broader campaign of repression.Footnote ⁵³ Indeed, the federal government soon launched a widespread crackdown: prominent figures such as Zemene Kassie were arrested, while security operations were conducted to apprehend others, including Merie Wodajo and Mesafint Tesfu. Activists suspected of ties to the Fano were also targeted. One notable example is Asress Mare, the Head of Political Affairs for the Amhara Fano in Gojjam. In an interview with the Associated Press (2025), he recounted being arrested twice on allegations of conspiring with extremist groups to forcibly overthrow the government. He stated that his decision to join the Fano stemmed from the government’s closure of any avenue for peaceful struggle.

In a seemingly contradictory move, on May 11, 2022, the federal government held an award ceremony to recognize certain Fano leaders for their contributions during the TPLF-government conflict (Ethio Times 2022). This move was widely interpreted by some factions within the Fano as a calculated attempt to divide the movement and weaken its collective resistance. In a statement, the Amhara Fano Unity in Gondar expressed strong disapproval:

Meanwhile, a political scientist from Addis Ababa University remarked that although the award ceremony included an element of recognition, it also conveyed an implicit message.Footnote ⁵⁴ The message, he argued, was the government’s intention to halt the recruitment and training of new Fano members and to initiate the disarmament of those already in possession of weapons. This interpretation was reinforced by a speech delivered during the ceremony by the then Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen, who stated: “from now on, our focus is on development. Youths must invest their energy in developmental activities rather than maintaining a warfare mentality” (Ethio Times 2022). An interviewee interpreted this statement as an indirect order for armed youth to lay down their weapons.Footnote ⁵⁵

The fears of this interviewee materialized when the government launched disarmament operations and suspended military training (Birhanu Reference Birhanu2023). This contributed to the escalation of contention by the Fano, as the campaign was framed as an existential threat to the survival of the Amhara population.Footnote ⁵⁶ At this stage, relations between the state and the Fano increasingly came to be characterized through rigid “us” and “them” distinctions, reflecting a process of category formation through which political boundaries were sharpened and armed resistance was justified as a necessary response to a perceived enemy (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly Reference McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly2001). Consequently, sporadic clashes began in April 2022 when government security forces attempted to halt a training exercise organized by the Amhara Fano (Ethiopian Peace Observatory 2022). Shortly thereafter, Brigadier General Tefera, who had been dismissed without explanation from his leadership role in the ARSF in February, was arrested (Reuters 2022). In May 2022, the Amhara regional government announced a law enforcement operation purportedly aimed at restoring peace and security in the region (Ethiopian Peace Observatory 2022). According to Amhara Media Corporation (2022), over 4500 individuals were arrested as part of this extensive operation.

Although regional authorities insisted that the campaign targeted criminals rather than the Fano, Amhara nationalists perceived it differently. An interviewee argued that the government’s true intention was to eliminate prominent Fano leaders and disarm the group, thereby leaving the Amhara defenseless.Footnote ⁵⁷ As evidence, they pointed to a violent incident in Motta on May 19, 2022, where security forces launched a disarmament operation against Fano fighters (Ethiopian Peace Observatory 2022). In the days that followed, protests erupted in regional towns as demonstrators took to the streets, demanding the release of detainees and denouncing the disarmament campaign. Government forces reportedly responded with live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of an unspecified number of youths (DW Amharic 2022). Since these politico-military incidents, Amhara nationalists have come to view every move by the government with deep suspicion.Footnote ⁵⁸

Adding fuel to the fire was the federal government’s decision to demobilize regional special forces. Article 52(7) of the 1995 Constitution states that regional states are only empowered to “establish and administer a state police force.” In a statement issued on April 18, 2023, the Prime Minister cited this provision to argue that the establishment of special forces was unconstitutional (Daniel Reference Daniel2024). He contended that these forces not only violated the Constitution but also contributed to national instability. As Daniel (Reference Daniel2024) recounts, the Prime Minister cited two key incidents to support his claim: the TPLF’s attack on the national army and the alleged involvement of the Somali regional special forces in the 2017 expulsion of numerous Oromos. Consequently, the Prime Minister announced that regional special forces would be demobilized and integrated into the national army and regional police in order to uphold state integrity and reassert the central government’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force.

Though the initiative was intended to apply to all regions, the demobilization of the ARSF became particularly controversial. When the letter announcing the decision to demobilize the ARSF was circulated on April 5, 2023, Amhara nationalists immediately objected, citing three main concerns.Footnote ⁵⁹ First, they argued that the Pretoria Agreement, which called for the TPLF to disarm, had not been fully implemented, as TPLF officials admitted that they had not fully disarmed and had no intention of doing so.Footnote ⁶⁰ Second, they pointed out that the TPLF still controlled contested territories such as Telemt, arguing that the disarmament of the ARSF effectively enabled the TPLF to retain these areas.Footnote ⁶¹ Third, they claimed that the decision targeted only the ARSF, aiming to weaken the Amhara region, while the government had taken no comparable action to demobilize the Oromia Regional Special Force.Footnote ⁶² Overall, as Yonas (Reference Yonas2024) writes, Amhara nationalists believed that the disarmament operations should be delayed until they had developed sufficient confidence in the government’s commitment to protecting Amhara interests.

Daniel (Reference Daniel2024), Social Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister, notes that opposition to the demobilization initiative came not only from Amhara nationalists but also from members of the ARSF themselves. According to him, their objection stemmed from the lack of consultation prior to the issuance of the official letter announcing their demobilization. Due to this communication gap, ARSF members interpreted the initiative as a disarmament effort rather than a plan to integrate them into the national army or regional police force (International Crisis Group 2023). In contrast to official narratives, one ARSF member recalled that they were instructed to drop their weapons while stationed at a camp in North Wollo.Footnote ⁶³ This perception of coercive demobilization contributed to the defection of multiple ARSF members, who left the camp with their weapons and joined the Fano. Binalf Andualem, then Minister of Peace, acknowledged in August 2023 that most ARSF members had indeed joined the Fano with their weapons (Yonas Reference Yonas2024). This process reflects a reconfiguration of mobilizing structures, whereby personnel and resources were transferred from state-aligned forces to the Fano.