AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF GOD

In this section, I present the steps in al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God (Allāh) and His uniquenessFootnote ³ in the order as they appear in Kitāb al-Tamhīd (The Book of Foundation).Footnote ⁴ Al-Bāqillānī initially undertakes to show that the entire universe (ʿālam) has come into existence out of nothing (ḥādith). On the basis of his metaphysics, al-Bāqillānī categorizes beings that come into existence into three classes. They are either (a) isolated atoms (jawhar munfarid), (b) composite bodies (jism muʿallaf), or (c) accidents (ʿarāḍ) that exist in bodies or atoms. According to al-Bāqillānī, an atom is an indivisible particle and body is that which is adjoined.Footnote ⁵

Al-Bāqillānī argues that accidents are clearly known to come into existence (ḥādith). An examination of the accidents of motion and rest reveals this fact. Motion and rest follow each other. When motion exists, rest disappears and vice versa. They cannot exist together. Thus, accidents are not eternal; that is, they have a beginning (ḥudūth).Footnote ⁶ Then, he argues that bodies (ajsām) have temporal origination as well. To justify his thesis about bodies, he claims that a body cannot exist without any accident, and therefore bodies do not exist before accidents. Since accidents come into existence, bodies also exist this way. Thus, every body has a temporal origination. In addition, recall that al-Bāqillānī notes that the atoms constituting bodies are either existent within a composite whole or are found separately. Either state presupposes their coming into being.Footnote ⁷

After his argument for the temporal origination of the entire universe (ḥudūth), al-Bāqillānī infers the existence of a cause (muḥdith) responsible for its coming into existence. He adds that a temporally originated (muḥdath) and formed (muṣawwar) universe indicates an originator (muḥdith) and a form giver (muṣawwir). This inference is exemplified in daily life when we say that a book indicates an author or a building indicates a builder.Footnote ⁸

Al-Bāqillānī explains what he means by a formed universe. We see that some things come into existence before others. This order in time cannot be caused by the things themselves or by their genus because if the order arouse due to the essence of the things or due to their genus, then an actual temporal order would be necessary. But this is unacceptable. Since an early or late appearance in the temporal order is equally possible for something, its existence in a definite temporal order indicates the existence of a being that arranges its existence this way in accordance with its volition.Footnote ⁹ Next, al-Bāqillānī appeals to the idea of determination – particularization (ihkti ṣāṣ) in a context where he talks about the contingency of the world. According to al-Bāqillānī, objects may possibly (bi-ṣiḥḥaḥ) take different shapes or properties than they actually have. That they have the forms proper to them can only happen by means of an agent who gives them that form in accordance with what he wills (qaṣd).Footnote ¹⁰

In the next step, al-Bāqillānī argues that the causal agent (fāʿil) of the universe cannot be the universe itself. In his opinion, something cannot be a causal agent (fāʿil) if it is not alive, knowing or powerful. The causal activity in the universe is perfectly ordered and cannot be explained without knowledge and power. However, in this world, that which is alive becomes dead; that is to say, it cannot prevent its own death and does not know its own composition. Thus, since things alive cannot have causal efficacy nothing in this world can be its own causal agent. As a result, that which has no causal control over itself has no causal efficacy over other objects.Footnote ¹¹

Following this step, al-Bāqillānī argues that the causal agent (fāʿil) of the universe does not resemble it and, thus, must be eternal. Here, he appeals explicitly to the basic principle that everything that comes into existence (mu ḥdath) needs an originator (muḥdith). If this originator is assumed to be something that comes into existence as well, then it also needs an originator. This cannot go ad infinitum and the originator must be categorically different from beings that come into existence. Therefore, the originator of the universe must be eternal (qadīm).Footnote ¹²

The next step in the development of the argument is to show that there is just one maker of the universe. Basically, there could not be more than one maker for the following reason. Assume that there are two makers. If one of them wishes to create something and the other wishes just the opposite, both wishes cannot be realized since it would be a contradictory state of affairs. Therefore, if neither wish is realized, neither being could be the maker of the universe because they would be impotent, and impotence is a mark of coming into being (ḥudūth). If only one wish is realized, the being whose wish is realized is the maker and the other is not because the other could not fulfill his wish and is therefore impotent.Footnote ¹³ At this stage, al-Bāqillānī's argument seems to be complete because, after that, he considers some questions regarding further evidence for certain attributes – for example life, knowledge, and will – of the causal agent of the universe. He summarizes and clarifies his particular arguments to the extent that they are relevant to a particular attribute.

What is noteworthy in this case is that al-Bāqillānī first considers the attribute of life. As evidence that the maker (ṣānīʿ) of the world is alive, he suggests that the maker is a knowledgeable and powerful agent. Then he considers the attribute of knowledge (ʿilm), and presents the order and the complicated mechanism of the universe as evidence for the knowledge of its maker. That is to say, the universe exemplifies the orderly complex activity of its maker. At the end of the passage in which he discusses the knowledge of the maker, he changes the subject and ascribes this orderly complex activity to God (Allāh).Footnote ¹⁴ In this context, the term “God” (Allāh) is used with the same meaning as the maker of the universe, who is presented as alive, powerful, and intelligent. This is the first place in al-Bāqillānī's presentation of the argument in Kitāb al-Tamhīd where the causal agent of the universe is identified with God (Allāh).

THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S ARGUMENT

In this section, I aim to display the logical structure of al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God by making use of Davidson's interpretations. The argument presented above contains many sub-arguments each of which, according to al-Bāqillānī, is a step in demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of God.

Davidson considers the first argument as a form of the standard kalām proof for creation since it follows a common pattern among the mutakallimūn. It starts with the temporality of accidents, then moves on to the temporality of bodies by using the bridge principle that bodies cannot exist independently of accidents, and then concludes that the entire universe – since it consists of bodies and accidents – must be originated. The concept of accident plays a significant role in this argument, and for this reason Davidson calls it “the proof from accidents.”Footnote ¹⁵

As for the second and third arguments, Davidson classifies them as a kind of “particularization argument.” Recall that in those arguments the actual order of things and their forms are presented as being determined out of many possibilities. For Davidson, this act of determining or particularizing is the core element of these arguments. This act indicates that the efficient cause responsible for this act has a will; thus, it is a particularizing agent (mukha ṣṣis).Footnote ¹⁶ In brief, on the basis of the contingency of the world, the particularization argument aims to establish the attribute of will.

Davidson considers the passage in which al-Bāqillānī elaborates on the knowledge of the maker of the universe – just after the attribute of life – to include an “argument from design.”Footnote ¹⁷ In that passage, al-Bāqillānī claims that the actions of the creatures that involve order and arrangement, such as writing and carpentry, cannot happen without knowing agents, yet God's (Allāh) actions are far subtler in terms of order and perfection and, thus, cannot occur without His knowledge.Footnote ¹⁸ Davidson presents the maker of the universe in this context as “God.” Recall that, in arguing for the thesis that all originated beings have no effective causal power, al-Bāqillānī discusses the attribute of knowledge in a passage before the one Davidson cites. In this earlier passage, al-Bāqillānī draws attention to the order in the universe and the perfect design in the structure of beings, and to their inability to know the details of this order and design. From this he infers that the maker of this universe must have the attribute of knowledge. Thus, these two passages aim to show that the order and design indicate the reality of a causal agent who has the attribute of knowledge. Yet Davidson ignores two significant types of arguments, which are also essential to understanding al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence and uniqueness of God.

The first argument purports to establish that the causal agent of the universe is categorically different from the universe, and al-Bāqillānī makes this point by arguing that this causal agent is eternal. Eternity (qidam) is just the opposite of becoming or having a temporal origination (ḥudūth). By describing the causal agent as eternal, al-Bāqillānī posits that only eternity satisfies the condition for being under no causal influence. Otherwise, the series of temporal beings can go on ad infinitum, and in this way, no real cause can be formulated for their existence. However, since the entire universe is originated and has determinate forms out of many possibilities, there must be a causal agent responsible for the existence and contingent features of the universe. Being eternal, the causal agent is not the same in kind as the universe. While the former is under no causal influence of anything, the latter is causally dependent on the former in all respects. Let me call this argument the “argument for eternity.” With this argument, al-Bāqillānī completes his proof of the existence of God, who is understood as the causal agent of the universe, who is eternal, and who possesses the attributes of power, knowledge, and will, and thus, life.

The second argument is not integral to the argument for the existence of God because it aims to justify His uniqueness, which presupposes His existence. The argument aiming to show that there is only one God supervenes on the earlier arguments for the existence of God and makes a further point about God's uniqueness, which is very significant in the Islamic tradition. Let me call it then “the argument for uniqueness.” However, uniqueness is not integral to the concept of God. It is an issue that pertains to how this concept is instantiated. Thus, I separate this last argument from the others in the following sense. Earlier arguments aim to show that the concept of God is instantiated and allow us to understand the concept of God al-Bāqillānī presumes. The last argument contributes to these in clarifying whether there are more beings of such nature but does not add anything new to the concept of God.

Davidson's remarks shed light on the structure of al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence and uniqueness of God. Following the terminology of Davidson, we can accept that al-Bāqillānī presents arguments from accidents, from particularization, and from design. Moreover, he puts forward arguments for eternity and uniqueness. Yet al-Bāqillānī offers neither argument as a self-sufficient proof for the existence of God (Allāh) because the term “God” appears only after he finishes presenting all of these arguments. Rather, these arguments are individual premises of his meta-argument for the existence and uniqueness of God. Although Davidson does not state the exact premises of al-Bāqillānī's meta-argument, we can identify them on the basis of the order of the arguments al-Bāqillānī presents in Kitāb al-Tamhīd and on his choice of the terms he uses to describe the agent he infers from them.

The first argument attempts to show that the universe is originated. That which is responsible for its origination is presented as a maker (ṣāniʿ) and an originator (muḥdith). The second argument focuses on the contingent features of the universe and draws attention to the attribute of will possessed by this causal agent. In this step, the causal agent of the universe is also described as the one who forms (muṣawwir), the one who makes something before the others (muqaddim), the one who composes (muʾallif), and the one who wills (qāṣid). In the next argument, the causal agent (fāʿil) is identified with a being that has life, power and knowledge (hayy, qādir, ʿālim). The next step argues for the transcendence of this causal agent from the universe and describes it as eternal (qadīm). After the argument that there is only one causal agent of the universe, we see in the text extended explanations of the earlier premises and a discussion of their implications. Just after the explication of the attributes of life and power, when the attribute of knowledge is explained in a more detailed way, the causal agent is also described as God (Allāh).

In a nutshell, the arguments from accidents, from particularization, from design and for eternity specify necessary and sufficient conditions for a substantive argument for the existence of God. The argument for uniqueness is additional, in order to show that there is only one God. This meta-argument considers God as an eternal agent (fāʿil) and attempts to justify how the minimum conditions for agency are satisfied. For this reason, we should try to understand what the concept of agency might mean for al-Bāqillānī. For a better understanding of al-Bāqillānī's argument and its presuppositions, I would like to compare it with the arguments of al-Juwayī and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār first and then move to examine the concept of agency.

AL-JUWAYNĪ'S AND QĀḌĪ ʿABD AL-JABBĀR'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Let me start with al-Juwaynī's argument for the existence of God. In Kitāb al-Irshād, al-Juwaynī presents an argument, which is similar to that of al-Bāqillānī in certain respects and different from it in certain other respects. First, al-Juwaynī tries to show that the whole universe is originated.Footnote ¹⁹ Like al-Bāqillānī, he considers the universe to be formed out of atoms and accidents and bodies to be combinations of atoms. He argues, al-Bāqillānī does, that accidents exist and originated. Next, al-Juwaynī argues for the origination of atoms by stating that they cannot be stripped of accidents since anything that does not precede what is originated is also originated.Footnote ²⁰ In this step, al-Juwaynī directly aims to show the origination of atoms rather then bodies whereas al-Bāqillānī argued for the origination of bodies only in his argument.

There is another significant addition in al-Juwaynī's argument, which is missing in al-Bāqillānī. Al-Juwaynī also considers as to whether originated beings could form an infinite series. In other words, weather the universe is eternal even though every single being within it is originated. He refutes the possibility of an infinite series of beings that have occurred up to the present moment. His argument for this refutation relies on that an actual infinite cannot be traversed by successive addition.Footnote ²¹

After al-Juwaynī established that everything within the universe and the universe itself have an origination, he appeals to the idea of particularization in order to show that there is a causal agent of the universe. In brief, anything that comes into being might not have been existent. Its existence is possible as its non-existence is. Its coming into being at a given time is possible as any other time. Therefore, originated beings need a particularizing agent (mukha ṣṣiṣ). Thus the universe needs a particularizing agent. Then he inquires whether this particularizing agent could be a [necessary] cause (ʿilla) or a certain nature (ṭabīʿa) or a voluntary agent (fāʿilan mukhtāran). He rejects the first two options for the following reasons: The effect of a necessary cause or of a nature co-exists with them. The necessary cause or nature could be either eternal or originated. If they are originated they would need another particularizing agent and it would go this way ad infinitum. An infinite regress of particularizing agents is unacceptable. If they are eternal, then their effect must be eternal as well, which was rejected by the earlier arguments. Therefore, the maker (ṣāniʿ) of the universe must be a voluntary agent who created it with his will. That this voluntary agent must be eternal is also implied by the argument. After this point, al-Juwaynī calls this maker Allāh and investigates which kinds of attributes are possibly or necessarily ascribed to Him and what cannot be ascribed to Him.Footnote ²² Like al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī also gives an argument for the uniqueness of God afterwards. However, unlike al-Bāqillānī, he does not integrate a kind of teleological argument into his meta-argument for the existence of God. Nonetheless, in order to show that God has the attribute of knowledge, al-Juwaynī later uses a teleological argument, which is similar to that of al-Bāqillānī.

In Shar ḥ al-Uṣūl, Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār also gives an argument for the existence of God from the origination of the universe. He presents four explicit premises for the origination of the universe, which he explains in detail. These premises are as follows:

1. (1) Things (maʿānin) are present in bodies.Footnote ²³

2. (2) They are originated.

3. (3) Body cannot be devoid of them and does not precede them.

4. (4) What cannot be devoid of, or precede, what is originated is likewise originated.Footnote ²⁴

As we can see, like al-Bāqillānī but unlike al-Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues for the origination of bodies without explicitly referring to atoms. In explaining the origination of the universe, like al-Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-Jabbār refutes the possibility that the universe could be eternal.Footnote ²⁵

ʿAbd al-Jabbār concludes his argument that the origination of the universe requires the existence of an originator (mu ḥdith) and an agent (fāʿil), which is identical with God (Allāh). He also describes this agent as a voluntary agent (fāʿil al-mukhtār) and rejects that the originator could be a cause that acts out of its nature. A cause that acts out of its nature necessarily is either originated or eternal. If it is originated, it requires another cause and this would go ad infinitum, which is absurd. If it is eternal, its effect must be eternal as well, which is already rejected. Thus, the originator of the universe is a voluntary agent. By implication, it could not be originated.Footnote ²⁶ Recall that both al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī appealed to the idea of particularization in establishing that the originated of the universe is a voluntary agent and has the attribute of will. However, ʿAbd al-Jabbār does not give any argument that relies upon the idea of particularization.

The following points are common in the arguments of all the three scholars: (1) All arguments rely on an inference from the universe to the existence of God. (2) All arguments aim to establish that the creator of the world is a voluntary agent. Concerning the first point, the inference type in question is a general form of reasoning that “proceeds from a visible effect to an invisible cause” and called istidlāl bi-al-shāhid ʿalā al-ghā ʾib.Footnote ²⁷ Within this context, it means “to draw a conclusion regarding imperceptible (God) on the basis of the observable (sublunary) world.”Footnote ²⁸ Thus this argument is by and large a kind of cosmological argument. As it does not derive the existence of God from a given concept of God, it does not fall within the category of ontological arguments. Concerning the second point, all arguments have supplementary premises that aim to establish that the creator of the universe is an agent with free will. Unlike the others, al-Bāqillānī's argument purports to show that the creator has also knowledge. All of the three scholars start calling the creator “God” (Allāh) only after they considered it to be an agent. Thus, the concept of agency plays a significant role in understanding the arguments in question and the concept of God that they presuppose. Let me now analyze the concept of agency in detail.

THE CENTRAL PRESUPPOSITION OF AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S ARGUMENT: AGENCY

Now, I aim to clarify the meaning of agency or the concept of agent (fāʿil) as presupposed by al-Bāqillānī. In doing this, I compare his concept of agency with those of al-Juwaynī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār. As it will be clear, al-Bāqillānī's understanding of agency seems to be different from the other two scholars and very close to al-Ghazālī's understanding. Al-Ghazālī's comments on this concept help a lot to explicate al-Bāqillānī's concept of agency.

In discussing that the universe is not its own causal agent, al-Bāqillānī says that an agent (fāʿil) cannot exist without being alive (ḥayy) and powerful (qādir).Footnote ²⁹ When he explains why he thinks that the universe cannot have the attributes of power and efficient causality, he appeals to the concept of knowledge (ʿilm). Al-Bāqillānī draws attention to things that do not know their own composition and qualities when they are alive. Thus, he argues, things that do not know their own structure cannot be their own agents, and therefore cannot causally affect (lā yafʿalu) other objects.Footnote ³⁰ This is a common type of argument among the mutakallimūn that denies the causal efficacy of finite beings on the basis of their inability to know the details of what they are doing. Thus, it supports the occasionalist thesis that finite beings are causally inert. From this argument, we understand that al-Bāqillānī conceives knowledge as a precondition of effective power.

In addition, al-Bāqillānī seems to consider will as another precondition of power. After he argues that the entire universe is originated, he proposes to show that the originated (mu ḥdath) and formed (muṣawwar) universe has an originator and former. Everything in the universe comes into being but in various forms. They might have been different, and thus, they must have been chosen out of many possibilities. Therefore, for al-Bāqillānī, things that are originated and have determinate forms indicate an originator and the presence of will. Power is postulated to account for the fact that there are originated beings, and will is postulated to explain why those beings have determinate forms. Since the forms do not exist independently of their objects, the originator must have willed a definite form for an object which he wanted to create and must have applied his power to create them in accordance with his will.

Whereas al-Bāqillānī uses the term “agent” (fāʿil) in describing the maker of the universe, al-Juwaynī does not use this exact term. Rather he uses a slightly modified term “voluntary agent” (fāʿilan mukhtāran). Al-Juwaynī rejects that the maker of the universe is a necessary cause or a nature and clearly identifies him as a voluntary agent who must possess the attribute of will. Then, he calls this voluntary agent “God” (Allāh) as well but does not refer to his attribute of knowledge in his argument for the existence of God. Later in Kitāb al-Irshād, when he discusses the attributes of God, he also adds that the maker of the universe is one who is powerful and one who knows, and thus the maker is alive.Footnote ³¹ Yet the attributes of knowledge and life are not embedded in his argument, and they not associated with his use of the term “agent.”

ʿAbd al-Jabbār uses the both the terms of “agent” (fāʿil) and “voluntary agent” (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār), but his understanding of agent is different from that of al-Bāqillānī. After showing that the universe is originated, ʿAbd al-Jabbār states that its origination requires the existence of an originator (mu ḥdith) and agent (fāʿil), which he identifies with God (Allāh). Then he rejects that this agent can be a necessary cause that acts by nature and consequently describes this agent as a voluntary agent (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār) who possesses the attribute of will.Footnote ³² Later ʿAbd al-Jabbār presents power, knowledge, life and existence as essential characteristics of God.

As we have seen, both al-Juwaynī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār specifically use the term “voluntary agent” to express the idea that the agent in question possesses free will. In other words, for them, the concept of agency does not include the idea of free will. Thus, there might be other types of agents that do not possess the attribute of will. Indeed, as Eldīn al-Alousī points out, there had been a distinction between fāʿil mukhtār and fāʿil matbūʿ since the seventh century (second century in Hijra). The former refers to the causal agent that acts by free will and the latter to the one that acts by nature, being capable only one kind of action.Footnote ³³ Thus, in this understanding, the term fāʿil may refer to any type of causal agent whether it possesses free will or not. Once it possesses free will, it is called fāʿil mukhtār (“voluntary agent”). Both al-Juwaynī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār seem to have this meaning of agency in mind since they peculiarly use the term fāʿil mukhtār. However, al-Bāqillānī does not use this term in his argument for the existence of God. Rather he only uses the term fāʿil but associates with it the concepts of will, power, knowledge and life. In brief, al-Bāqillānī's understanding of agency differs from how al-Juwaynī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār conceive agency. Al-Ghazālī follows al-Bāqillānī's intuitions and proposes a more explicit characterization of agency.

Al-Ghazālī writes in his Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa): “‘Agent’ (fāʿil) is an expression [referring] to one from whom the act (fiʿl) proceeds together with the will (irāda) to act by way of choice (ikhtiyār) and the knowledge (ʿilm) of what is willed.”Footnote ³⁴ In this characterization, the act of an agent relies upon the agent's will, choice and knowledge. Furthermore, any action presupposes the use of the attribute of power. A more explicit statement of these three attributes is the following: “The agent's existence, his will (irāda), his power (qudra), his knowledge (ʿilm) [constitute] a condition for his being an agent.”Footnote ³⁵ Thus, in order to consider something to be a real agent, we have to justify ascribing at least the three attributes of power, will and knowledge to that thing.

Frank Griffel argues that al-Ghazālī's characterization of agency in this way in the Incoherence shows that al-Ghazālī adapted to use the term fāʿil “according to the meaning it has in Muslim theology over its meaning for the Aristotelian philosophers.”Footnote ³⁶ The Incoherence is a work where al-Ghazālī criticizes certain theses of the falāsifa who were influenced from Greek philosophers to a significant extent. Griffel claims that the mutakallimūn generally appealed to language, specifically to common usage of Arabic terms in order to justify their theoretical positions. However, he states, the falāsifa constructed their terminology in Arabic from the relevant Greek terms. Since al-Ghazālī presents his understanding of agency as the meaning commonly understood from the term fāʿil, according to Griffel, he follows the mutakallimūn's intuitions, not those of the falāsifa.Footnote ³⁷ From our earlier observations, it becomes clear that this interpretation is problematic. As we have seen, neither al-Juwaynī nor ʿAbd al-Jabbār (two significant mutakallimūn, one being an Ashʿarite and the other being a Muʿtazilite) does use the term fāʿil in order to refer to an agent who possesses the attribute of will. ʿAbd al-Jabbār describes the originator of the universe as an agent (fāʿil) before he establishes that this originator has free will. Once he established it, he calls this agent “voluntary agent” (fāʿil mukhtār). Al-Juwaynī also calls the maker of the universe a “voluntary agent” (fāʿil mukhtār) after he shows that the maker possesses the attribute of will. Thus, Griffel's attempt to relate al-Ghazālī's concept of agency to those of earlier mutakallimūn without any specification is not well grounded. Not all mutakallimūn shared al-Ghazālī's intuitions on this issue, both al-Juwaynī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār being two outstanding counter-examples. Nonetheless, al-Ghazālī's understanding of agency is parallel to that of al-Bāqillānī. This shows that there are various strands of terminological choices among the mutakallimūn. In order to understand their conceptual and terminological frameworks, we should abstain from arbitrary generalizations and focus on each scholar specifically.

Recall that al-Bāqillānī denies the causal efficacy of finite beings on the basis of their insufficient knowledge about themselves and other beings. Thus, in his view, we cannot consider anything in the universe as a real agent. A real agent must be an eternal being categorically different from the universe; it must have eternal power, will and knowledge. Indeed, this being is what the term “God” refers to for al-Bāqillānī. However, agency might be understood differently with respect to finite beings. As Michael Marmura points out, al-Ghazālī presents two basic interpretations of agency as ascribed to beings in the universe.

First, certain acts can be ascribed to non-animate objects metaphorically. In the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, al-Ghazālī considers certain utterances by Arabs such as that “fire burns” and that “sword cuts” metaphorical because these causal actions cannot be ascribed to non-agent beings. The fact that common people use them widely does not necessitate our interpreting them literally. Rather, we should understand them metaphorically. In fact, al-Ghazālī does not reject uttering such phrases.Footnote ³⁸ This might be for the following reason: In real life, we cannot communicate with people efficiently if we refer to divine agency in every utterance. It is cumbersome, for example, to say in every instance that God burned cotton with fire, or that God killed somebody with a sword. For a more efficient communication, we can ascribe the casual actions in question to fire and sword metaphorically, while we keep in mind that the real agent behind these events is God. Metaphors are used in such a case out of the practical necessities of life.

Second, al-Ghazālī also presents voluntary beings such as angels and human beings as “agents.” Marmura draws attention to al-Ghazālī's clarification of the different senses associated with the term “agent” (fāʿil). In al-Iqti ṣād fī al-iʿtiqād (Moderation in Belief)Footnote ³⁹ and Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (The Revival of the Religious Sciences),Footnote ⁴⁰ al-Ghazālī mentions two different senses of agency that are ascribed separately to God and his servants. God is presented as a real agent in the sense that He creates. The sense in which God's servants are treated as agents is that they are the locus (maḥall) of creation.Footnote ⁴¹ For example, humans are agents in the sense of being the locus of the creation of knowledge, will and the power to act. The attribution of voluntary acts to human beings is called “acquisition” (kasb).Footnote ⁴² The idea of acquisition briefly postulates the following: Humans acquire their deeds but God creates them. Al-Ghazālī states that any creature's having power to act means that it is a center and locus of creation, and thus, an agent.Footnote ⁴³ It is noteworthy that agency has a causal connotation only in the first sense, when it is ascribed to God. Al-Ghazālī also points to some verses in the Qurʾān where some acts are attributed to God and other acts to angels and human beings. However, the sense in which acts are ascribed to angels and human beings, he stresses, is that they are the locus of divine creation.Footnote ⁴⁴

In sum, from the perspectives of al-Bāqillānī and al-Ghazālī, an agent, in the primary literal sense, must have the attributes of knowledge, will and power with causal efficacy. These attributes are essential to the concept of agency. God as a real agent must have these attributes.

CATEGORIZING AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S ARGUMENT

Al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God aims to show that there is an eternal creator with the attributes of knowledge, will and power. These three attributes automatically imply the attribute of life. Each premise of this meta-argument can be treated as a separate argument, yet these separate arguments purport to prove the existence of God only when taken together, not individually. Since this meta-argument includes references to the universe and requires experiential knowledge, its logical structure can be treated as an inference from the universe to various aspects of its efficient cause. In this respect, we can consider it a kind of cosmological argument because it starts from the universe. However, it is not the classical type of “a contingentia mundi proof” as presented by Leibniz or “the cosmological proof” as presented by Kant. In both Leibniz's and Kant's versions, the cosmological argument relies on some general features of the universe such as contingency and on this basis infers the existence of an absolutely necessary being. One problematic aspect of this argument is, as Kant notes, is that we need to justify why this necessary being is identified with “God.”Footnote ⁴⁵ Just for this reason, al-Bāqillānī would reject this type of cosmological argument as an argument for the existence of God. For him, we must add more premises in order to show that God exists. The extra premises focus on aspects of the universe such as order and design. They help characterize the eternal being in question as an agent by ascribing to him knowledge, power, will, and life. Thus al-Bāqillānī's argument integrates into its structure what Kant calls “the physico-theological argument” as a part within it. Yet the physico-theological argument alone does not yield the conclusion that God exists. As Kant points out, what it could show at most is that there is a designer (architect) of the universe who has attributes such as intelligence and intention.Footnote ⁴⁶

Al-Bāqillānī's argument cannot be treated as an ontological argument nor as something that presupposes one. He does not start with a given concept of God and does not aim to show that this concept is instantiated a priori. Al-Bāqillānī presumes that God is an eternal agent but proposes separate arguments from experience for why the efficient cause of the universe must be an eternal agent as well as a unique being. Neither its eternity nor its agency or uniqueness is assumed a priori. In al-Bāqillānī's argument, all the steps jointly aim to show that there is a unique eternal being that has power, knowledge, and will. Because of the centrality of the concept of agency in this argument, I propose to dub it “the cosmological argument from agency.” This argument has the potential to accomplish what the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological arguments individually cannot do. Al-Bāqillānī presents a significant methodology for how to argue for the existence of the God of monotheistic religions. The following remarks of Richard Swinburne capture this insight behind al-Bāqillānī's argumentative style very neatly: “An argument such as the cosmological argument does not show the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob. Not by itself, but it does its small bit together with some very diverse arguments that do their small bit to get to this conclusion.”Footnote ⁴⁷

AN ANALYSIS OF MAJID FAKHRY'S INTERPRETATION OF AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ

In this section, I show that Majid Fakhry's comments on al-Bāqillānī's argument, presented above, do not sufficiently capture its logical structure. Fakhry finds three independent arguments in al-Bāqillānī's Kitāb al-Tamhīd. According to Fakhry, the first argument is an inference to a Maker and Fashioner (mu ḥdith wa-muṣawwir) from the temporality of the world (ḥudūth). This argument is derived from the first passages I presented in which al-Bāqillānī starts by arguing for the temporality of accidents, then moves on to argue for the temporality of bodies, by using the bridge principle that bodies cannot exist independently of accidents, and then concludes that the entire universe – since it consists of bodies and accidents – must have been originated. Fakhry considers this a version of the argument from the temporality of the world (a novitiate mundi, dalīl al-ḥudūth).Footnote ⁴⁸ The second argument is based on the observation that certain things in the universe follow others in a definite order. Certain things come into existence prior to others, and this fact indicates an agent who made them prior. Fakhry identifies this “determinant of priority” with God.Footnote ⁴⁹ The last argument focuses on the contingent features of things. Things could potentially take different forms than they actually have. The actual forms are determined out of many possible ones, and their determinant, in Fakhry's interpretation, is again, God. According to Fakhry, the last argument is a variant of an inference about God based on the contingency of the world (contingentia mundi, dalīl al-jawāz).Footnote ⁵⁰ The last two arguments come exactly after the first one in Kitāb al-Tamhīd, but on the basis of these arguments, al-Bāqillānī concludes only that the maker of the world has will but does not state that this maker is identical with God.

In brief, Fakhry identifies three arguments of al-Bāqillānī, which are of two main types. The first argument, from the temporality of the world, attempts to show that there is a Maker of the universe. Fakhry's last two arguments rely on the contingent features of the world and purport to show that God exists.

Salient in Fakhry's interpretation of al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence and uniqueness of God are the following. First, Fakhry does not present the first argument as a proof for the existence of God, but this nuance is lost in his presentation of the other arguments. He explicitly presents the last two arguments as proofs for the existence of “God.” In these arguments, Fakhry suddenly jumps from the contingent features of the universe to the existence of God, without discussing how the agent responsible for the contingency is identical with God. Second, Fakhry presents only three arguments and ignores what we have presented as the arguments from design, for eternity and for uniqueness. Lastly, and related to the second point, he does not see a unified picture emerging from the interrelatedness of all of these arguments.