Stuart Gray argues that comparing early Greek and early Indian political thought can enable one to produce a political theory which gives appropriate weight to the interests of the nonhuman world, and will therefore produce more environmentally friendly and sustainable policies than current Western ideology. He uses historical and comparative study to justify a contemporary program. This book is not so much about justifying the state (as the title implies) but rather about seeing how the concept of the state has been related to metaphysics.
The Greek and Indian texts could hardly be more different (this comes as no surprise). The strength of his work lies in his painstaking and enlightening textual analysis of the early Indian texts, ranging from the beginnings (ca. 1500 BCE) to around 500 BCE. He excavates the processes by which two different notions of “rule,” order, the cosmos, and humanity emerged. His close textual analysis shows (in a way that, so far as I know, is original) how the notion of kingship developed between approximately 1500 and 500 BCE, from a primarily cosmic concept to one which also accounted for human kingship. “This transference of ruling responsibility from divine to human agents … leads to an incredibly robust conception of ruling-in and ruling-for a broader cosmic well-being and the interests of a wide variety of nonhuman beings and phenomena. … Human beings are not understood as exceptional or privileged over other groups of entities” (144–46).
Gray does not examine the Greek sources so closely. He does not even mention the widely held view that the Odyssey was composed later than the Iliad and that they were by different authors. And it is strange to confine “the Greeks” to Homer and Hesiod, not including even the pre-Socratic philosophers. Over against the vast array of early Indian sacred texts, he sets two poets.
Gray has no difficulty demonstrating that the Indian sources lay much less emphasis on the purely human sphere and make it appear reasonable, and indeed essential, to factor nonhuman life, the biosphere, the environment, into our calculations of political justice. He calls this “panocracy”—“world-building,” rule by the whole: “all human beings have the power and response-ability to rule as stewards [a central concept for Gray]” with regard to both human and nonhuman beings (12).
There are weaknesses in Gray's argument. First, he does not present arguments for the superiority of the proto-Indian over the current Western way of viewing things. Rather, he hopes to persuade us by expounding an alternative worldview which, unlike the Western, places equal emphasis on our responsibility for the natural environment. He aims to “expand our political imagination by supplying alternative ideas and outlooks that might serve as resources for rethinking the meaning of rule [and] … why human beings have a responsibility or duty to act as stewards for the interests of various nonhuman beings” (vii–viii). What he does is to provide a precedent for an environmental approach. But this surely requires one to accept the Indian premises as of equal value to the Western ones.
Nonetheless, I believe his book does help us to “identify gaps in one tradition by using a comparative vantage point” (174). It both underscores the need, identified by numerous environmental political theorists today, to take into account the interests of future generations, and suggests a metaphysical case for taking into account the interests of nonhuman forms of life.
Second, the Greeks and Indians are neither the only nor the most appropriate points of comparison here. In considering Western priorities, it is surely equally important to take into account the Hebrew Bible which in its metaphysical scope is far more readily comparable to the ancient Indian sacred texts, and as it happens is hardly less anthropocentric than the Greeks. And if we were to look to the non-West, Buddhism and the Tao-te-Ching (Classic of the Way and Its Power, ca. 400 BCE) have an at least equal claim to provide metaphysical foundations for equal respect for nonhuman life forms.
There is surely a case for considering the emergence of justice in early Greek thought as the criterion for the legitimacy of rule. Justice plays an increasing role in the Odyssey, and is made fundamental by Hesiod (partly in the sense of human rights). Here Gray misses an opportunity, for there is no real parallel in Indian thought; rather, the essentializing of status (caste) makes it the very antithesis of Greek and later Western political ethics. Surely here too a comparative approach could lead to one tradition making good the defects of another (as Gandhi recognized).
