THE COURSE

Taught at a public university in the United States, the introduction to politics course begins with lectures and readings on concepts including cognitive dissonance (Festinger Reference Festinger1957), confirmation bias (Taber and Lodge Reference Taber and Lodge2006), filter bubbles (Pariser Reference Pariser2011), narratives (Jones and McBeth Reference Jones and McBeth2010; McBeth and Pearsall Reference McBeth and Pearsall2019), and political emotion and identity (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe Reference Huddy, Mason and Aarøe2015). There are subsequent discussions of the political brain (Westen Reference Westen2008), a critique of classic economics and utility maximization (Nowak, Page, and Sigmund Reference Nowak, Page and Sigmund2000), readings on motivated reasoning (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman Reference Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman2011), and discussions of political disinformation (Bennett and Livingston Reference Bennett and Livingston2018). The course encourages students to engage in deliberate, rational thinking about politics or, in other words, to use Kahneman’s (Reference Kahneman2011) System One while also recognizing the fast and uncritical-thinking biases of humans (i.e., Kahneman’s System Two). Such a cognitive approach to an introduction to politics course puts students in a position to evaluate not only how others make political decisions but also how they make decisions reflecting the use of cognitive science in pedagogy (e.g., Eyler Reference Eyler2018). We know that students’ political identity is more set than their issue positions (Woessner and Kelly-Woessner Reference Woessner and Kelly-Woessner2020); therefore, the course approach teaches them to recognize their biases and encounter evidence with the goal of avoiding concerns over political science and indoctrination (Mariani and Hewitt Reference Mariani and Hewitt2008; Woessner and Kelly-Woessner Reference Woessner and Kelly-Woessner2009).

Robert Putnam’s seminal work, Bowling Alone (Reference Putnam2000), provides an important starting point in teaching political polarization. Putnam argued that the United States is suffering from a decline in bridging social capital, thereby leading to a decline in reciprocity; in turn, this condition leads to decreased political trust and increased political conflict. In 2020, Putnam’s theory resonates more than ever given that our study originated in September 2020 as we watched both peaceful and violent protests erupt throughout the United States and the world. As we encountered Putnam in the third week of the course, his theory seems an appropriate summation of “how we ended up here.”

Generational politics, however, comes into play given Putnam’s insistence in Reference Putnam2000 that the younger generation of that era played the most significant role in democracy’s decline. Dalton (Reference Dalton2015) provided a counterpoint to Putnam’s (Reference Putnam2000) more pessimistic view of young people. Dalton’s central argument is not that democracy is in decline but instead that the norms of democratic citizenship are changing. For example, Putnam cited technology (although there was no social media in Reference Putnam2000) as leading to the decline in political participation. Today, some studies are negative about the impact of social media on democracy (Tucker et al. Reference Tucker, Theocharis, Roberts and Barberá2017). Yet, students in our class responded to a survey asking them to evaluate their social media friends on a bonding and bridging social-capital scale (Williams Reference Williams2006). They overwhelmingly reported that their social media friends reflect primarily bridging social capital: 25 of 44 students in the survey reported that it helped them understand others with different political views. Students view social media as something that brings other viewpoints into their world, and some of the literature validates these views (Phua, Jin, and Kim Reference Phua, Jin and Kim2017).

Students initially discussed whether their generation is polarized. One theme in the discussion almost parroted Dalton’s (Reference Dalton2015) thesis before the students began reading The Good Citizen. They contended that their generation is nonpartisan and their diversity moderates their views, making them open to new ideas. Students promoting this first theme agreed that polarizing narratives were dividing them, but they believed that a political middle remains strong and reflects their generational views. A second theme that emerged in the class was that today’s political narrative is so polarizing and so extreme that young people must take sides. Students choose “political tribalism” because if they are liberal, their conservative counterparts are so extreme that they cannot tolerate them (and vice versa).

When asked about this initial debate, one of the two Generation Z coauthors (Jules Belyea) commented:

Drawing on class discussions around political tolerance and distinctions between rights and science and political issues, the other Generation Z coauthor (Andrew Perry) wrote as follows:

Indeed, the two student coauthors had initial disagreements about polarization, but political scientists also disagree about it. Although there is little doubt that the United States suffers from institutional polarization (e.g., Andris et al. Reference Andris, Lee, Hamilton, Martino, Gunning and Selden2015), the debates over individual polarization focus on those between Abramowitz and Webster (Reference Abramowitz and Webster2018) and Fiorina (Reference Fiorina2016). Abramowitz and Webster (Reference Abramowitz and Webster2018) contend that individuals are polarized, using the term “negative partisanship” to describe why and basing their conclusions on growing racial and media divides (among other factors). The growing racial divide is obvious in US politics. In the 2016 election, white non-Hispanic voters chose Trump over Clinton by a margin of 58% to 37% (Tyson and Maniam Reference Tyson and Maniam2016). The continued importance of Fox News and other more conservative outlets for influencing conservative voters, as well as more liberal outlets (e.g., MSNBC), demonstrates the growing media divide (Grieco Reference Grieco2020).

Fiorina (Reference Fiorina2016), conversely, contends that a political middle still exists. Similar studies suggest that there is a strong middle and that in red and blue congressional districts, there is far more agreement than disagreement on policy issues (Center for Policy Attitudes 2014). Moreover, Fiorina (Reference Fiorina2016) provided evidence that extreme partisans are far more satisfied with their political party compared to moderate partisans.

A third approach to political polarization suggests that both Abramowitz and Webster (Reference Abramowitz and Webster2018) and Fiorina (Reference Fiorina2018) are correct. “Affective polarization” describes how individuals who strongly identify as liberal or conservative disagree less on policy issues but greatly dislike and do not want social contact with those of opposing ideologies. Mason’s (Reference Mason2015, 142) work on this concluded that the United States is “a nation that may agree on many things but is bitterly divided nonetheless.”

POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND GENERATION Z STUDENTS

The first assignment consists of students writing an analysis in the form of a memo to a nonprofit group interested in bipartisanship. Students are asked to answer three questions: (1) What is political polarization?; (2) Are young people more or less politically polarized (based on survey data and interviews from the class)?; and (3) Why did you answer question 2 in the way that you did? The assignment teaches students the usefulness of political science and gives them an idea of the type of questions that political scientists answer. The assignment also encourages them to practice political science research by grappling with both qualitative evidence (i.e., students interview one another) and quantitative evidence (i.e., a course survey and data from a previous class).

Measures of Affective Polarization

After interviewing one another, students answer a series of survey questions measuring political polarization. The data file for the survey (conducted over three semesters) is available on Harvard Dataverse (McBeth Reference McBeth2021). Tables 1–5 measure affective polarization, table 6 is an affective-polarization index, and table 7 measures issue polarization. Students use survey responses from the course and previous classes in their polarization paper. The survey questions are from the Pew Research Center (Reference Center2014) and also include original questions, one of which was developed by a student in a previous semester. It is interesting that although students were not upset if their hypothetical son or daughter married someone with a different political ideology (see table 1), a majority would not marry someone from the opposite party (see table 2). In table 3, 68% of students had a negative view of the opposite political party. In table 4, 41% agreed that it was important to them to live in a place where most people shared their values. In table 5, 59% agreed that their close friends shared their values.

Table 1

Upset If Son or Daughter Married Someone with Different Political Ideology

Table 2

Likelihood That You Would Marry Someone of Opposite Political Party

Table 3

Views of the Opposite Political Party

Table 4

Important to Live in a Place Where Most People Share My Values

Table 5

Close Friends Share My Political Beliefs

Table 6

Affective Polarization Index

Table 7

Ranking of Where Things Should End Up: Most Important Issues Facing the Country

It is interesting that although students were not upset if their hypothetical son or daughter married someone with a different political ideology (see table 1), a majority would not marry someone from the opposite party (see table 2).

The affective-polarization index in table 6 counts the number of polarized responses to the five questions measuring affective polarization: 57% of students had some to no political polarization and 43% were moderately to extremely polarized.