This is a valuable book that explores a neglected aspect of Anglo-American wartime economic diplomacy. It provides a regional perspective on US (and British) efforts to promote financial and trade multilateralism at a global level, which was pursued in the hope of establishing a stable and prosperous postwar order. Latin Americans had some voice in these discussions, albeit they and other countries on the periphery were not listened to with much interest by the UK and the USA. As Mills shows, however, those two nations had a considerable interest in Latin American markets. The British, forced to abandon their strong export position there by the exigencies of war, were desperate to retain some sort of toehold against the encroachments of their allies the Americans, some of whom spotted an opportunity to say a permanent adios to European economic involvement on the continent.
This is traditional diplomatic history, executed with clarity, thoroughness, and skill. The book begins with a useful long-term survey of British and American economic activities prior to 1939. Further chronological chapters illustrate the tensions in Anglo-US relations during the war itself. In the period before Pearl Harbor, the British faced criticism from American business interests and Congressional Anglo-sceptics for their efforts to maintain their own Latin American markets. The Roosevelt administration knew that the attacks were overblown but urged the British to appease them for wider strategic reasons. After all, it would be hard to justify US aid to Britain whilst she retained other sources of economic strength. Even after the Americans entered the war things did not improve dramatically. British officialdom and the business community suspected that policies such as the blacklisting of enemy firms in Latin America were being applied in such a way as to secure US economic dominance of the region. US government multilateralists led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized that efforts to exclude the British ran counter to their own agenda of nondiscrimination in trade affairs. At the same time, the perennial problem of multiple agencies meant that the administration did not speak with a single voice or always act consistently. Even within the State Department itself, Latin Americanists led by the influential Sumner Welles supported policies that would have the effect of driving British interests out. Welles – a dynamic but unsympathetic character – even proposed an “economic Monroe doctrine” (119). In 1943, the British managed to secure a formal commitment that neither country would seek to accrue advantages at the other's expense by exploiting the wartime situation in the longer term. But, unsurprisingly, the well-meaning phraseology did not prevent the Americans from deploying economic-warfare measures in order to help US business. In Mills's account, American actions certainly appear hypocritical, but we cannot imagine that the British would have behaved much differently if the boot had been on the other foot.
Mills acknowledges that the book does little “to address the topic from the perspective of the South American countries themselves,” pointing out, reasonably enough, that it is “primarily a study in Anglo-American relations” (26). Still, one itches to know how the Latin Americans themselves perceived these squabbles over their markets. Finally, it is possible to take issue with one of Mills's central findings. He writes that “in South America Anglo-American relations failed to conform to the pattern whereby the US promoted multilateralism and Britain opposed such a system” (25). In fact, there was no such pattern. The British consistently supported the construction of a multilateral system, always hoping, however, to implement exceptions that would match it to their own interests. In that sense, Mills has discovered not an exception but rather a further illustration of a more general rule. Overall, though, his account adds significant nuance to our understanding of the crucial economic negotiations of World War II.
