Sweeping across the social and political landscape of the northeastern United States during the late 1820s and early 1830s, the Antimasonic Party has earned a modest immortality as the first “third” party in American history.Footnote 1 In pamphlets, speeches, sermons, protests, and other venues, Antimasons lambasted the fraternal order of Freemasonry as undemocratic, inegalitarian, and un-Christian, reviling it as a threat to the moral order and civic health of the Early Republic. Because they believed that the fraternal organization largely controlled all levels of government, antebellum Antimasons first created a social movement and then an independent political party. Even before the full emergence of modern mass democratic politics, Antimasons demonstrated the benefits of party organization, open national nominating conventions, and party platforms. Scholars with otherwise different perspectives on the “party period” tend to agree that Antimasonry had an important impact on what became the first true mass party organizations—the Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs—and helped push the political culture in a more egalitarian and populist direction.Footnote 2
Almost as well known as Antimasonry's status in the history of political parties is the curious story of its origins in a mysterious case of abduction and presumed murder. When William Morgan, a resident of Batavia, New York, left the brotherhood of Freemasonry and prepared to divulge its “secrets” in 1826, a group of outraged Masons kidnapped and probably murdered him. Despite the notoriety of the crime, the ensuing investigations and prosecutions yielded little in the way of justice. Most of the resulting trials ended in acquittals of Masonic defendants, notwithstanding ample evidence of their guilt.Footnote 3 In response, Antimasons railed against corruption in the legal system, claiming that Masons had used their considerable social and political clout to thwart the judicial process. Moreover, Antimasons thought they saw instances in other states of Masonic conspiracies to protect the Brotherhood's members from criminal prosecutions or convictions by juries. Certain that Masons were hijacking the judicial system, Antimasons coalesced as a political party determined to elect candidates who would help prevent the “secretive” and “tyrannical” institution of Freemasonry from derailing justice and destroying the republic.
Given the Antimasonic movement's origins in judicial wrongdoing, it is somewhat ironic that scholars have been much more inclined to recognize it as an important episode in American political history than in American legal history. Part of the reason may lie in the reluctance of many historians to take Antimasonic claims seriously. For example, in treating Antimasonry as part of an enduring national tradition of “paranoid” populist movements, Richard Hofstadter tended to dismiss most Antimasonic allegations of judicial malfeasance as “conspiratorial fantasy.”Footnote 4 Likewise, Paul Goodman's far more comprehensive and nuanced study ultimately sided with Hofstadter in characterizing the movement as paranoid and driven by “displaced anxieties about the commercialization of society.”Footnote 5 Breaking decisively with such social-psychological interpretations, historian Ronald P. Formisano has demonstrated that Masons did, indeed, engage in such egregious obstructions of the justice system in upstate New York between 1826 and 1831 as to justify the Antimasonic backlash.Footnote 6 However, having validated the movement's founding legal grievances, Formisano, as a political historian, has naturally shown a greater interest in tracing the religious, gender, and socioeconomic dynamics of Antimasonry and the movement's impact on the evolving political culture and emerging mass parties of the 1830s.Footnote 7
This article takes a different tack, exploring the ongoing effects of Antimasonry on legal ideology and judicial practice in the Early Republic, with a particular focus on the jury as a critical lynchpin of democratic governance. From the 1780s through the 1820s, many Americans, including judges, had widely embraced the ideal of jury autonomy, generally ceding to jurors the authority not simply to establish the facts of a criminal case but also to interpret and even to nullify the law in rendering verdicts.Footnote 8 Beginning in the 1830s, however, influential American judges, particularly from Massachusetts, launched a largely successful decades-long effort to rein in juries, most dramatically by denying their law-interpretation and nullification authority (but also through other means, such as more rigorous voir dire procedures). Legal scholars such as Mark DeWolfe Howe, Deidre Harris, Matthew Harrington, and Jeffrey Abramson have variously attributed this drive to a number of interrelated institutional, ideological, and partisan-political factors.
First, during a period of growing professional self-confidence among bench and bar, many judges had greater faith in their own legal expertise and placed greater value on regularity, uniformity, and predictability in both trial procedures and jury verdicts.Footnote 9 Second, and conversely, such judges viewed increasingly diverse (or socially heterogeneous) jury pools with growing distrust, finding jurors less likely to share their own values, less able to resist popular “passions,” and more prone to reach inconsistent or irregular verdicts.Footnote 10 Given their enhanced self-confidence, greater commitment to procedural regularity and uniformity, and diminished faith in juries, judges naturally sought to impose tighter control over criminal trials. Third, several scholars have also linked the nineteenth century effort to restrict the power of juries to partisan politics. Jeffersonian Republicans beat back Federalist efforts to restrict jury autonomy early in the century, whereas conservative Whig (and later Republican) jurists and lawyers subsequently enjoyed greater success in curtailing it, despite considerable partisan opposition from Democrats and others.Footnote 11
Although an analysis of the legal clashes between Masons and Antimasons during the 1820s and 1830s confirms aspects of the existing ideological, institutional, and partisan interpretations of judge–jury conflict, it also suggests a broader explanation rooted in more fundamental changes in American society and political culture. It was not merely that arrogant judges were determined to assert their institutional prerogatives or impose their ideological preferences; some antebellum judges were genuinely alarmed by what they saw as an ominous new danger: that endemic partisan, sectarian, and other ideological cleavages among ordinary citizens in an increasingly contentious society might tear apart America's jury system from within. The Early Republic saw a proliferation of religious denominations and voluntary associations, along with the rise of two mass political parties, several significant third party movements, and many more ephemeral or localized political insurgencies, all egged on by a rapidly growing number of highly competitive daily and weekly newspapers and monthly periodicials often representing divergent and mutually antagonistic ideological positions.Footnote 12
The Boston trials examined in this article show that this increasingly diverse and contentious civic and political culture could occasionally disrupt the very capacity of juries to function and reach unanimous verdicts. Indeed, intrajury conflicts (of a sort not previously highlighted by scholars in explaining the nineteenth century shift of power to judges) sometimes nearly paralyzed juries.Footnote 13 In short, whereas the lasting impact of the Antimasonic movement in the political realm was to promote a more populist pattern of mass, democratic mobilization, its enduring impact in the legal arena appears to have been almost precisely the reverse. Ironically, the most significant, if indirect, long-term consequence of a reform movement born out of populist outrage at official judicial corruption may have been to disrupt, and, at times, even immobilize the processes of jury selection, deliberation, and decision making, thereby strengthening the hand of elite judges at the expense of democratic juries.Footnote 14
The first section of this article provides an overview of the exalted status of the American jury during the Colonial and Revolutionary eras and of elite challenges to jury autonomy by Federalist officeholders in the Early Republic. This section also shows how Jeffersonian Republicans resisted top-down efforts by Federalists to curtail jury autonomy. Section two traces the inception of the Antimasonic movement in western New York in response to the Morgan affair, and the subsequent efforts by political Antimasons to combat what they saw as systematic corruption of the court system throughout the United States. During this period, Antimasons opposed both elite manipulation of juries and judicial outcomes and non-elite machinations within the jury room. In section three, the focus narrows to a careful examination of three criminal trials involving Masons and Antimasons in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1833. These cases suggest how the conflicting institutional affiliations, ideological convictions, and personal prejudices of individual jurors could disrupt the orderly functioning of the criminal justice system and taint jury verdicts, thereby justifiably alarming conscientious judges. The final section revisits the existing scholarly interpretations of the redistribution of power from juries to judges during the nineteenth century in light of the Antimasonic movement and the problematic criminal trials that it spawned. The messy and disputed outcomes of the Boston Antimasonic cases (along with other controversial criminal trial verdicts during the 1830s) may help to explain judges' fears that the jury system was becoming imperiled in an increasingly contentious political culture, requiring, in their view, both greater vigilance in the process of jury selection and significant new restrictions on jury autonomy.
Juries and Jury Conflict in Early America
Antimasonic charges of jury corruption seem to have particularly roiled America's Early Republic because of an enduring popular belief that the jury should be the “voice” and “conscience of the community” in the administration of justice.Footnote 15 This idealistic conception was based, in large part, on the role that American juries had played in negating unpopular British laws or foiling otherwise oppressive imperial measures during the pre-Revolutionary period. Colonial juries often did so by assuming the right not only to judge the facts in a trial but also to interpret, or even nullify, the underlying law.Footnote 16 When New York authorities prosecuted the local printer John Peter Zenger for seditious libel in 1735, the defendant's eminent counsel, Andrew Hamilton, informed the jury that it had “the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact.”Footnote 17 The jurors, he insisted, had an obligation to rely on their own “consciences” in reaching their verdict, even if contrary to the judges' instructions. When the Zenger jury voted to acquit, the Pennsylvania Gazette endorsed the verdict, declaring that “if it is not law it is better than law, it ought to be law.”Footnote 18 By the eve of the American Revolution, such expansive views of the jury's proper role had become widespread throughout the colonies. The jury's law-interpretation authority was based not only on its function as a bulwark against government oppression but also on popular suspicion of legal experts and, conversely, confidence in the ability of “the people” to rule themselves in accordance with natural-law principles.Footnote 19 Therefore, in 1771, John Adams insisted that when a judge's charge ran contrary to fundamental principles of justice, it was every juror's duty to “find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment, and Conscience, though in Direct Opposition to the Direction of the Court.”Footnote 20
After the Revolution, at least two states acted to enshrine the jury's right to judge both the facts and the law in their new constitutions.Footnote 21 During the early years of the Republic, state and federal court judges alike also showed deference to the law-interpretation power of American juries. In legal lectures delivered in 1790, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice James Wilson conceded that when “a difference of sentiment takes place between the judges and jury, with regard to a point of law … the jury must do their duty, and … decide the law as well as the fact.”Footnote 22 Similarly, while riding circuit, United States Supreme Court Justice John Jay instructed civil jurors that they had “a right to take upon yourselves to … determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.”Footnote 23
Even in jurisdictions where the Constitution or the courts had not spoken definitively, the very structure and day-to-day operation of the judicial system tended to cede considerable interpretive power to juries. “There was no practical alternative to permitting juries to decide questions of law because virtually all cases were tried before a panel of at least three judges, each of whom delivered separate and often contradictory instructions,” Abramson has explained of trial practice in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts. “Add to this the privilege of opposing counsel to argue the law, and the jury heard up to five different versions of the law. By default if not design, the jurors had to decide the law.”Footnote 24 In Massachusetts by the end of the eighteenth century, legal historian William Nelson has similarly argued, “the representatives of local communities assembled as jurors generally had effective power to control the content of the province's substantive law.”Footnote 25
Consensus broke down, however, with the rise of the First Party System, as disagreement over the proper role of juries became one of many sources of conflict between the two emerging political parties. After passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Federalists tried to use the criminal courts to suppress their Jeffersonian-Republican adversaries, especially by prosecuting Republican newspaper editors for libel. In response, Republicans sometimes tried to defend themselves by appealing to the law-interpretation authority of jurors. And after Jefferson's election in 1800, Republicans attempted to settle scores by accusing Federalist judges of having tried to corrupt the jury system. In impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, for example, Republicans claimed that the Federalist judge had tried to strip jurors of their right to decide questions of law. In Massachusetts, however, where they remained in power for several years after Jefferson's election, Federalist legislators enacted various jurisdictional and procedural reforms designed to reduce the power of juries and openly sought to strip jurors of their right to decide matters of law. Meanwhile, Federalist prosecutors in the Bay State continued to harass Republican editors with libel accusations, Federalist judges continued to libel Jeffersonians with impunity, and Federalist county clerks continued to manipulate jury selection in order to assure panels loyal to their party.Footnote 26
The judicial arrogance of Massachusetts Federalists arguably reached its climax in 1806 with the failed prosecution of Federalist lawyer Thomas O. Selfridge for fatally shooting the son of Benjamin Austin, a leading Republican newspaper editor, as the young man menaced him on the street with a walking stick. Although the coroner's jury had ruled the incident “willful murder,” Federalist Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons instructed the grand jury in a manner favorable to Selfridge, resulting in an indictment on the lesser charge of manslaughter. Despite the Republican attorney general's aggressive prosecution of the case, an apparently partisan jury, led by the staunch Federalist Paul Revere, outraged public opinion by taking only 15 minutes to acquit Selfridge.Footnote 27 Probably in part because of a popular backlash against this Federalist travesty of justice, Republicans won both the governorship and control of the state legislature in elections the following spring. In 1808, the Republican-controlled legislature passed a judicial reform act designed to shield the jury system from “party spirit” and to prevent judges and other officials from oppressing their enemies through “perverted laws” and “packed juries.”Footnote 28 The statute also explicitly guaranteed jurors their sacred right to decide “both the fact and the law involved in the issue on trial … as intelligence and conscience shall dictate.”Footnote 29 Ironically, the most immediate beneficiaries of that language may have been Federalist lawyers, who were soon urging local jurors to override the legal instructions of judges and acquit merchants guilty of violating Jefferson's unpopular embargo.Footnote 30
Once the Federalist Party began to disintegrate after the War of 1812, the controversy over the jury's law-interpretation authority appears to have faded for a time both in the Bay State and across the United States. At the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820, for example, a proposal to guarantee jurors the right to “determine both the law and the fact” in libel prosecutions was defeated on the grounds that this right was already “the law of the land” and an accepted principle of “the common law of the country.”Footnote 31 Likewise, at the federal level, “until 1835, lower court judges and Justices of the Supreme Court, sitting on circuit, had time and again specifically instructed juries that they were ‘the judges both of the law and the fact in a criminal case and are not bound by the opinion of the court.’”Footnote 32
This widespread deference to criminal trial juries did not endure, however. When jury controversies again took center stage during the antebellum period, the driving fear was not top-down manipulation by powerful judges or other elite officeholders (as it had been during the Jeffersonian era) but rather the danger that increasingly assertive laymen might smuggle their own institutional loyalties, ideological convictions, and personal prejudices into the jury room, thereby disrupting or corrupting the deliberative process. Marking the transition from one set of concerns to the other was an unanticipated sequence of events in upstate New York. As a result of the arrest, abduction, and presumed murder of an apostate Freemason from Batavia, New York, in September 1826, courts across five western counties of the Empire State were soon engulfed in controversy.
William Morgan, Antimasonry, and Judicial Corruption
Dating back at least to the 1720s, the exclusively male fraternal Order of Freemasonry had, a century later, established numerous lodges throughout the United States. Many social and political elites joined Masonic lodges to cultivate fellow feeling and professional connections among “brother Masons.” Despite the high public profile of many of its members, Freemasonry deliberately maintained an aura of secrecy. Only Masons themselves were privy to the Brotherhood's mysterious oaths, admission protocols, rituals, and system of promotions. The resulting mystique of Freemasonry helped to foster solidarity among its acolytes and to attract curious, ambitious young men into its ranks.Footnote 33
Other Americans, however, were concerned about the Brotherhood's hierarchical structure, its inscrutable internal workings, and the avowed loyalty binding Freemasons to each other. As Kevin Charles Butterfield has explained, many citizens of the Early Republic joined a variety of voluntary organizations, but they perceived the Masonic Brotherhood, in particular, as transgressing dominant cultural norms governing associational practices. Associations were expected to grant their members certain rights and operate in accordance with clear, transparent rules and regulations, thus mirroring the ideal of the rule of law in the broader Republic. Although Masonry had its own laws, “these laws, unlike the rules of other mutual benefit societies, were kept at a remove from a larger regime of civil rights that members carried into each private association.” The belief that Masonry had its own “shadow government” and “legal system,” Butterfield suggests, shaped Americans' reactions to the Morgan murder and to its adjudication.Footnote 34
In 1826, William Morgan, a stonemason residing in Batavia, New York, decided to publicly divulge the secrets of Freemasonry. Upon learning that he intended to publish an exposé, some Masonic brothers spoke of forcibly relocating Morgan to Canada in order to block the publication; one Mason even fumed that the apostate “deserved to die.” As Morgan and his partner, David C. Miller, the editor of Batavia's Republican Advocate, took their manuscript to press, club-wielding Masons tried unsuccessfully to burn down Miller's printing office. The next day Masons had Morgan arrested on a “trumped-up charge” that was quickly dropped. A few days later, abductors allegedly shoved Morgan into a carriage bound for Fort Niagara, and the apostate was never seen again. Many Americans were convinced that enraged Masons had killed Morgan in retaliation for publishing Masonic secrets.Footnote 35
The Antimasonic movement was sparked not simply by Morgan's abduction and likely murder but by the shockingly lenient treatment that Masonic suspects and defendants received in the criminal justice system. A high percentage of political officeholders and judges in western New York were Masons, and many reacted defensively, derisively, or dismissively to Antimasonic charges of conspiracy and corruption. However, contemporary accounts of the Morgan-related proceedings in the late 1820s, drawn from various legal documents, largely confirm Antimasonic allegations of abuse of the judicial process in the Morgan investigation and trials. Local Masonic sheriffs, judges, witnesses, and jurors (including five Masonic foremen of grand juries in Genesee County alone) helped to prevent Morgan's abductors and their collaborators from being brought to justice, despite more than twenty grand jury investigations and at least eighteen separate trials. Further, between 1828 and 1831, the New York legislature appointed three separate special counsels, each of whose reports “concurred with the many published Anti-Masonic accounts” of the Morgan conspiracy and “pointed to the obstruction of the legal system, as well as the obstacles they themselves had encountered in seeking information.”Footnote 36
Probably the most widely respected account of Masonic obstruction of justice in upstate New York was William L. Stone's large compilation, Letters on Masonry and Anti-Masonry Addressed to the Honorable John Quincy Adams.Footnote 37 Although himself a Mason, Stone was troubled by the handling of the Morgan-related investigations and trials. His book documents an array of biases and procedural irregularities in the judicial system's handling of the Morgan affair. Witnesses were sometimes tipped off that they were about to be called and fled the area or otherwise failed to appear before grand or petit juries; other witnesses showed up but declined to answer questions, whereas still others, bowing to Masonic influence, were “incommunicative,” “evasive,” or untruthful.”Footnote 38
When cases did advance to trial, prosecutors faced difficulties in selecting juries and obtaining fair verdicts consistent with the evidence. For example, during voir dire, prospective jurors who were Masons sometimes responded to questions falsely or evasively.Footnote 39 Once selected, recalcitrant Masonic jurors sometimes succeeded in “hanging” otherwise unanimous panels, forcing judges to declare mistrials.Footnote 40 Too often, Stone concluded, Masons involved in legal proceedings “held their obligations to the Order” above “the laws of the land,” thereby obstructing “the impartial and due administration of the laws.”Footnote 41 Not even a “guilty” verdict was sufficient to guarantee due punishment. One of the only Masons to be convicted in the Morgan affair, Sheriff Eli Bruce, served just a short stint in prison before New York's governor pardoned him.Footnote 42 In sum, Masonic influences appeared to permeate—and poison—every level of the state's justice system, from the jury box to the governor's mansion.
Antimasons took their grievances over jury irregularities and judicial corruption into New York's political arena, insisting that Masonic oaths to help a Brother Mason “in distress” and to guard the Order's secrets prevented Masons from serving as honorable jurors. As early as 1827, New York legislators, concerned about “jury tampering,” transferred the authority for compiling jury lists from county sheriffs to town supervisors.Footnote 43 In 1828, Solomon Southwick, the Antimasonic candidate for governor, proposed an amendment to the state's constitution that would have banned “any member of a secret society” from jury duty and elective office.Footnote 44 In February 1829, a New York State Senate committee expressed alarm over the public's understandable view that “masonry exerts its influence in criminal as well as civil cases.”Footnote 45 Finally, in 1831, the rising Antimasonic politician and New York State Senator William H. Seward pilloried Freemasonry's secret oaths and the “effects of [the Brotherhood's] dreadful obligations upon our … courts of justice, and upon jurors.”Footnote 46 Antimasons were certain that Masons could not be trustworthy jurors, at least in cases involving their fraternal “brothers.”
Fearful of Masonic manipulation, Antimasons outside of New York sought to safeguard their own states' trial systems. In Pennsylvania, State Representative Thaddeus Stevens was particularly relentless in this regard: in cases involving Masons, he proposed prohibiting other Masons from serving as jurors, Masonic sheriffs from selecting the jury pools, and Masonic judges from presiding over the actual trials. More common than such piecemeal legislative efforts (that failed in Pennsylvania) were sweeping proposals to prohibit “extrajudicial oaths,” which, by banning the vows that bound Masons into a Brotherhood, might have effectively dismantled the Order altogether.Footnote 47 Bills to prohibit all “extrajudicial oaths”—either explicitly or implicitly including Masonic oaths—were defeated in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, but enacted in Rhode Island (1833), Vermont (1833), and Massachusetts (1834).Footnote 48
However, because such laws were never actually enforced, aggrieved Antimasons shifted much of their focus back to the trial courts themselves.Footnote 49 In 1833, for example, Massachusetts Antimasons called upon judges to use the voir dire process to exclude Masons from juries just as they did other interested parties.Footnote 50 The Antimasonic cause had been born out of miscarriages of justice in the courtrooms of upstate New York, and courtrooms remained integral to the movement. Antimasons were adamant that Masonic influence had rendered “the trial by jury a mere mockery” and severely “obstructed” the system of justice.Footnote 51 Ironically, however, the very zeal of Antimasonry in opposing jury corruption eventually threatened the viability of the jury system itself by politicizing the processes of jury selection, jury deliberation, and jury decision making. These problems were dramatized by three interrelated criminal trials in Boston that became so enmeshed in partisan bickering and intrigue as to exasperate and ultimately baffle the presiding judge. The near-constant jostling between Masons and their opponents was so extreme and created so many procedural irregularities that these cases remain challenging to neatly untangle even in retrospect.
The Boston Trials of 1833: Mason versus Antimason in the Jury Room
The Trial of Charles Moore and Edwin Sevey
Given Antimasonry's enduring obsession with the Morgan affair, founders of the movement from the Empire State probably held particular cachet in the minds of Antimasons in other places.Footnote 52 Samuel D. Greene was one such founder, having renounced Freemasonry in 1826, worked with Morgan in upstate New York to expose the Brotherhood, reportedly witnessed Morgan's abduction, and later testified at one of the resulting trials. Branding him a traitor to the Brotherhood, vengeful Masons supposedly wrecked Greene's tavern and hotel business, vandalized his home, and stabbed his dog. Fearing for his safety, Greene relocated to New England and became a “militant Antimason,” owning and editing an Antimasonic newspaper and lecturing on the “evils” of Masonry.Footnote 53 As in New York, however, Greene became a target of New England's Masons. When he tried to discuss “the Morgan murder” at Boston's Faneuil Hall in September 1829, Masons barged into the room brandishing “clubs and billets of wood” and yelling “Pitch him out of the window! Kill him!”Footnote 54
In April 1833, Charles W. Moore and Edwin Sevey, publishers of a Masonic newspaper called the Boston Masonic Mirror, reprinted part of an article attacking Greene from the (Batavia, New York) Times and added their own commentary accusing him of fraud and perjury in connection with a bankruptcy filing. Invoking their duty as newspaper publishers to expose both Greene and his dangerous doctrines, Moore and Sevey skewered him for fomenting animosity toward Masons and advocating their exclusion from juries. By discrediting Greene, the Masonic publishers also hoped to stem the growing popularity of Antimasonry, which they attributed to the demagoguery of unscrupulous agitators like him.Footnote 55
In mid-July 1833, Samuel D. Parker, the Suffolk County Attorney, and Benjamin F. Hallett, Greene's lawyer and a prominent Antimasonic politician and editor of the Antimasonic Boston Daily Advocate, together prosecuted Moore and Sevey for a criminal libel against Greene in Boston Municipal Court. Parker, the moralist son of an Episcopal bishop, and Hallett, a belligerent political operative with a populist bent, made for a somewhat uncomfortable pairing.Footnote 56 The courtroom was packed during the week-long trial, which reportedly stirred “greater excitement in the community at large” than had any other recent Boston case.Footnote 57 All of the lawyers involved were acutely aware of the “party excitement” surrounding the case, as was Judge Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, a conservative or “traditionalist” jurist—later eulogized as an old-style “Federalist of the Washington school”—who was neither a Mason nor an Antimason.Footnote 58
Before he officially swore in the jury, Judge Thacher acknowledged that this case had “peculiar interest,” because Greene was an “agent” of Antimasonry, whereas the defendants were “probably masons.” Thacher, however, firmly rejected the Antimasonic position that Masons should automatically be excluded from jury service in trials involving their fraternal brethren, maintaining instead that the fitness of each potential juror, Mason or not, had to be determined individually. Therefore, after alluding to the passions aroused by Masonry and Antimasonry, Judge Thacher asked each prospective juror: “Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice, so that you cannot serve as a free juror?” In his opening, prosecutor Parker agreed that such pointed questions were necessary in order to “secure a fair and impartial trial,” especially given the widespread perception that Masons subordinated their civic oaths to their fraternal obligations. The judge eventually swore in twelve jurors—including at least two Masons and one or two Antimasons—all of whom had vowed that they could be impartial.Footnote 59
Parker's case against Moore and Sevey was brief, aiming simply to establish that they had published the piece attacking Greene's “bad character.” The prosecutor then explained that the peculiar nature of criminal libel trials was such that the “victim” of a libel—in this case Greene—was, in effect, put on trial by the defense lawyers, whose burden was to prove that the content of Moore and Sevey's publication was true and that their motives in printing it were “good” and in furtherance of “justifiable ends.” In Parker's words, “the defendants turn round, and to justify the publication, make an attack upon Mr. Greene, and he becomes in fact the defendant.” With Greene becoming the de facto defendant, Judge Thacher granted Parker's request to enlist Hallett's help in order to counter the charges against Greene.Footnote 60
The central legal questions addressed at trial were whether the content of the article maligning Greene's “bad character” was true and whether Moore and Sevey had “good reasons” and “justifiable ends” in publishing it. The defendants' two lawyers, David A. Simmons and Richard Fletcher, began the case by conceding that Moore and Sevey had published an excerpt from the Batavia newspaper article and had also added their own statements assailing Greene's “bad character.” They then called eighteen witnesses who testified not only to Greene's alleged financial improprieties but also to his campaign against the Brotherhood. For his part, Hallett maintained that Moore and Sevey had published false and defamatory statements about Greene and lacked “good reasons” or “justifiable ends” in doing so. Rather, Hallett contended, their motive was to discredit Greene simply because Masons were infuriated by his Antimasonic agitation. Many of the twenty-three witnesses who testified in support of Greene's “good character” claimed likewise.Footnote 61
A key part of Hallett's trial strategy was to bring up the Morgan affair and spotlight the rules and practices of the Brotherhood whenever possible, evidently trying to convey the impression that Moore and Sevey's libels were part and parcel of a broader Masonic cover-up of the Morgan affair.Footnote 62 Perhaps he was also subliminally appealing to the jury to redress the wrong inflicted on Morgan by declaring Moore and Sevey guilty of libel. But when Hallett tried to raise the Morgan affair or explore Masonic practices in questions to hostile witnesses, Judge Thacher repeatedly ruled him out of order, insisting in successive exchanges that the trial's purpose was “not to lift the veil for the doings of the lodge,” that there could be no “investigation of the rules of the lodge,” and that “if we get upon [the Morgan affair], there will be no end to it.” When Hallett asked him for “some latitude in the cross examination,” the judge snapped that he had already given him “latitude and longitude, too, almost without limits.”Footnote 63 Hallett's tactics even annoyed the prosecutor, his legal ally in this case, who asserted that “the jury were not empanneled to try the death of Morgan.”Footnote 64
Despite Judge Thacher's attempts to extinguish the flames of party spirit, the opposing lawyers continued to stoke them. Unintimidated by Hallett's effort to “relitigate” the Morgan case, one of Moore and Sevey's lawyers vowed that he was “willing to go over the whole Morgan affair, and … fight it out, yard arm to yard arm, to the last moment, and the last inquiry.”Footnote 65 The defense lawyers also assailed Greene's Antimasonic political goals as utterly contemptible. In addition to focusing on Greene's alleged perjury, defense counsel saw evidence of Greene's “bad character” in his belief that Masons should automatically be disqualified from jury service when a Mason was a party to a case. Such a prejudicial doctrine, they insisted, would destroy the integrity of the justice system.Footnote 66 Likewise, a defense witness attacked Greene's desire to turn “masons out of the jury box … and out of all offices.”Footnote 67 Purportedly claiming the high road in his closing argument, attorney Fletcher asserted that he took “no encouragement” when a prospective juror identified himself as a Mason and that he “cared not if all [the jurors] were antimasons” because the “business of parties must be entirely separated from courts of law.”Footnote 68 In fact, however, Fletcher's aspersions on Antimasonic objectives further politicized the case, even though he and his cocounsel were indignant when Hallett did likewise. By questioning Greene's commitment to basic democratic principles and institutions—including the jury system that would decide their clients' fate—Moore and Sevey's defense team was suggesting that it was the Antimasonic cause, not Masonry's values or oaths, that imperiled the republic.Footnote 69
To counter the politicization of the trial by the lawyers on both sides, Judge Thacher's closing instructions amplified the need to banish “party excitement” from jury deliberations. After forthrightly identifying Moore and Sevey as Masons and Greene as an Antimason, Thacher proclaimed: “If there is any place from which party spirit should be excluded, it should be a court of justice.” As jurors are bound by their oaths to render an impartial verdict, they cannot be influenced by any other “voluntary oath.” The judge elaborated: “I mention this because it is said—I have no personal knowledge whether it is truly said or not, for I am neither a mason nor an antimason—and I say it only in fidelity to the law, that masons do assume engagements on their admission to that fraternity, to prefer the cause of a brother mason, to that of one who is not a mason; and not only to relieve him from distress arising from misfortune, but from the consequence even of his own evil deeds.” Any such duty, the judge stressed, had no place in a court of law.Footnote 70
While emphasizing that Masonic oaths were out of bounds in judicial proceedings, Judge Thacher also repudiated the Antimasonic position on jury service, underscoring the utter impracticality of trying to impose blanket exclusions based on partisan or sectarian affiliation in the context of a pluralistic and often polarized democratic public sphere: “At a period in which party spirit greatly prevails, and in a country where opinion is free; if a man is to be deemed incompetent as a witness or a juror, because he belongs to one political or religious denomination rather than another, perhaps a very great majority of the community and some of its best citizens would be excluded from assisting in the administration of public justice.” Under such a policy, “the Calvinist and the Unitarian would exclude each other, and both would exclude the Universalist. The Mason and the Antimason would exclude each other. It would be impossible to empanel a jury or to try a cause.” A Mason, he continued, could not be disqualified from jury service so long as he could truthfully affirm that his oath to the Brotherhood “was no longer binding on his conscience.” Finally, Judge Thacher reminded the jurors that the law was designed to “protect both Masons and Antimasons in the enjoyment of their respective rights as free and voluntary associations.”Footnote 71
After all the partisan maneuvering by lawyers on both sides, jury deliberations proved to be protracted and the verdict contested. A vote taken at the outset of deliberations revealed eight votes for an acquittal of Moore and Sevey, three votes of guilty, and one undecided. Ten minutes later only two jurors still opposed an acquittal. Following a long, hard night of deliberating, Jeremiah Campbell, a self-identified Antimason and one of the two pro-conviction jurors, finally agreed to an acquittal. That left just one holdout juror, Joseph Barnes (whom the Masons had identified as an Antimason).Footnote 72
Eventually, the foreman asked Barnes point blank: Did he believe Moore and Sevey were guilty or not guilty? According to all but one of the other jurors, Barnes finally agreed to an acquittal, telling the foreman: “Yes, I agree with you on my doubts.” When the foreman subsequently announced the verdict and Judge Thacher allowed Hallett to poll the jurors individually, all but Barnes confirmed that they had agreed to acquit Moore and Sevey. Barnes, however, indicated only that he had “agreed upon his doubts,” setting off a spirited discussion between the contending lawyers over the meaning and significance of that phrase. Judge Thacher ended the legal wrangling by recording a verdict of “not guilty” on grounds that “doubts” redound to the benefit of defendants in the American criminal justice system.Footnote 73
The jury intrigue did not end with the formal announcement of the verdict. Just one day later, two jurors—self-proclaimed Antimason Jeremiah Campbell and probable Antimason Joseph Barnes—published separate newspaper letters that cast doubt on the unanimous verdict and that alleged coercion in the jury room.Footnote 74 Barnes stated that the other jurors had pressured him to go along with the “not guilty” verdict. When he had told them that he would go into the courtroom “on [his] doubts,” he had expected to have an opportunity to talk with the judge, not that the jury foreman would announce a unanimous vote of acquittal. Barnes declared: “Had I been called on by the Judge to know what my verdict was, I should without hesitation, have said GUILTY.” Barnes also accused fellow jurors of exploiting his “exhaustion” and compelling him to join their verdict. Although Campbell, the self-identified Antimason, did not recant his vote to acquit Moore and Sevey, he did confirm Barnes's newspaper account, writing: “When the jury left their room to go into court, at eleven o'clock, I had no knowledge that the jury were agreed on a verdict; and the first knowledge I had we were agreed on a verdict of not guilty, was when the foreman stated it to the court.”Footnote 75
The war of words continued in the newspapers. Responding to Barnes and Campbell, the ten other jurors published their own letter. According to them, Barnes (unlike Campbell) had been stubborn and closed minded. Denying that they had pressured either man, the ten jurors described Barnes as unwilling even to engage in discussion.Footnote 76 Moore and Sevey's Boston Mirror reprinted the statement and offered a dire warning against the politicization of jury decisions: “If the fiend-like spirit of antimasonry is to be carried into our jury boxes—if jurors are to be influenced in making up their verdict by the fact that the party on trial belongs to this society, or to that political sect—if a Mason is to be convicted merely because he is a Mason, it is time the fact should be known. And we believe … that such principles have had their influence in the present case.”Footnote 77 Ironically, the specter of Antimasonic manipulation of the jury that Moore and Sevey was raising was a mirror image of a central grievance of Antimasonry: the political corruption of juries by Masons.
The day after the announcement of the verdict, an article in Hallett's Boston Daily Advocate likened the acquittal of Moore and Sevey to the acquittals of defendants in the Morgan trials.Footnote 78 Depicting the jury controversy as indisputable evidence that Masons were continuing to poison the judicial process, Hallett was clearly seeking to discredit the jury's verdict. Yet whether or not one accepted Hallett's conspiratorial viewpoint, the sparring jurors and the opposing lawyers clearly did expose a dangerous new threat to the criminal trial system. From inception to contested conclusion, Moore and Sevey reflected the disruptive intrusion of partisan conflict into the courtroom and into the jury room. Even worse from Judge Thacher's perspective, the case spawned two additional trials that were also roiled by partisan divisions.
The Trial of Ebenezer Clough
Notwithstanding the postverdict war of words, Thacher did not order a new trial of Moore and Sevey. That, however, did not put the matter to rest. At the trial of Moore and Sevey, one of the witnesses whom Hallett had called in support of Greene's character was an active Antimason named Ebenezer Clough. On the stand, Clough trumpeted his Antimasonic affiliation without any prompting: “If you want to know if I'm an antimason, I am; and I think every one in this court house will be afore three years, except half a dozen.” Judge Thacher quipped: “You are not ashamed of your colors.”Footnote 79 That humorous exchange aside, subsequent events proved no laughing matter for Clough. In October 1833, the State prosecuted him for jury tampering, alleging that he had given a Masonic juryman, Nathaniel Frothingham, a printed piece of Antimasonic propaganda in an effort to sway him and other jurors in Greene's favor.
Benjamin Hallett, Greene's Antimasonic attorney, also represented Clough, and, once again, Samuel Parker was the government's prosecutor, and Peter Oxenbridge Thacher was the presiding judge. Hallett took a particularly aggressive stance during jury selection. Believing the first prospective juror, Daniel Sargent, to be a Mason, Hallett immediately objected to his being sworn. Hallett claimed that his client's constitutional right “to be tried by an impartial jury, free from all bias” was at risk and asserted that he “expected to prove a bias by showing that [Sargent] was a Freemason … and that the obligations assumed by the juror, as a Mason” would “create a bias or prejudice, even unconsciously to himself, and under which he could not act with entire impartiality.”Footnote 80
Parker, Hallett, and Thacher thereupon all agreed to the somewhat unusual expedient of having the judge appoint two “triers” from among the Court's bystanders in order to determine whether or not Sargent could serve as an impartial juror. The judge assigned two lawyers unconnected to the case to serve as the triers, and they, along with Parker and Hallett, proceeded to put Sargent on trial—complete with eyewitness testimony—to decide on his fitness to serve as a juror.Footnote 81 Although pleased with the appointment of triers, Hallett was unhappy when Judge Thacher refused his request to call Sargent to the stand, presumably to ask him about his connection to Masonry. The judge ruled that Hallett would have to establish the prospective juror's bias through other testimony or evidence, because forcing Sargent to testify would “tend to his disparagement of himself.”Footnote 82 Reversing course, Hallett abruptly affirmed that Sargent was not a Mason and withdrew his objection. However, Judge Thacher rebuffed Hallett's maneuver by holding that it was the triers’ duty, not Hallett's, to decide whether or not Sargent could be empanelled. Afterward, Hallett repeatedly attempted to persuade the triers that all prospective jurors who were Masons should be struck, contending, yet again, that Masonic oaths to help brother Masons “in distress” disqualified them from jury service.Footnote 83
Determined to keep the conflict between Masonry and Antimasonry out of the trial, prosecutor Parker fended off Hallett's elaborate effort to exclude Sargent (and all other Masons) from jury service. Parker reminded the Court that Hallett had withdrawn his objection to Sargent's being sworn as a juror because he was satisfied that Sargent was not a Mason. And even if Sargent were a Mason, Parker wondered, “to whom does he stand related as a Mason, in this case. The Commonwealth is a party, and the Commonwealth is not a Mason.” Besides, for Parker, the logical implication of Hallett's argument was that “we must exclude Anti-masons as well as Masons” because of the “supposed bias of one group towards the other.” The result, asserted Parker, would be to make it difficult, if not impossible, “to try a case, for the want of a jury who belonged to neither of these classes.”Footnote 84
Following Parker's “closing argument” to the triers, Judge Thacher issued a charge in which he highlighted Hallett's contradictory statements. The judge noted that Hallett had “disclaimed altogether challenging the juror as being incompetent because he was a Mason, and yet his only objection to him, in this case, is the bias, founded on obligations he is supposed to have taken as a Mason. Is not this saying in one breath what he takes back in the next?” And, like Parker, Thacher held that even if Sargent were a Mason, there was “no law that excludes him in this case.”Footnote 85 Clearly, Parker and Thacher feared that the judicial system might be crippled by barring vast numbers of citizens from jury service in any number of cases. Agreeing with the prosecutor and the judge, the two triers ruled that Sargent was qualified to sit as a juror.Footnote 86
With a jury sworn, Parker presented the Commonwealth's position that Clough had “intended to bias and influence the juror, contrary to law” and that his action was “wicked, unlawful, unjust, and corrupt.” If people were free to apply external influence on juries, Parker warned, the whole edifice of the jury system could come tumbling down, because such influence “poisons the very fountains of justice.” Parker also tried to preempt any attempt by Hallett to politicize the case: “I am aware this case is supposed to touch some of those party-strings now in motion, and which at the present time agitate the public mind, and are particularly interesting on the eve of a political struggle.” Instead, Parker promised to transcend politics: “Whoever expects that, on the part of this prosecution, any partisan feelings, any political partialities, any private or personal motives, are to be indulged, will be much mistaken.” To the contrary, he emphasized, justice brooked no passion, was affiliated with no party, and sought only the truth.Footnote 87
Parker then explained the law of “embracery,” the technical term for jury tampering, and established that Clough had given Nathaniel Frothingham an Antimasonic pamphlet early one morning during the Moore and Sevey trial and had asked him to read it with his fellow jurors. Because Clough had sat so close to the jury box during the trial, the prosecutor scoffed at the notion that the defendant was unaware or had forgotten that Frothingham was a juror. That Clough had asked Frothingham to return the document to him revealed nothing more than the defendant's guilty conscience, Parker contended.Footnote 88
With his usual tactics having backfired in jury selection, defense counsel Hallett generally avoided mentioning the political conflict between Masonry and Antimasonry for the remainder of the trial. Instead, he focused on motive, arguing that Clough had never intended to influence the jury and that, in any case, the pamphlet he had given to Frothingham had “no direct reference to the [Moore and Sevey] case.” Further, claimed Hallett, no actual influence on the jury had been exerted, because Clough, an Antimason, had given the document to a juror who was a self-identified “bigoted Mason.” Citing legal authorities, Hallett contended that Clough's actions simply did not fall within the legal definition of “embracery.” Particularly significant to Hallett was witness testimony that Clough had almost immediately asked the juror to give back the Antimasonic tract to him. Far from exhibiting a “guilty conscience,” as Parker had maintained, Clough had never intended for the jury to be influenced by the document. Because of Clough's “advancing in age,” he had simply “forgotten” that Frothingham was a juryman in the case. If there were to be any punishment at all, Hallett insisted, it should be meted out to the juror Frothingham, who took the document from Clough despite being a “sworn officer of this Court.”Footnote 89
After the lawyers’ closing arguments, Judge Thacher issued detailed jury instructions highlighting the threat of “embracery” to the jury system. However, he also declared that it was not the jury's “duty to indulge in a severe construction of the acts of the defendant, if there was room for the exercise of a charitable judgment.” Further, jurors “might take into consideration [Clough's] advanced age, and his general good character.” However, Judge Thacher also reminded jurors that Clough “was an ardent friend and a warm partizan” of Antimasonry. In essence, the judge exhorted the jury to focus on Clough's intent: if the jurors concluded that Clough had sought to sway the jury against Moore and Sevey, they must pronounce him guilty, but if he had been “free from corrupt intent,” they must acquit him.Footnote 90
Unlike the protracted jury deliberations in the Moore and Sevey case, the jury quickly found Ebenezer Clough “not guilty” of jury tampering.Footnote 91 And just as Masons had construed Moore and Sevey's acquittal as a vindication of Masonry, so, too, did Antimasons perceive Clough's acquittal as a victory for their own side. Of course, neither the Masonic Order nor the Antimasonic Party presented itself as using these trials as vehicles to advance its own cause, and both sides excoriated the other for trying to manipulate the trial system for partisan purposes. Meanwhile, Judge Thacher's concerns mounted that the courtroom was becoming just another arena for partisan politicking.
The Trial of Aaron Guild
Remarkably, the Moore and Sevey case spawned yet another criminal trial, demonstrating once again how endemic social and partisan conflicts could serve, at once, to preoccupy, disrupt, and potentially discredit America's jury system. In October 1833, Suffolk County Attorney Samuel Parker prosecuted Aaron Guild for allegedly libeling Thomas French.Footnote 92 Yet again, Hallett stood for the defense and Judge Thacher presided. The charge stemmed from Guild's publishing a letter in Hallett's Antimasonic newspaper in which he claimed that Thomas French, a Mason who had served on the Moore and Sevey jury, had boasted about browbeating the two original holdouts, Jeremiah Campbell and Joseph Barnes. In trying to convince the two jurors to see matters his way, French bragged that he “did work all night to damn it into them.”Footnote 93 In reporting that conversation, the prosecutor charged, Guild had deliberately published false information designed to harm French's reputation. Surely, Parker also saw Guild's letter as a further skirmish in the partisan war between Masons and Antimasons, because Guild was an Antimason and French a Mason—with public confidence in the jury system as potential collateral damage.
The government's position was that, by writing and publishing the letter about French in the Boston Daily Advocate, defendant Aaron Guild intended “to vilify and defame the character and credit of Thomas French, and to expose him to be prosecuted for a violation of law, by representing that his conduct as a juror … was highly offensive and reproachful to the public justice.”Footnote 94 Hallett's defense was that the contents of Guild's publication were true and were not libelous, because they were “not calculated to expose [French] to a legal prosecution, nor to blacken” his reputation. However, to establish the truth of Guild's letter, Hallett also announced that he would call the two holdout jurors, Barnes and Campbell, to testify not only that French had used “violent language,” but also that he was “guilty of other improper conduct in the jury room, in urging the two to agree with their fellows.” In other words, even as Hallett insisted that Guild had not sought to “blacken” French's reputation or to make him vulnerable to prosecution, the Antimasonic attorney seemed bent on doing just that.Footnote 95 In fact, an article about Guild's trial in Hallett's Boston Daily Advocate characterized French's coercive words as evidence of jury tampering.Footnote 96
However, Parker immediately objected to Hallett's stratagem, contending that what had taken place in the jury room in the Moore and Sevey case was irrelevant to Guild's trial; rather, all that mattered was what French had said to Guild and with what intent and motive.Footnote 97 For his part, Hallett was adamant that he could prove the truth of Guild's statements by calling witnesses to testify that French “did damn the two jurors” and “that he used great urgency with them.”Footnote 98 Facing this standoff, Judge Thacher, however, sided with the prosecution by ruling out any examination of jury deliberations in the Moore and Sevey case. He explained that, in his published letter, Guild had claimed neither that the jury as a whole nor Thomas French as an individual juror had engaged in any misconduct in the deliberations; therefore, what had occurred in the jury room was immaterial. The only pertinent question, Thacher averred, was what French had said to Guild: Did defendant Guild's published piece accurately report what French had said to him? By barring any inquiry into the jurors’ behavior in the earlier trial, Thacher was evidently determined to prevent Antimasons from using the Guild trial to challenge yet again the legitimacy of Moore and Sevey's acquittal.
Judge Thacher's charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Guild conveyed the jurist's deep concern over the impact of partisan polarization on the jury system, as well as his displeasure with Guild's and Hallett's efforts to use the popular press to discredit the verdict in Moore and Sevey. Thus distracted, however, Judge Thacher failed to clarify key technical issues surrounding the defendant's guilt or innocence. The judge opened his instructions with an account of the politically divisive environment of the Moore and Sevey trial, which had “excited a great interest” because Greene was an Antimason, whereas the two defendants were Masons. “The feelings of both sides were enlisted in the case,” the judge recalled, and the jury's acquittal of Moore and Sevey aroused “much disappointment” among some and “an equal degree of satisfaction” among others. In apparent reference to Hallett, Guild, and other Antimasons, Judge Thacher observed that “some blamed the jury, finding fault with their conduct, and laying hold of any circumstances, which would detract from the weight of the verdict.” Further, in subsequent newspaper statements, antagonistic jurors “charged each other with improper conduct during deliberations.” However, any allegations of juror misconduct, Judge Thacher stated sternly, should have been formally submitted to the court, because only a judge could “correct an error or fault of this kind, and, therefore, it is useless and mischievous to appeal to the public by publications in the newspapers.”Footnote 99 Here Judge Thacher seemed determined both to condemn Guild's and Hallett's earlier partisan scandal-mongering and to deter similar attempts to challenge or delegitimize jury verdicts in the future.
In the middle portion of his charge, Judge Thacher sought (as he had throughout the trial) to redirect attention away from the earlier case—and away from the broader problem of partisan polarization—and to refocus the jury's attention back on the narrow issue of whether Guild's publication of French's alleged words constituted a malicious libel against French under the law. The judge emphasized that the indictment contained “no accusation against the conduct of the jurors” in Moore and Sevey, and that the jury should not convict Guild even if they concluded that his published letter defamed the “public justice” system in general but not French in particular. However, Judge Thacher's indignation at previous disclosures of jury deliberations and his concern over the possible damage that Guild's allegation might inflict on the reputation of the court system apparently led him to waffle on that last issue. Judge Thacher went on to ask: “Was it the intention of the defendant by this piece to lessen the confidence of the community in the justice of this court, by representing the deliberations of the jury as a scene of violence, and the verdict not the fruit of deliberation, but of intimidation and force?” If so “the defendant may be justly considered guilty.”Footnote 100 The self-contradictory nature of the judge's instructions portended a muddled verdict.
Overall, Judge Thacher's jury instructions revealed greater attention to the public implications of the case—especially the lesson that the public might draw from the verdict (whichever way it went)—than to the relevant technical issues or legal distinctions. On the one hand, in the event that Guild were convicted, the judge was determined that the defendant not be seen as a courageous truth-teller who was being punished for honestly revealing jury corruption. The proper course for a sincere “whistleblower” in instances of jury misconduct, Thacher reiterated, would have been to go to the judge and not to the press. On the other hand, Thacher was probably even more worried that the public might interpret an acquittal of Guild as opening the door to more second-guessing of verdicts in the future, thereby discrediting jury trials.
Likely fearful of just such an outcome (and especially fearful that a jury might nullify regardless of his instructions), Judge Thacher hedged his bets by closing his charge with a rationale for acquittal that could, paradoxically, also be understood as vindicating the propriety of both French's post-verdict boast and the jury's deliberations in Moore and Sevey. Perhaps, the judge gamely suggested, French's phrase “damn it into them” was not evidence of juror misconduct at all but simply a colorful characterization of conscientious jurors spiritedly debating among themselves with a “sincere desire to arrive at a correct result.” If French simply meant to say that jury deliberations had been “protracted,” “animated,” and somewhat “excited”—in essence, if French was merely describing “a conflict of words only, without threats or force”—then Guild's statement could not constitute a libel as it did not, under this reading, tend to harm French's reputation or subject him to legal prosecution. “For you must allow to jurors reasonable liberty of thinking, speaking, and action,” Judge Thacher concluded wistfully, adding that “their verdict must flow from free minds, restrained only by regard for the truth of the fact and the law of the land.”Footnote 101
Judge Thacher's charge to the jury clearly conveyed both his exasperation with Guild's and Hallett's behavior and his much broader concern over increasing politicization of the jury system. As if re-enacting the political standoff between Masons and Antimasons, the jury was unable to reach a decisive verdict in the Guild trial, despite several rounds of deliberations. Instead, the jury finally issued a special verdict, ruling both that Guild had not been malicious in publishing his newspaper piece about French but that he had “no justifiable motive” in doing so.
In a separate hearing on whether the jury's ambiguous verdict should be deemed a conviction or an acquittal, prosecutor Parker called the outcome a “guilty” verdict because jurors ruled that Guild had published his piece with “no justifiable motive” and that it “reflected [badly] on Thomas French.”Footnote 102 Defense lawyer Hallett, by contrast, characterized the jury's finding of no malice on Guild's part as an acquittal and insisted that any doubt about the jury's meaning should favor the defendant, the very conclusion that Judge Thacher had reached in Moore and Sevey. Footnote 103
Judge Thacher was reluctant to explain away the jury's “inconsistency,” even though he noted that “a wrongful act done to another intentionally, and without just cause or excuse, is malicious in the eye of the law.” Still, Thacher felt unable to impute a “guilty motive” to the defendant when the jury had explicitly stated that Guild had not acted with malice. Consequently, he concluded, “in this verdict the elements are contradictory, and will not unite.” Obviously disappointed but believing that he had no choice, Judge Thacher declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial of Aaron Guild. However, upon learning that the defendant was suffering from mental exhaustion, Judge Thacher persuaded Parker to abandon the prosecution, stating that “public justice had already been served.”Footnote 104
Aaron Guild's nervous breakdown may have marked the formal conclusion of the legal proceedings growing out of Moore and Sevey, but the underlying social conflicts and animosities had certainly not been resolved. In 1834, Samuel Greene, still fuming over some of the hostile testimony at the original trial, published a pamphlet in which he accused one of Moore and Sevey's key witnesses of perjury. For Greene, the lesson of the entire embroglio was hardly reassuring: “Let no one hereafter say, masonry has had no influence on the courts of Massachusetts; and where is the security for life, property, or character of its citizens, when Masonic jurors and Masonic witnesses are secretly arrayed against them?”Footnote 105 That same year, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law—clearly aimed at Masons—banning from jury service all individuals whose non-civil oaths to private organizations might compromise their oaths as jurors. However, amid the party “excitement,” state officials never enforced the statute, much to the dismay of Antimasons. One wonders whether the jury system would have collapsed under the weight of partisan conflict had the state actually enforced the statute. Maybe not, but an institution increasingly premised on the ideal of impartial deliberation certainly appears to have come dangerously close to becoming an arena of perpetual partisan combat, a possibility that seemed to haunt Judge Thacher.
In the months following the ambiguous Guild verdict, Judge Thacher continued to wrestle with the unresolved problem of securing an impartial jury from among an increasingly divided and polarized citizenry. In August 1834, he presented some of his still tangled ideas on the issue in a published pamphlet that provided a historical overview of jury selection practices in England and Massachusetts.Footnote 106 Although much of his discussion was fairly technical in nature and seemed motivated by regret over his decision to appoint triers in the Clough case, he also struggled to clarify whether or not members of particular organizations could serve on juries in trials involving their fellow members.Footnote 107 As with his charge to the jury in the Guild case, however, Thacher's ambivalence led him into seeming contradictions. In the pamphlet, he stated that a prospective juror could be legitimately challenged if he was “of the same society or corporation” as one of the parties to a case.Footnote 108 Just two pages later, however, he contended that a member of a voluntary association such as the “Free-Masons” should not necessarily be barred from jury service in a trial involving a fellow member, because the prospective juror might consider the demands of the organization to be “subordinate to the laws and principles of the government under which he lives.” However, when partisan zeal sparked a desire for “retributive justice,” he conceded, both Masons and Antimasons might be appropriately excluded from jury service. “In times of party excitement, growing out of political or religious controversy, affecting the community generally,” he concluded wearily, “it is not always easy to select an impartial jury.” In short, even after months to think about it, Judge Thacher still had not managed to settle this vexing problem with any great clarity.Footnote 109
Judicial Backlash: Reining in Juries
After achieving its electoral peak in Massachusetts in 1833, the Antimasonic movement rapidly declined during the mid-1830s.Footnote 110 However, as older endemic social conflicts persisted and new ones emerged, antebellum prosecutors and judges continued to be alarmed by trials in which partisan, sectarian, or ideological prejudices or biases appeared to taint jury deliberations and verdicts. For example, approximately a year after the Guild case, Boston newspapers reported that the jury in one of freethinker Abner Kneeland's several trials for blasphemy failed to reach a verdict when one of the jurors refused to convict based on doubts about the constitutionality of the law. The editor of the Boston Evening Transcript was even more shocked by the revelation (later disputed) that the sole holdout was actually a musician who regularly performed for the weekly meetings of Kneeland's Society of Free Inquirers. The editor railed that “neither the law nor the constitution would be safe from corruption” if every trial verdict could be held hostage to a single juror's “prejudice, bigotry, latitudinarianism, personal interest, or political bias.”Footnote 111 A correspondent to another Boston newspaper, the Mercantile Journal, was equally outraged, pointing out the absurdity of “an infidel preacher, charged with the nastiest and wickedest of blasphemies, gravely arguing his own cause, before his own fiddler!” That same correspondent also explicitly drew the analogy between Antimasonic complaints over biased Masonic jurors and the current case of an apparently biased infidel juryman.Footnote 112 By this time, complaints about jury bias of any sort had become easily associated with the struggle between Antimasons and Masons.
Even more serious problems derived not from infidels but from animosities among different types of Christians. In a series of trials held between December 1834 and June 1835, prosecutors struggled mightily to persuade four different all-Protestant juries to convict a series of Protestant defendants accused of torching an Ursuline convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in an infamous incident of anti-Catholic mob violence. Throughout the proceedings, Massachusetts Attorney General James T. Austin seemed to be obsessed by the possibility that Protestant jurors would act on their sectarian prejudices and simply refuse to convict the accused rioters regardless of the evidence. In his closing argument at the first trial, Austin laid down some basic legal rules governing jurors. Jurors had “no more right to depart from these rules than they had to commit the offence for which the prisoner at the bar is indicted.” From Austin's perspective, juries that disregarded the law and acted on their own prejudices were nothing better than lawless mobs.Footnote 113 As an Antimasonic newspaper editor had recently put it in regard to an entirely different case: “Such a tribunal is in reality a court of public opinion—it administers popular rumor,—it is the spirit of a mob acting under legal forms and with judicial power.”Footnote 114
Echoing Judge Thacher in the trials involving Masons and Anti-Masons one year earlier, Attorney General Austin further admonished the jurors that they could not weigh the testimony of Catholics any differently from that of Protestants. “If they could set aside Catholic testimony, they might do the same with Baptist, Unitarian, or Methodist testimony,” he reasoned. He continued, ominously: “Once admit that lines are to be drawn in this way, and our courts become useless; we have only to ascertain the religious faith of the jurors, to know at once how a case will be decided.”Footnote 115 Notwithstanding Austin's nightmarish scenario, the juries acquitted all but one of the nine accused rioters who were brought to trial, despite very strong testimony against some of them. Although there was no evidence that Masons had anything to do with these particular miscarriages of justice, an Antimasonic newspaper editor from Vermont knew precisely whom to blame: “The Convent affair is but one of a thousand instances, in which the deeds of masonry are exhibited, and, to the shame of humanity, is proof that masonry is surety to any extent of wickedness and crime whatever.”Footnote 116 Whether the immediate problems stemmed from nefarious Masons, ardent Antimasons, freethinking fiddlers, or bigoted anti-Catholics, the American trial system seemed to be increasingly afflicted by jurors who acted on their ideological convictions and prejudices in the jury room. During the 1830s and 1840s, alarmed observers detected similar evidence of jury bias or outright jury nullification in ideologically charged cases involving early labor unions, liquor laws, and fugitive slaves.Footnote 117
Beginning in the mid-1830s, conservative judges at both the state and federal levels reacted to the perceived threat of jury prejudice (and nullification) by issuing a series of charges and rulings designed to circumscribe the autonomy of the criminal trial jury, most notably by accentuating the law–fact distinction and stripping jurors of their authority to judge matters of law.Footnote 118 Several of the most important markers were laid down by Massachusetts judges in Bay State courtrooms. For example, in United States v. Battiste (1835), a case that involved the legally dubious prosecution of a sailor for slave trading, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, a Massachusetts native then riding the federal circuit in the Bay State, feared that the increasing hostility of Northern public opinion toward slavery might prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial. To head off the possibility of an unjust conviction, Justice Story warned jurors that they had no “moral right to decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure.” Rather, Story underscored, every defendant had a “sacred constitutional right” to expect that judges and juries would each perform their proper roles. “It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law,” Story maintained, “and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.”Footnote 119
Ten years later, in Commonwealth v. Porter (1845), Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, who had presided over the trials of the convent rioters in 1834–35, similarly ruled on appeal that a “jury had no right to decide questions of law in disregard of the judge's instruction.”Footnote 120 At trial, Benjamin Hallett argued for the defense that the unpopular liquor law did not apply to his client, an innkeeper; the trial judge rejected this claim as well as Hallett's position that he had the right to present his view of the statute to the jury.Footnote 121 Similarly, in United States v. Morris (1851), United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, another Massachusetts native riding circuit in his home state, ruled that “it is the duty of the court to decide every question of law which arises in a criminal trial.” Appalled by a defense lawyer's claim that the jury could declare the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 unconstitutional, Justice Curtis cut off the lawyer's closing argument and insisted that any jury that defied a judge's instruction and acted on the basis of its own understanding was committing a “public wrong.”Footnote 122 In the meantime, as part of a sweeping statutory revision in 1836, the Massachusetts Legislature repealed the 1808 law that had explicitly guaranteed to jurors the power to judge matters of both fact and law in criminal cases.
Although there is no evidence that the repeal of the jury provision in the 1808 statute generated any controversy, the string of judicial decisions denying the jury's law-determining power did provoke significant political opposition. For example, delegates to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 adopted an amendment to the proposed new state constitution that directly challenged Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's ruling in Commonwealth v. Porter. The amendment stated: “In all trials for criminal offenses, the jury, after having received the instruction of the court shall have the right, in their verdict of guilty or not guilty, to determine the law and the facts of the case .…”Footnote 123 One supporter of the amendment was convention delegate Benjamin F. Hallett, who attacked the Porter ruling for flouting established practice and who reviled it as “the worst reasoned judicial opinion in the Massachusetts Reports.”Footnote 124 An opponent of the proposed amendment quipped that Hallett (who had unsuccessfully argued the Porter case) endorsed the amendment in order to “rectify [court] decisions which he has lost.”Footnote 125
In 1855, just two years after the new constitution—including the jury amendment—had been defeated in a popular referendum, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a law affirming the jury's right to resolve issues of both law and fact in criminal cases.Footnote 126 The statute's language was very similar to that of the defeated constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, on this matter, judges ultimately had the last word. In Commonwealth v. Anthes (1855), issued in the same year that the jury law was passed, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw essentially nullified the new statute by interpreting it in such a way as to deny the law-finding power to juries. As one scholar has concluded, in Massachusetts “the efforts of the 1850's, constitutional and legislative, to reaffirm the jury's right to decide questions of law ended with a judicial veto.”Footnote 127 Further, in the longer run, the opinions of Story in Battiste, Curtis in Morris, and Shaw in Anthes all proved to be “models” for the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Sparf and Hansen v. U.S. (1895), in which “the Court cited them extensively in concluding that although the jury ‘have the physical power to disregard the law,’ they do not have the ‘right to decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure.’”Footnote 128
In sum, judges and their supporters in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the United States were extraordinarily successful in what amounted to a concerted campaign to strip juries of their law-interpretation authority, a power that had not only been explicitly affirmed in the Massachusetts statute of 1808, but that had also rarely been challenged in judicial decisions prior to the mid-1830s.Footnote 129 The advocates of expanding the authority of judges not only succeeded in shifting the balance of power between judges and juries, but also rewrote history, and reinterpreted precedents, so as to suggest that juries had never really possessed the law-interpretation authority in the first place.Footnote 130 Although Massachusetts judges had still been acknowledging the jury's right to decide questions of law in criminal cases as late as 1830 (in Commonwealth v. Knapp), before the end of that decade proponents of judicial power were arguing that the statute of 1808 had been an “extraordinary” anomaly and that one of “the oldest maxims of the law [was] that judges are to answer questions of law, and juries to answer questions of fact.”Footnote 131 And the new trend did not end there. During the second half of the nineteenth century, judges and their supporters led an even “more general assault” on “the utility of the jury in the trial process,” advocating “closer supervision” of the jury's role “even as decider of fact.”Footnote 132
One underpinning of this broad trend was the assumption that the gravest dangers of jury corruption came not from improper impositions or manipulations by judges or other government officials but rather from improper attitudes smuggled into courtrooms by citizen-jurors themselves. Hence, many opponents of the jury's law-interpretation authority also sought to allow judges to engage in more rigorous questioning during voir dire in order to weed out any potentially biased or otherwise inappropriate jurors at the outset. In contrast to their vaunted colonial and Revolutionary era roles as embodiments of individual conscience, repositories of local knowledge, and exponents of community values, jurors were now valued first and foremost for their strict impartiality.Footnote 133 Failure to exercise proper judicial supervision at every stage—from voir dire to verdict—would, in the ominous words of one early advocate of the new approach, “give the opportunity to artful, biased and prejudiced men to get into the jury seats, to prevent verdicts from being agreed to according to law and evidence, or to produce verdicts contrary to both; and the trial by jury, now one of our boasted privileges, would be in danger of becoming the instrument of injustice, and of growing into disrepute.”Footnote 134
As already noted, most scholars have largely explained the nineteenth century struggle over the respective powers of judges and juries in interconnected ideological and institutional terms. According to Mark DeWolfe Howe, for example, supporters of the jury's law-interpretation authority privileged “the people's aspiration for democratic government,” whereas those who opposed it reflected “the judiciary's desire for the orderly supervision of public affairs by judges.” Similarly, Jeffrey Abramson has described the conflict as one between those who believed that “democracy is fundamentally about participation in self-government” and others more concerned about “equal protection of the laws,” which, according to opponents of jury authority, could only be guaranteed when judges decided “legal questions consistently, uniformly, and predictably.”Footnote 135 The evidence presented here is generally consistent with those broad formulations, although this article focuses more intently on the very practical problems of jury impartiality and intrajury conflict in an increasingly fragmented and contentious civic and political culture, particularly as manifested by the fierce antagonism between Antimasons and Masons.
Other scholars have framed the dispute over jury power largely in partisan political terms, and there is considerable evidence to support that approach. After the rise of the First Party System during the 1790's, Federalists used libel prosecutions as a weapon against their Jeffersonian Republican opponents. Because the presiding judges in most such cases were Federalists, Republicans often relied on the law-interpretation and nullification authority of local juries to protect themselves from punishment for criticizing the government. Even after Jefferson's election in 1800, that pattern persisted at the state level in jurisdictions where Federalists retained political control. Thus, in Massachusetts during the first decade of the nineteenth century, Federalist judges and legislators alike sought to abridge the law-interpretation authority of juries, whereas Republican politicians defended it. And in 1808, the year after Massachusetts Republicans finally gained control of the legislature and governorship, they reformed the law so as to explicitly guarantee the jury's right to decide matters of law.Footnote 136
Later, in antebellum Massachusetts, opponents of the jury's law-interpretation authority tended to be conservative Whigs (such as Attorney General Austin, Chief Justice Shaw, and United States Supreme Court Justice Curtis), whereas advocates tended to be either Democrats or supporters of other anti-Whig parties, such as Free Soilers or Know Nothings. Hence, in 1836, the same year in which the law of 1808 was repealed by the Whig-dominated legislature, one of the state's most prominent Jacksonians offered a sweeping rebuke of Massachusetts judicial policies. In an Independence Day address at Boston's Fanueil Hall, Democratic Party boss David Henshaw lambasted the state's judiciary for, among other things, habitually trying to “insult the jury” and to “invade their legal rights.” Likewise, in 1853, a coalition of Democrats and Free Soilers sponsored the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention that explicitly affirmed the right of the criminal trial jury to interpret (and to nullify) the law, whereas in 1855, a Know-Nothing-dominated legislature passed the statute that sought to guarantee the criminal trial jury's law-interpretation authority.Footnote 137
Although largely ignored by jury scholars, the legal clashes between Masons and Antimasons during the 1820s and 1830s serve both to clarify and to complicate the existing ideological, institutional, and partisan interpretations of the shift of power from juries to judges in criminal cases. On one level, the experiences and attitudes of the Antimasons were transitional. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Jeffersonian Republicans saw the greatest threat to the criminal justice system as coming from the top down; that is, from partisan judges, legislators, and other government officials (such as county clerks) who sought to manipulate the system through biased rulings, “perverted laws,” and “packed juries.” Conversely, by the middle decades of the century, conservative Whigs saw the greatest danger as coming from the bottom up; that is, from the infiltration into the jury room of popular prejudices and passions that pervaded an increasingly pluralistic, contentious, and often polarized democratic public sphere. Over the course of nearly five years during the late 1820s and early 1830s, alarmed Antimasons of upstate New York confronted the realization of both sets of fears: The Morgan trials were undermined both from the top down by sheriffs, judges, and other local officials who impeded investigations and prosecutions, and from the bottom up by local Masonic witnesses and jurors who defeated justice by evading court appearances, perjuring themselves, hanging juries, or delivering unjust acquittals of Masonic defendants.
However, to the extent that the Antimasonic movement eventually succeeded in undermining the political clout of Masons (and historians of the movement have concluded that Antimasons did “devastate” Freemasonry for over a decade in the northeast), Antimasons could shift their focus away from top-down official corruption and toward the grassroots threat.Footnote 138 Therefore, during the early 1830s, a major Antimasonic legislative goal was to exclude Masons from jury service in cases involving fellow Masons. Although some former Antimasonic leaders, such as the lawyer-politician Benjamin F. Hallett, may have later been led by partisan exigencies or by the tactical needs of courtroom advocacy to embrace pro-jury positions, the logic of the Antimasonic effort to exclude Masons on grounds of bias was arguably more consistent with the conservative Whig outlook. Hence, antebellum opponents of the jury's law-interpretation authority not only asserted the obligation of judges to prevent jurors’ passions or prejudices from overriding the law but also often emphasized “impartiality” rather than individual conscience, local knowledge, or community representation as the paramount prerequisite for jury service.Footnote 139
Somewhat differently, the three Boston Municipal Court cases of 1833—involving Masonic defendants Moore and Sevey and Antimasonic defendants Clough and Guild—also suggest how political Antimasonry may have inadvertently helped to promote the antebellum redistribution of power from juries to judges. The trial of Moore and Sevey for criminal libel was itself the byproduct of conflict between Masons and Antimasons. However, the same bitter political animosities that led to the prosecution of these two Masonic editors also evidently divided the trial jury, leading to contentious deliberations, allegations of juror misconduct, and the subsequent prosecutions of the Antimason Clough for jury tampering and the Antimason Guild for libeling one of the Moore and Sevey jurors. In turn, the inability or unwillingness of the jury in the Guild case to render a clear verdict demonstrated just how difficult it could be to undo the damage done once partisan conflicts had infiltrated and disrupted the jury system. With juries increasingly vulnerable or even prone to dysfunction, it should not be surprising that some judges decided that tighter oversight and control were necessary.
Conclusion
In 1735, American colonists had widely endorsed a jury's assertion of community conscience over judicial instructions and legal precedent in the Zenger case by declaring, in the words of one newspaper commentary, that “if it is not law it is better than law, it ought to be law.” One hundred years later, as American jury rooms occasionally degenerated into contentious cockpits of cross-cutting and mutually antagonistic social affiliations, partisan loyalties, religious beliefs, and ideological convictions, such an opinion would probably have struck sober jurists such as Joseph Story as dangerous nonsense. For Story, ill-informed and erratic lay opinion easily manipulated or inflamed by “political parties and demagogues” was the problem and the law itself, as a “rational and systematic” science, was the solution. In broad terms, the rise in social pluralism and the shift in political culture toward perpetual partisan mass mobilization led judges such as Story to recast the law on their own authority. As historian R. Kent Newmyer has explained of Story's outlook, only “lawyers and judges, not professional politicians and legislators”—and certainly not untrained jurors—“should be entrusted with law making.” In his pervasive distrust of partisan legislators and politicized laymen alike and in his vision of a “judge-centric” legal culture, Justice Story was increasingly joined by other conservative jurists, especially from his home state.Footnote 140
Story and the other men who issued such famous decisions as Battiste, Porter, Morris, and Anthes were products of the same cohesive, if highly competitive, fraternity of the Massachusetts bar as the judge and lawyers who figured as principals in the three 1833 cases featured in this article, as, for example, Lemuel Shaw, who issued important rulings in both Porter and Anthes, and Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, who presided over all three Boston trials of 1833 involving Masons and Antimasons. During the late 1820s, both men were active members of the Boston bar. When Shaw delivered the keynote address at the annual meeting of the Suffolk [County] Bar Association in 1827, Thacher was a member of the committee that solicited a copy of the speech for publication. After Shaw spoke, the Suffolk lawyers (including, presumably, both Shaw and Thacher) retired to a nearby coffee house, where they enjoyed dinner, delivered more speeches, and sang songs. Just three years later, in 1830, Shaw resigned from his post as president of the Suffolk Bar Association in order to assume his position on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which would define his subsequent career and historical legacy. The following year, it was Thacher who was invited to deliver the keynote address to the Suffolk Bar Association. In short, men such as Shaw and Thacher (and, to some extent, Story) were products of some of the same professional networks and undoubtedly shared many of the same values and attitudes.Footnote 141
Even after stipulating, however, that jurists such as Story, Thacher, and Shaw had their own partisan loyalties, ideological biases, and institutional axes to grind, it is difficult to discount their genuine alarm over what appeared to be an emerging pattern of jury dysfunction, especially after the three Antimasonic cases of 1833 were followed by the acquittals of all but one of the Charlestown convent rioters in 1834–35. Given that troubling sequence, one did not necessarily have to be a conservative or self-interested judge to fear for the future of a jury system set adrift in a pluralistic public sphere increasingly buffeted by fierce partisan, sectarian, ethnocultural, and ideological antipathies. That series of cases between 1833 and 1835, particularly in conjunction with a widely publicized upsurge of ideologically and politically motivated mob violence across the country during those same years, may help to explain why the effort to rein in the power of juries—vigorously spearheaded by such nationally prominent judges from Massachusetts as Lemuel Shaw, Joseph Story, and Benjamin Curtis—emerged during the mid-1830s.Footnote 142 Ironically, even as the Antimasonic movement helped to usher in modern patterns of mass democratic politics, so may it also have inadvertently promoted enduring, if distinctly undemocratic, changes in the American criminal trial system.
