Introduction
For the past several years, the normalisation of extreme nationalism – including its violent form – has been evident in Russia, as the Kremlin regime demands support for its aggression against Ukraine. Repressions against critics of the regime are escalating, and opportunities for civil society organisations to challenge it are vanishingly small. With Navalny’s murder in prison and the increased emigration of the liberal-left opposition, state repression has also intensified against the pro-war, anti-Putin nationalist camp. For instance, Igor (Girkin) Strelkov, a decorated former FSB colonel, was sentenced to four years in prison in January 2024 for criticising the regime. Nationalist activist Vladimir Kvachkov, a former GRU colonel and respected authority among Russian nationalists, may also face criminal prosecution following two administrative cases for “discrediting of the Russian Army” (SOVA 2023).
Before his arrest, Strelkov succeeded in inspiring political activism in wartime Russia. One such initiative was the creation of a discussion platform called Club of Angry Patriots (KRP) in April 2023. Trubac (Reference Trubac2023) describes the KRP as “a Russian extremist, nationalist social movement”. Many leading KRP members can be simultaneously described as violent extremists and terrorists – due to their contributions to the hostilities in Ukraine – and as civil society activists, owing to their non-violent political opposition to Putin’s regime and the repression they face. While Strelkov’s earlier political projects were generally unsuccessful – largely due to their absence from social networks (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019, 170) – the KRP marked a turning point. It had a Telegram (TG) channel with 20,000 subscribers as of 27 May 2023, just over a month after its creation. The KRP’s TG channel also listed 76 similar TG channels. This suggests that, in Russia as elsewhere, social media, new technologies, and digital platforms have provided extremists with new avenues for activism beyond traditional organisational structures (Mulhall Reference Mulhall2018).
This article focuses on the KRP’s role as a social movement that leverages advances in communication technology. Its aim is to examine the inner workings of the KRP, primarily through analysis of its Telegram channel, to explore how the movement used framing strategies to establish itself as a potent civil society initiative in opposition to the regime. Although the KRP has been addressed in academic literature (e.g., Sakwa Reference Sakwa2023; Farbman Reference Farbman2023; Van Bladel Reference Van Bladel2023; Trubac Reference Trubac2024a, Reference Trubac2024b), no detailed analysis of its internal dynamics and rhetoric has yet been undertaken. This article seeks to make an analytical contribution to the growing body of knowledge on the interaction between the Putin regime and (extreme) Russian nationalism – specifically in the context of the re-invasion of Ukraine – by arguing that patriotic movements have significant potential to mobilise Russians against the regime through the effective use of framing strategies and communication technologies. Even in the face of state repression, their ideology remains resonant, and new organisations continue to emerge to carry it forward.
The article first conceptualises Russian nationalism to clarify the specific strand to which the KRP’s major actors belong. It then conceptualises patriotism to identify the historical tradition from which the KRP draws its mobilisation potential. Next, the article examines the opportunities for mobilisation available to extreme nationalists and patriotic movements under Putin’s regime and considers the implications for the KRP. The article then describes the KRP’s predecessors – namely, Strelkov’s earlier movements with similar ideological and organisational features. It goes on to focus on the KRP itself, outlines the methodology for analysing its Telegram channel, presents the analysis, and concludes with final observations.
Conceptualisation of Russian nationalism
As Kolstø and Blakkisrud (Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 4) note, “contemporary ‘Russian nationalism’ is a variegated phenomenon with numerous emphases and possible definitions”. Understanding this complexity requires recognising the historical and institutional roots of Russia’s unfinished nation-building process (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019, 16). One enduring consequence of this is the persistent ideological divide between “empire savers” (inclusive imperial nationalism) and “nation builders” (exclusive ethnic nationalism) (Szporluk Reference Szporluk1989, 17). Even today, the Kremlin exhibits ambivalence between a state-centeredFootnote 1/civic and an ethno-cultural conception of the Russian nation (Kolstø and Blakkisrud Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 8).
To further complicate matters, Russian nationalism does not align neatly with traditional ideological categories. Rather, it permeates the entire political spectrum. As Kolstø and Blakkisrud (Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 5) explain, “it is not monopolised by any particular ideological persuasion, but can be found in various constellations ranging from national democrats to anarchists, from parties inside the State Duma to fringe groups that engage in nationalistically motivated terrorism”. In the current political landscape, the principal dividing lines among Russian nationalists concern their stance on the Kremlin regime and on the war on Ukraine (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019, 181; Kolstø Reference Kolstø2016; Kolstø and Blakkisrud Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 5). This article concentrates on a distinct subset of these actors: pro-war, anti-Putin nationalists with ideological roots in the Orthodox-monarchist tradition of the Black Hundreds.
The Black Hundreds movement was the first conservative mass movement in Russian history, active between 1905 and 1917, being staunch supporters of the monarchy. Their ideology combined Orthodox-monarchist devotion with virulent anti-Semitism. Positioned on the far-rightFootnote 2 end of the political spectrum, they allied with monarchists and advocates of a unified multinational Russia. These factions later formed the backbone of the White (anti-communist) movement, alongside more moderate republican liberals and social democrats. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, millions of members of the White movement – including Black Hundreds activists – fled abroad, preserving a right-wing political tradition that eventually evolved into a new strand of Russian nationalism defined by its rejection of Western liberal democracy (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019).
The ideological imprint of the Black Hundreds re-emerged during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period. One key vehicle for this revival was the Pamiat [Memory] society, which was active from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Pamiat was characterised by intense Orthodox religiosity and a desire to restore tsarist autocracy. It consciously sought to replicate the ideological content and stylistic features of the original Black Hundreds. Functioning as the central organisational framework for Russian nationalists at the time, Pamiat placed particular emphasis on antisemitic conspiracy theories (Gregor Reference Gregor1998, 2). This Orthodox-monarchist and far-right nationalist tradition remains a powerful influence on contemporary movements such as the Club of Angry Patriots, whose grassroots emergence underscores the need to differentiate between state-level and grassroots nationalist projects – an important distinction in conceptualising Russian nationalism (Pain Reference Pain, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 23). The following section explores how this ideological lineage relates to patriotism and mobilises its support base.
Conceptualisation of patriotic forces in Russia’s politics
Kruglova (Reference Kruglova2023) characterises Strelkov’s Club of Angry Patriots as “so-called ultrapatriots – a loose conglomerate of extreme right-wingFootnote 3, nationalist, and imperial groups that insist on conducting a more active and aggressive military campaign in Ukraine, including the possible use of nuclear weapons.” This depiction invites further examination of the discursive meaning of “patriotic” within the broader framework of Russian nationalism and its historical underpinnings. Notably, the concept of patriotism has been fiercely contested in post-Soviet Russia, as illustrated by the opposing narratives of participants in the 2014 Peace March against the intervention in Ukraine and their pro-state adversaries (Nikolayenko Reference Nikolayenko2019). A similar dispute played out in the widely publicised July 20, 2017 debate between Strelkov and Alexei Navalny, in which each claimed to represent the true embodiment of Russian nationalism and patriotism (NavalnyLive 2017).
While patriotism can be defined as a sense of “civil duty” (Kolstø and Blakkisrud Reference Kolstø and Blakkisrud2017, 719), this article adopts a more specific interpretation: patriotism as a manifestation of extreme Russian nationalism. In this view, the patriot is someone who espouses a more rigid, ideological, and doctrinally defined variant of nationalism than the mainstream centrist nationalists in Russian politics (Shenfield Reference Shenfield2001, 49, 65). Importantly, as the Putin regime’s version of nationalism has grown more extreme (Belova-Dalton Reference Belova-Dalton2023), so too has the patriotic opposition, whose adherents may now be more accurately described as ultranationalists – or, as in the case of KRP members, ultrapatriots.
Core to the patriotic movement is the conviction that Russia is destined to follow a unique historical path. Moreover, these actors often reject the Russian Federation as the legitimate culmination of Russian statehood. This position is evident in discourse within the KRP’s Telegram channel, where one post asserts: “we do not have an Empire; instead, we have RFiya.” Footnote 4 Such rhetoric reflects a broader rejection of the post-Soviet status quo and a longing for imperial restoration. Members of the patriotic movement frequently attribute Russia’s domestic challenges to geopolitical or ethnic conspiracies, often drawing upon antisemitic tropes, including references to alleged Jewish or Judeo-Masonic plots. Ideologically, extreme nationalism in Russia tends to crystallise around two dominant strands: Orthodox monarchism rooted in the Black Hundreds tradition and fascism (Shenfield Reference Shenfield2001, 50).
In the 1970s, nationalist journals such as Nash sovremennik and Molodaia gvardia began articulating the vision of a “Red-Brown” patriotic coalition – uniting anti-Soviet nationalists and former communists – later materialising as right-wing opposition to Boris Yeltsin’s government, exemplified by the National Salvation Front. During the 1990s, while the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) served as a vehicle for nationalists and patriots within the political system, most national-patriotic groups remained anti-systemic and vocally critical of pro-presidential forces (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019). This historical tradition – to unite disparate elements of the ideological spectrum under the banner of patriotism – remains the source of mobilisation potential of the Russian patriotic opposition today.
A compelling example is the KRP itself, which included members from the centre-left party A Just Russia – For Truth, such as Georgy Fyodorov, head of the information agency Avrora. The latter is a far-left patriotic media outlet, whose Telegram channel has over 30,000 subscribers and garners up to 5,000 views per episode. This cross-ideological alliance demonstrates the continuing appeal of patriotic discourse as a unifying force in oppositional politics. The following section investigates the mobilisation opportunities available to extreme Russian nationalist movements under the conditions of Putin’s authoritarian regime.
Interaction between extreme Russian nationalism and Putin’s regime
Putin and the political elites governing Russia are generally perceived as pragmatic and non-ideological in their orientation and conduct (Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019, 4; Kolstø Reference Kolstø2016, 704). However, since 2013, the regime has faced a steady decline in its earlier performance-based legitimacy, largely due to various economic factors. As Morozov (Reference Morozov, Tüür and Morozov2014, 25) observed at the time, “being perceived as inefficient is perhaps the single most important threat Putin’s regime now faces.” In response, the Kremlin has increasingly relied on charismatic leadership and ideological mobilisation to justify its authority. By 2015, the influence of the Russian extreme right and lunatic fringe had expanded considerably (Laqueur Reference Laqueur2015, 250), while Putin’s administration was veering further into the terrain of authoritarian nationalism. This trend was sharply intensified by the annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.
According to Kolstø (Reference Kolstø2016, 717), the annexation of Crimea initially garnered enthusiastic support from nationalists; however, the Kremlin’s subsequent failure to provide robust backing for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine resulted in a significant backlash. Putin was accused of betrayal by many within the nationalist camp. Today, anti-Putin nationalists can broadly be divided into two camps: pro-Ukraine (primarily the ethnic-nationalist opposition) and anti-Ukraine but pro-war (predominantly Orthodox-monarchists). The latter criticise the regime from an ultra-radical perspective, characterising it as excessively liberal and insufficiently committed to advancing Russian interests in Ukraine through more aggressive policies. For instance, Savelyev, a leading member of the Russian National FrontFootnote 5, expressed disillusionment with how the Kremlin was perceived abroad, stating: “Putin is certainly not an opponent of American expansion, but rather its humble servant. He is not the person to renew Russia’s greatness but rather someone who conducts the genocide of the Russian majority and destroys state and legal institutions. Unfortunately, the anti-American ‘right-wing’ forces in Europe seek to idolise Putin, and by doing so support the worst enemy of the Russian people” (quoted in Holzer, Laryš, and Mareš Reference Holzer, Laryš and Mareš2019, 189).
Kolstø and Blakkisrud (Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 8) observe that the Russian state at times permits independent nationalist groups limited operational space, particularly when it does not itself depend on nationalist discourse to legitimise its actions. For example, in the second half of the 1990s, the Russian state securitised migration, framing migrants as a security threat associated with criminality and terrorism (Grigoreva Reference Grigoreva2025). This securitisation contributed to rising xenophobic and nationalist sentiments, fuelling the growth of skinhead movements in the 2000s, when Russia became the world’s leading country in terms of the number of skinheads (around 50,000), many of whom developed close ties with political parties (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2007). Varga (Reference Varga2019) documents the wave of far-right violence in Russia during the 2000s. Between 2004 and 2006, government actions facilitated an increase in far-right militancy by providing political opportunities that organisations such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and the National-Imperial Party of Russia used to coordinate further activities, escalate inter-ethnic clashes, recruit new members, and gain visibility (Varga Reference Varga2008). Notably, former Ku Klux Klan member David Duke participated in a conference organised by the National-Imperial Party of Russia in 2006 (Varga Reference Varga2008, 568). Between 2008 and 2010, the policy of “managed nationalism” enabled radical actors such as the Neo-Nazi group Russkii obraz to grow in prominence and serve as counterweights to liberal or anti-authoritarian opposition (Horvath Reference Horvath2021). However, the regime later curtailed this policy. During moments of national crisis or when official nationalism becomes more central to state discourse, the government tends to eliminate competing nationalist factions altogether (Kolstø and Blakkisrud Reference Kolstø, Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2018, 8) and seeks to foster international far-right cooperation (for example, by providing financial support to Marine Le Pen, leader of the French far-right National Front, for the 2015 regional elections) (Shekhovtsov Reference Shekhovtsov2019).
As a result, since 2014, grassroots radical nationalist groups in Russia have been increasingly marginalised within the domestic political arena. In contrast, over the past fifteen years, right-wing anti-Putin extremists have become central actors within the global transnational right-wing extremist milieu (Trubac Reference Trubac2023). Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, followed by the full-scale war in 2022, significantly expanded the operational scope and international influence of these actors. This divergence between their domestic marginalisation and international prominence is also evident in the case of the KRP. Before examining this movement in detail, the following section explores previous patriotic movements founded by Igor Strelkov, which both organisationally and ideologically laid the groundwork for the emergence of the KRP.
Igor Strelkov and his patriotic movements
“Igor Ivanovich Strelkov” is Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin’s alias he adopted during his work as an FSB officer. Girkin is commonly referred to as Strelkov, and this article follows this trend. Strelkov contributed as a commander to the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Notably, he further claimed that the annexation was not voluntary, contradicting state propaganda (Gordon Reference Gordon2020). Strelkov then organised pro-Russian militias in seizing control of parts of eastern Ukraine from Kyiv, beginning with the overtaking of Slavyansk. Investigations manifest that Strelkov was recruited, financed, and overseen by Russian nationalist oligarch and an early ideologue and organiser of Crimea’s annexation Konstantin Malofeev. Although Malofeev’s activities were formally presented as private initiatives, intercepted phone calls and hacked emails indicate that he closely coordinated with the Kremlin (Grozev Reference Grozev2017). Strelkov functioned as the military commander of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic from May 12 to August 12, 2014, until his dismissal after the downing of the MH17 airplane by Russia-backed militias. He is referred to as “the most famous separatist warlord from the 2014 Donbas War” (Fediunin Reference Fediunin2022). In an interview, Strelkov was called “a man of legend to many.”Footnote 6
After dismissal from Donbas, Strelkov began criticising the Russian government for its military conduct in Ukraine. For instance, during an interview with the Red-Brown newspaper Zavtra on November 21, 2014, Strelkov criticised the Russian government for its inability to shield pro-Russian separatists from Ukrainian artillery fire and voiced discontent with inadequate material assistance. In 2014, Strelkov created a social movement called Novorossiya, which was meant to be a rallying call for solidarity and constructive work for the benefit of Russia, including helping separatists in eastern Ukraine (Social Movement Novorossiya of Igor Strelkov, n.d.). The movement’s ultimate goal was to establish a centralised Orthodox Christian union encompassing Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. The movement faced sanctions from the U.S. in December 2014 and the EU in September 2020 (Trubac Reference Trubac2024b). In early 2016, Strelkov, together with other imperialist ultranationalists such as Eduard Limonov and Maksim Kalashnikov, created the January 25th Committee (K25), which further developed into the All-Russian National Movement (RNM).
K25 was organisationally innovative, as it was initially intended to be a platform for discussion and information exchange for activists with anti-liberal and nationalist orientations (including national-democrats and Stalinist nationalists) (SOVA n.d.). Members of K25 were united in the belief that Russia was sliding into a systemic collapse (like Ukraine at the dawn of Maidan) and needed “the third force” to safeguard Russia against both pro-Western liberals and the ruling party, the United Russia, as well as to keep the country from disintegration when a systemic crisis occurs. K25 sought to unite Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, establish Russians as the state-forming ethnicity in Russia, and build a just, sovereign, and developed state of the Russian people (ibid.). K25 swiftly evolved from a discussion platform into a structured organisation governed by regulations, merging with Novorossiya and forming the RNM. The RNM promoted Strelkov as a national leader, but it did not seek to overthrow the regime, although Strelkov officially denounced the Russian president as weak and his policy as influenced by the West (Trubac Reference Trubac2024b). However, Strelkov was unsuccessful in transforming this force into a comprehensive political initiative – it held almost no public activities and had no comprehensive agenda – and since 2018, the RNM has remained inactive in public engagement (SOVA n.d.).
As full-scale aggression against Ukraine began in 2022, anti-Ukraine nationalists jumped to support the cause, and many of them went to the frontlines, including Strelkov. However, following Russian military failures, their criticism of the government escalated. In December 2022, in a 90-minute video on his Telegram channelFootnote 7, Strelkov condemned Russian military leadership, claiming that the “fish’s head is completely rotten” (Beecher Reference Beecher2022). Earlier, in September 2022, on his Telegram channel, Strelkov called for Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu “to be executed by a firing squad.” (Trubac Reference Trubac2024b). Strelkov’s criticism of Putin as a cowardly mediocrity and Russia’s inefficient management of the invasion on his Telegram channel brought him the greatest popularity among fellow nationalists (ibid.). This criticism formed the basis of Strelkov’s next movement – the Club of Angry Patriots.
Club of Angry Patriots
On April 1, 2023, Strelkov and other imperialist ultranationalists created the Club of Angry Patriots (KRP). Similarly to K25 and in line with the tradition of Black Hundreds, the KRP was created as an online discussion platform aiming to connect ultranationalists. Among the participants, there were various ultranationalists such as Pavel Gubarev (a soldier and “people’s governor” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in 2014), Vladimir Grubnik (soldier in the DPR and organiser of a biggest volunteer fund in support of this “republic”), and Maxim Kalashnikov (writer and activist praising Stalin and advocating for the annexation of Ukraine, parts of Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia). KRP co-founders included Mikhail Aksel, head of Other Russia of E. V. Limonov. Notably, in both 2014 and 2022, Other Russia formed a paramilitary unit called Interbrigades to fight in Ukraine. Associated with the KRP is also Black Hundred. This is a publisher which runs “Listva” bookstoresFootnote 8 in Moscow and St Petersburg and is selling books of Russian imperialist nationalist content. At the same time, Black Hundred is a movement in support of Russian troops in Ukraine. Contemplating cooperation with the Club and otherwise supporting Strelkov on its Telegram channelFootnote 9 has been the Russian Imperial MovementFootnote 10 (with its Imperial Legion fighting in Ukraine during both invasions, in 2014 and 2022).
Although expressing anti-regime stance, the KRP did not aim at deposing the reigning government. Strelkov harshly criticised Yevgeny Prigozhin for the implementation of violent methods against the government on 23–24 June 2023 (referred as the Wagner Group mutiny). Nevertheless, the KRP aimed at pursuing political power, as in a quote from their Telegram channel: “we declare our right to participate in an open, fair, and competitive political struggle and our intention to claim political power”.Footnote 11
Ultimately, the Russian state came to consider ultrapatriots a threat, especially in the case of joining efforts and proposing a presidential candidate for the 2024 elections. Strelkov attempted a presidential campaign from the pre-trial detention facilities. He obtained the necessary number of voter signatures as a result of campaigning on Telegram and other online platforms, but his candidacy was rejected because of his status as a detainee. Authorities feared that the ultrapatriots might react violently if their candidate were to lose, potentially triggering a Maidan-style uprising and the overthrow of Putin’s regime – particularly if supported by elements within the military and security leadership (Kruglova Reference Kruglova2023). Nevertheless, the Club has not staged any protests, and the ones that did occur against Strelkov’s arrest on 21 July 2023, and on the occasion of his sentencing on 25 January 2024 on charges of inciting extremism, were neither sizeable nor violent. The actions of ultrapatriots mostly concentrated on online agitation. Currently, the Club focuses on collecting donations to support pro-Russian volunteer units in Ukraine. Nevertheless, on 28 December 2023, Strelkov made a Telegram post stating that all actions by ultrapatriots were contributing to the creation of a capable cell of a civil society of patriots that may become necessary in the future.
According to Van Bladel (Reference Van Bladel2023, 10), Putin has silenced ultrapatriotic critics (as a consequence of Prigozhin’s rebellion) and they are of no serious threat to the Kremlin. Still, although the KRP was quickly paralysed after Strelkov’s arrest, its ideology continued to spread through the Strelkov Support Movement and other affiliated actors. In addition, even though the KRP’s discourse on Ukraine did not differ significantly from that of the government, it was nevertheless subversive as the Club, for instance, did not motivate their supporters to join the fight in Ukraine; rather, supporters were urged to prepare to fight in the potential domestic crisis.
Methodology
Ideology is usually defined both by beliefs as well as behaviour and practices, since ideas, although abstract, are also embedded in social relationships, digital networks, values, aesthetics, and subcultural capital (Holbrook and Horgan Reference Holbrook and Horgan2019; Knott and Lee Reference Knott and Lee2020). This is why this article focuses on the Telegram channel of the patriotic movement – its analysis (from the creation on April 15, 2023, until June 4, 2024, when the channel became focused solely on the donations to the Russian army in Ukraine) helps to trace the inner workings of the KRP, its (fluid) key tendencies, and framing patterns.
This study of 237 KRP TG posts implements the framingFootnote 12 analysis approach developed by Benford and Snow (Benford and Snow Reference Snow, Benford, Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow1988; Snow and Benford 2000), which has been proven analytically fruitful in examining mobilisation and participation in social movements (Lindekilde Reference Lindekilde and della Porta2014, 198). Benford and Snow (Reference Snow, Benford, Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow1988) consider social movement actors as signifying agents who actively interpret grievances and specify goals. To mobilise consensus and action on a specific issue, social movement actors fulfil three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing (identification of a problem, with consequent attribution of blame or causality), prognostic framing (proposing of a solution to the identified problem, along with strategies, tactics, and objectives), and motivational framing (identification of motives for action) (ibid.). This approach helps to reach the aim of this article, namely, to explain how, through framing strategies, the KRP established itself as an influential civil society movement in opposition to the regime in times of escalating repressions.
In addition, Benford and Snow (Reference Benford and Snow2000, 624–625) describe four frame alignment strategies used to increase frame resonance: frame bridging (linking of two or several ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames concerning a specific issue), frame amplification (invigoration of one interpretive frame over others), frame extension (broadening the boundaries of the proffered frame to include views, interests, and sentiments of targeted groups), and frame transformation (needed when proposed frames lose resonance). Resonance occurs when frames effectively “speak to” people’s current perceptions and circumstances, prompting them to be receptive to the content of the message (Lindekilde Reference Lindekilde and della Porta2014, 208).
Benford and Snow (Reference Benford and Snow2000, 619–622) also identify the degree of resonance of a frame based on its credibility and relative salience. Credibility includes frame consistency (conformity between the SMO’s beliefs, claims, and actions), empirical credibility (conformity between frames and real-world events, believable to potential or actual targets of mobilisation), and credibility of the frame articulators or claimsmakers. The status of the latter and/or their perceived expertise in the eyes of supporters increases the resonance of frames and claims. As for salience, it includes three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (ibid.). However, since salience entails an analysis of how close framings are to the everyday and cultural experiences of the target audience, these will not be examined here but elaborated on in further research of Telegram channels run by Strelkov’s supporters, such as the Reserve regiment. Strelkov’s fellows Footnote 13, Spiritual Shield (all-Russian community) Footnote 14, etc. For the present research, coding was performed in an Excel file, and the coding process was both deductive (e.g., searching for diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames) and inductive (examination of frame alignment and credibility).
The framing approach has been effectively applied by McGlynn (Reference McGlynn2020), who demonstrated how the Russian government – and its supportive media – during Putin’s third term employed historical framing to link history with grassroots, everyday patriotism. In this context, history was rendered an everyday concern and patriotism became a matter of interpreting current events through the lens of past triumphs and traumas. The “correct” reading of history was conflated with support for government policy and, consequently, with the “correct” form of patriotism (McGlynn Reference McGlynn2020, 1080). McGlynn also analysed how the state curated everyday patriotic practices (e.g., producing T-shirts featuring missiles) and co-opted otherwise apolitical activities, politicising them as patriotic responses to policies and events (e.g., decisions about food consumption or holiday destinations). In contrast, this article focuses on grassroots patriotism – specifically, how the KRP mobilised individuals via its Telegram channel to express opposition to the Putin regime through everyday acts of resistance in an environment where dissent is increasingly suppressed.
Frame analysis of the KRP Telegram channel
On April 17, 2023, the KRP TG channel posted the KRP’s manifesto, which was viewed 785 thousand times. On May 27, 2023, a little over a month after its creation, the KRP TG channel boasted over 20 thousand subscribers and had 77 similar TG channels. By 16 July 2023, KRP branches were created in Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Kuban, Voronezh, Belgorod, Volgograd, and Sevastopol. On 25 June 2023, over 400 supporters from 30 Russia’s regions came to the KRP conference “Victory Veche”. The KRP TG channel also actively promoted its merchandising products and, on 4 May 2023, approved its emblem (see Figure 1).
KRP Emblem.
According to the KRP, emblem features a sword since the KRP was created by Russian citizens during wartime. The laurel wreath symbolises triumph, reflecting the main goal of all Russian patriots: the victory of their Motherland in the war.
Note: Igor Ivanovich Strelkov’s TG Channel (t.me/strelkovii), 4 May 2023.
The ideology of the club includes both ethnic and imperial nationalism, as KRP’s activities were “guided by two fundamental principles: the national interests of the Russian people and other indigenous peoples of Russia, as well as the interests of the Russian world within its historical boundaries”Footnote 15. A strong Russia is framed as a nation-state, with imperial nationalism notably framed to enhance the target group’s sense of belonging, e.g., “Everything will be Russia, my dears!”Footnote 16, “We are one. We are one people. No one can defeat us”Footnote 17, “ancestral Russian lands”Footnote 18, etc. Orthodox-monarchism of the KRP was expressed in the framing of Russia’s aggression as the “Holy war”: “The supreme meaning of this Holy War of Purification is for our people to purify themselves from false values and ruinous delusions, to unite in defence of their Faith and Motherland “as one man”, and only then, with the Grace of God, will victory be granted to us.”Footnote 19
Although envisioned and created as a coalition, the KRP was nevertheless imbued with a leader-cult (e.g., “the patriotic movement is fragmented and vulnerable to political repression as it tries time after time to rally around a prominent figure or organisation”Footnote 20). This eventually produced deep divisions between the Club’s members (for instance, Gubarev blamed Strelkov for using the Club for his presidential ambitions) and, after Strelkov’s arrest, paralysed the Club’s activity. Disagreements between Gubarev and Strelkov began from the outset of the KRP creation. The former saw the Club as a potential revolutionary force, arguing that only a revolution – from above or below – can bring meaningful change to Russia.Footnote 21 In contrast, the latter strongly rejected this view, calling Gubarev’s statement a personal opinion that does not reflect the KRP’s official stance. Strelkov dismissed the idea of a “revolution from below” as illusory, asserting that real change in Russia historically comes from elite-level coups, not grassroots uprisings. He emphasised that the KRP neither has the means nor the intention to prepare or lead any kind of revolution.Footnote 22 Gubarev did not respond to this criticism, and the topic of revolution was never again raised in the KRP TG channel.
In addition, from its inception, the KRP stressed in its manifesto that members need to overcome the clashes between the Reds and the Whites: “We understand that now is not the time to continue the Red–White confrontation of a century ago”.Footnote 23 Also Georgy Fyodorov stressed that “the left-wing and right-wing patriots must reach a consensus in their assessment of the situation and begin to cooperate. Naturally, this cooperation should be reasonable and pragmatic”.Footnote 24 The cooperation between Club members appeared indeed pragmatic and reasonable (for instance, Gubarev came to protest Strelkov’s arrest and was also detained), and they were highly united in their framing strategies.
Diagnosis: Russian political elite is grossly incompetent
The problem is framed as the fact that the Russian government is grossly incompetent at all levels and completely detached from realities on the ground (“serious war” is being conducted “ineptly”, “in a mediocre manner”, while “Russia’s military and political leadership does not realise the severity of the situation”Footnote 25). Causality is framed so that a war of attrition instead of victory occurred due to “botched organisation at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.”Footnote 26 Blame is framed as Russia’s government’s failure to conduct military and industrial mobilisation on the required scale, while appointing grossly incompetent military leaders who “are not worthy of wearing even the epaulettes of sergeants by virtue of their abilities.”Footnote 27 Repressions against patriots are also framed as the ineptitude of the government, based on the principle “beat your people so that others are afraid.”Footnote 28
Russian government and business elites are framed as loyal to the West (due to having their funds there), hostile towards Russian national interests, and ready for collusion leading to domestic crisis: “they are ready for sabotage, as well as for direct collusion with the enemy and, consequently, betrayal. We do not rule out their preparation of a pro-Western coup d’état, capitulation and, consequently, dismemberment of Russia”Footnote 29. The Russian government is framed as constantly seeking compromise with the enemy (including Minsk (2014) and Istanbul (2022) agreements), which indicates their “indecision, weakness and ineptitude”Footnote 30and also leads to military losses: “Understand, Russian people, if the conflict is frozen for another 5–10 years, we will not be able to win anymore.”Footnote 31 Military losses are framed as escalating the risk of domestic crisis in Russia. On the one hand, due to their loyalty to the West, Russian political elites may eliminate Putin and incur a power crisis or Smuta (the Time of TroublesFootnote 32) in the country. On the other hand, due to its weakness and incompetence, the reigning government is seen as inevitably destined to collapse amid the unfolding domestic crisis (framed as the Smuta), thereby necessitating a political force capable of managing the situation competently.
The government is firmly portrayed as responsible for the situation on the frontline, as well as for broader domestic issues such as corruption, social injustice, pension reform, etc. In fact, the “incompetent government” frame targets the biggest fear of the Russian government, as identified by Morozov (Reference Morozov, Tüür and Morozov2014) – the fear of being perceived as inefficient.
Prognosis: “We are the third force”
The KRP frames solution to the problem of the government’s incompetency in the following way: competent and experienced angry patriots and Russian civil society overtake the functions of the inept government, keep Russia from crisis, and trigger the transformation of Russia’s current political and economic system to serve Russian national interests and create social justice. For this, the KRP frame the following strategies: achieving of consensus and cooperation between right-wing and left-wing patriots and overall termination of the century-long struggle between the Reds and the Whites (“Russian civil society demands that we stop slinging mud at each other”Footnote 33); promoting of competent fighters and commanders and giving rise to innovative ideas; resisting peace negotiations (framed as treason) at all costs and seek the reunion of the “the triune Russian people divided by political storms of XX century”Footnote 34; nipping the unfolding crisis in the bud by rapidly creating “a force of real patriots”, consisting of the “demoralised siloviki, army men, Red and White statists, captains of industry and agro-industry, volunteers, and veterans of the current battles.”Footnote 35
Tactically, the following measures are framed: assuming of many functions of the Russian government by civil society and angry patriots as its part. Primarily, these functions include the supply, training, and re-equipment of the fighting units of the Russian army via the Volunteer Committee of the KRP. The KRP frame themselves as competent (in contrast to the Russian government): “We have experience in solving other problems as well.”Footnote 36 In addition, the framed tactics include building up an “informational, social, and economic environment”Footnote 37 to make the KRP’s idea “really popular among the masses”Footnote 38, and, through the political will of these masses, transforming Russia’s current hostile political system. Notably, the strictly legal nature of all activities is emphasized.
Motivation: If you love Russia, stop the new 1991
Having constructed consensus through diagnosis and prognosis, the KRP motivates its supporters, framing motives like “love for Russia”, wish for its victory in the war, and desire to prevent Russia’s dismemberment. The latter is seen as an inevitable consequence of the defeat and subsequent domestic crisis: “either Russia wins, frees itself from corruption, oligarchs, the [pro-Western] fifth column and begins to revive as a strong and just modern state, or we lose and Russian civilisation comes to an end”.Footnote 39 Demoralised army and special services officers are framed as having failed to prevent the country’s dismemberment in 1991, so the rationale for action is preventing of the new 1991: “Only by keeping the country from a new 1991 can we lead it on and choose the future.”Footnote 40
Supporters of the Club are mobilised for various activities – from enrolling and participation in the Club’s events (e.g., trainings on tactical medicine) to the dissemination of its ideas: “If you support the KRP Manifesto, love our Fatherland and wish it victory in the war, you are already our supporter. You can and must openly talk about it, spread our ideas, talk about our plans and use the KRP symbols without any instructions from the centre”Footnote 41; “to show your support for the Club of Angry Patriots, embed the hashtag #KRP in your social media user names and use it in your posts and comments”Footnote 42; “freely use the KRP symbols to create branded products (T-shirts, caps, cups, etc.) and wear them”Footnote 43, etc.
Frame bridging
Referring to the situation in Russia as the unfolding new Smuta, the new Russian Revolution of 1917 and civil war as well as the new 1991 (disintegration of the Soviet Union), the KRP is drawing parallels between structurally incongruent huge political crises from different periods of Russia’s history that resonate with the Russian people. Thus, the KRP seeks the highest resonance for its diagnostic frames: “At the same time, the people whose assets, capital, and political loyalty are in the West remain in power and big business in Russia. They continue sabotage and express readiness for direct collusion with the enemy at the expense of the next collapse of Russia according to the scenario of February 1917 or December 1991”.Footnote 44 In contrast, another frame bridging occurs when Russia’s war on Ukraine is framed as the new Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, as it is claimed that Russia is being attacked by 52 countries. The Great Patriotic War functions as a singular unifying symbol for Russian society and is associated with genuine patriotism, which, in turn, is framed as being embodied by the KRP: “Club of Angry Patriots represents the interests of patriotic Russian society, born in the crucible of a new Patriotic War”.Footnote 45 In this way, the KRP frame themselves as true patriots and as representatives of what they frame as patriotic Russian society – people who love their Fatherland and seek to defend it in the crisis, while framing the government as national traitors.
Frame extension
“Patriot” / “Angry patriot” and, therefore, a KRP supporter, is framed so as to encompass the views and sentiments of as many potential adherents as possible:
Virtually the only criteria for cooperation are unconditional patriotism and proven personal integrity. An honest person, not indifferent to the fate of our country and our peoples (primarily the Russian people, but also all Russia’s residents), concerned about the current situation and understanding where it may lead us in the near future, ready to actively oppose the Smuta, as well as (if it happens) to actively act in the national interest, shoulder to shoulder with similar comrades – this is our ready-comrade-in-arms.Footnote 46
In addition, all those who openly claim to support the KRP are framed as angry patriots:
Just wearing our badge openly and telling other people – “I am a supporter of the KRP” – is already a thing. When a chief / chekist / police officer approaches him and […] asks: “So what? Are you an ‘angry patriot’, too?” - he will answer directly and calmly: “Yes! I am an angry patriot! I stand for Russia’s victory in the war, for its transformation from a damn thing into Russia again. I am for our people and social justice, I am for honest people in power, for equal opportunities for all citizens, not just for someone’s sons and mistresses”. And it will already be THAT DEED, which we hope to obtain from each of our future associates.Footnote 47
The KRP is framed as a volunteer fire brigade that is created to extinguish a specific fire, so it is stressed that the Club has members of all sorts: representatives of the “Party of Business”, “Just Russia”, National Bolsheviks, other registered and unregistered parties as well as monarchists, conservatives, socialists, communists, people of different nationalities and religious beliefs (or holding no such beliefs). Therefore, cooperation for the common goal to save the Motherland is highly emphasized.
Frame transformation
After Strelkov’s arrest, core framing tasks were refocused to create consensus and mobilise the target audience in his support. Diagnostic frames still attributed blame to the Russian government for its ineptitude, but this was more specifically concerning Strelkov, e.g., “Russian Spring is under arrest”Footnote 48. Prognostic frames focused on the urgent support for Strelkov (and also Gubarev who was taken into custody on the day of Strelkov’s arrest): “At this point, it is important not to let the campaign fade into the background of the news. We therefore call for a massive and safe expression of support for Strelkov.”Footnote 49 To motivate supporters, Strelkov and patriots are framed as the equivalent of victory for which it is necessary to fight against the Russian government: “The Russian Federation has taken a path to fight against victory. Only you can stop it.”Footnote 50 In addition, all patriots are framed as targeted by such repressions: “If we do not defend him, any Russian patriot could be next.”Footnote 51 Russian people’s presumed empathy is appealed to for mobilisation: “Russian people, we must help!”Footnote 52 In the light of this, the “Club” was reframed into a “coalition”, aiming to mobilise the “entire patriotic civil society”, concluding that “the times of discussion clubs are gone”Footnote 53.
Empirical credibility
Notably, in their framing of Russia’s government as inept and Russia’s internal situation as heading into a political crisis, the KRP predicted Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, which took place on June 24, 2023. Otherwise, the empirical credibility of the KRP’s framing is conditioned upon its direct communication with Russia’s army units in Ukraine. As Strelkov’s wife wrote in a letter addressed to Putin and asking for Strelkov’s release, “My husband’s blog was an invaluable source of grassroots information from ordinary (and not only) frontline soldiers. It was read not only by ordinary citizens, but also by middle and high-ranking commanders, state security officers, and even your administration”Footnote 54. Strelkov also framed propaganda on federal TV channels as gung-ho and harmful, essentially working for the enemy, lulling Russian citizens instead of forming their defence consciousness.Footnote 55
Credibility of the claimsmakers
All KRP major members are framed as experienced combat officers in contrast to “cubicle” and “bunker” political elite. The latter are framed as those who discredit the Russian army, as opposed to patriots, who are framed as war heroes. For instance, colonels Strelkov and Kvachkov are framed as recipients of the Order of Courage, Strelkov and Gubarev are framed as the two legends of the Russian Spring, while Strelkov is framed as the banner of Russian irredentism, willpower and personal integrity, creator of the Young Russian Donbas, etc.: “Strelkov is proof that human will and personality still mean something in the modern world. That a group of 52 fighters can create a new state, turn the course of history, and redraw the world map. That heroic deeds are glorious, that fervent faith will bear fruit one day, and that David will definitely defeat Goliath. These are the traditional values of the world that Russia seems to be defending today.”Footnote 56
Framing of political opportunities
The KRP frame themselves as a “third force”, “a point of gravity, an alternative centre of power”Footnote 57, as opposed to the Russian government framed as “the rotten state-oligarchic system”Footnote 58 and liberal-left opposition, framed as “equally corrupt and even more treacherous liberal camp.”Footnote 59 The KRP frames the necessity of its existence as a force that will hold the country together during “the destruction of the power vertical [like] in 1917”Footnote 60 by creating something like “Robespierre’s Committee for National Salvation”Footnote 61 and later administer reforms, based on the principles of patriotism, social justice, and national interests. In addition, the KRP sets out to assist “the final destruction of the Ukrainian state” and further mobilisation of Russian society. When asked about the possibility of “the patriotic Maidan”, the KRP member framed “a trigger event”, or “the moment X” of profound changes, which it is important to await, since the government is efficient in detaining activists who may initiate civil unrest but much less efficient in countering events that may trigger civil unrest. Until the “moment X”, however, it is necessary to act within the boundaries of law and order, resisting the “new totalitarianism” in Russia through hybrid methods.Footnote 62
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to analyse the inner dynamics and framing strategies of the Club of Angry Patriots (KRP), the anti-regime and pro-war civil society movement created during Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine by the imperialist nationalist and Orthodox-monarchist Igor (Girkin) Strelkov, headed by the Russian nationalist Pavel Gubarev, and joined by a wide stretch of Russian nationalists from different parts of the political spectrum. Ideologically, Strelkov and other Orthodox-monarchists continue the tradition of Black Hundreds, while the movement itself tapped into the tradition of the Red-Brown coalition of former communists and anti-Soviet nationalists that has been driving nationalist opposition in Russia since the 1960s.
The Club bore substantial similarities to Strelkov’s preceding discussion platform, 25 January Committee (K25), which also positioned itself as the third force beside the United Russia Party and liberal-left opposition. Created as an oppositional organisation and soon growing into a structured organisation, K25 did not aim to depose the reigning government. As for the KRP, despite such plans being voiced by the members, it did not develop into anything bigger in the absence of Strelkov. The Club was active but more influential among the transnational extreme-right than domestically. As for the domestic terrain, despite a more dynamic social media campaign and harsher state repressions, the Club continued the trend that Russian (ultra)nationalist opposition has exhibited for decades – they are exploited by the government and suppressed, if necessary. Nevertheless, the Club’s ideology remains resonant due to effective framing strategies.
The KRP diagnostically framed Putin’s regime as grossly incompetent, loyal to the West, and incurring a deep internal crisis in Russia comparable to the worst political crises in Russia’s history. Incompetence is framed as the government being detached from reality on the ground and constantly seeking compromise with the enemy. Blame for the outrageous situation on the frontline as well as in the country as a whole (corruption, lack of social justice, wrong socioeconomic course) is put on the Russian government. The emphasis on social justice is largely the input of left-wing nationalists in the KRP. Prognostically, the Club framed themselves as a part of civil society, competent to overtake many functions of the incompetent Russian government and nip the unfolding crisis in the bud. In terms of motivational frames, supporters were mobilised by the rationale to prevent the beloved country’s dismemberment resulting from the crisis and, upon Strelkov’s arrest, to resist the inept Russian government’s fight against victory (of which Strelkov was framed as a symbol).
The resonance of framing was increased in several ways. The first is frame extension. Although according to Sakwa (Reference Sakwa2023, 69) “angry patriot” is a term used to refer to pro-war bloggers outraged by Russia’s military performance, the KRP framed everybody with personal integrity and concern for the country as an “angry patriot”. Secondly, resonance of the framing was enhanced by the forceful securitisation of the presupposed crisis, achieved by frame bridging, or drawing parallels between the current domestic situation in Russia and the Time of Troubles, the 1917 Revolution, and the 1991 collapse of the USSR. Thirdly, framing resonance was facilitated by empirical credibility, as KRP members drew their situational awareness directly from the frontlines, and the credibility of the claimsmakers, as KRP members framed themselves as experienced combat officers in opposition to bunker political elite. In a way, the predicted crisis came in the form of Prigozhin’s riot that the KRP was able to foresee, but the KRP rather frames a “moment X” when there will emerge political opportunity for them to act as a Robespierre’s Committee for National Salvation and transform Russia’s political and socio-economic system. Notably, the KRP strictly advocate for law and order and no use of violent measures in Russia.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin took the criticism of military bloggers on Telegram channels seriously, both cracking down on them and integrating them into the official information space (Farbman Reference Farbman2023). Strelkov, in turn, was detained, as his military and political criticism appeared too astute: “he pinpoints many tactical and strategic issues within the Russian army, many of which are valid. Even his critique of Putin, suggesting that the President has lately become more isolated, hesitant, and therefore less decisive, appears accurate.” (Van Bladel Reference Van Bladel2023, 9). This manifests that the KRP’s empirical credibility was remarkable and significantly increased the resonance of their framing strategies. Notably, hitting into the soft spot or the regime’s fear of being perceived as inefficient made the KRP’s framing strategies even more effective and dangerous to the regime.
The Russo-Ukrainian war can be characterised by a mix of defensive and offensive operations, with both sides experiencing significant casualties and destruction (Matiaszczyk Reference Matiaszczyk2024). From the vantage point of 2025, Russian troops continue to wage a slow war of attrition in eastern and northern Ukraine (PBS 2025), thereby largely sustaining the empirical credibility of the frames articulated by Strelkov and other KRP speakers in 2023. Notably, Strelkov has continued to issue analyses and forecasts from prison, which are published on his personal Telegram channel as well as on that of the Russian Strelkov Movement. As of 25 February 2026, Strelkov continues to frame Russia’s ruling elite as grossly incompetent, causing Russia’s inability to subjugate Ukraine, inevitable failure of peace talks, and the likelihood of Russia’s capitulation.Footnote 63 Strelkov reinforces his credibility as a claimsmaker by framing himself as someone with insider knowledge of the system:
I saw this “system” from the inside when it was only beginning to take shape. I understood and intuitively grasped its future stages of development (as they appeared at the time) and its inevitably sad finale. Hence my frequent “unenthusiastic,” yet “sadly self-fulfilling,” forecasts.Footnote 64
Even though, after Strelkov’s arrest, the activities of the Club of Angry Patriots significantly decreased, many of its supporters continued with the Russian Strelkov Movement. Although Strelkov’s presidential candidacy was rejected, the movement remains an important civil society initiative to study as it continues to withstand repression. Although the Soviet patriotic movement, later the Russian National Front, and Strelkov’s organisations, including the KRP, did not achieve political influence in Russia due to state repressions, the importance of further study of pro-war nationalist opposition lies in the fact that these organisations may solidify their ideological influence in Russia due to their effective and resonant framing and the fact that their extremist beliefs stand in contrast to Putin’s pragmatic nationalism, posing a challenge to his leadership in contrast to pro-system extreme nationalist movements exploited, tolerated, and even backed by the state for various ends.
Financial support
This work was carried out under R&D project SSVJS23367 (6.2-7/356) “Limits and opportunities of civic activism in contemporary Russia” (1/06/2023−14/06/2024) funded by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Disclosure
None.
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