Following and furthering the University of Chicago “Fundamentalism” Project, this book sets out to demonstrate how the fraught category of “fundamentalism” can make instructive cross-religious comparison possible. Building upon the family resemblances evinced by a survey of discourses in contemporary Protestant Christianity and Islam, the book aims to replace analyses of the world that invoke a civilizational clash between West and East with an analysis that relies upon the Kulturkampf within single civilizations: religious and secular materialist. In other words, Christian and Islamic “fundamentalisms” are more like each other than they are like their secular or irreligious discursive companions.
The most valuable contribution of the book is indeed the substantial—and sometimes surprising—congruities it reveals between the words of those identifying themselves with two different faiths. It effectively shatters the misconception that either Protestant or Islamic “fundamentalist” discourses are unique or even exceptional species of belief and practice. A succinct comparison with Marxism (Leninism) instructively interrogates the conventional wisdom that “fundamentalism” is a necessarily religious phenomenon. An additional benefit specific to students of the Middle East or Islamic studies is the opportunity to acquaint themselves more thoroughly and thoughtfully with Protestant Christian “fundamentalist” discourses. The biographies of quoted “fundamentalists” afford an unusually personal perspective on Evangelical preachers and draw some intriguing parallels that will call into question the common sentiment that “Islamic fundamentalists” are irreducibly alien and exotic creatures.
The historically minded will find frustration in the book, as it deliberately wrenches from its geographic or social housings the discourses selected. In the opinion of this reviewer this does not invalidate the study, but it does raise questions about its purpose. Clearly the author's intention is not to explain in economic, sociological, psychological, or political terms why people accede to peculiarly “fundamentalist” beliefs. (The first chapter of the book dedicated to “historical background” presents some factual precedents to the contemporary discourses that the body of the text quotes. However, none of this background constitutes a causal explanation for the constellation the author takes to typify “fundamentalism.” Certainly chapter 1 adds little to common knowledge concerning the resurgence of political Islam, relying on commonplace secondary literature.) Rather than a causal explanation or detailed historical analysis, the author contents himself with the identification of doctrinal affinities. (The core chapters of the book concern antisecularism; scripturalism; attitudes to “religion, politics, and the state”; a past golden age; and “the contemporary battle,” the characteristic axes along which “fundamentalists” putatively distinguish themselves.)
Although identifying resemblances and variations between ideas may be an aim worthy in itself, the fact that the book rests with what is essentially an uncritical inventory of short statements scattered across space and time does bear unfavorably upon the fulfillment of that objective. Such a survey by its very nature cannot probe beneath surface similarities and differences. The book sacrifices depth for comparative breadth.
Perhaps this is an inescapable limitation made unavoidable by the comparative enterprise undertaken here. However, an adequate grasp of doctrine and the content of discourse—to say nothing of the more semantically slippery issues of style, tone, and modes of justification and authorization—arguably requires at least an intellectual contextualization of the isolated views stated within, and invariably informed by, traditions and schools of thought—whether those views conform or clash with that context. As it stands, the rationale for considering a given statement or its author “fundamentalist,” and therefore the criterion for its inclusion in the book, is a most vexing methodological issue. It is difficult to rule out the worrying possibility that the category “fundamentalism” as deployed here, rather than helping us to understand the world, serves instead to confirm the predetermined conclusion that “fundamentalism” exists and that it faithfully exhibits those features that it is expected to exhibit. In other words, a methodological case of placing the cart before the horse.
One defense of the fundamentalism category is a nonstarter: although, as the book reports, it is true that Hasan al-Turabi and Rashid al-Ghannushi apply the term uṣuliyyīn to themselves, the Arabic term has little in common with the connotations invoked by the literal translation of the Arabic word as “fundamentalists.”
The author takes pains to indicate the freighted and contentious nature of the term “fundamentalism.” He expresses his own and others' eminently reasonable concern that the word may carry such an emotional and wholly pejorative sense as to be irretrievably lost from the scholarly repertoire. However, in my opinion, the more serious problem is that the meaning of “fundamentalism” is indeterminate. This book and the literature it cites have not shown, in my view, that “fundamentalism” can be anything but a shibboleth, an instrument of exclusion and domination rather than a tool for serious analysis, and that the category of “fundamentalism” is, in short, an excuse for sloppy thinking.
What features does this book attribute to “fundamentalism” and to notional instances of it? Some of the candidate characteristics and counterexamples to them follow.
A genetic account, whereby “alienating crises and dislocations” (p. 6) produce fundamentalists, is a characteristic. As a counterexample, consider the canonical liberal John Locke, responding to the thoroughly alienating, dislocating English wars of religion. Was John Locke a fundamentalist? Another definition cited states that fundamentalists express “common resistance to secular modernity” (p. 8). What about antiglobalization, environmental, and animal-rights activists who object to what they find destructive in modernity? What of believers of all stripes who quietly take umbrage to, and courteously protest, the expressions of disdain for their faith that they encounter when among antireligious company?
Another characterization states that fundamentalists construct a “regime of absolute truth as against modernist concepts of truth as relative and contextual. Fundamentalist discourse is essentialist, aiming at establishing a space of unchanging divinely based and objectively knowable truth” (p. 9). Are the value of human rights, social justice, and democracy relative and contextual? What about the truths of mathematics and basic science? Was Socrates' student Plato with his transcendental metaphysics, and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant with his rationalist scheme of objective imperative duties, fundamentalist?
Fundamentalism is a “religious ideology that claims a divinely revealed inerrant scripture as its ultimate authority, [and] is mainly literalist in its handling of scripture” (p. 15). Further information is needed; suppose individuals view their Bible or Qurءan or their copy of Das Kapital as their ultimate authority, do they often (or ever) refer to that ultimate authority and, when they do, how do they interpret that authority's demands?
“Most observers see scripturalism, radicalism, extremism, exclusivism, and militancy as typical attributes of fundamentalisms” (p. 16). Is everyone holding the belief that the Qurءan is the literal word of God (for practical purposes, all believing Muslims) therefore fundamentalist? As for “radicalism” and “extremism,” these are in the eye of the beholder—my moderate may be your extremist, and your trusted ally my dangerous radical. Moreover, if exclusivism is the measure, are the members of MENSA, elite country clubs, and the G-7 fundamentalists? As to militancy, are governments with aggressive and interventionist foreign policies fundamentalist, no matter what cause they may invoke to justify their actions, including self-defense?
Presumably as a “polythetic” concept, it is some weighing of evidence, some combination or preponderance of characteristics that qualify a person, group, or an idea as “fundamentalist.” However, whether analytical clarity, conceptual convenience, or comparative purchase can ultimately redeem “fundamentalism,” a reader who is not yet converted to the correctness of its cause is unlikely to be won over by this book.
