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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of War is an ambitious, lucid, and stimulating book that describes the political and military response of the U.S. government to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington of 11 September 2001. Its author, Norman Friedman, weaves military analysis cleverly into his narrative of political events, as he has done in earlier books on the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, showing an ability to cut through to essentials that characterizes the best military historians. But the book has some shortcomings.
One of its central themes is that the U.S. defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan demonstrated the growing importance of a new “network-centric” military doctrine, which relies on remote sensors and computer-driven command-and-control systems to deliver smart weapons, precisely and with devastating effect, from a relatively small number of offensive units. Friedman's argument is that networked air strikes, combined with action by coalition partners such as the Northern Alliance on the ground (supported by Western Special Forces), are the way that the United States will fight future wars. He admits that what happened in Afghanistan did not entirely fit that model, because not all the necessary systems were yet available. But overall his argument is convincing, and the technical military issues are presented clearly, without excessive jargon to confound the uninitiated.
The purely military sections form only a relatively short part of the book. Having given an account of the 11 September attacks, Friedman runs through the history of the U.S. response to terrorism back to the early 1980s, criticizing the insufficiently robust policy of the Clinton administration and CIA shortcomings. He accounts for the origins and development of al- Qa

ida, suggesting that Osama bin Laden's main aim is to foster fundamentalist movements in Middle Eastern states, encouraging them and drawing attention to himself through attacks on the United States. He considers the recent history of Afghanistan and how that application of the theory of network-centric warfare developed from experience in earlier conflicts in the Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo. He then describes the coalition building and the preparations for and actual conduct of the war in Afghanistan.
It was perhaps inevitable that there would be some fuzzy patches in the detail of this broad canvas, but a glance at the bibliography suggests that Friedman could have avoided some of them by relying less heavily on journalistic articles and on books of doubtful value. He repeats unsubstantiated reports that “Arab-looking” passengers were seen running away from grounded airliners on 11 September, leaving box cutters on their seats, and that fundamentalist Muslims in New Jersey were told to train telescopes on the Twin Towers because something big was about to happen.
On the central questions, Friedman assembles his evidence and presents his judgments more convincingly, leaving us in little doubt about his overall alignment. His view is that Arafat chose a renewed intifada after the Barak plan because he could not face the prospect of peace, and that until Palestinians and others accept Israel's right to exist, negotiations toward a settlement will be fruitless. He is accordingly skeptical about the arguments for removing what are called the root causes of terrorism, noting deeper motives behind anti–Americanism and the fact that Osama bin Laden's version of it had more initially to do with hostility to U.S. bases on Arabian soil than any other factor. His judgment is that anti–Americanism is fairly intractable. Given that, it is important to deter terrorist aggression by acting firmly against governments that sponsor or harbor terrorists. The true root causes of terrorism may be the long-standing failure of states in the Middle East to deliver representative government or economic prosperity for their people, fueling discontent that emerges in fundamentalism. The United States should therefore do more to encourage political and economic freedom. Whether one fully agrees with these positions, Friedman presents the arguments for them in a balanced and trenchant way.
But Friedman does not consider the argument that, leaving Israel aside, important elements of American problems in the region stem from past errors in U.S. policy. In the period of the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and later, CIA support flowed to Sunni Muslim groups, including the Taliban and al-Qa

ida, via Pakistan. The United States and other Western nations supported Saddam in the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s and betrayed the Shi

is of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. In each case, the U.S. decided on these actions because of an overriding fear of Iran: this fear is central to the story of what went wrong in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran has threatened the United States and attacked U.S. interests, but not on the order of those made by Saddam and al-Qa

ida. And Iran had some legitimate grievances (notably, the shameful USS Vincennes incident). Iran would never have been easy to handle, but U.S. mishandling of Iran since the trauma of the embassy hostage episode has helped create its most serious security threats: al-Qa

ida and Saddam. Friedman does not address the central question of why the United States perceived Iran as more of a threat than the factors that later emerged as the most serious dangers.
Iran is only one example. Friedman's book indicates that the United States also badly misunderstood the nature and limits of Saudi Arabia's friendship, if it can be called that. Might the origin of those failures go so deep that they still cause misunderstandings about the region today? When Friedman tells us that the CIA may not have had anyone capable of speaking Afghan languages—or, indeed, anyone with much understanding of Afghanistan at all—in the autumn of 2001, that appears sadly plausible. The United States has many experts on these regions in its universities and elsewhere, but few of them appear in Friedman's bibliography. It is as if the U.S. military/security sector sees the regional experts as somehow unsound and untouchable—and, perhaps, vice versa. That could allow people on both sides to get away with unrealistic arguments and positions within their respective coteries that would quickly be blown away if they engaged properly with each other, as they should. If so, that situation is one that the United States can ill afford.