Most smokers want to quit, if not today, soon (Babb, Reference Babb2017). Most students I poll think they spend too much time on social media. And I expect most academics think they put off long-term projects more than they ought to. We often miss out on that second marshmallow. But, if the point of comparison is not optimality but instead other species, we are extraordinarily effective at pursuing long-term interest. How do we do this? Ainslie has been refining what is the most complete functional account of this for nearly a half-century. Here, he advances the work by, above all, articulating the symbiotic relationship between the effortful control of attention (“suppression”) and the intra-personal bargaining phenomena necessary for durable resistance of temptation (“resolve”). This advance in the theory should be an invitation to experimental psychologists who can integrate methodologies previously more narrowly directed at suppression.

There is, however, a behaviorist's commitment Ainslie holds that strikes me as unjustified and unnecessary because his essential insights do not depend on it. And I think it may contribute to the neglect of the broader theory by some in behavioral sciences grounded in biology (relative to its embrace by economists and philosophers). According to Ainslie, the present value of any anticipated future reward is its value at the moment it will be experienced, discounted for delay. The present state of the organism should not matter. For example, consider two opioid dependent individuals who both are interested in quitting, and who both have the option of making a phone call for delivery of heroin in 1 hour. One is experiencing intense withdrawal. The other is comfortable, but knows she will be experiencing intense withdrawal in an hour (perhaps because of an unavoidable scheduled injection of the opioid antagonist naloxone). Given Ainslie's approach, the divergent present states (withdrawal vs. comfort) should not impact motivation to make that call – they should be equivalent. An implication of this “present-state independence” assumption is that the shape of the discount function is the only motivational basis for systematic inconsistency. If there were an intervention that could make discounting exponential, problems of self-control would vanish.

It seems likely that present state influences valuation sufficiently to constitute a separate source of self-control challenge. It is helpful to step back and consider inconsistency in the context of living organisms generally. Inconsistency is fundamental to complex life. This is obviously true at the timescale of biological development. Babies are no more mini adults than caterpillars are mini butterflies. The problems babies need to solve are different than those adults need to solve, and their bodies and brains are designed accordingly. At shorter timescales, emotions are also transformations. Heart rate increases when the environment signals threat – presumably trading-off future energy stores for greater immediate capacity. Activities that are enjoyable when secure (e.g., an interesting conversation) lose appeal when one is frightened. Emotions transform the organism to better solve the problems of the present, making them inconsistent over time. And although strong emotions make inconsistency easy to see, the issue is more general. Complex organisms are fluid in countless ways, adaptively shifting internal functioning, and behavioral tendencies from one moment to the next. Inconsistency is fundamental and not limited to special cases of strong emotions. And yet because humans pursue plans and maintain social relationships that require dependability, inconsistency poses a serious challenge.

Of course, Ainslie is well-aware of state changes that impact value, but he holds they do so only to the extent they are anticipated at the time a reward will be realized. If I am not hungry when I am preparing for my hike, but I anticipate I will be when miles into a trail, food holds present-value grounded in my future anticipated state. And so I take the time to pack my lunch. People have foresight, and the present-value of packing food is influenced by its anticipated value later in the day. However, the fact that changes in appetite are anticipated does not imply the process is unfailing or optimal. Indeed in many cases we likely lack the capacities that would be necessary for unbiased good approximations of future state-based value. We regularly make decisions on timescales large enough to rule out reinforcement history as a mechanism for shaping orderly (present-state independent) preference. Indeed, we value rewards at delays so great there is no reliable way to anticipate their value when realized (e.g., saving for retirement that might be decades away). When deciding about contingencies that span years, the mental imagery (whether spontaneous or manipulated) is influential (Hu et al., Reference Hu, Kleinschmidt, Martin, Han, Thelen, Meiberth and Weber2017; Peters & Büchel, Reference Peters and Büchel2010). And imagery of the future suffers corruption from the present (Wilson & Gilbert, Reference Wilson and Gilbert2003). Even when imagining state changes relatively near in time, forecasts can be poor if the predictable state change is significant, leading people to undue confidence that their resolutions will hold (Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, Reference Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin and Black2008).

If state-based inconsistency were extreme and global, it would create inconsistent behavior impervious to Ainslie's resolve. Mr. Hyde does not share enough with Dr. Jekyll to have any bargaining basis for sticking with resolutions Dr. Jekyll made. But people experience themselves as continuous. If state changes are a source of inconsistency (in addition to hyperbolic discounting) the mechanisms Ainslie characterizes would apply with little modification. Suppose, as seems possible, being in a present-state of withdrawal makes even next week's heroin more valued. If so, it does not follow that the increase has made the value greater than the value of abstinence next week. And if it has not, a conceived connection between present choice and the larger category (the individual's interest in cessation) provide the necessary ingredients for Ainslie's resolve.

Relaxing the assumption of present-state independence is a more dramatic departure from Rational Choice Theory than is hyperbolic discounting. Whether doing so provides enough additional explanatory power to justify the added complexity is an empirical question.